John Adams.

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THE

WORKS

OF

Dr. JONATHAN SWIFT,

DEAN of ST. PATRICK'S, DUBLIN.

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POSTHUMOUS SERMONS*.

SERMON I.

On the TRINITY.

1 Epistle general of St. JOHN, v. 7.

For there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one.

THIS day being set apart to acknowledge our belief in the eternal *Trinity*, I thought it might be proper to employ my present discourse entirely upon that subject; and I hope to handle it in such a manner, that the most ignorant among you may return home better in-

* These sermons are curious, and curious for such reasons as would make other works despicable. They were written in a careless hurrying manner; and were the offspring of necessity, not of choice: so that one will see the original force of the Dean's genius more in these compositions, that were the legitimate sons of duty, than in other pieces that were the natural sons of love. They were held in such low esteem in his own thoughts, that, some years before he died, he gave away the whole collection to Dr. Sheridan, with the utmost indifference: "Here," says he, "are a bundle of my old sermons. "You may have them if you please. They may be of use to you, "they have never been of any to me." The parcel given to Dr. Sheridan consisted, as I have heard, of about thirty five sermons. Three or four only are publish'd; and those I have read over with attention. *Orrery*.

formed of your duty in this great point, than probably you are at present.

It must be confessed, that by the weakness and indiscretion of busy (or, at best, of well-meaning) people, as well as by the malice of those who are enemies to all revealed religion, and are not content to possess their own infidelity in silence, without communicating it to the disturbance of mankind; I say, by these means, it must be confessed, that the doctrine of the Trinity hath suffered very much, and made Christianity suffer along with it. For these two things must be granted: First, That men of wicked lives would be very glad there were no truth in Christianity at all; and, secondly, If they can pick out any one single article in the Christian religion which appears not agreeable to their own corrupted reason, or to the arguments of those bad people who follow the trade of seducing others, they presently conclude, that the truth of the whole gospel must sink along with that one article. Which is just as wise, as if a man should say, because he dislikes one law of his country, he will therefore observe no law at all; and yet that one law may be very reasonable in itself, although he does not allow it, or does not know the reason of the lawgivers.

Thus it hath happened with the great doctrine of the *Trinity*; which word is indeed not in scripture, but was a term of art invented in the earlier times, to express the doctrine by a single word, for the sake of brevity and convenience. The doctrine then as delivered in holy scripture, though not exactly in the same words, is very short, and amounts only to this: That the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are each of them God, and yet there is but one God. For as to the word *person*, when we say there are three persons; and as to those other explanations in the Athanasian creed, this day read to you, (whether compiled by Atha-

Athanasius or no, they were taken up three hundred years after Christ, to expound this doctrine; and I will tell you upon what occasion. About that time there sprang up a heresy of people called *Arians*, from one *Arius* the leader of them. These denied our Saviour to be God, although they allowed all the rest of the gospel, (wherein they were more sincere than their followers among us). Thus the Christian world was divided into two parts, till at length, by the zeal and courage of St. Athanasius, the Arians were condemned in a general council, and a creed formed upon the true faith, as St. Athanasius hath settled it. This creed is now read at certain times in our churches; which although it is useful for edification to those who understand it, yet since it contains some nice and philosophical points, which few people can comprehend, the bulk of mankind is obliged to believe no more than the scripture-doctrine, as I have delivered it; because that creed was intended only as an answer to the Arians in their own way, who were very subtile disputers.

But this heresy having revived in the world about an hundred years ago, and continued ever since; not out of a zeal to truth, but to give a loose to wickedness, by throwing off all religion; several divines, in order to answer the cavils of those adversaries to truth and morality, began to find out farther explanations of this doctrine of the Trinity by rules of philosophy; which have multiplied controversies to such a degree, as to beget scruples that have perplexed the minds of many sober Christians, who otherwise could never have entertained them.

I must therefore be so bold to affirm, that the method taken by many of those learned men to defend the doctrine of the Trinity, hath been founded upon a mistake.

It must be allowed, that every man is bound to follow the rules and directions of that measure of

reaſon which God hath given him. And indeed he cannot do otherwiſe, if he will be ſincere, or act like a man. For inſtance, if I ſhould be commanded by an angel from heaven to believe it is midnight at noon-day; yet I could not believe him. So if I were directly told in ſcripture, that *three* are *one*, and *one* is *three*, I could not conceive or believe it, in the natural common ſenſe of that expreſſion; but muſt ſuppoſe, that ſomething dark or myſtical was meant, which it pleaſed God to conceal from me, and from all the world. Thus, in the text, *There are three that bear record*, &c. Am I capable of knowing and defining, what union and what diſtinction there may be in the divine nature, which poſſibly may be hid from the angels themſelves? Again, I ſee it plainly declared in ſcripture, that there is but one God; and yet I find our Saviour claiming the prerogative of God, in knowing mens thoughts; in ſaying, *He and his Father are one*; and, *Before Abraham was, I am.* I read, that the diſciples worſhipped him; that Thomas ſaid to him, *My Lord and my God*; and St. John, chap. i. *In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.* I read likewiſe, that the Holy Ghoſt beſtowed the gift of tongues, and the power of working miracles; which, if rightly conſidered, is as great a miracle as any, that a number of illiterate men ſhould of a ſudden be qualified to ſpeak all the languages then known in the world; ſuch as could be done by the inſpiration of God alone *. From theſe ſeveral texts it is plain, that God

* In defending the peculiar doctrines of Chriſtianity, perhaps it is always beſt to inſiſt upon the poſitive evidence, as the Dean has done in this ſermon: for in every queſtion, he who undertakes to obviate objections, muſt neceſſarily be foiled by him who puts them. By the human intellect, little more than the ſurface of things can be known, and therefore ſpeculative objections, which would puzzle an able philoſopher, may be eaſily raiſed even againſt thoſe truths which admit of practical demonſtration. It was once objected to a philoſopher who

God commands us to believe there is an union, and there is a diſtinction; but what that union, or what that diſtinction is, all mankind are equally ignorant, and muſt continue ſo, at leaſt till the day of judgment, without ſome new revelation.

But becauſe I cannot conceive the nature of this union and diſtinction in the divine nature, am I therefore to reject them as abſurd and impoſſible, as I would if any one told me, that three men are one, and one man is three? We are told, that a man and his wife are one fleſh: this I can comprehend the meaning of; yet, literally taken, it is a thing impoſſible. But the apoſtle tells us, *We ſee but in part, and we know but in part*; and yet we would comprehend all the ſecret ways and workings of God.

Therefore I ſhall again repeat the doctrine of the Trinity, as it is poſitively affirmed in ſcripture: That God is there expreſſed in three different names, as Father, as Son, and as Holy Ghoſt; that each of theſe is God, and that there is but one God. But this union and diſtinction are a myſtery utterly unknown to mankind.

This is enough for any good Chriſtian to believe on this great article, without ever inquiring any farther. And this can be contrary to no man's reaſon, although the knowledge of it is hid from him.

But there is another difficulty, of great importance among thoſe who quarrel with the doctrine of the Trinity, as well as with ſeveral other articles of Chriſtianity; which is, That our religion abounds

who was explaining the laws of motion. That there could be no ſuch thing; for that a body muſt move either in the place in which it *is*, or in the place in which it is *not*; but both being impoſſible, there could be no motion. This objection the philoſopher immediately removed, by walking croſs the room. And if none were to triumph in the ſtrength of popular objections againſt Chriſtianity, but thoſe who could otherwiſe ſhew the fallacy of this againſt motion, the number of *moral philoſophers* among us would probably be very few.

in myſteries; and theſe they are ſo bold to revile as cant, impoſture, and prieſtcraft. It is impoſſible for us to determine, for what reaſons God thought fit to communicate ſome things to us in part, and leave ſome part a myſtery; but ſo it is in fact, and ſo the holy ſcriptures tell us in ſeveral places. For inſtance, the reſurrection and change of our bodies are called myſteries by St. Paul; our Saviour's incarnation is another; the kingdom of God is called a myſtery by our Saviour, to be only known to his diſciples; ſo is faith, and the word of God, by St. Paul. I omit many others. So that to declare againſt all myſteries without diſtinction or exception, is to declare againſt the whole tenor of the New Teſtament.

There are two conditions that may bring a myſtery under ſuſpicion. Firſt, When it is not taught and commanded in holy writ; or, ſecondly, When the myſtery turns to the advantage of thoſe who preach it to others. Now, as to the firſt, it can never be ſaid, that we preach myſteries without warrant from holy ſcripture; although I confeſs this of the *Trinity* may have ſometimes been explained by human invention, which might perhaps better have been ſpared. As to the ſecond, it will not be poſſible to charge the Proteſtant prieſthood with propoſing any temporal advantage to themſelves by broaching, or multiplying, or preaching of myſteries. Does this myſtery of the *Trinity*, for inſtance, and the deſcent of the Holy Ghoſt, bring the leaſt profit or power to the preachers? No; it is as great a myſtery to themſelves, as it is to the meaneſt of their hearers; and may be rather a cauſe of humiliation, by putting their underſtanding in that point upon a level with the moſt ignorant of their flock. It is true indeed, the Roman church hath very much enriched herſelf by trading in myſteries, for which they have not the leaſt authority from ſcripture, and which were fitted

ted only to advance their own temporal wealth and grandeur; such as *transubstantiation, worshipping of images, indulgencies for sins, purgatory*, and *masses for the dead*; with many more. But it is the perpetual talent of those who have ill-will to our church, or a contempt for all religion, taken up by the wickedness of their lives, to charge us with the errors and corruptions of Popery, which all Protestants have thrown off near two hundred years: whereas those mysteries held by us have no prospect of power, pomp, or wealth; but have been ever maintained by the universal body of true believers from the days of the apostles, and will be so to the resurrection; neither will the gates of hell prevail against them.

It may be thought perhaps a strange thing, that God should require us to believe mysteries, while the reason or manner of what we are to believe is above our comprehension, and wholly concealed from us. Neither doth it appear at first sight, that the believing or not believing them doth concern either the glory of God, or contribute to the goodness or wickedness of our lives. But this is a great and dangerous mistake. We see what a mighty weight is laid upon faith both in the Old and New Testament. In the former we read, how the faith of Abraham is praised, who could believe that God would raise from him a great nation, at the very same time that he was commanded to sacrifice his only son, and despaired of any other issue: and this was to him a great mystery. Our Saviour is perpetually preaching faith to his disciples, or reproaching them with the want of it; and St. Paul produceth numerous examples of the wonders done by faith. And all this is highly reasonable: for faith is an entire dependence upon the truth, the power, the justice, and the mercy of God; which dependence will certainly incline us to obey him in all things. So that the great excellency

cy of faith consists in the consequence it hath upon our actions: as if we depend upon the truth and wisdom of a man, we shall certainly be more disposed to follow his advice. Therefore let no man think, that he can lead as good a moral life without faith as with it; for this reason, because he who has no faith, cannot, by the strength of his own reason or endeavours, so easily resist temptations, as the other, who depends upon God's assistance in the overcoming his frailties, and is sure to be rewarded for ever in heaven, for his victory over them. *Faith*, says the apostle, *is the evidence of things not seen.* He means, that faith is a virtue, by which any thing commanded us by God to believe, appears evident and certain to us, although we do not see, nor can conceive it; because by faith we entirely depend upon the truth and power of God.

It is an old and true distinction, that things may be above our reason, without being contrary to it. Of this kind are the power, the nature, and the universal presence of God, with innumerable other points. How little do those who quarrel with mysteries, know of the commonest actions of nature? The growth of an animal, of a plant, or of the smallest seed, is a mystery to the wisest among men. If an ignorant person were told, that a loadstone would draw iron at a distance, he might say, it was a thing contrary to his reason, and could not believe before he saw it with his eyes.

The manner whereby the soul and body are united, and how they are distinguished, is wholly unaccountable to us. We see but one part, and yet we know we consist of two; and this is a mystery we cannot comprehend, any more than that of the *Trinity*.

From what hath been said, it is manifest, that God did never command us to believe, nor his ministers to preach, any doctrine which is contrary to the

the reaſon he hath pleaſed to endue us with; but, for his own wiſe ends, has thought fit to conceal from us the nature of the thing he commands; thereby to try our faith and obedience, and increaſe our dependence upon him.

It is highly probable, that if God ſhould pleaſe to reveal unto us this great myſtery of the *Trinity*, or ſome other myſteries in our holy religion, we ſhould not be able to underſtand them, unleſs he would at the ſame time think fit to beſtow on us ſome new powers or faculties of the mind, which we want at preſent, and are reſerved till the day of reſurrection to life eternal. *For now*, as the apoſtle ſays, *we ſee through a glaſs darkly, but then face to face.*

Thus, we ſee, the matter is brought to this iſſue; we muſt either believe what God directly commands us in holy ſcripture, or we muſt wholly reject the ſcripture, and the Chriſtian religion, which we pretend to profeſs. But this, I hope, is too deſperate a ſtep for any of us to make.

I have already obſerved, that thoſe who preach up the belief of the *Trinity*, or of any other myſtery, cannot propoſe any temporal advantage to themſelves by ſo doing. But this is not the caſe of thoſe who oppoſe theſe doctrines. Do *they* lead better moral lives than a good Chriſtian? Are *they* more juſt in their dealings? more chaſte, or temperate, or charitable? Nothing at all of this; but, on the contrary, their intent is to overthrow all religion, that they may gratify their vices, without any reproach from the world, or their own conſcience; and are zealous to bring over as many others as they can to their own opinions; becauſe it is ſome kind of imaginary comfort, to have a multitude on their ſide.

There is no miracle mentioned in holy writ, which, if it were ſtrictly examined, is not as much contrary to common reaſon, and as much a myſte-

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ry, as this doctrine of the *Trinity*; and therefore we may with equal juſtice deny the truth of them all. For inſtance, it is againſt the laws of nature, that a human body ſhould be able to walk upon the water, as St. Peter is recorded to have done; or that a dead carcaſe ſhould be raiſed from the grave after three days, when it began to corrupt; which thoſe who underſtand anatomy, will pronounce to be impoſſible by the common rules of nature and reaſon. Yet theſe miracles, and many others, are poſitively affirmed in the goſpel; and theſe we muſt believe, or give up our holy religion to Atheiſts and Infidels.

I ſhall now make a few inferences and obſervations upon what hath been ſaid.

Firſt, It would be well if people would not lay ſo much weight on their own reaſon in matters of religion, as to think every thing impoſſible and abſurd which they cannot conceive. How often do we contradict the right rules of reaſon in the whole courſe of our lives? *Reaſon* itſelf is true and juſt; but the *reaſon* of every particular man is weak and wavering, perpetually ſwayed and turned by his intereſts, his paſſions, and his vices. Let any man but conſider, when he hath a controverſy with another, though his cauſe be ever ſo unjuſt, though the whole world be againſt him, how blinded he is by the love of himſelf, to believe that right is wrong, and wrong is right, when it makes for his own advantage. Where is then the right uſe of his reaſon, which he ſo much boaſts of, and which he would blaſphemouſly ſet up to control the commands of the Almighty?

Secondly, When men are tempted to deny the myſteries of religion, let them examine and ſearch into their own hearts, whether they have not ſome favourite ſin, which is of their party in this diſpute, and which is equally contrary to other commands of God in the goſpel. For why do men love

love darkneſs rather than light? The ſcripture tells us, *Becauſe their deeds are evil*; and there can be no other reaſon aſſigned. Therefore when men are curious and inquiſitive to diſcover ſome weak ſides in Chriſtianity, and inclined to favour every thing that is offered to its diſadvantage, it is plain they wiſh it were not true: and thoſe wiſhes can proceed from nothing but an evil conſcience; becauſe, if there be truth in our religion, their condition muſt be miſerable *.

And therefore, *thirdly*, men ſhould conſider, that raiſing difficulties concerning the myſteries in religion, cannot make them more wiſe, learned, or virtuous; better neighbours, or friends, or more ſerviceable to their country; but, whatever they pretend, will deſtroy their inward peace of mind, by perpetual doubts and fears ariſing in their breaſts. And God forbid we ſhould ever ſee the times ſo bad, when dangerous opinions in religion will be a means to get favour and preferment; although, even in ſuch a caſe, it would be an ill traffic, to gain the world and loſe our own ſouls. So that, upon the whole, it will be impoſſible to find any real uſe towards a virtuous or happy life, by denying the myſteries of the goſpel.

Fourthly, Thoſe ſtrong unbelievers who expect that all myſteries ſhould be ſquared and fitted to their own reaſon, might have ſomewhat to ſay for themſelves, if they could ſatisfy the general reaſon of mankind in their opinions. But herein they are miſerably defective, abſurd, and ridiculous. They ſtrain at a gnat, and ſwallow a camel: they can believe, that the world was made by chance; that

* It is an high encomium on reformed Chriſtianity, and a ſtrong argument of its ſuperior excellence, that a corrupt life always inclines men to wiſh it were not true. It does not appear, that Mahometans and Papiſts wiſh their religion to be falſe in proportion as their lives are immoral; and it is ſaid of Dryden, that not being able to ſortify himſelf in infidelity, he died a Papiſt.

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God doth not concern himself with things below, will neither punish vice nor reward virtue; that religion was invented by cunning men to keep the world in awe; with many other opinions equally false and detestable, against the common light of nature as well as reason; against the universal sentiments of all civilized nations, and offensive to the ears even of a sober Heathen.

Lastly, Since the world abounds with pestilent books, particularly written against this doctrine of the *Trinity*, it is fit to inform you, that the authors of them proceed wholly upon a mistake. They would shew how impossible it is, that *three* can be *one*, and *one* can be *three:* whereas the scripture saith no such thing, at least in that manner they would make it; but only that there is some kind of unity and distinction in the divine nature, which mankind cannot possibly comprehend. Thus the whole doctrine is short and plain, and in itself incapable of any controversy; since God himself hath pronounced the fact, but wholly concealed the manner. And therefore many divines, who thought fit to answer those wicked books, have been mistaken too, by answering fools in their folly, and endeavouring to explain a mystery which God intended to keep secret from us. And as I would exhort all men to avoid reading those wicked books written against this doctrine, as dangerous and pernicious; so I think they may omit the answers, as unnecessary. This, I confess, will probably affect but few or none among the generality of our congregations, who do not much trouble themselves with books, at least of this kind. However, many who do not read themselves, are seduced by others that do; and thus become unbelievers upon trust, and at second hand; and this is too frequent a case: for which reason I have endeavoured to put this doctrine upon a short and sure foot, levelled to the meanest understanding; by

by which we may, as the apoſtle directs, be ready always to give an anſwer to every man that aſketh us a reaſon of the hope that is in us, with meekneſs and fear.

And thus I have done with my ſubject; which probably I ſhould not have choſen, if I had not been invited to it by the occaſion of this ſeaſon, appointed on purpoſe to celebrate the myſteries of the *Trinity*, and the deſcent of the Holy Ghoſt, wherein we pray to be kept ſtedfaſt in this faith; and what this faith is, I have ſhewn you in the plaineſt manner I could. For, upon the whole, it is no more than this: God commands us, by our dependence upon his truth and his holy word, to believe a fact that we do not underſtand. And this is no more than what we do every day in the works of nature, upon the credit of men of learning. Without faith we can do no works acceptable to God; for if they proceed from any other principle, they will not advance our ſalvation; and this faith, as I have explained it, we may acquire, without giving up our ſenſes, or contradicting our reaſon. May God, of his infinite mercy, inſpire us with true faith in every article and myſtery of our holy religion, ſo as to diſpoſe us to do what is pleaſing in his ſight: and this we pray through Jeſus Chriſt; to whom, with the Father and the Holy Ghoſt, the myſterious incomprehenſible ONE God, be all honour and glory, now and for evermore. *Amen.*

*** This is one of the beſt ſermons in its kind. Dr. Swift ſeems not to have made ſuch a plan his voluntary choice, nor to have built, *ſuo ex motu*, upon ſuch a baſis; but he has compleated the ſuperſtructure in a moſt maſterly manner. The materials anſwer the dignity of the edifice; and the artificer may aſſume great honour, upon the completion of ſo noble, ſo ſimple, and ſo uſeful a pile. The myſterious parts of our religion are apt to have dreadful effects upon weak minds. The general comments upon the ſacred writings, and the

several sermons upon the most abstruse points of scripture, are too often composed in the gloomy style. Damnation, eternal damnation, is placed with all its horror before our eyes; and we are so terrified at the prospect, that fear makes us imagine we can comprehend mysteries, which, on this side of the grave, must be for ever denied to our limited understandings. Swift has taken the safest and the properest method of expounding these *arcana*. He advances every position that can be established upon so incomprehensible a subject. He sustains the belief, avows the doctrine, and adapts the matter of faith as well as possible to the human capacity. His manner of reasoning is masterly, and his arguments are nervous, particularly, where he says, "It is highly probable, that if God should "please to reveal unto us this great mystery of the Trinity, or some "other mysteries in our holy religion, we should not be able to un-"derstand them, unless he would at the same time think fit to be-"stow on us some new powers or faculties of the mind, which we "want at present, and are reserved till the day of resurrection to life "eternal." p. 9. *Orrery.*

SERMON II.

On MUTUAL SUBJECTION.

1 St. Peter v. 5.

—— *Yea, all of you be subject one to another.*

THE apostle having, in many parts of this epistle, given directions to Christians concerning the duty of subjection or obedience to superiors; in the several instances of the subject to the prince, the child to his parent, the servant to his master, the wife to her husband, and the younger to the elder; doth here, in the words of my text, sum up the whole, by advancing a point of doctrine, which

which at first may appear a little extraordinary: *Yea, all of you*, saith he, *be subject one to another*. For it should seem, that two persons cannot properly be said to be subject to each other, and that subjection is only due from inferiors to those above them: yet St. Paul hath several passages to the same purpose. For he exhorts the Romans, *in honour to prefer one another* *; and the Philippians, that in *lowliness of mind they should let each esteem other better than themselves* †; and the Ephesians, that they should *submit themselves one to another in the fear of the Lord* ‡. Here we find these two great apostles recommending to all Christians this duty of mutual subjection. For we may observe by St. Peter, that having mentioned the several relations which men bear to each other, as governor and subject, master and servant, and the rest which I have already repeated, he makes no exception; but sums up the whole with commanding *all to be subject one to another*. From whence we may conclude, that this subjection due from all men to all men, is something more than the compliment of course, when our betters are pleased to tell us, they are our humble servants, but understand us to be their slaves.

I know very well, that some of those who explain this text, apply it to humility, to the duties of charity, to private exhortations, and to bearing with each other's infirmities; and it is probable the apostle may have had a regard to all these. But, however, many learned men agree, that there is something more understood; and so the words in their plain natural meaning must import; as you will observe yourselves, if you read them with the beginning of the verse, which is thus: *likewise ye younger, submit yourselves unto the elder: yea, all of you, be subject one to another*. So that, upon the whole, there must be some kind of subjection due

* Rom. xii. 10. † Philip. ii. 3. ‡ Eph. v. 21.

from every man to every man, which cannot be made void by any power, pre-eminence, or authority whatsoever. Now, what sort of subjection this is, and how it ought to be paid, shall be the subject of my present discourse.

As God hath contrived all the works of nature to be useful, and in some manner a support to each other, by which the whole frame of the world under his providence is preserved and kept up; so, among mankind, our particular stations are appointed to each of us by God almighty, wherein we are obliged to act as far as our power reacheth, towards the good of the whole community. And he who doth not perform that part assigned him, towards advancing the benefit of the whole, in proportion to his opportunities and abilities, is not only an useless, but a very mischievous member of the public; because he takes his share of the profit, and yet leaves his share of the burden to be borne by others, which is the true principal cause of most miseries and misfortunes in life. For a wise man who does not assist with his counsels, a great man with his protection, a rich man with his bounty and charity, and a poor man with his labour, are perfect nuisances in a commonwealth. Neither is any condition of life more honourable in the sight of God than another; otherwise he would be a respecter of persons, which he assures us he is not: for he hath proposed the same salvation to all men, and hath only placed them in different ways or stations to work it out. Princes are born with no more advantages of strength or wisdom than other men; and, by an unhappy education, are usually more defective in both, than thousands of their subjects. They depend for every necessary of life upon the meanest of their people: besides, obedience and subjection were never injoined by God to humour the passions, lusts, and vanities of those who demand them from us; but we are command-

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ed to obey our governors, becauſe diſobedience would breed ſeditions in the ſtate. Thus ſervants are directed to obey their maſters, children their parents, and wives their huſbands; not from any reſpect of perſons in God, but becauſe otherwiſe there would be nothing but confuſion in private families. This matter will be clearly explained, by conſidering the compariſon which St. Paul makes between the church of Chriſt and the body of man: for the ſame reſemblance will hold, not only to families and kingdoms, but to the whole corporation of mankind. "The eye," ſaith he, "cannot ſay "unto the hand, I have no need of thee: nor a-"gain the head to the feet, I have no need of you. "Nay, much more, thoſe members of the body "which ſeem to be more feeble, are neceſſary. "And whether one member ſuffer, all the mem-"bers ſuffer with it; or one member be honour-"ed, all the members rejoice with it *." The caſe is directly the ſame among mankind. The prince cannot ſay to the merchant, I have no need of thee; nor the merchant to the labourer, I have no need of thee. Nay, much more, thoſe members which ſeem to be more feeble, are neceſſary. For the poor are generally more neceſſary members of the commonwealth than the rich: which clearly ſhews, that God never intended ſuch poſſeſſions for the ſake and ſervice of thoſe to whom he lends them; but becauſe he hath aſſigned every man his particular ſtation to be uſeful in life, and this for the reaſon given by the apoſtle, *that there may be no ſchiſm in the body.*

From hence may partly be gathered the nature of that ſubjection which we all owe to one another. God almighty hath been pleaſed to put us into an imperfect ſtate, where we have perpetual occaſion of each other's aſſiſtance. There is none ſo low, as

* 1 Cor. xii. 21. 22. 26.

not to be in a capacity of assisting the highest; nor so high, as not to want the assistance of the lowest.

It plainly appears from what hath been said, that no one human creature is more worthy than another in the sight of God, farther than according to the goodness or holiness of their lives; and that power, wealth, and the like outward advantages, are so far from being the marks of God's approving or preferring those on whom they are bestowed, that, on the contrary, he is pleased to suffer them to be almost ingrossed by those who have least title to his favour. Now, according to this equality wherein God hath placed all mankind with relation to himself, you will observe, that, in all the relations between man and man, there is a mutual dependence, whereby the one cannot subsist without the other. Thus, no man can be a prince without subjects, nor a master without servants, nor a father without children. And this both explains and confirms the doctrine of the text: for where there is a mutual dependence, there must be a mutual duty, and consequently a mutual subjection. For instance, the subject must obey his prince, because God commands it, human laws require it, and the safety of the public makes it necessary. For the same reasons we must obey all that are in authority, and submit ourselves not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward, whether they rule according to our liking or no. On the other side, in those countries that pretend to freedom, princes are subject to those laws which their people have chosen; they are bound to protect their subjects in liberty, property, and religion; to receive their petitions, and redress their grievances: so that the best prince is, in the opinion of wise men, only the greatest servant of the nation; not only a servant to the public in general, but in some sort to every man in it. In the like manner, a servant

vant owes obedience, and diligence, and faithfulneſs, to his maſter; from whom, at the ſame time, he hath a juſt demand for protection, and maintenance, and gentle treatment. Nay, even the poor beggar hath a juſt demand of an alms from the rich man; who is guilty of fraud, injuſtice, and oppreſſion, if he does not afford relief according to his abilities.

But this ſubjection we all owe one another, is no where more neceſſary, than in the common converſations of life; for without it there could be no ſociety among men. If the learned would not ſometimes ſubmit to the ignorant, the wiſe to the ſimple, the gentle to the froward, the old to the weakneſſes of the young, there would be nothing but everlaſting variance in the world. This our Saviour himſelf confirmed by his own example: for he appeared in the form of a ſervant, and waſhed his diſciples feet, adding thoſe memorable words, "Ye call me Lord and Maſter: and ye "ſay well; for ſo I am. If I then, your Lord "and Maſter, waſh your feet, how much more "ought ye to waſh one another's feet?" Under which expreſſion of waſhing the feet, is included all that ſubjection, aſſiſtance, love, and duty, which every good Chriſtian ought to pay his brother, in whatever ſtation God hath placed him. For the greateſt prince and the meaneſt ſlave are not by infinite degrees ſo diſtant, as our Saviour and thoſe diſciples whoſe feet he vouchſafed to waſh.

And although this doctrine of ſubjecting ourſelves to one another, may ſeem to grate upon the pride and vanity of mankind, and may therefore be hard to be digeſted by thoſe who value themſelves upon their greatneſs or their wealth; yet it is really no more than what moſt men practiſe upon other occaſions. For if our neighbour, who is our inferior, comes to ſee us, we riſe to receive him, we place him above us, and reſpect him as if he

he were better than ourſelves ; and this is thought both decent and neceſſary, and is uſually called *good manners*. Now, the duty required by the apoſtle is only, that we ſhould enlarge our minds, and that what we thus practiſe in the common courſe of life, we ſhould imitate in all our actions and proceedings whatſoever ; ſince our Saviour tells us that every man is our neighbour, and ſince we are ſo ready, in the point of civility, to yield to others in our own houſes, where only we have any title to govern.

Having thus ſhewn you, what ſort of ſubjection it is which all men owe one to another, and in what manner it ought to be paid, I ſhall now draw ſome obſervations from what hath been ſaid.

And, *firſt*, A thorough practice of this duty of ſubjecting ourſelves to the wants and infirmities of each other, would utterly extinguiſh in us the vice of pride.

For if God has pleaſed to intruſt me with a talent, not for my own ſake, but for the ſervice of others, and at the ſame time hath left me full of wants and neceſſities, which others muſt ſupply ; I can then have no cauſe to ſet any extraordinary value upon myſelf, or to deſpiſe my brother, becauſe he hath not the ſame talents which were lent to me. His being may probably be as uſeful to the public as mine ; and therefore, by the rules of right reaſon, I am in no ſort preferable to him.

Secondly, It is very manifeſt from what has been ſaid, that no man ought to look upon the advantages of life, ſuch as riches, honour, power, and the like, as his property, but merely as a truſt which God hath depoſited with him to be employed for the uſe of his brethren : and God will certainly puniſh the breach of that truſt, though the laws of man will not, or rather indeed cannot ; becauſe the truſt was conferred only by God, who has not left it to any power on earth to decide infallibly, whether

whether a man makes a good uſe of his talents or no, or to puniſh him where he fails. And therefore God ſeems to have more particularly taken this matter into his own hands, and will moſt certainly reward or puniſh us in proportion to our good or ill performance in it. Now, although the advantages which one man poſſeſſeth more than another, may in ſome ſenſe be called his property with reſpect to other men; yet with reſpect to God, they are, as I ſaid, only a truſt; which will plainly appear from hence: if a man does not uſe thoſe advantages to the good of the public, or the benefit of his neighbour, it is certain, he doth not deſerve them, and conſequently that God never intended them for a bleſſing to him; and, on the other ſide, whoever does employ his talents as he ought, will find by his own experience, that they were chiefly lent him for the ſervice of others; for to the ſervice of others he will certainly employ them.

Thirdly, If we could all be brought to practiſe this duty of ſubjecting ourſelves to each other, it would very much contribute to the general happineſs of mankind. For this would root out envy and malice from the heart of man; becauſe you cannot envy your neighbour's ſtrength, if he make uſe of it to defend your life, or carry your burden; you cannot envy his wiſdom, if he gives you good counſel; nor his riches, if he ſupplies you in your wants; nor his greatneſs, if he employs it to your protection. The miſeries of life are not properly owing to the unequal diſtribution of things; but God almighty, the great King of heaven, is treated like the kings of the earth, who, although perhaps intending well themſelves, have often moſt abominable miniſters and ſtewards; and thoſe generally the vileſt, to whom they intruſt the moſt talents. But here is the difference, that the princes of this world ſee by other mens eyes, but God ſees all things; and

and therefore whenever he permits his bleſſings to be dealt among thoſe who are unworthy, we may certainly conclude, that he intends them only as a puniſhment to an evil world, as well as to the owners. It were well, if thoſe would conſider this, whoſe riches ſerve them only as a ſpur to avarice, or as an inſtrument to their luſts; whoſe wiſdom is only of this world, to put falſe colours upon things, to call good evil, and evil good, againſt the conviction of their own conſciences; and, laſtly, who employ their power and favour in acts of oppreſſion or injuſtice, in miſrepreſenting perſons and things, or in countenancing the wicked to the ruin of the innocent.

Fourthly, The practice of this duty of being ſubject to one another, would make us reſt contented in the ſeveral ſtations of life wherein God hath thought fit to place us; becauſe it would, in the beſt and eaſieſt manner, bring us back as it were to that early ſtate of the goſpel, when Chriſtians had all things in common. For if the poor found the rich diſpoſed to ſupply their wants; if the ignorant found the wiſe ready to inſtruct and direct them; or if the weak might always find protection from the mighty; they could none of them, with the leaſt pretence of juſtice, lament their own condition.

From all that hath been hitherto ſaid, it appears, that great abilities of any ſort, when they are employed as God directs, do but make the owners of them greater and more painful ſervants to their neighbour, and the public. However, we are by no means to conclude from hence, that they are not really bleſſings, when they are in the hands of good men. For, firſt, what can be a greater honour, than to be choſen one of the ſtewards and diſpenſers of God's bounty to mankind? What is there that can give a generous ſpirit more pleaſure and complacency of mind, than to conſider, that he

he is an inſtrument of doing much good? that great numbers owe to him, under God, their ſubſiſtence, their ſafety, their health, and the good conduct of their lives? The wickedeſt man upon earth takes a pleaſure in doing good to thoſe he loves; and therefore, ſurely, a good Chriſtian, who obeys our Saviour's command of loving all men, cannot but take delight in doing good even to his enemies. God, who gives all things to all men, can receive nothing from any; and thoſe among men who do the moſt good, and receive the feweſt returns, do moſt reſemble their Creator; for which reaſon St. Paul delivers it as a ſaying of our Saviour, that *it is more bleſſed to give than to receive.* By this rule, what muſt become of thoſe things which the world values as the greateſt bleſſings, riches, power, and the like, when our Saviour plainly determines, that the beſt way to make them bleſſings, is to part with them? Therefore although the advantages which one man hath over another, may be called bleſſings, yet they are by no means ſo in the ſenſe the word uſually underſtands. Thus, for example, great riches are no bleſſing in themſelves; becauſe the poor man, with the common neceſſaries of life, enjoys more health, and has fewer cares, without them. How then do they become bleſſings? No otherwiſe, than by being employed in feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, rewarding worthy men, and, in ſhort, doing acts of charity and generoſity. Thus, likewiſe, power is no bleſſing in itſelf, becauſe private men bear leſs envy, and trouble, and anguiſh, without it. But, when it is employed to protect the innocent, to relieve the oppreſſed, and to puniſh the oppreſſor, then it becomes a great bleſſing. And ſo, laſtly, even great wiſdom is, in the opinion of Solomon, not a bleſſing in itſelf: for *in much wiſdom is much ſorrow*; and men of common underſtandings, if they ſerve God, and mind their callings, make fewer miſtakes

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in the conduct of life, than those who have better heads. And yet wisdom is a mighty blessing, when it is applied to good purposes, to instruct the ignorant, to be a faithful counsellor either in public or private, to be a director to youth, and to many other ends needless here to mention.

To conclude: God sent us into the world to obey his commands, by doing as much good as our abilities will reach, and as little evil as our many infirmities will permit. Some he hath only trusted with one talent, some with five, and some with ten. No man is without his talent; and he that is faithful or negligent in a little, shall be rewarded or punished, as well as he that hath been so in a great deal.

Consider what hath been said, &c.

*** This sermon is upon mutual subjection, and that duty which is owing from one man to another. A clearer style, or a discourse more properly adapted to a public audience, can scarce be framed. Every paragraph is simple, nervous, and intelligible. The threads of each argument are closely connected, and logically pursued. But in places where the Dean has the least opportunity to introduce political maxims, or to dart an arrow at the conduct of princes, he never fails to indulge himself in his usual manner of thinking; as will appear from the following quotations. "A wise man," says Dr. Swift, "who does not assist with his counsels, a great man with his protection, a rich man with his bounty and charity, and a poor man "with his labour, are perfect nuisances in a commonwealth. Neither is any condition of life more honourable in the sight of God "than another; otherwise he would be a respecter of persons, which "he assures us he is not: for he hath proposed the same salvation "to all men, and hath only placed them in different ways or stations "to work it out. Princes are born with no more advantages of "strength or wisdom than other men; and, by an unhappy education, are usually more defective in both, than thousands of their "subjects," p. 16. Again, in the same strain, "The best prince "is, in the opinion of wise men, only the greatest servant of the nation; not only a servant to the public in general, but in some sort "to every man in it," p. 18. But the most extraordinary passage is a covert stroke at the highest order of his brethren the clergy. It runs thus. "The miseries of life are not properly owing to the unequal distribution of things; but God almighty, the great King "of heaven, is treated like the kings of the earth; who, although perhaps

" perhaps intending well themſelves, have often moſt abominable " miniſters and ſtewards, and thoſe generally the vileſt, to whom " they intruſt the moſt talents," p. 21. Dark as it is, this paragraph requires no explanation. The author's natural turn of mind breaks forth upon all occaſions, and the politician frequently outweighs the divine. If the dictates of ſuch a ſpirit were capable of forcing their way from the pulpit, what a glorious, what a conſiſtent figure, muſt Swift have made in the roſtrum at Rome, or in one of the porticos at Athens? *Orrery.*

SERMON III.

On the TESTIMONY of CONSCIENCE.

2 COR. i. 12. part of it

——*For our rejoicing is this, the teſtimony of our conſcience.*

THere is no word more frequently in the mouths of men, than that of *conſcience*; and the meaning of it is in ſome meaſure generally underſtood. However, becauſe it is likewiſe a word extremely abuſed by many people, who apply other meanings to it, which God Almighty never intended; I ſhall explain it to you in the cleareſt manner I am able. The word *conſcience* properly ſignifies that knowledge which a man hath within himſelf, of his own thoughts and actions. And becauſe, if a man judgeth fairly of his own actions, by comparing them with the law of God, his mind will either approve or condemn him, according as he hath done good or evil; therefore this knowledge or conſcience may properly be called both an accuſer and

a judge. So that whenever our conſcience accuſeth us, we are certainly guilty: but we are not always innocent, when it doth not accuſe us; for very often, through the hardneſs of our hearts, or the fondneſs and favour we bear to ourſelves, or through ignorance or neglect, we do not ſuffer our conſcience to take any cogniſance of ſeveral ſins we commit. There is another office likewiſe belonging to conſcience, which is that of being our director and guide; and the wrong uſe of this hath been the occaſion of more evils under the ſun, than almoſt all other cauſes put together. For as conſcience is nothing elſe but the knowledge we have of what we are thinking and doing; ſo it can guide us no farther than that knowledge reacheth; and therefore God hath placed conſcience in us to be our director only in thoſe actions which ſcripture and reaſon plainly tells us to be good or evil. But in caſes too difficult or doubtful for us to comprehend or determine, there conſcience is not concerned; becauſe it cannot adviſe in what it doth not underſtand, nor decide where it is itſelf in doubt: But, by God's great mercy, thoſe difficult points are never of abſolute neceſſity to our ſalvation. There is likewiſe another evil, that men often ſay, a thing is againſt their conſcience, when really it is not. For inſtance, aſk any of thoſe who differ from the worſhip eſtabliſhed, why they do not come to church, they will ſay, they diſlike the ceremonies, the prayers, the habits, and the like; and therefore it goes againſt their conſcience. But they are miſtaken; their teacher hath put thoſe words into their mouth; for a man's conſcience can go no higher than his knowledge; and therefore till he has thoroughly examined, by ſcripture, and the practice of the ancient church, whether thoſe points are blameable or no, his conſcience cannot poſſibly direct him to condemn them. Hence have likewiſe ariſen thoſe miſtakes about what is uſually called

called *liberty of conſcience*; which, properly ſpeaking, is no more than a liberty of knowing our own thoughts; which liberty no one can take from us. But thoſe words have obtained quite different meanings. Liberty of conſcience is now-a-days not only underſtood to be the liberty of believing what men pleaſe, but alſo of endeavouring to propagate that belief as much as they can, and to overthrow the faith which the laws have already eſtabliſhed, and to be rewarded by the public for thoſe wicked endeavours; and this is the liberty of conſcience which the fanatics are now, openly in the face the world, endeavouring at with their utmoſt application. At the ſame time it cannot but be obſerved, that thoſe very perſons who, under pretence of a public ſpirit, and tenderneſs towards their Chriſtian brethren, are ſo zealous for ſuch a liberty of conſcience as this, are of all others the leaſt tender to thoſe who differ from them in the ſmalleſt point relating to government; and I wiſh I could not ſay, that the majeſty of the living God may be offended with more ſecurity than the memory of a dead prince. But the wiſdom of the world at preſent ſeems to agree with that of the Heathen Emperor, who ſaid, if the gods were offended, it was their own concern, and they were able to vindicate themſelves.

But altho' conſcience hath been abuſed to thoſe wicked purpoſes which I have already related, yet a due regard to the directions it plainly gives us; as well as to its accuſations, reproaches, and advices, would be of the greateſt uſe to mankind, both for their preſent welfare and future happineſs.

Therefore my diſcourſe at this time ſhall be directed to prove to you, that there is no ſolid, firm foundation for virtue, but in a conſcience which is guided by religion.

In order to this, I ſhall firſt ſhew you the weakneſs and uncertainty of two falſe principles, which

many people set up in the place of conscience for a guide to their actions.

The first of these principles is what the world usually calls *moral honesty*. There are some people, who appear very indifferent as to religion, and yet have the repute of being just and fair in their dealings; and these are generally known by the character of good moral men. But now, if you look into the grounds and the motives of such a man's actions, you shall find them to be no other than his own ease and interest. For example, you trust a moral man with your money in the way of trade, you trust another with the defence of your cause at law; and perhaps they both deal justly with you. Why? not from any regard they have for justice, but because their fortune depends upon their credit, and a stain of open public dishonesty must be to their disadvantage. But let it consist with such a man's interest and safety to wrong you, and then it will be impossible you can have any hold upon him; because there is nothing left to give him check, or to put in the balance against his profit. For, if he hath nothing to govern himself by but the opinion of the world, as long as he can conceal his injustice from the world he thinks he is safe.

Besides, it is found by experience, that those men who set up for morality without regard to religion, are generally virtuous but in part; they will be just in their dealings between man and man: but if they find themselves disposed to pride, lust, intemperance, or avarice, they do not think their morality concerned to check them in any of these vices; because it is the great rule of such men, that they may lawfully follow the dictates of nature, wherever their safety, health, and fortune are not injured. So that, upon the whole, there is hardly one vice which a mere moral man may not upon some occasions allow himself to practise.

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The other falſe principle which ſome men ſet up in the place of conſcience to be their director in life, is what thoſe pretend to call *honour*.

This word is often made the ſanction of an oath; it is reckoned a great commendation to be a man of ſtrict honour; and it is commonly underſtood, that a man of honour can never be guilty of a baſe action. This is uſually the ſtyle of military men, of perſons with titles, and of others who pretend to birth and quality. It is true indeed, that in ancient times it was univerſally underſtood, that honour was the reward of virtue; but if ſuch honour as is now-a-days going, will not permit a man to do a baſe action, it muſt be allowed, there are very few ſuch things as baſe actions in nature. No man of honour, as that word is uſually underſtood, did ever pretend, that his honour obliged him to be chaſte or temperate, to pay his creditors, to be uſeful to his country, to do good to mankind, to endeavour to be wiſe or learned, to regard his word, his promiſe, or his oath; or, if he hath any of theſe virtues, they were never learned in the catechiſm of honour; which contains but two precepts; the punctual payments of debts contracted at play, and the right underſtanding the ſeveral degrees of an affront, in order to revenge it by the death of an adverſary.

But ſuppoſe this principle of honour, which ſome men ſo much boaſt of, did really produce more virtues than it ever pretended to; yet, ſince the very being of that honour depended upon the breath, the opinion, or the fancy of the people, the virtues derived from it could be of no long or certain duration. For example, ſuppoſe a man, from a principle of honour, ſhould reſolve to be juſt, or chaſte, or temperate, and yet the cenſuring world ſhould take a humour of refuſing him thoſe characters, he would then think the obligation at an end. Or, on the other ſide, if he

thought he could gain honour by the falſeſt and vileſt action, (which is a caſe that very often happens), he would then make no ſcruple to perform it. And God knows, it would be an unhappy ſtate, to have the religion, the liberty, or the property of a people lodged in ſuch hands; which however hath been too often the caſe.

What I have ſaid upon this principle of honour, may perhaps be thought of ſmall concernment to moſt of you who are my hearers: However, a caution was not altogether unneceſſary; ſince there is nothing by which not only the vulgar, but the honeſt tradeſman hath been ſo much deceived, as this infamous pretence to honour in too many of their betters.

Having thus ſhewn you the weakneſs and uncertainty of thoſe principles which ſome men ſet up in the place of conſcience to direct them in their actions, I ſhall now endeavour to prove to you, that there is no ſolid, firm foundation of virtue, but in a conſcience directed by the principles of religion.

There is no way of judging how far we may depend upon the actions of men, otherwiſe than by knowing the motives, and grounds, and cauſes of them; and if the motives of our actions be not reſolved and determined into the law of God, they will be precarious and uncertain, and liable to perpetual changes. I will ſhew you what I mean, by an example. Suppoſe a man thinks it his duty to obey his parents, becauſe reaſon tells him ſo, becauſe he is obliged by gratitude, and becauſe the laws of his country command him to do ſo: if he ſtops here, his parents can have no laſting ſecurity; for an occaſion may happen, wherein it may be extremely his intereſt to be diſobedient, and where the laws of the land can lay no hold upon him: therefore, before ſuch a man can ſafely be truſted, he muſt proceed farther, and conſider that his reaſon

ſon is the gift of God; that God commanded him to be obedient to the laws, and did moreover, in a particular manner, injoin him to be dutiful to his parents; after which, if he lays due weight upon thoſe conſiderations, he will probably continue in his duty to the end of his life; becauſe no earthly intereſt can ever come in competition to balance the danger of offending his Creator, or the happineſs of pleaſing him. And of all this his conſcience will certainly inform him, if he hath any regard to religion.

Secondly, Fear and hope are the two greateſt natural motives of all mens actions. But neither of theſe paſſions will ever put us in the way of virtue, unleſs they be directed by conſcience. For altho' virtuous men do ſometimes accidentally make their way to preferment, yet the world is ſo corrupted, that no man can reaſonably hope to be rewarded in it, merely upon account of his virtue. And conſequently the fear of puniſhment in this life will preſerve men from very few vices; ſince ſome of the blackeſt and baſeſt do often prove the ſureſt ſteps to favour; ſuch as ingratitude, hypocriſy, treachery, malice, ſubornation, atheiſm, and many more, which human laws do little concern themſelves about. But when conſcience placeth before us the hopes of everlaſting happineſs, and the fears of everlaſting miſery, as the reward and puniſhment of our good or evil actions, our reaſon can find no way to avoid the force of ſuch an argument, otherwiſe than by running into infidelity.

Laſtly, Conſcience will direct us to love God, and to put our whole truſt and confidence in him. Our love of God will inſpire us with a deteſtation for ſin, as what is of all things moſt contrary to his divine nature; and if we have an entire confidence in him, *that* will enable us to ſubdue and deſpiſe all the allurements of the world.

It

It may here be objected, If conſcience be ſo ſure a director to us Chriſtians in the conduct of our lives, how comes it to paſs, that the ancient Heathens, who had no other lights but thoſe of nature and reaſon, ſhould ſo far exceed us in all manner of virtue, as plainly appears by many examples they have left on record?

To which it may be anſwered: Firſt, thoſe Heathens were extremely ſtrict and exact in the education of their children: whereas, among us, this care is ſo much laid aſide, that the more God has bleſſed any man with eſtate or quality, juſt ſo much the leſs in proportion is the care he takes in the education of his children, and particularly of that child which is to inherit his fortune; of which the effects are viſible enough among the great ones of the world. Again, thoſe Heathens did, in a particular manner, inſtil the principle into their children of loving their country; which is ſo far otherwiſe now-a-days, that of the ſeveral parties among us, there is none of them that ſeem to have ſo much as heard whether there be ſuch a virtue in the world; as plainly appears by their practices, and eſpecially when they are placed in thoſe ſtations where they can only have opportunity of ſhewing it. Laſtly, the moſt conſiderable among the Heathens did generally believe rewards and puniſhments in a life to come; which is the great principle for conſcience to work upon: whereas too many of thoſe who would be thought the moſt conſiderable among us, do, both by their practices and their diſcourſes, plainly affirm, that they believe nothing at all of the matter.

Wherefore, ſince it hath manifeſtly appeared, that a religious conſcience is the only true ſolid foundation upon which virtue can be built, give me leave, before I conclude, to let you ſee how neceſſary ſuch a conſcience is to conduct us in every ſtation and condition of our lives.

That

That a religious conſcience is neceſſary in any ſtation, is confeſſed even by thoſe who tell us that all religion was invented by cunning men, in order to keep the world in awe. For if religion, by the confeſſion of its adverſaries, be neceſſary toward the well-governing of mankind; then every wiſe man in power will be ſure, not only to chuſe out for every ſtation under him, ſuch perſons as are moſt likely to be kept in awe by religion, but likewiſe to carry ſome appearance of it himſelf, or elſe he is a very weak politician. And accordingly, in any country, where great perſons affect to be open deſpiſers of religion, their counſels will be found at laſt to be fully as deſtructive to the ſtate as to the church.

It was the advice of Jethro to his ſon-in-law Moſes, to *provide able men, ſuch as fear God, men of truth, hating covetouſneſs*, and to place ſuch over the people; and Moſes, who was as wiſe a ſtateſman at leaſt as any in this age, thought fit to follow that advice. Great abilities, without the fear of God, are moſt dangerous inſtruments, when they are truſted with power. The laws of man have thought fit, that thoſe who are called to any office of truſt ſhould be bound by an oath to the faithful diſcharge of it: but an oath is an appeal to God, and therefore can have no influence except upon thoſe who believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of thoſe that ſeek him, and a puniſher of thoſe who diſobey him: and therefore we ſee the laws themſelves are forced to have recourſe to conſcience in theſe caſes; becauſe their penalties cannot reach the arts of cunning men, who can find ways to be guilty of a thouſand injuſtices, without being diſcovered, or at leaſt without being puniſhed. And the reaſon why we find ſo many frauds, abuſes, and corruptions, where any truſt is conferred, can be no other, than that there is ſo little conſcience and religion left in the world; or at

leaſt

leaſt that men, in their choice of inſtruments, have private ends in view, which are very different from the ſervice of the public. Beſides, is is certain, that men who profeſs to have no religion, are full as zealous to bring over proſelytes as any Papiſt or Fanatic can be. And therefore, if thoſe who are in ſtation high enough to be of influence or example to others; if thoſe (I ſay) openly profeſs a contempt or diſbelief of religion, they will be ſure to make all their dependents of their own principles; and what ſecurity can the public expect from ſuch perſons, whenever their intereſts or their luſts come into competition with their duty? It is very poſſible for a man who hath the appearance of religion, and is a great pretender to conſcience, to be wicked and a hypocrite; but it is impoſſible for a man who openly declares againſt religion, to give any reaſonable ſecurity that he will not be falſe, and cruel, and corrupt, whenever a temptation offers, which he values more than he does the power wherewith he was truſted. And if ſuch a man doth not betray his cauſe and his maſter, it is only becauſe the temptation was not properly offered, or the profit was too ſmall, or the danger too great. And hence it is, that we find ſo little truth or juſtice among us, becauſe there are ſo very few who, either in the ſervice of the public, or in common dealings with each other, do ever look farther than their own advantage, and how to guard themſelves againſt the laws of the country; which a man may do by favour, by ſecrecy, or by cunning, though he breaks almoſt every law of God.

Therefore, to conclude: It plainly appears, that unleſs men are guided by the advice and judgment of conſcience founded on religion, they can give no ſecurity that they will be either good ſubjects, faithful ſervants of the public, or honeſt in their mutual dealings; ſince there is no other tie, thro' which the pride, or luſt, or avarice, or ambition of

of mankind will not certainly break one time or other.

Consider what has been said, *&c.*

*** In this moral essay, for I can scarce call it a sermon, the author inserts some very striking observations upon such false notions of honour as are too prevalent in the world. [Here the particular passage is quoted, beginning thus, "The other false principle which "some men set up in the place of conscience," *&c. p.* 9. *l.* 1. and ending thus, "in order to revenge it by the death of an adversary," *ibid. l.* 27. ——But you must be weary of quotations: and in excuse for those already made, I can only offer, that in comments upon original authors, quotations are often the best, and perhaps the only explanations that can fully answer the end proposed. I mean, that the original spirit is so volatile, as not to admit of the least transfusion. In ordinary compositions, the essence may be extracted, and the subtilest parts distilled: but Swift's sermons appeared a chymical preparation of so extraordinary and penetrating a nature, that I was resolved to send you as much of the ethereal spirit as might be safely conveyed by the post. *Orrery.*

SERMON IV.

On BROTHERLY LOVE*.

HEB. xiii. 1.

Let brotherly love continue.

IN the early times of the gospel, the Christians were very much distinguished from all other bodies of men, by the great and constant love they bore to each other; which although it was done in obedience to the frequent injunctions of our Saviour and his apostles, yet, I confess, there seemeth to have been likewise a natural reason, that very much promoted it. For the Christians then were few and scattered, living under persecution by the

* This sermon is not in the Dublin edition.

Heath-

Heathens round about them, in whose hands was all the civil and military power; and there is nothing so apt to unite the minds and hearts of men, or to beget love and tenderness, as a general distress. The first dissensions between Christians took their beginning from the errors and heresies that arose among them; many of those heresies, sometimes extinguished, and sometimes reviving, or succeeded by others, remain to this day; and having been made instruments to the pride, avarice, or ambition of ill-designing men, by extinguishing brotherly love, have been the cause of infinite calamities, as well as corruptions of faith and manners, in the Christian world.

The last legacy of Christ was peace and mutual love; but then he foretold, that he came to send a sword upon the earth. The primitive Christians accepted the legacy, and their successors down to the present age have been largely fulfilling his prophecy. But whatever the practice of mankind hath been, or still continues, there is no duty more incumbent upon those who profess the gospel, than that of brotherly love; which whoever could restore in any degree among men, would be an instrument of more good to human society, than ever was, or will be done by all the statesmen and politicians in the world.

It is upon this subject of brotherly love that I intend to discourse at present; and the method I observe shall be as follows.

1. I will inquire into the causes of this great want of brotherly love among us.

2. I will lay open the sad effects and consequences which our animosities and mutual hatred have produced.

3. I will use some motives and exhortations that may persuade you to embrace brotherly love, and continue in it.

I. I shall inquire into the causes of this great want of brotherly love among us.

This nation of ours hath for an hundred years past been infested by two enemies, the Papists and Fanatics; who each in their turns filled it with blood and slaughter, and for a time destroyed both the church and government. The memory of these events hath put all true Protestants equally upon their guard against both these adversaries; who, by consequence, do equally hate us. The Fanatics revile us, as too nearly approaching to Popery; and the Papists condemn us, as bordering too much on Fanaticism. The Papists, God be praised, are, by the wisdom of our laws, put out of all visible possibility of hurting us; besides, their religion is so generally abhorred, that they have no advocates or abettors among Protestants to assist them. But the Fanatics are to be considered in another light: they have had, of late years, the power, the luck, or the cunning, to divide us among ourselves; they have endeavoured to represent all those who have been so bold as to oppose their errors and designs, under the character of persons disaffected to the government; and they have so far succeeded, that now-a-days, if a clergyman happens to preach with any zeal and vehemence against the sin or danger of schism, there will not want too many in his congregation ready enough to censure him, as hot and high-flying, an inflamer of mens minds, an enemy to moderation, and disloyal to his prince. This hath produced a formed and settled division between those who profess the same doctrine and discipline, while they who call themselves moderate, are forced to widen their bottom, by sacrificing their principles and their brethren to the incroachments and insolence of dissenters; who are therefore answerable, as a principal cause of all that hatred and animosity now reigning among us.

Another cauſe of the great want of brotherly love, is the weakneſs and folly of too many among you of the lower ſort, who are made the tools and inſtruments of your betters to work their deſigns, wherein you have no concern. Your numbers make you of uſe, and cunning men take the advantage by putting words into your mouths which you do not underſtand; then they fix good or ill characters to thoſe words, as it beſt ſerves their purpoſes; and thus you are taught to love or hate, you know not what or why; you often ſuſpect your beſt friends and neareſt neighbours, even your teacher himſelf, without any reaſon, if your leaders once taught you to call him by a name which they tell you ſignifieth ſome very bad thing.

A third cauſe of our great want of brotherly love ſeemeth to be, that this duty is not ſo often inſiſted on from the pulpit, as it ought to be in ſuch times as theſe: on the contrary, it is to be doubted, whether doctrines are not ſometimes delivered by an ungoverned zeal, a deſire to be diſtinguiſh'd, or a view of intereſt, which produce quite different effects; when, upon occaſions ſet apart to return thanks to God for ſome public bleſſing, the time is employed in ſtirring up one part of the congregation againſt the other, by repreſentations of things and perſons, which God in his mercy forgive thoſe who are guilty of.

The laſt cauſe I ſhall mention of the want of brotherly love, is that unhappy diſpoſition towards politics among the trading people, which hath been induſtriouſly inſtilled into them. In former times, the middle and lower ſort of mankind ſeldom gained or loſt by the factions of the kingdom; and therefore were little concerned in them, further than as matter of talk and amuſement: but now the meaneſt dealer will expect to turn the penny by the merits of his party. He can repreſent his neighbour

bour as a man of dangerous principles; can bring a railling accusation against him, perhaps a criminal one; and so rob him of his livelihood, and find his own account by that much more than if he had disparaged his nighbour's goods, or defamed him as a cheat. For so it happens, that instead of inquiring into the skill or honesty of those kind of people, the manner is now to inquire into their party, and to reject or encourage them accordingly; which proceeding hath made our people in general such able politicians, that all the artifice, flattery, dissimulation, diligence and dexterity in undermining each other, which the satirical wit of men hath charged upon courts; together with all the rage and violence, cruelty and injustice, which have been ever imputed to public assemblies; are with us (so polite are we grown) to be seen among our meanest traders and artificers in the greatest perfection. All which, as it may be matter of some humiliation to the wise and mighty of this world, so the effects thereof may perhaps in time prove very different from what, I hope in charity, were ever foreseen or intended.

II. I will therefore, now, in the second place, lay open some of the sad effects and consequences which our animosities and mutual hatred have produced.

And the first ill consequence is, that our want of brotherly love hath almost driven out all sense of religion from among us; which cannot well be otherwise: for since our Saviour laid so much weight upon his disciples loving one another, that he gave it among his last instructions; and since the primitive Christians are allowed to have chiefly propagated the faith, by their strict observance of that instruction; it must follow, that, in proportion as brotherly love declineth, Christianity will do so too. The little religion there is in the world, hath

been obſerved to reſide chiefly among the middle and lower ſort of people, who are neither tempted to pride and luxury by great riches, nor to deſperate courſes by extreme poverty: and truly I upon that account have thought it a happineſs, that thoſe who are under my immediate care are generally of that condition. But where party hath once made entrance, with all its conſequences, of hatred, envy, partiality, and virulence, religion cannot long keep its hold in any ſtate or degree of life whatſoever. For if the great men of the world have been cenſured in all ages for mingling too little religion with their politics, what a havock of principles muſt they needs make in unlearned and irregular heads? of which indeed the effects are already too viſible and melancholy all over the kingdom.

Another ill conſequence from our want of brotherly love is, that it increaſeth the inſolence of the Fanatics. And this partly ariſeth from a miſtaken meaning of the word *moderation*; a word which hath been much abuſed, and handed about for ſeveral years paſt. There are too many people indifferent enough to all religion; there are many others who diſlike the clergy, and would have them live in poverty and dependence. Both theſe ſorts are much commended by the Fanatics for moderate men, ready to put an end to our diviſions, and to make a general union among Proteſtants. Many ignorant well-meaning people are deceived by theſe appearances, ſtrengthened with great pretences to loyalty; and theſe occaſions the Fanatics lay hold on to revile the doctrine and diſcipline of the church, and even inſult and oppreſs the clergy, wherever their numbers or favourers will bear them out; inſomuch that one wilful refractory Fanatic hath been able to diſturb a whole pariſh for many years together. But the moſt moderate and favoured divines dare not own, that the word *moderation*

deration with reſpect to the diſſenters can be at all applied to their religion, but is purely perſonal or prudential. No good man repineth at the liberty of conſcience they enjoy; and perhaps a very moderate divine may think better of their loyalty than others do; or, to ſpeak after the manner of men, may think it neceſſary, that all Proteſtants ſhould be united againſt the common enemy; or out of diſcretion, or other reaſons beſt known to himſelf, be tender of mentioning them at all. But ſtill the errors of the diſſenters are all fixed and determined; and muſt, upon demand, be acknowledged by all the divines of our church, whether they be called, in party-phraſe, high or low, moderate or violent. And further, I believe it would be hard to find many moderate divines, who, if their opinion were aſked, whether diſſenters ſhould be truſted with power, could according to their conſciences anſwer in the affirmative: from whence it is plain, that all the ſtir which the Fanatics have made with this word *moderation*, was only meant to increaſe our diviſions, and widen them ſo far as to make room for themſelves to get in between. And this is the only ſcheme they ever had (except that of deſtroying root and branch) for the uniting of Proteſtants, they ſo much talk of.

I ſhall mention but one ill conſequence more, which attends our want of brotherly love; that it hath put an end to all hoſpitality and friendſhip, all good correſpondence and commerce between mankind. There are indeed ſuch things as leagues and confederacies among thoſe of the ſame party; but ſurely God never intended, that men ſhould be ſo limited in the choice of their friends: however, ſo it is in town and country, in every pariſh and ſtreet; the paſtor is divided from his flock, the father from his ſon, and the houſe often divided againſt itſelf. Mens very natures are ſoured, and their paſſions inflamed, when they meet in party-

clubs, and ſpend their time in nothing elſe but railing at the oppoſite ſide; thus every man alive among us is encompaſſed with a million of enemies of his own country, among which his oldeſt acquaintance, and friends, and kindred themſelves, are often of the number. Neither can people of different parties mix together without conſtraint, ſuſpicion, and jealouſy; watching every word they ſpeak, for fear of giving offence; or elſe falling into rudeneſs and reproaches, and ſo leaving themſelves open to the malice and corruption of informers, who were never more numerous or expert in their trade. And, as a further addition to this evil, thoſe very few, who, by the goodneſs and generoſity of their nature, do in their own hearts deſpiſe this narrow principle, of confining their friendſhip and eſteem, their charity and good offices, to thoſe of their own party, yet dare not diſcover their good inclinations, for fear of loſing their favour and intereſt. And others, again, whom God had formed with mild and gentle diſpoſitions, think it neceſſary to put a force upon their own tempers, by acting a noiſy, violent, malicious part, as a means to be diſtinguiſhed. Thus hath party got the better of the very genius and conſtitution of our people; ſo that whoever reads the character of the Engliſh in former ages, will hardly believe their preſent poſterity to be of the ſame nation or climate.

III. I ſhall now, in the laſt place, make uſe of ſome motives and exhortations, that may perſuade you to embrace brotherly love, and to continue in it. Let me apply myſelf to you of the lower ſort, and deſire you will conſider, when any of you make uſe of fair and enticing words to draw in cuſtomers, whether you do it for their ſakes or your own. And then for whoſe ſakes do you think it is, that your leaders are ſo induſtrious to put into your heads

heads all that party-rage and virulence? Is it not to make you the tools and inſtruments, by which they work out their own deſigns? Has this ſpirit of faction been uſeful to any of you in your worldly concerns, except to thoſe who have traded in whiſpering, backbiting, or informing, and wanted ſkill or honeſty to thrive by fairer methods? It is no buſineſs of yours to inquire, who is at the head of armies, or of councils, unleſs you had power and ſkill to chuſe, neither of which is ever like to be your caſe: and therefore to fill your heads with fears and hatred of perſons and things of which it is impoſſible you can ever make a right judgement, or to ſet you at variance with your neighbour, becauſe his thoughts are not the ſame as yours, is not only in a very groſs manner to cheat you of your time and quiet, but likewiſe to endanger your ſouls.

Secondly, In order to reſtore brotherly love, let me earneſtly exhort you to ſtand firm in your religion, I mean the true religion hitherto eſtabliſhed among us; without varying in the leaſt, either to Popery on the one ſide, or to Fanaticiſm on the other: and in a particular manner beware of that word, *moderation*; and believe it, that your neighbour is not immediately a villain, a Papiſt, and a traitor, becauſe the Fanatics and their adherents will not allow him to be a moderate man. Nay, it is very probable, that your teacher himſelf may be a loyal, pious, and able divine, without the leaſt grain of moderation, as the word is too frequently underſtood. Therefore, to ſet you right in this matter, I will lay before you the character of a truly moderate man; and then I will give you the deſcription of ſuch an one who falſely pretendeth to that title.

A man truly moderate is ſteady in the doctrine and diſcipline of the church, but with a due Chriſtian charity to all who diſſent from it out of a principle

principle of conſcience; the freedom of which, he thinketh, ought to be fully allowed, as long as it is not abuſed; but never truſted with power. He is ready to defend with his life and fortune the Proteſtant ſucceſſion, and the Proteſtant eſtabliſhed faith, againſt all invaders whatſoever. He is for giving the crown its juſt prerogative, and the people their juſt liberties. He hateth no man for differing from him in political opinions; nor doth he think it a maxim infallible, That virtue ſhould always attend upon favour, and vice upon diſgrace. Theſe are ſome few lineaments in the character of a truly moderate man. Let us now compare it with the deſcription of one who uſually paſſeth under that title.

A moderate man, in the new meaning of the word, is one to whom all religion is indifferent; who, although he denominates himſelf of the church, regardeth it no more than a conventicle. He perpetually raileth at the body of the clergy, with exceptions only to a very few, who he hopeth, and probably upon falſe grounds, are as ready to betray their rights and properties as himſelf. He thinks the power of the people can never be too great, nor that of the prince too little; and yet this very notion he publiſheth, as his beſt argument to prove him a moſt loyal ſubject. Every opinion in government that differeth in the leaſt from his, tends directly to Popery, ſlavery, and rebellion. Whoever lieth under the frown of power, can in his judgement neither have common ſenſe, common honeſty, nor religion. Laſtly, his devotion conſiſteth in drinking gibbets, confuſion, and damnation; in profanely idolizing the memory of one dead prince, and ungratefully trampling upon the aſhes of another.

By theſe marks you will eaſily diſtinguiſh a truly moderate man from thoſe who are commonly, but very falſely, ſo called: and while perſons thus qualified

lified are so numerous and so noisy, so full of zeal and industry to gain proselytes, and spread their opinions among the people, it cannot be wondered that there should be so little brotherly love left among us.

Lastly, It would probably contribute to restore some degree of brotherly love, if we would but consider, that the matter of those disputes which inflame us to this degree, doth not in its own nature at all concern the generality of mankind. Indeed, as to those who have been great gainers or losers by the changes of the world, the case is different; and to preach moderation to the first, and patience to the last, would perhaps be to little purpose. But what is that to the bulk of the people, who are not properly concerned in the quarrel, although evil instruments have drawn them into it? For if the reasonable men on both sides were to confer opinions, they would find neither religion, loyalty, nor interest, are at all affected in this dispute. Not religion, because the members of the church on both sides profess to agree in every article: not loyalty to our prince; which is pretended to by one party as much as the other, and therefore can be no subject for debate: not interest, for trade and industry lie open to all; and, what is further, concerneth only those who have expectations from the public. So that the body of the people, if they knew their own good, might yet live amicably together, and leave their betters to quarrel among themselves, who might also probably soon come to a better temper, if they were less seconded and supported by the poor deluded multitude.

I have now done with my text; which I confess to have treated in a manner more suited to the present times, than to the nature of the subject in general. That I have not been more particular in explaining the several parts and properties of this great duty of brotherly love, the apostle to the

Thessalonians

Theſſalonians will plead my excuſe. "Touching "brotherly love," (ſaith he), "ye need not that "I write unto you; for ye yourſelves are taught "of God to love one another." So that nothing remains to add, but our prayers to God, that he would pleaſe to reſtore and continue this great duty of brotherly love or charity among us, the very bond of peace and of all virtues.

Nov. 20. 1717.

SERMON V.

The difficulty of knowing one's ſelf *.

2 Kings viii. 13. part of it.

And Hazael ſaid, But what, is thy ſervant a dog, that he ſhould do this great thing?

WE have a very ſignal inſtance of the deceitfulneſs of the heart repreſented to us in the perſon of Hazael; who was ſent to the prophet Eliſha,

* The manuſcript title-page of the following ſermon being loſt, and no memorandums writ upon it, as there were upon the others, when and where it was preached, made the editor doubtful whether he ſhould print it as the Dean's or not. But its being found amongſt the ſame papers; and the hand, although writ ſomewhat better, having a great ſimilitude to the Dean's, made him willing to lay it before the public, that they might judge whether the ſtyle and manner alſo do not render it ſtill more probable to be his. *Dublin edition.* —— I ſhall take no notice of this ſermon, as it is evidently not compoſed by the Dean. *Orrery.*

to inquire of the Lord, concerning his master the King of Syria's recovery. For the man of God having told him that the king might recover from the disorder he was then labouring under, began to set and fasten his countenance upon him of a sudden, and to break out into the most violent expressions of sorrow, and a deep concern for it: whereupon, when Hazael, full of shame and confusion, asked, "Why weepeth my lord?" he answered, "Because I know the evil that thou wilt do unto "the children of Israel: Their strong holds wilt "thou set on fire, and their young men wilt thou "slay with the sword, and wilt dash their children, "and rip up their women with child." Thus much did the man of God say and know of him, by a light darted into his mind from heaven. But Hazael, not knowing himself so well as the other did, was startled and amazed at the relation, and would not believe it possible, that a man of his temper could ever run out into such enormous instances of cruelty and inhumanity: "What," says he, "is thy servant a dog, that he should do this great "thing?"

And yet, for all this, it is highly probable, that he was then that very man he could not imagine himself to be: for we find him, on the very next day after his return, in a very treacherous and disloyal manner, murdering his own master, and usurping his kingdom; which was but a prologue to the sad tragedy which he afterwards acted upon the people of Israel.

And now the case is but very little better with most men, than it was with Hazael. However it cometh to pass, they are wonderfully unacquainted with their own temper and disposition, and know very little of what passeth within them: for of so many proud, ambitious, revengeful, envying, and ill-natured persons that are in the world, where is there one of them, who, although he hath all the symptoms

ſymptoms of the vice appearing upon every occaſion, can look with ſuch an impartial eye upon himſelf, as to believe that the imputation thrown upon him is not altogether groundleſs and unfair? who, if he were told, by men of a diſcerning ſpirit and a ſtrong conjecture, of all the evil and abſurd things which that falſe heart of his would at one time or other betray him into, would not believe as little, and wonder as much, as Hazael did before him? Thus, for inſtance, tell an angry perſon, that he is weak and impotent, and of no conſiſtency of mind; tell him, that ſuch or ſuch a little accident, which he may then deſpiſe, and think much below a paſſion, ſhall hereafter make him ſay and do ſeveral abſurd, indiſcreet, and miſbecoming things: he may perhaps own, that he hath a ſpirit of reſentment within him, that will not let him be impoſed on; but he fondly imagines, that he can lay a becoming reſtraint upon it when he pleaſes, although it is ever running away with him into ſome indecency or other.

Therefore, to bring down the words of my text to our preſent occaſion, I ſhall endeavour, in a further proſecution of them, to evince the great neceſſity of a nice and curious inſpection into the ſeveral receſſes of the heart; that being the ſureſt and the ſhorteſt method that a wicked man can take to reform himſelf. For let us but ſtop the fountain, and the ſtreams will ſpend and waſte themſelves away in a very little time: but if we go about, like children, to raiſe a bank, and to ſtop the current, not taking notice all the while of the ſpring which continually feedeth it; when the next flood of a temptation riſeth, and breaketh in upon it, then we ſhall find, that we have begun at the wrong end of our duty, and that we are very little more the better for it, than if we had ſat ſtill, and made no advances at all.

But,

But, in order to a clearer explanation of the point, I shall speak to these following particulars.

1. By endeavouring to prove, from particular instances, that man is generally the most ignorant creature in the world of himself.

2. By inquiring into the grounds and reasons of this ignorance.

3. And lastly, by proposing several advantages that do most assuredly attend a due improvement in the knowledge of ourselves.

I. First then, To prove that man is generally the most ignorant creature in the world of himself:

To pursue the heart of man through all the instances of life, in all its several windings and turnings, and under that infinite variety of shapes and appearances which it putteth on, would be a difficult and almost impossible undertaking: so that I shall confine myself to such as have a nearer reference to the present occasion, and do, upon a closer view, shew themselves through the whole business of repentance. For we all know what it is to repent; but whether he repenteth him truly of his sins or not, who can know it?

Now, the great duty of repentance is chiefly made up of these two parts; a hearty sorrow for the follies and miscarriages of the time past, and a full purpose and resolution of amendment for the time to come. And now, to shew the falseness of the heart in both these parts of repentance. And,

First, As to a hearty sorrow for the sins and miscarriages of the time past: Is there a more usual thing than for a man to impose upon himself, by putting on a grave and demure countenance, by casting a severe look into his past conduct, and making some few pious and devout reflections upon it, and then to believe that he hath repented to an excellent purpose, without ever letting it step forth into practice,

and ſhew itſelf in a holy converſation? Nay, ſome perſons do carry the deceit a little higher; who, if they can but bring themſelves to weep for their ſins, are then full of an ill-grounded confidence and ſecurity; never conſidering, that all this may prove to be no more than the very garb and outward dreſs of a contrite heart, which another heart, as hard as the nether millſtone, may as well put on. For tears and ſighs, however in ſome perſons they may be decent and commendable expreſſions of a godly ſorrow, are neither neceſſary, nor infallible ſigns of a true and unfeigned repentance: not neceſſary, becauſe ſometimes, and in ſome perſons, the inward grief and anguiſh of the mind may be too big to be expreſſed by ſo little a thing as a tear; and then it turneth its edge inwards upon the mind; and, like thoſe wounds of the body which bleed inwardly, it generally proves the moſt fatal and dangerous to the whole body of ſin: not infallible, becauſe a very ſmall portion of ſorrow may make ſome tender diſpoſitions melt, and break out into tears; or a man may perhaps weep at parting with his ſins, as he would to bid the laſt farewell to an old friend, that he was ſure never to ſee again.

But there is ſtill a more pleaſant cheat in this affair, that when we find a deadneſs, and a ſtrange kind of unaptneſs and indiſpoſition to all impreſſions of religion, and that we cannot be as truly ſorry for our ſins as we ſhould be, we then pretend to be ſorry that we are not more ſorry for them; which is not leſs abſurd and irrational, than that a man ſhould pretend to be very angry at a thing; becauſe he did not know how to be angry at all.

But after all, what is wanting in this part of repentance, we expect to make it up in the next; and to that purpoſe we put on a reſolution of amendment, which we take to be as firm as a houſe built upon

upon a rock; so that let the floods arise, and the winds blow, and the streams beat vehemently upon it, nothing shall shake it into ruin and disorder. We doubt not, upon the strength of this resolve, to stand fast and unmoved amidst the storm of a temptation; and do firmly believe, at the time we make it, that nothing in the world will ever be able to make us commit those sins over again, which we have so firmly resolved against.

Thus many a time have we come to the sacrament of the Lord's supper, with a full purpose of amendment, and with as full a perswasion of putting that same purpose into practice; and yet have we not all as often broke that good purpose, and falsified that same perswasion, by starting aside, like a broken bow, into those very sins which we then so solemnly and so confidently declared against?

Whereas, had but any other person entered with us into a vow so solemn, that he had taken the holy sacrament upon it, I believe had he but once deceived us by breaking in upon the vow, we should hardly ever after be prevailed upon to trust that man again, although we still continue to trust our own hearts, against reason and against experience.

This indeed is a dangerous deceit enough; and will of course betray all those well-meaning persons into sin and folly, who are apt to take religion for a much easier thing than it is. But this is not the only mistake we are apt to run into: we do not only think sometimes that we can do more than we can do, but sometimes that we are incapable of doing less: An error of another kind indeed, but not less dangerous, arising from a diffidence and false humility: for how much a wicked man can do in the business of religion, if he would do his best, is very often more than he can tell.

Thus nothing is more common, than to see a wicked man running headlong into sin and folly, against his reason, against his religion, and against

his God. Tell him, that what he is going to do will be an infinite diſparagement to his underſtanding, which at another time he ſetteth no ſmall value upon; tell him, that it will blacken his reputation, which he had rather die for than loſe; tell him, that the pleaſure of the ſin is ſhort and tranſient, and leaveth a vexatious kind of ſting behind it, which will very hardly be drawn forth; tell him, that this is one of thoſe things for which God will moſt ſurely bring him to judgment, which he pretendeth to believe with a full aſſurance and perſuaſion: And yet, for all this, he ſhutteth his eyes againſt all conviction, and ruſheth into the ſin, like a horſe into the battle; as if he had nothing left to do, but, like a ſilly child, to wink hard, and to think to eſcape a certain and an infinite miſchief, only by endeavouring not to ſee it.

And now to ſhew that the heart hath given in a falſe report of the temptation, we may learn from this, that the ſame weak man would reſiſt and maſter the ſame powerful temptation, upon conſiderations of infinitely leſs value than thoſe which religion offereth, nay, ſuch vile conſiderations, that the grace of God cannot, without blaſphemy, be ſuppoſed to add any manner of force and efficacy to them. Thus, for inſtance, it would be an hard matter to dreſs up a ſin in ſuch ſoft and tempting circumſtances, that a truly covetous man would not reſiſt for a conſiderable ſum of money; when neither the hopes of heaven nor the fears of hell could make an impreſſion upon him before. But can any thing be a ſurer indication of the deceitfulneſs of the heart, than thus to ſhew more courage, reſolution, and activity, in an ill cauſe, than it doth in a good one? and to exert itſelf to better purpoſe, when it is to ſerve its own pride, or luſt, or revenge, or any other paſſion, than when it is to ſerve God upon the motives of the goſpel, and upon all the arguments that have ever been made uſe

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of to bring men over to religion and a good life? And thus having shewn that a man is wonderfully apt to deceive and impose upon himself, in passing through the several stages of that great duty, repentance, I proceed now, in the

II. Second place, to inquire into the grounds and reasons of this ignorance, and to shew whence it cometh to pass, that a man, the only creature in the world that can reflect and look into himself, should know so little of what passeth within him, and be so very much unacquainted even with the standing dispositions and complexion of his own heart. The prime reason of it is, because we so very seldom converse with ourselves, and take so little notice of what passeth within us. For a man can no more know his own heart than he can know his own face, any other way than by reflection: He may as well tell over every feature of the smaller portions of his face without the help of a looking-glass, as he can tell all the inward bents and tendencies of the soul, those standing features and lineaments of the inward man, and know all the various changes that this is liable to, from custom, from passion, and from opinion, without a very frequent use of looking within himself.

For our passion and inclinations are not always upon the wing, and always moving towards their respective objects; but retire now and then into the more dark and hidden recesses of the heart, where they lie concealed for a while, until a fresh occasion calls them forth again; so that not every transient, oblique glance upon the mind, can bring a man into a through knowlege of all its strengths and weaknesses; far a man may sometimes turn the eye of the mind inward upon itself, as he may behold his natural face in a glass, and go away, and straight forget what manner of man he was. But a man must rather sit down, and unravel every

action of the past day into all its circumstances and particularities, and observe how every little thing moved and affected him, and what manner of impression it made upon his heart: This done with that frequency and carefulness which the importance of the duty doth require, would in a short time bring him into a near and intimate acquaintance with himself.

But when men, instead of this, do pass away months and years in a perfect slumber of the mind without once awaking it, it is no wonder they should be so very ignorant of themselves, and know very little more of what passeth within them than the very beasts which perish. But here it may not be amiss to inquire into the reasons why most men have so little conversation with themselves.

And, *1st*, Because this reflection is a work and labour of the mind, and cannot be performed without some pain and difficulty. For, before a man can reflect upon himself, and look into his heart with a steady eye, he must contract his sight, and collect all his scattered and roving thoughts into some order and compass, that he may be able to take a clear and distinct view of them; he must retire from the world for a while, and be unattentive to all impressions of sense; And how hard and painful a thing must it needs be to a man of passion and infirmity, amidst such a crowd of objects that are continually striking upon the sense, and soliciting the affections, not to be moved and interrupted by one or other of them! But,

2dly, Another reason why we so seldom converse with ourselves, is, because the business of the world taketh up all our time, and leaveth us no portion of it to spend upon this great work and labour of the mind. Thus twelve or fourteen years pass away before we can well discern good from evil; and of the rest so much goeth away in sleep, so much in the ordinary business of life, and so much

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in the proper buſineſs of our callings, that we have none to lay out upon the more ſerious and religious employments. Every man's life is an imperfect ſort of a circle, which he repeateth and runneth over every day; he hath a ſet of thoughts, deſires, and inclinations, which return upon him in their proper time and order, and will very hardly be laid aſide to make room for any thing new and uncommon: So that call upon him when you pleaſe, to ſet about the ſtudy of his own heart, and you are ſure to find him pre-engaged; either he hath ſome buſineſs to do, or ſome diverſion to take, ſome acquaintance that he muſt viſit, or ſome company that he muſt entertain, or ſome croſs accident hath put him out of humour, and unfitted him for ſuch a grave employment. And thus it comes to paſs, that a man can never find leiſure to look into himſelf, becauſe he doth not ſet apart ſome portion of the day for that very purpoſe, but fooliſhly defereth it from one day to another, until his glaſs is almoſt run out, and he is called upon to give a miſerable account of himſelf in the other world. But,

3*dly*, Another reaſon why a man doth not more frequently converſe with himſelf, is, becauſe ſuch a converſation with his own heart may diſcover ſome vice or ſome infirmity lurking within him, which he is very unwilling to believe himſelf guilty of. For can there be a more ungrateful thing to a man, than to find, that, upon a nearer view, he is not that perſon he took himſelf to be? that he hath neither the courage, nor the honeſty, nor the piety, nor the humility, that he dreamed he had? that a very little pain, for inſtance, putteth him out of patience, and as little pleaſure ſofteneth and diſarmeth him into eaſe and wantonneſs? that he hath been at more pains, and labour, and coſt, to be revenged of an enemy, than to oblige

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the beſt friend he hath in the world? that he cannot bring himſelf to ſay his prayers without a great deal of reluctancy; and when he doth ſay them, the ſpirit and fervour of devotion evaporate in a very ſhort time, and he can ſcarcely hold out a prayer of ten lines, without a number of idle and impertinent, if not vain and wicked thoughts coming into his head? Theſe are very unwelcome diſcoveries that a man may make of himſelf; ſo that it is no wonder that every one who is already flushed with a good opinion of himſelf, ſhould rather ſtudy how to run away from it, than how to converſe with his own heart.

But further, if a man were both able and willing to retire into his own heart, and to ſet apart ſome portion of the day for that very purpoſe; yet he is ſtill diſabled from paſſing a fair and impartial judgment upon himſelf, by ſeveral difficulties, ariſing partly from prejudice and prepoſſeſſion, partly from the lower appetites and inclinations. And,

1ſt, That the buſineſs of prepoſſeſſion may lead and betray a man into a falſe judgment of his own heart. For we may obſerve, that the firſt opinion we take up of any thing, or of any perſon, doth generally ſtick cloſe to us; the nature of the mind being ſuch, that it cannot but deſire, and conſequently endeavour, to have ſome certain principles to go upon, ſomething fixed and immoveable, whereon it may reſt and ſupport itſelf. And hence it cometh to paſs, that ſome perſons are with ſo much difficulty brought to think well of a man they have once entertained an ill opinion of; and, perhaps, that too for a very abſurd and unwarrantable reaſon. But how much more difficult then muſt it be, for a man who taketh up a fond opinion of his own heart, long before he hath either years or ſenſe enough to underſtand it, either to be perſuaded out of it by himſelf, whom he loveth

loveth ſo well; or, by another, whoſe intereſt or diverſion it may be to make him aſhamed of himſelf? Then,

2*dly*, As to the difficulties ariſing from the inferior appetites and inclinations, let any man look into his own heart, and obſerve in how different a light, and under what different complexions, any two ſins, of equal turpitude and malignity, do appear to him, if he hath but a ſtrong inclination to the one, and none at all to the other. That which he hath an inclination to, is always dreſſed up in all the falſe beauty that a fond and buſy imagination can give it; the other appeareth naked and deformed, and in all the true circumſtances of folly and diſhonour. Thus, ſtealing is a vice that few gentlemen are inclined to; and they juſtly think it below the dignity of a man, to ſtoop to ſo baſe and low a ſin: But no principle of honour, no workings of the mind and conſcience, not the ſtill voice of mercy, not the dreadful call of judgment, nor any conſiderations whatever, can put a ſtop to that violence and oppreſſion, that pride and ambition, that revelling and wantonneſs, which we every day we meet with in the world. Nay, it is eaſy to obſerve very different thoughts in a man, of the ſin that he is moſt fond of, according to the different ebbs and flows of his inclination to it. For as ſoon as the appetite is alarmed, and ſeizeth upon the heart, a little cloud gathereth about the head, and ſpreadeth a kind of darkneſs over the face of the ſoul, whereby it is hindered from taking a clear and diſtinct view of things: But no ſooner is the appetite tired and ſatiated, but the ſame cloud paſſeth away like a ſhadow, and a new light ſpringing up in the mind of a ſudden, the man ſeeth much more, both of the folly and of the danger of the ſin, than he did before.

And thus having done with the ſeveral reaſons, why man, the only creature in the world that can reflect

reflect and look into himself, is so very ignorant of what passeth within him, and so much unacquainted with the standing dispositions and complexions of his own heart: I proceed now, in the

III. Third and last place, to lay down several advantages, that do *most assuredly* attend a due improvement in the knowledge of ourselves. And,

1. One great advantage is, that it tendeth very much to mortify and humble a man into a modest and low opinion of himself. For let a man take a nice and curious inspection into all the several regions of the heart, and observe every thing irregular and amiss within him; for instance, how narrow and short-sighted a thing is the understanding! upon how little reason do we take up an opinion, and upon how much less sometimes do we lay it down again! how weak and false ground do we often walk upon, with the biggest confidence and assurance; and how tremulous and doubtful we are very often, where no doubt is to be made! again, how wild and impertinent, how busy and incoherent a thing is the imagination, even in the best and wisest men; insomuch that every man may be said to be mad, but every man doth not shew it! Then, as to the passions, how noisy, how turbulent, and how tumultuous are they! how easily are they stirred and set a-going; how eager and hot in the pursuit, and what strange disorder and confusion do they throw a man into, so that he can neither think, nor speak, nor act, as he should do, while he is under the dominion of any of them.

Thus, let every man look with a severe and impartial eye into all the distinct regions of the heart; and, no doubt, several deformities and irregularities that he never thought of, will open and disclose themselves upon so near a view; and rather make the man ashamed of himself, than proud.

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2. A due improvement in the knowlege of ourselves, doth certainly secure us from the fly and insinuating assaults of flattery. There is not in the world a baser, and more hateful thing, than flattery. It proceedeth from so much falseness and insincerity in the man that giveth it, and often discovereth so much weakness and folly in the man that taketh it, that it is hard to tell which of the two is most to be blamed. Every man of common sense can demonstrate in speculation and may be fully convinced, that all the praises and commendations of the whole world can add no more to the real and intrinsic value of a man, than they can add to his stature. And yet, for all this, men of the best sense and piety when they come down to the practice, cannot forbear thinking much better of themselves, when they have the good fortune to be spoken well of by other persons.

But the meaning of this absurd proceeding seemeth to be no other than this; There are few men that have so intimate an acquaintance with their own hearts, as to know their own real worth, and how to set a just rate upon themselves; and therefore they do not know, but that he who praises them most, may be most in the right of it. For, no doubt if a man were ignorant of the true value of a thing he loved as well as himself, he would measure the worth of it according to the esteem of him who biddeth most for it, rather than of him that biddeth less.

Therefore the most infalliable way to disintangle a man from the snares of flattery, is, to consult and study his own heart; for whoever does that well, will hardly be so absurd, as to take another man's word, before his own sense and experience.

3. Another advantage from this kind of study, is this, that it teacheth a man how to behave himself patiently, when he has the ill fortune to be censured and abused by other people. For a man who is thoroughly acquainted with his own heart, doth already

already know much more evil of himself than any body else can tell him; and when any one speaketh ill of him, he rather thanketh God, that he can say no worse. For could his enemy but look into the dark and hidden recesses of the heart, he considereth what a number of impure thoughts he might there see brooding and hovering like a dark cloud upon the face of the soul; that there he might take a prospect of the fancy, and view it acting over the several scenes of pride, of ambition, of envy, of lust, and revenge; that there he might tell how often a vitious inclination hath been restrained, for no other reason, but just to save the man's credit or interest in the world; and how many unbecoming ingredients have entered into the composition of his best actions. And now, what man in the whole world would be able to bear so severe a test, to have every thought and inward motion of the heart laid open and exposed to the view of his enemies? But,

4. and *lastly*, Another advantage of this kind is, that it maketh men less severe upon other people's faults, and less busy and industrious in spreading them. For a man employed at home, inspecting into his own failings, hath not leisure enough to take notice of every little spot and blemish that lieth scattered upon others: or, if he cannot escape the sight of them, he always passes the most easy and favourable construction upon them. Thus, for instance, does the ill he knoweth of a man proceed from an unhappy temper and constitution of body? He then considereth with himself, how hard a thing it is, not to be borne down with the current of the blood and spirits; and accordingly layeth some part of the blame upon the weakness of human nature; for he hath felt the force and rapidity of it within his own breast; though, perhaps, in another instance, he remembereth how it rageth and swelleth by opposition; and though

though it may be reſtrained, or diverted for a while, yet it can hardly ever be totally ſubdued.

Or, hath the man ſinned out of cuſtom? he then, from his own experience, traceth a habit into the very firſt riſe and imperfect beginnings of it; and can tell, by how ſlow and inſenſible advances it creepeth upon the heart; how it worketh itſelf by degrees into the very frame and texture of it, and ſo paſſeth into a ſecond nature; and conſequently he hath a juſt ſenſe of the great difficulty for him to learn to do good, who hath been long accuſtomed to do evil.

Or, laſtly, hath a falſe opinion betrayed him into a ſin? he then calleth to mind what wrong apprehenſions he hath had of ſome things himſelf; how many opinions that he once made no doubt of, he hath, upon a ſtricter examination, found to be doubtful and uncertain; how many more to be unreaſonable and abſurd. He knoweth further, that there are a great many more opinions that he hath never yet examined into at all, and which, however, he ſtill believeth, for no other reaſon, but becauſe he hath believed them ſo long already without a reaſon. Thus, upon every occaſion, a man intimately acquainted with himſelf, conſulteth his own heart, and maketh every man's caſe to be his own, (and ſo puts the moſt favourable interpretation upon it) Let every man therefore look into his own heart, before he beginneth to abuſe the reputation of another, and then he will hardly be ſo abſurd, as to throw a dart that will ſo certainly rebound, and wound himſelf. And thus, through the whole courſe of his converſation, let him keep an eye upon that one great and comprehenſive rule of Chriſtian duty, on which hangeth not only the law and the prophets, but the very life and ſpirit of the goſpel too: *Whatſoever ye would that men ſhould do unto you, do ye even ſo*

unto them. Which rule that we may all duly obſerve, by throwing aſide all ſcandal and detraction, all ſpite and rancour, all rudeneſs and contempt, all rage and violence, and whatever tendeth to make converſation and commerce either uneaſy or troubleſome, may the God of peace grant, for Jeſus Chriſt's ſake, *&c.*

Conſider what has been ſaid, and the Lord give you a right underſtanding in all things. To whom, with the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt, be all honour, and glory, now and for ever.

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Ultra quam satis est, virtutem si petat ipsum.
HOR.

HAving, with great sorrow of heart, observed the increase of Popery among us of late years, and how ineffectual the penal laws and statutes of this realm have been, for near forty years last past, towards reclaiming that blind and deluded people from their errors, notwithstanding the good intentions of the legislators, and the *pious and unwearied labours* of the many learned divines of the established church, who have preached to them *without ceasing*, although hitherto without success:

Having also remarked, in his Grace's speech to both houses of parliament, most kind offers of his Grace's good offices, towards obtaining such further laws as shall be thought necessary towards bringing home the said wandering sheep into the fold of the church; as also a good disposition in the parliament to join in the *laudable* work, towards which every good Protestant ought to contribute

at leaſt his advice: I think it a proper time to lay before the public a ſcheme which was writ ſome years ſince, and laid by to be ready on a fit occaſion.

That whereas the ſeveral penal laws and ſtatutes now in being againſt Papiſts, have been found ineffectual, and rather tend to confirm than reclaim men from their errors, as, calling a man *coward*, is a ready way to make him fight; it is humbly propoſed,

I. That the ſaid penal laws and ſtatutes againſt Papiſts, except the law of *Gavelkind*, and that which diſqualifies them for places, be repealed, abrogated, annulled, deſtroyed, and obliterated, to all intents and purpoſes.

II. That, in room of the ſaid penal laws and ſtatutes, all eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction be taken from out of the hands of the clergy of the eſtabliſhed church, and the ſame be veſted in the ſeveral Popiſh archbiſhops, biſhops, deans, and archdeacons; nevertheleſs ſo as ſuch juriſdiction be exerciſed over perſons of the Popiſh religion only.

III. That a Popiſh prieſt ſhall be ſettled by law in each and every pariſh in Ireland.

IV. That the ſaid Popiſh prieſt ſhall, on taking the oath of allegiance to his Majeſty, be intitled to a tenth part or tithe of all things tithable in Ireland, belonging to the Papiſts within their reſpective pariſhes; yet ſo as ſuch grant of tithes to ſuch Popiſh prieſts, ſhall not be conſtrued, *in law or equity*, to hinder the Proteſtant clergyman of ſuch pariſh from receiving and collecting his tithes, in *like manner* as he does at preſent.

V. That, in caſe of detention or ſubtraction of tithes by any Papiſt, the pariſh-prieſt do have his remedy at law, in any of his Majeſty's courts, in the ſame *manner as now practiſed by the clergy of the eſtabliſhed church*; together with all other eccleſiaſtical dues. And, for their further diſcovery, to

vex

vex their people at law, it might not be amiſs to oblige the Solicitor-General, or ſome other able King's counſel, to give his advice or aſſiſtance to to ſuch prieſts *gratis*, for which he might receive a ſalary out of the *barrack-fund, military contingencies*, or *concordatum*; having obſerved the exceedings there better paid than of the army, or any other branch of the eſtabliſhment; and I would have no delay in payment in a matter of this importance.

VI. That the archbiſhops and biſhops have power to viſit the inferior clergy, and to extort proxies exhibits, and all other perquiſites uſual in *Popiſh* and *Proteſtant countries*.

VII. That the convocation having been found, by long experience, to be hurtful to *true religion*, be for ever hereafter aboliſhed among Proteſtants.

VIII. That, in the room thereof, the Popiſh archbiſhops, biſhops, prieſts, deans, archdeacons, and proctors, have liberty to aſſemble themſelves in convocation, and be impowered to make ſuch canons as they ſhall think proper for the government of the Papiſts in Ireland.

IX. And, that the ſecular arm being neceſſary to inforce obedience to eccleſiaſtical cenſure, the ſheriffs, conſtables, and other officers, be commanded to execute the decrees and ſentences of the ſaid Popiſh convocation, with ſecrecy and diſpatch; or, in lieu thereof, they may be at liberty to erect an inquiſition with proper officers of their own.

X That, as Papiſts declare themſelves converts to the eſtabliſhed church, all *ſpiritual power* over them ſhall ceaſe.

XI. That as ſoon as any whole pariſh ſhall renounce the popiſh religion, the Prieſt of ſuch pariſh ſhall, for his good ſervices, have a penſion of 200 l. *per annum* ſettled on him for life, and that he be, from ſuch time, exempt from preaching and

praying, and other duties of his function, in like manner as *Proteſtant divines*, with equal incomes, are at preſent.

XII. That each biſhop, ſo ſoon as his dioceſe ſhall become Proteſtants, be called *My Lord*, and have a penſion of two thouſand pounds *per annum* during life.

XIII. That when a whole province ſhall be reclaimed, the archbiſhop ſhall be called *His Grace*, and have a penſion of three thouſand pounds *per annum*, during life, and be admitted a member of his Majeſty's *moſt honourable privy council*.

The good conſequences of this ſcheme (which will execute itſelf without murmurings againſt the government) are very viſible. I ſhall mention a few of the moſt obvious.

I. The giving the prieſt a right to the tithe would produce law ſuits and wrangles; his Reverence, being intitled to a certain income at all events, would conſider himſelf as a legal incumbent, and *behave accordingly*, and apply himſelf more to fleecing than feeding his flock. His neceſſary attendance on the courts of juſtice would leave his people without a *ſpiritual guide*; by which means proteſtant curates, who have no ſuits about tithes, would be furniſhed with proper opportunities for making converts, which is very much wanted.

II. The erecting a ſpiritual juriſdiction amongſt them, would, *in all probability*, drive as many out of that communion, as a *due execution* of ſuch juriſdiction hath hitherto drove from amongſt ourſelves.

III. An *inquiſition* would ſtill be a further improvement, and moſt certainly would expedite the converſion of Papiſts.

I know it may be objected to this ſcheme, and with ſome ſhew of reaſon, That, ſhould the Popiſh princes abroad purſue the ſame methods, with regard to their Proteſtant ſubjects, the Proteſtant intereſt

tereſt in Europe would thereby be conſiderably weakned. But, as we have no reaſon to ſuſpect Popiſh counſels will ever produce ſo much moderation, I think the objection ought to have but little weight.

A due execution of this ſcheme will ſoon produce many converts from Popery: nevertheleſs, to the end it may be known when they ſhall be of the true *church*, I have ordered a large parcel of eccleſiaſtical or church *thermometers* to be made, one of which is to be hung up in each pariſh church; the deſcription and uſe of which take as follows, in the words of the ingenious Iſaac Bickerſtaff, Eſq;

THE church-thermometer, which I am now to treat of, is ſuppoſed to have been invented in the reign of Henry VIII. about the time when that religious prince put ſome to death for owning the Pope's ſupremacy, and others for denying tranſubſtantiation. I do not find, however, any great uſe made of this inſtrument, till it fell into the hand of a learned and vigilant prieſt or miniſter, (for he frequently wrote himſelf both the one and the other), who was ſome time vicar of Bray. This gentleman lived in his vicarage to a good old age; and, after having ſeen ſeveral ſucceſſions of his neighbouring clergy, either burnt or baniſhed, departed this life with the ſatisfaction of having never deſerted his flock, and died vicar of Bray. As this glaſs was firſt deſigned to calculate the different degrees of heat in religion, as it raged in Popery, or as it cooled and grew temperate in the reformation, it was marked at ſeveral diſtances, after the manner our ordinary thermometer is to this day, *viz. Extreme hot, Sultry hot, Very hot, Hot, Warm, Temperate, Cold, Juſt freezing, Froſt, Hard froſt, Great froſt, Extreme cold.*

It is well known, that Torricellius, the inventor of the common weather-glaſs, made the experiment

ment of a long tube which held thirty-two feet of water; and that a more modern virtuoso finding such a machine altogether unwieldy and useless, and considering that thirty-two inches of quicksilver weighed as much as so many foot of water in a tube of the same circumference, invented that sizable instrument which is now in use. After this manner, that I might adapt the thermometer I am now speaking of to the present constitution of our church, as divided into *High* and *Low*, I have made some necessary variations, both in the tube, and the fluid it contains. In the first place, I ordered a tube to be cast in a planetary hour, and took care to seal it hermetically, when the sun was in conjunction with Saturn. I then took the proper precautions about the fluid, which is a compound of two different liquors; one of them a spirit drawn out of a strong heady wine; the other a particular sort of rock-water, colder than ice, and clearer than crystal. The spirit is of a red, fiery colour; and so very apt to ferment, that, unless it be mingled with a proportion of the water, or pent up very close, it will burst the vessel that holds it, and fly up in fume and smoke. The water, on the contrary, is of such a subtle, piercing cold, that unless it be mingled with a proportion of the spirits, it will sink almost through every thing it is put into; and seems to be of the same nature as the water mentioned by Quintus Curtius, which, says the historian, could be contained in nothing but the hoof, or (as the Oxford manuscript has it) the scull of an ass. The thermometer is marked according to the following figure, which I set down at length, not only to give my reader a clear idea of it, but also to fill up my paper.

Ignorance

Ignorance.
Perſecution.
Wrath.
Zeal.
CHURCH.
Moderation.
Lukewarmneſs.
Infidelity.
Ignorance.

The reader will obſerve, that the *Church* is placed in the middle point of the glaſs, between *Zeal* and *Moderation*, the ſituation in which ſhe always flouriſhes, and in which every good Engliſhman wiſhes her, who is a friend to the conſtitution of his country. However, when it mounts to *Zeal*, it is not amiſs; and when it ſinks to *Moderation*, it is ſtill in admirable temper. The worſt of it is, that when once it begins to riſe, it has ſtill an inclination to aſcend, inſomuch that it is apt to climb from *Zeal* to *Wrath*, and from *Wrath* to *Perſecution*, which often ends in *Ignorance*, and very often proceeds from it. In the ſame manner, it frequently takes its progreſs through the lower half of the glaſs; and, when it has a tendency to fall, will gradually deſcend from *Moderation* to *Lukewarmneſs*, and from *Lukewarmneſs* to *Infidelity*, which very often terminates in *Ignorance*, and always proceeds from it.

It is a common obſervation, that the ordinary thermometer will be affected by the breathing of people who are in the room where it ſtands; and indeed it is almoſt incredible to conceive, how the glaſs I am now deſcribing will fall by the breath of the multitude crying *Popery*; or, on the contrary, how it will riſe when the ſame multitude (as it ſometimes happens) cry out in the ſame breath, *The church is in danger.*

As ſoon as I had finiſhed this my glaſs, and adjuſted

juſted it to the above-mentioned ſcale of religion, that I might make proper experiments with it, I carried it under my cloak to ſeveral coffeehouſes, and other places of reſort, about this great city. At St. James's coffeehouſe the liquor ſtood at *Moderation*; but at Will's, to my extreme ſurpriſe, it ſubſided to the very loweſt mark of the glaſs. At the Grecian it mounted but juſt one point higher; at the Rainbow it ſtill aſcended two degrees; Child's fetched it up to *Zeal*, and other adjacent coffeehouſes to *Wrath*.

It fell in the lower half of the glaſs, as I went further into the city, till at length it ſettled at *Moderation*, where it continued all the time I ſtaid about the Change, as alſo whilſt I paſſed by the Bank. And here I cannot but take notice, that, through the whole courſe of my remarks, I never obſerved my glaſs to riſe at the ſame time that the ſtocks did.

To complete the experiment, I prevailed upon a friend of mine, who works under me in the occult ſciences, to make a progreſs with my glaſs through the whole iſland of Great Britain; and after his return, to preſent me with a regiſter of his obſervations. I gueſſed beforehand at the temper of ſeveral places he paſſed through, by the characters they have had, time out of mind. Thus, that facetious divine, Dr. Fuller, ſpeaking of the town of Banbury, near a hundred years ago, tell us, it was a place famous for cakes and *zeal*; which I find by my glaſs is true to this day, as to the latter part of his deſcription; though I muſt confeſs, it is not in the ſame reputation for cakes that it was in the time of that learned author; and thus of other places. In ſhort, I have now by me, digeſted in an alphabetical order, all the counties, corporations, and boroughs in Great Britain, with their reſpective tempers, as they ſtand related in my thermometer. But this I ſhall keep to myſelf, becauſe

becauſe I would by no means do any thing that may ſeem to influence any enſuing election.

The point of doctrine which I would propagate by this my invention, is the ſame which was long ago advanced by that able teacher Horace, out of whom I have taken my text for this diſcourſe. We ſhould be careful not to overſhoot ourſelves, in the purſuits even of virtue. Whether *Zeal* or *Moderation* be the point we aim at, let us keep fire out of the one, and froſt out of the other. But, alas! the world is too wiſe to want ſuch a precaution. The terms *High-church* and *Low-church*, as commonly uſed, do not ſo much denote a principle, as they diſtinguiſh a party. They are like words of battle, that have nothing to do with their original ſignification, but are only given to keep out a body of men together, and to let them know friends from enemies.

I muſt confeſs, I have conſidered, with ſome attention, the influence which the opinions of theſe great national ſects have upon their practice; and do look upon it as one of the unaccountable things of our times, that multitudes of honeſt gentlemen, who entirely agree in their lives, ſhould take it in their heads to differ in their religion.

I ſhall conclude this paper with an account of a conference which happened between a very excellent divine (whoſe doctrine was eaſy, and formerly much reſpected) and a lawyer.

AND behold, a certain lawyer ſtood up, and tempted him, ſaying, Maſter, what ſhall I do to inherit eternal life?

He ſaid unto him, What is written in the law? how readeſt thou?

And he anſwering, ſaid, Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy ſoul, and with all thy ſtrength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyſelf.

And

And he ſaid unto him, Thou haſt anſwered right: this do, and thou ſhalt live.

But he, willing to juſtify himſelf, ſaid unto Jeſus, And who is my neighbour?

And Jeſus anſwering, ſaid, A certain man went down from Jeruſalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves, which ſtripped him of his raiment, and wounded *him*, and departed, leaving *him* half dead.

And by chance there came down a certain prieſt that way; and when he ſaw him he paſſed by on the other ſide.

And likewiſe a Levite, when he was at the place, came and looked on *him*, and paſſed by on the other ſide.

But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was: and when he ſaw him, he had compaſſion on him,

And went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine; and ſet him on his own beaſt, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him.

And on the morrow, when he departed, he took out two pence, and gave them to the hoſt, and ſaid unto him, Take care of him; and whatſoever thou ſpendeſt more, when I come again, I will repay thee.

Which now of theſe three, thinkeſt thou, was nighbour unto him that fell among the thieves?

And he ſaid, He that ſhewed mercy on him. Then ſaid Jeſus unto him, Go, and do thou likewiſe. *Luke* x. 25. *to* 38.

ADVER-

ADVERTISEMENT.

THere is now in the preſs a propoſal for raiſing a fund towards paying the national debt by the following means. The author would have commiſſioners appointed to ſearch all the public and private libraries, bookſellers ſhops and warehouſes, in this kingdom, for ſuch books as are of no uſe to the owner, or to the public, *viz.* all comments on the holy ſcriptures, whether called ſermons, creeds, bodies of divinity, tomes of caſuiſtry, vindications, confutations, eſſays, anſwers, replies, rejoinders, or ſur-rejoinders; together with all other learned treatiſes and books of divinity of what denomination or claſs ſoever: as alſo, all comments on the laws of the land; ſuch as, reports, law-caſes, decrees, guides for attorneys and young clerks; and, in fine, all the books now in being in this kingdom, (whether of divinity, law, phyſic, metaphyſics, logics, or politics), except the pure text of the holy ſcriptures, the naked text of the laws, a few books of morality, poetry, muſic, architecture, agriculture, mathematics, merchandiſe, and hiſtory: the author would have the aforeſaid uſeleſs books carried to the ſeveral paper-mills, there to be wrought into white paper; which, to prevent damage or complaints, he would have performed by the commentators, critics, popular preachers, apothecaries, learned lawyers, attorneys, ſolicitors, logicians, phyſicians, almanac-makers, and others of the like wrong turn of mind; the ſaid paper to be ſold, and the produce applied to diſcharge the national debt. What ſhould remain of the ſaid debt unſatisfied, might be paid by a tax on the ſalaries or eſtates of *bankers, common cheats, uſurers, treaſurers, imbezzlers of public money, general officers, ſharpers, perſioners, pick-pockets*, &c.

The PREFACE prefixed to POPE's and SWIFT's Miſcellanies, in four volumes 12mo, 1727.

THE papers that compoſe the firſt of theſe volumes were printed about eighteen years ago, to which there are now added two or three ſmall tracts; and the verſes are transferred into the fourth volume apart, with the addition of ſuch others as we ſince have written. The ſecond and third will conſiſt of ſeveral ſmall treatiſes in proſe, in which a friend or two is concerned with us.

Having both of us been extremely ill treated by ſome bookſellers, eſpecially one Edmund Curl, it was our opinion, that the beſt method we could take for juſtifying ourſelves, would be to publiſh whatever looſe papers, in proſe and verſe, we have formerly written; not only ſuch as have already ſtole into the world (very much to our regret, and perhaps very little to our credit), but ſuch as in any probability hereafter may run the ſame fate; having been obtained from us by the importunity, and divulged by the indiſcretion of friends, although reſtrained by promiſes, which few of them are ever known to obſerve, and often think they make us a compliment in breaking.

But the conſequences have been ſtill worſe: we have been intitled, and have had our names prefixed at length, to whole volumes of mean productions, equally offenſive to good manners and good ſenſe, which we never ſaw nor heard of till they appeared in print.

For a *forgery* in ſetting a falſe name to a writing,

ing, which may prejudice another's fortune, the law punishes the offender with the loss of his *ears*; but has inflicted no adequate penalty for such as prejudice another's reputation in doing the same thing in print; though all and every individual book, so sold under a false name, are manifestly so many several and multiplied forgeries.

Indeed we hoped, that the good nature, or at least the good judgement of the world, would have cleared us from the imputation of such things, as had been thus charged upon us by the malice of enemies, the want of judgement in friends, the unconcern of indifferent persons, and the confident assertions of booksellers.

We are ashamed to find so ill a taste prevail, as to make it a necessary work to do this justice to ourselves. It is very possible for any author to write below himself; either his subject not proving so fruitful, or fitted for him, as he at first imagined; or his health, or his humour, or the present disposition of his mind, unqualifying him at that juncture: however, if he possessed any distinguishing marks of style, or peculiarity of thinking, there would remain in his least successful writings some few tokens, whereby persons of taste might discover him.

But since it hath otherwise fallen out, we think we have sufficiently paid for our want of prudence, and determine for the future to be less communicative: or rather, having done with such amusements, we are resolved to give up what we cannot fairly disown, to the severity of critics, the malice of personal enemies, and the indulgence of friends.

We are sorry for the satire interspersed in some of these pieces upon a few people, from whom the highest provocations have been received, and who, by their conduct since, have shewn, that they have not yet forgiven us the wrong they did. It is a very unlucky circumstance, to be obliged to

retaliate the injuries of such authors, whose works are so soon forgotten, that we are in danger already of appearing the first aggressors. It is to be lamented, that Virgil let pass a line, which told posterity he had two enemies, called Bavius and Mævius. The wisest way is not once to name them, but (as the madman advised the gentleman, who told him he wore a sword to kill his enemies), *to let them alone, and they would die of themselves.* And according to this rule we have acted throughout all those writings which we designed for the press: but in those, the publication whereof was not owing to our folly, but that of others, the omission of the names was not in our power. At the worst we can only give them that liberty now for something; which they have so many years exercised for nothing, of railing and scribbling against us. And it is some commendation, that we have not done it all this while, but avoided publicly to characterise any person without long experience. *Nonum prematur in annum,* is a good rule for all writers, but chiefly for writers of characters; because it may happen to those who vent praise or censure too precipitately, as it did to an eminent English poet, who celebrated a young nobleman for erecting Dryden's monument upon a promise, which his Lordship forgot, till it was done by another.

In regard to two persons only we wish our raillery, though ever so tender, or resentment, though ever so just, had not been indulged. We speak of Sir John Vanbrugh, who was a man of wit, and of honour; and of Mr. Addison, whose name deserves all respect from every lover of learning.

We cannot deny (and perhaps most writers of our kind have been in the same circumstances) that in several parts of our lives, and according to the dispositions we were in, we have written some things which we may wish never to have thought on. Some sallies of levity ought to be imputed to youth,

(supposed

(ſuppoſed in charity, as it was in truth, to be the time in which we wrote them); others to the gaiety of our minds at certain junctures common to all men. The publiſhing of theſe, which we cannot diſown, and without our conſent, is, we think, a greater injury, than that of aſcribing to us the moſt ſtupid productions, which we can wholly deny.

This has been uſually practiſed in other countries after a man's deceaſe; which in a great meaſure accounts for that manifeſt *inequality* found in the works of the beſt authors; the collectors only conſidering, that ſo many more ſheets raiſe the price of the book; and the greater fame a writer is in poſſeſſion of, the more of ſuch traſh he may bear to have tacked to him. Thus it is apparently the editor's intereſt to inſert what the author's judgement had rejected; and care is always taken to interſperſe theſe additions in ſuch a manner, that ſcarce any book of conſequence can be bought, without purchaſing ſomething unworthy of the author along with it.

But in our own country it is ſtill worſe: thoſe very bookſellers, who have ſupported themſelves upon an author's fame while he lived, have done their utmoſt after his death to leſſen it by ſuch practices: even a man's *laſt will* is not ſecure from being expoſed in print; whereby his moſt particular regards, and even his dying tenderneſſes, are laid open. It has been humorouſly ſaid, that ſome have fiſhed the very jakes for papers left there by men of wit: but it is no jeſt to affirm, that the cabinets of the ſick, and the cloſets of the dead, have been broke open and ranſacked to publiſh our *private letters*, and divulged to all mankind the moſt ſecret ſentiments and intercourſe of friendſhip. Nay, theſe fellows are arrived to that height of impudence, that when an author has publicly diſowned a ſpurious piece, they have diſputed his own name with

him in printed advertiſements; which has been practiſed to Mr. Congreve and Mr. Prior.

We are therefore compelled, in reſpect to truth, to ſubmit to a very great hardſhip; to own ſuch pieces as in our ſtricter judgements we would have ſuppreſſed for ever; we are obliged to confeſs, that this whole collection, in a manner, conſiſts of what we not only thought unlikely to reach the future, but unworthy even of the *preſent* age; not our ſtudies, but our follies; not our works, but our idleneſſes.

Some comfort however it is, that all of them are innocent, and moſt of them, ſlight as they are, had yet a moral tendency; either to ſoften the virulence of parties againſt each other; or to laugh out of countenance ſome vice or folly of the time; or to diſcredit the impoſitions of quacks and falſe pretenders to ſcience; or to humble the arrogance of the ill-natured and envious; in a word, to leſſen the *vanity*, and promote the *good humour* of mankind.

Such as they are, we muſt in truth confeſs, they are *ours*, and others ſhould in juſtice believe, they are *all* that are *ours* If any thing elſe has been printed, in which we really had any hand, it is either intolerably imperfect, or loaded with ſpurious additions; ſometimes even with inſertions of mens names, which we never meant, and for whom we have an eſteem and reſpect. Even thoſe pieces in which we are leaſt injured, have never before been printed from the true copies, or with any tolerable degree of correctneſs. We declare, that this collection contains every piece, which in the idleſt humour we have written; not only ſuch as came under our review or correction; but many others, which, however unfiniſhed, are not now in our power to ſuppreſs. Whatſoever was in our own poſſeſſion at the publiſhing hereof, or of which no

copy

copy was gone abroad, we have actually destroyed, to prevent all possibility of the like treatment.

These volumes likewise will contain all the papers wherein we have casually had any share; particularly those written in conjunction with our friends, Dr. Arbuthnot and Mr. Gay; and, lastly, all of this sort composed singly by either of those hands. The reader is therefore desired to do the same justice to these our friends, as to us; and to be assured, that all the *things* called our *miscellanies* (except the works of Alexander Pope, published by B. Lintot, in *quarto* and *folio*, in 1717; those of Mr. Gay by J. Tonson, in *quarto*, in 1720; and as many of these miscellanies as have been formerly printed by Benj. Tooke) are absolutely spurious, and without our consent imposed upon the public.

Twickenham,
May 27, 1727.

JONATH. SWIFT.
ALEX POPE.

A Dif-

A Discourse of the CONTESTS and DISSENSIONS between the NOBLES and the COMMONS in ATHENS and Rome; with the consequences they had upon both those states *.

——— *Si tibi vera videtur,*
Dede manus; et, si falsa est, accingere contra. Lucr.

Written in the year 1701.

CHAP. I.

IT is agreed, that in all government there is an absolute unlimited power, which naturally and originally seems to be placed in the whole body, wherever the executive part of it lies. This holds in

* This discourse is a kind of remonstrance in behalf of King William and his friends, against the proceedings of the house of Commons; and was published during the recess of parliament in the summer of 1701, with a view to engage them in milder measures when they should meet again.

As this time Lewis XIV. was making large strides towards universal monarchy: plots were carrying on at St. Germain's; the Dutch had acknowledged the Duke of Anjou as King of Spain, and King William was made extremely uneasy by the violence with which many of his ministers and chief favourites were pursued by the Commons; the King, to appease their resentment, had made several changes in his ministry, and removed some of his most faithful servants from places of the highest trust and dignity: this expedient, however, had proved ineffectual, and the Commons persisted in their opposition; they began by impeaching William Bentink, Earl of Portland,

in the body natural: for wherever we place the beginning of motion, whether from the head, or the heart, or the animal ſpirits in general, the body moves and acts by a conſent of all its parts. This unlimited power, placed fundamentally in the body of a people, is what the beſt legiſlators of all ages have endeavoured, in their ſeveral ſchemes or inſtitutions of government, to depoſit in ſuch hands as would preſerve the people from rapine and oppreſſion within, as well as violence from without. Moſt of them ſeem to agree in this, that it was a truſt too great to be committed to any one man or aſſembly, and therefore they left the right ſtill in the whole body; but the adminiſtration or executive part in the hands of the *one*, the *few*, or the *many*, into which three powers all independent bodies of men ſeem naturally to divide; for by all I have read of thoſe innumerable and petty commonwealths in Italy, Greece, and Sicily, as well as the great ones of Carthage and Rome, it ſeems to me, that a free people met together, whether by *compact*, or *family-government*, as ſoon as they fall into any acts of civil ſociety, do of themſelves divide into three powers. The firſt is that of ſome one eminent ſpirit, who, having ſignalized his valour and fortune in defence of his

Portland, Groom of the Stole; and proceeded to the impeachment of John Somers, Baron Somers of Eveſham, Firſt Lord Keeper, afterwards Lord Chancellor; Edward Ruſſel, Earl of Orford, Lord Treaſurer of the Navy, and one of the Lords Commiſſioners of the Admiralty; and Charles Montague, Earl of Halifax, one of the Commiſſioners of the Treaſury, and afterwards Chancellor of the Exchequer. Its general purport is to damp the warmth of the Commons, by ſhewing, that the meaſures they purſued had a direct tendency to bring on the tyranny which they profeſſed to oppoſe; and the particular caſes of the impeached Lords are parallelled in Athenian characters.

This whole treatiſe is full of hiſtorical knowledge, and excellent reflections. It is not mixed with any improper ſallies of wit, or any light airs of humour; and, in point of ſtyle and learning, is equal, if not ſuperior, to any of Swift's political works. *Orrery.*

country

country, or by the practice of popular arts at home, comes to have great influence on the people, to grow their leader in warlike expeditions, and to preside, after a fort, in their civil assemblies; and this is grounded upon the principles of nature and common reason, which in all difficulties or dangers, where prudence or courage is required, do rather incite us to fly for counsel or assistance to a single person, than a multitude. The second natural division of power is of such men, who have acquired large possessions, and consequently dependencies, or descend from ancestors who have left them great inheritances, together with an hereditary authority. These easily uniting in thoughts and opinions, and acting in concert, begin to enter upon measures for securing their properties, which are best upheld by preparing against invasions from abroad, and maintaining peace at home; this commences a great council or senate of nobles for the weighty affairs of the nation. The last division is of the mass or body of the people, whose part of power is great and indisputable, whenever they can unite either collectively, or by deputation, to exert it. Now, the three forms of government, so generally known in the schools, differ only by the civil administration being placed in the hands of one, or sometimes two, (as in Sparta), who were called *Kings*; or in a senate, who were called the *Nobles*; or in the people collective or representative, who may be called the *Commons*. Each of these had frequently the executive power in Greece, and sometimes in Rome; but the power in the last resort was always meant by legislators to be held in balance among all three. And it will be an eternal rule in politics among every free people, that there is a balance of power to be carefully held by every state within itself, as well as among several states with each other.

The true meaning of a balance of power, either without

without or within a ſtate, is beſt conceived by conſidering what the nature of a balance is. It ſuppoſes three things: Firſt, the part which is held, together with the hand that holds it; and then the two ſcales, with whatever is weighed therein. Now, conſider ſeveral ſtates in a neighbourhood; in order to preſerve peace between theſe ſtates, it is neceſſary they ſhould be formed into a balance, whereof one or more are to be directors, who are to divide the reſt into equal ſcales, and upon occaſion remove from one into the other, or elſe fall with their own weight into the lighteſt; ſo in a ſtate within itſelf, the balance muſt be held by a third hand, who is to deal the remaining power with the utmoſt exactneſs into the ſeveral ſcales. Now, it is not neceſſary, that the power ſhould be equally divided between theſe three; for the balance may be held by the weakeſt, who, by his addreſs and conduct, removing from either ſcale, and adding of his own, may keep the ſcales duly poized. Such was that of the two kings of Sparta, the conſular power in Rome, that of the kings of Media before the reign of Cyrus, as repreſented by Xenophon; and that of the ſeveral limited ſtates in the Gothic inſtitution.

When the balance is broken, whether by the negligence, folly, or weakneſs of the hand that held it, or by mighty weights fallen into either ſcale, the power will never continue long in equal diviſion between the two remaining parties, but, till the balance is fixed anew, will run entirely into one. This gives the trueſt account of what is underſtood in the moſt ancient and approved Greek authors by the word *tyranny*, which is not meant for the ſeizing of the uncontrolled or abſolute power into the hands of a ſingle perſon, (as many ſuperficial men have groſsly miſtaken), but for the breaking of the balance by whatever hand, and leaving the power wholly in one ſcale; for *tyranny* and *uſurpation*

tion in a ſtate are by no means confined to any number, as might eaſily appear from examples enough; and becauſe the point is material, I ſhall cite a few to prove it.

The Romans * having ſent to Athens, and the Greek cities of Italy, for the copies of the beſt laws, choſe ten legiſlators to put them into form, and, during the exerciſe of their office, ſuſpended the conſular power, leaving the adminiſtration of affairs in their hands. Theſe very men, though choſen for ſuch a work, as the digeſting a body of laws for the government of a free ſtate, did immediately uſurp arbitrary power; ran into all the forms of it, had their guards and ſpies after the practice of the tyrants of thoſe ages, affected kingly ſtate, deſtroyed the nobles, and oppreſſed the people; one of them proceeding ſo far, as to endeavour to force a lady of great virtue: the very crime which gave occaſion to the expulſion of the regal power but ſixty years before, as this attempt did to that of the Decemviri.

The Ephori in Sparta were at firſt only certain perſons deputed by the kings to judge in civil matters, while *they* were employed in the wars. Theſe men, at ſeveral times, uſurped the abſolute authority, and were as cruel tyrants, as any in their age.

Soon ‡ after the unfortunate expedition into Sicily, the Athenians choſe four hundred men for adminiſtration of affairs, who became a body of tyrants, and were called, in the language of thoſe ages, an *oligarchy*, or tyranny of the *few*; under which hateful denomination they were ſoon after depoſed in great rage by the people.

When Athens † was ſubdued by Lyſander, he appointed thirty men for the adminiſtration of that

* Dionyſ. Hal. lib. 10,
‡ Thucyd. lib. 8.
† Xenophon de rebus Græc. lib. 2.

city,

city, who immediately fell into the rankeſt tyranny: but this was not all; for conceiving their power not founded on a *baſis* large enough, they admitted three thouſand into a ſhare of the government; and thus fortified, became the cruelleſt tyranny upon record. They murdered in cold blood great numbers of the beſt men, without any provocation, from the mere luſt of cruelty, like Nero or Caligula. This was ſuch a number of tyrants together, as amounted to near a third part of the whole city; for Xenophon tells us ‡, that the city contained about ten thouſand houſes; and allowing one man to every houſe, who could have any ſhare in the government, (the reſt conſiſting of women, children, and ſervants), and making other obvious abatements, theſe tyrants, if they had been careful to adhere together, might have been a majority even of the people collective.

In the time of the ſecond Punic war ‖, the balance of power in Carthage was got on the ſide of the people, and this to a degree, that ſome authors reckon the government to have been then among them a *dominatio plebis*, or *tyranny of the Commons*; which it ſeems they were at all times apt to fall into, and was at laſt among the cauſes that ruined their ſtate: and the frequent murders of their generals, which Diodorus ** tells us was grown to an eſtabliſhed cuſtom among them, may be another inſtance, that tyranny is not confined to numbers.

I ſhall mention but one example more among a great number, that might be produced. It is related by the author laſt cited *. The orators of the people at Argos (whether you will ſtyle them,

‡ Memorab. lib. 3.
‖ Polyb. frag. lib. 6.
** Lib. 20.
* Lib. 15.

in modern phrase, *great speakers of the house*; or only, in general, representatives of the people collective) stirred up the commons against the nobles, of whom 1600 were murdered at once; and, at last, the orators themselves, because they left off their accusations, or, to speak intelligibly, because they *withdrew their impeachments*; having, it seems, raised a spirit they were not able to lay. And this last circumstance, as cases have lately stood, may perhaps be worth noting.

From what hath been already advanced, several conclusions may be drawn:

1*st*, That a mixed government partaking of the known forms received in the schools is by no means of Gothic invention, but hath place in nature and reason, seems very well to agree with the sentiments of most legislators, and to have been followed in most states, whether they have appeared under the name of monarchies, aristocracies, or democracies: for not to mention the several republics of this composition in Gaul and Germany, described by Cæsar and Tacitus, Polybius tells us, the best government is that which consists of three forms, *regni, optimatium, et populi imperio* †; which may be fairly translated, the *King*, *Lords*, and *Commons*. Such was that of Sparta, in its primitive institution by Lycurgus; who, observing the corruptions and depravations to which every one of these was subject, compounded his scheme out of all; so that it was made up of *reges, seniores, et populus*. Such also was the state of Rome under its consuls: and the author tells us, that the Romans fell upon this model purely by chance, (which I take to have been nature and common reason), but the Spartans by thought and design. And such at Carthage was the *summa reipublicæ* ‡, or power in the last resort;

† Fragm. lib. 6.
‡ Idem. ibid.

for

for they had their kings called *suffetes*, and a senate which had the power of *nobles*, and the people had a share established too.

2*dly*, It will follow, that those reasoners who employ so much of their zeal, their wit, and their leisure for the upholding the balance of power in Christendom, at the same time that by their practices they are endeavouring to destroy it at home, are not such mighty patriots, or so much in the true interest of their country, as they would affect to be thought; but seem to be employed like a man, who pulls down with his right hand what he has been building with his left.

3*dly*, This makes appear the error of those who think it an uncontrollable maxim, that power is always safer lodged in many hands than in one: for if these many hands be made up only from one of the three divisions before mentioned, it is plain from those examples already produced, and easy to be parallelled in other ages and countries, that they are as capable of enslaving the nation, and of acting all manner of tyranny and oppression, as it is possible for a single person to be, though we should suppose their number not only to be of four or five hundred, but above three thousand.

Again, It is manifest from what has been said, that, in order to preserve the balance in a mixed state, the limits of power deposited with each party ought to be ascertained, and generally known. The defect of this is the cause that introduces those struggling in a state about *prerogative* and *liberty*, about incroachments of the *few* upon the rights of the *many*, and of the *many* upon the privileges of the *few*, which ever did, and ever will conclude in a tyranny; first either of the *few*, or the *many*, but at last infallibly of a single person: for, which ever of the three divisions in a state is upon the scramble for more power than its own, (as one or other of them generally is), unless due care be ta-

ken by the other two, upon every new queſtion that ariſes, they will be ſure to decide in favour of themſelves, talk much of inherent right; they will nouriſh up a dormant power, and reſerve privileges *in petto*, to exert upon occaſions, to ſerve expedients, and to urge upon neceſſities; they will make large demands, and ſcanty conceſſions, ever coming off conſiderable gainers: thus at length the balance is broke, and tyranny let in; from which door of the three, it matters not.

To pretend to a *declarative* right upon any occaſion whatſoever, is little leſs than to make uſe of the whole power; that is, to declare an opinion to be law, which has always been conteſted, or perhaps never ſtarted at all before ſuch an incident brought it on the ſtage. Not to conſent to the enacting of ſuch a law, which has no view beſides the general good, unleſs another law ſhall at the ſame time paſs, with no other view but that of advancing the power of one party alone; what is this but to claim a poſitive voice, as well as a negative? To pretend that great changes * and alienations of property have created new and great dependencies, and conſequently new additions of power, as ſome reaſoners have done, is a moſt dangerous tenet. If dominion muſt follow property, let it follow in the ſame place; for change in property through the bulk of a nation makes ſlow marches, and its due power always attends it. To conclude, that whatever attempt is begun by an aſſembly, ought to be purſued to the end, without regard to the greateſt incidents that may happen to alter the caſe; to count it mean, and below the *dignity of a houſe*, to

* This ſeems to allude to a practice of the houſe of Commons called *Tacking*: when they ſuſpected that a favourite bill would be rejected, they tacked it to a money-bill; and as it was not poſſible to proceed without the ſupply, and as it became neceſſary to reject or receive both the bills thus tacked together, this expedient perfectly anſwered its purpoſe.

quit

quit a profecution; to refolve upon a conclufion before it is poffible to be appriſed of the premiſſes: to act thus, I ſay, is to affect not only abſolute power, but infallibility too. Yet ſuch unaccountable proceedings as theſe have popular aſſemblies engaged in, for want of fixing the due limits of *power* and *privilege*.

Great changes may indeed be made in a government, yet the form continue, and the balance be held: but large intervals of time muſt paſs between every ſuch innovation, enough to melt down and make it of a piece with the conſtitution. Such, we are told, were the proceedings of Solon, when he modelled anew the Athenian commonwealth: and what convulſions in our own, as well as other ſtates, have been bred by a neglect of this rule, is freſh and notorious enough; it is too ſoon in all conſcience to repeat this error again.

Having ſhewn, that there is a natural balance of power in all free ſtates, and how it hath been divided, ſometimes by the people themſelves, as in Rome, at others by the inſtitutions of the legiſlators, as in the ſeveral ſtates of Greece and Sicily; the next thing is to examine, what methods have been taken to break or overthrow this balance, which every one of the three parties hath continually endeavoured, as opportunities have ſerved; as might appear from the ſtories of moſt ages and countries: for abſolute power in a particular ſtate, is of the ſame nature with univerſal monarchy in ſeveral ſtates adjoining to each other. So endleſs and exorbitant are the deſires of men, whether conſidered in their perſons or their ſtates, that they will graſp at all, and can form no ſcheme of perfect happineſs with leſs. Ever ſince men have been united into governments, the hopes and endeavours after univerſal monarchy have been bandied among them, from the reign of Ninus to this of the Moſt Chriſtian King; in which purſuits commonwealths

have had their ſhare as well as monarchs: ſo the Athenians, the Spartans, the Thebans, and the Achaians, did ſeveral times aim at the univerſal monarchy of Greece: ſo the commonwealths of Carthage and Rome affected the univerſal monarchy of the then known world. In like manner hath abſolute power been purſued by the ſeveral parties of each particular ſtate; wherein ſingle perſons have met with moſt ſucceſs, though the endeavours of the *few* and the *many* have been frequent enough: yet, being neither ſo uniform in their deſigns, nor ſo direct in their views, they neither could manage nor maintain the power they had got; but were ever deceived by the popularity and ambition of ſome ſingle perſon. So that it will be always a wrong ſtep in policy, for the nobles or commons to carry their endeavours after power ſo far, as to overthrow the balance; and it would be enough to damp their warmth in ſuch purſuits, if they could once reflect, that in ſuch a courſe they will be ſure to run upon the very rock that they meant to avoid; which, I ſuppoſe, they would have us think, is the tyranny of a ſingle perſon.

Many examples might be produced of the endeavours of each of theſe three rivals after abſolute power; but I ſhall ſuit my diſcourſe to the time I am writing in, and relate only ſuch diſſenſions in Greece and Rome, between the nobles and commons, with the conſequences of them, wherein the latter were the aggreſſors.

I ſhall begin with Greece, where my obſervations ſhall be confined to Athens, though ſeveral inſtances might be brought from other ſtates thereof.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the diſſenſions in ATHENS, *between the* few *and the* many.

THESEUS is the firſt, who is recorded with any appearance of truth to have brought the Grecians from a barbarous manner of life, among ſcattered villages, into cities; and to have eſtabliſhed the *popular ſtate* in Athens, aſſigning to himſelf the guardianſhip of the laws and chief command in war. He was forced after ſome time to leave the Athenians to their own meaſures upon account of their ſeditious temper, which ever continued with them, till the final diſſolution of their government by the Romans. It ſeems, the country about Attica was the moſt barren of any in Greece: through which means it happened, that the natives were never expelled by the fury of invaders, (who thought it not worth a conqueſt), but continued always Aborigines; and therefore retained through all revolutions a tincture of that turbulent ſpirit wherewith their government began. This inſtitution of Theſeus appears to have been rather a ſort of mixed monarchy, than a popular ſtate, and, for aught we know, might continue ſo during the ſeries of kings till the death of Codrus. From this laſt prince Solon was ſaid to be deſcended; who, finding the people engaged in too violent factions of the poor and the rich, and in great confuſion thereupon; refuſing the monarchy, which was offered him, choſe rather to caſt the government after another model, wherein he made due proviſions for ſettling the balance of power,

power, chuſing a ſenate of four hundred, and diſpoſing the magiſtracies and offices according to mens eſtates; leaving to the multitude their votes in electing, and the power of judging certain proceſſes by appeal. This council of four hundred was choſen, one hundred out of each tribe, and ſeems to have been a body repreſentative of the people; though the people collective reſerved a ſhare of power to themſelves. It is a point of hiſtory perplexed enough; but thus much is certain, that the balance of power was provided for; elſe Piſiſtratus, called by authors the tyrant of Athens, could never have governed ſo peaceably as he did, without changing any of Solon's laws *. Theſe ſeveral powers, together with that of the *archon* or chief magiſtrate, made up the form of government in Athens, at what time it began to appear upon the ſcene of action and ſtory.

The firſt great man bred up under this inſtitution was Miltiades, who lived about ninety years after Solon, and is reckoned to have been the firſt great captain, not only of Athens, but of all Greece. From the time of Miltiades to that of Phocion, who is looked upon as the laſt famous general of Athens, are about 130 years: After which they were ſubdued and inſulted by Alexander's captains, and continued under ſeveral revolutions a ſmall truckling ſtate, of no name or reputation, till they fell with the reſt of Greece under the power of the Romans.

During this period from Miltiades to Phocion, I ſhall trace the conduct of the Athenians with relation to their diſſenſions between the people and ſome of their generals; who, at that time, by their power and credit in the army, in a warlike commonwealth, and often ſupported by each other, were, with the magiſtrates and other civil officers,

* Herodot. lib. 1.

a ſort

a sort of counterpoise to the power of the people, who, since the death of Solon, had already made great incroachments. What these dissensions were, how founded, and what the consequences of them, I shall briefly and impartially relate.

I must here premise, that the nobles in Athens were not at this time a corporate assembly, that I can gather; therefore the resentments of the commons were usually turned against particular persons, and by way of articles of impeachment. Whereas the commons in Rome, and some other states, as will appear in a proper place, though they followed this method upon occasion, yet generally pursued the enlargement of their power by more set quarrels of one entire assembly against another. However, the custom of particular impeachments being not limited to former ages, any more than that of general struggles and dissensions between fixed assemblies of nobles and commons, and the ruin of Greece having been owing to the former, as that of Rome was to the latter, I shall treat on both expressly; that those states who are concerned in either (if at least there be any such now in the world), may, by observing the means and issues of former dissensions, learn whether the causes are alike in theirs; and if they find them to be so, may consider whether they ought not justly to apprehend the same effects.

To speak of every particular person impeached by the commons of Athens, within the compass designed, would introduce the history of almost every great man they had among them; I shall therefore take notice only of six, who living in that period of time when Athens was at the height of its glory, as indeed it could not be otherwise while such hands were at the helm, though *impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors*, such as *bribery, arbitrary proceedings, misapplying or embezzling public funds, ill conduct at sea*, and the like, were honoured

honoured and lamented by their country, as the preſervers of it, and have had the veneration of all ages ſince paid juſtly to their memories.

Miltiades was one of the Athenian generals againſt the Perſian power, and the famous victory at Marathon was chiefly owing to his valour and conduct. Being ſent ſome time after to reduce the iſland Paros, he miſtook a great fire at a diſtance for the fleet, and, being nowiſe a match for them, ſet ſail for Athens; at his arrival he was *impeached* by the commons for treachery, though not able to appear by reaſon of his wounds, fined 30,000 crowns, and died in priſon. Though the conſequences of this proceeding upon the affairs of Athens were no other than the untimely loſs of ſo great and good a man, yet I could not forbear relating it.

Their next great man was Ariſtides *. Beſides the mighty ſervice he had done his country in the wars, he was a perſon of the ſtricteſt juſtice, and beſt acquainted with the laws, as well as forms of their government, ſo that he was in a manner chancellor of Athens. This man, upon a ſlight and falſe accuſation of *favouring arbitrary power*, was baniſhed by *oſtraciſm*; which rendered into modern Engliſh, would ſignify, that they voted *he ſhould be removed from their preſence and council for ever*. But, however, they had the wit to recall him, and to that action owed the preſervation of their ſtate by his future ſervices. For it muſt be ſtill confeſſed in behalf of the Athenian people, that they never conceived themſelves perfectly infallible, nor arrived to the heights of *modern aſſemblies*, to make *obſtinacy* confirm what *ſudden heat* and *temerity* began. They thought it not below the dignity of an

* Lord Somers. He was the general patron of the *literati*, and the particular friend of Dr. Swift. *Orrery.*

aſſembly

assembly to endeavour at correcting an ill step; at least to repent, though it often fell out too late.

Themistocles † was at first a commoner himself: It was he that raised the Athenians to their greatness at sea, which he thought to be the true and constant interest of that commonwealth; and and the famous naval victory over the Persians at Salamis was owing to his conduct. It seems the people observed somewhat of haughtiness in his temper and behaviour, and therefore banished him for five years; but finding some slight matter of accusation against him, they sent to seize his person, and he hardly escaped to the Persian court; from whence, if the love of his country had not surmounted its base ingratitude to him, he had many invitations to return at the head of the Persian fleet, and take a terrible revenge; but he rather chose a voluntary death.

The people of Athens impeached Pericles * for *misapplying the public revenues to his own private use.* He had been a person of great deservings from the republic, was an *admirable speaker*, and and very popular. *His accounts were confused, and he could not then give them up*; therefore merely to

† Earl of Orford, He had been considered in a manner as Lord High Admiral, the whole affairs of the navy having been committed to his charge. *Orrery*

* Lord Halifax. He had a fine genius for poetry, and had employed his more youthful part of life in that science. He was distinguished by the name of *Mouse Montague*, having ridicul'ed, jointly with Mat. Prior, Mr. Dryden's famous poem of the Hind and Panther. The parody is drawn from Horace's fable of the city mouse and country mouse. But afterwards, upon Mr. Montague's promotion to the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, Prior, with a good-humoured indignation at seeing his friend preferred, and himself neglected, concludes an epistle, written in the year 1698, to Fleetwood Shepherd, Esq; with these three lines.

My friend Charles Mountague's preferr'd,
Nor would I have it long observ'd,
That one *mouse* eats while *t'other*'s starv'd. *Orrery.*

divert

divert that difficulty, and the consequences of it, he was forced to engage his country in the Peloponesian war, the longest that ever was known in Greece, and which ended in the utter ruin of Athens.

The same people, having resolved to subdue Sicily, sent a mighty fleet under the command of Nicias, Lysimachus, and Alcibiades; the two former, persons of age and experience; the last, a young man of noble birth, excellent education, and a plentiful fortune. A little before the fleet set sail it seems one night the stone images of Mercury, placed in several parts of the city, were all pared in the face: this action the Athenians interpreted for a design of destroying the popular state; and Alcibiades, having been formerly noted for the like frolics and excursions, was immediately accused of this. He, whether conscious of his innocence, or assured of the secrecy, offered to come to his trial before he went to his command; this the Athenians refused. But as soon as he was got to Sicily, they sent for him back, designing to take the advantage, and prosecute him in the absence of his friends, and of the army, where he was very powerful. It seems, he understood the resentments of a popular assembly too well to trust them; and therefore, instead of returning, escaped to Sparta: where his desires of revenge prevailing over his love for his country, he became its greatest enemy. Mean while the Athenians before Sicily, by the death of one commander, and the superstition, weakness, and perfect ill conduct of the other, were utterly destroyed, the whole fleet taken, and a miserable slaughter made of the army, whereof hardly one ever returned. Some time after this, Alcibiades was recalled upon his own conditions, by the necessities of the people, and made chief commander at sea and land; but his lieutenant engaging against his positive orders, and being beaten by Lysander,

Alcibiades

Alcibiades was again disgraced, and banished. However, the Athenians having lost all strength and heart since their misfortune at Sicily, and now deprived of the only person that was able to recover their losses, repent of their rashness, and endeavour in vain for his restoration; the Persian lieutenant, to whose protection he fled, making him a sacrifice to the resentments of Lysander the general of the Lacedemonians, who now reduces all the dominions of the Athenians, takes the city, razes their walls, ruins their works, and changes the form of their government; which though again restored for some time by Thrasybulus, (as their walls were rebuilt by Conon) yet here we must date the fall of the Athenian greatness; the dominion and chief power in Greece from that period to the time of Alexander the Great, which was about fifty years, being divided between the Spartans and Thebans. Though Philip, Alexander's father, (*the Most Christian King* of that age), had indeed some time before begun to break in upon the republics of Greece by conquest or *bribery*; particularly *dealing large money among some popular orators*, by which he brought many of them, as the term of art was then, to Philippize.

In the time of Alexander and his captains, the Athenians were offered an opportunity of recovering their liberty, and being restored to their former state; but the wise turn they thought to give the matter, was by an impeachment and sacrifice of the author, to hinder the success. For, after the destruction of Thebes by Alexander, this prince designing the conquest of Athens, was prevented by Phocion * the Athenian general, then ambassador from that state; who, by his great wisdom and skill at negotiations, diverted Alexander from his design, and restored the Athenians to his favour.

* The Earl of Portland. *Orrery.*

The very fame ſucceſs he had with Antipater after Alexander's death, at which time the government was new regulated by Solon's laws: but Polyperchon, in hatred to Phocion, having, by order of the young King, whoſe governor he was, reſtored thoſe whom Phocion had baniſhed, the plot ſucceeded. Phocion was accuſed by popular orators, and put to death.

Thus was the moſt powerful commonwealth of all Greece, after great degeneracies from the inſtitution of Solon, utterly deſtroyed by that raſh, jealous, and inconſtant humour of the people, which was never ſatisfied to ſee a general either *victorious* or *unfortunate*; ſuch ill judges, as well as rewarders, have *popular aſſemblies* been, of thoſe who beſt deſerved from them.

Now, the circumſtance which makes theſe examples of more importance, is, that this very power of the people in Athens, claimed ſo confidently for an *inherent right*, and inſiſted on as the *undoubted privilege of an Athenian born*, was the rankeſt incroachment imaginable, and the groſſeſt degeneracy from the form that Solon left them. In ſhort, their government was grown into a *dominatio plebis*, or *tyranny of the people*, who, by degrees, had broke and overthrown the balance, which that legiſlator had very well fixed and provided for. This appears not only from what has been already ſaid of that lawgiver, but more manifeſtly from a paſſage in Diodorus; who tells us †, "That Antipater, one of Alexander's captains, abrogated the "popular government (in Athens), and reſtored "the power of ſuffrages and magiſtracy to ſuch "only as were worth two thouſand drachmas; by "which means, *ſays he*, that republic came to be "[again] adminiſtered by the laws of Solon." By this quotation it is manifeſt, that great author

† Lib. 18.

looked

looked upon Solon's inſtitution, and a popular government, to be two different things. And as for this reſtoration by Antipater, it had neither conſequence nor continuance worth obſerving.

I might eaſily produce many more examples, but theſe are ſufficient: and it may be worth the reader's time to reflect a little on the merits of the cauſe, as well as of the men, who had been thus dealt with by their country. I ſhall direct him no farther than by repeating, that Ariſtides was the moſt renowned by the people themſelves for his exact *juſtice and knowledge in the law*; that Themiſtocles was a moſt fortunate admiral, and had got a *mighty victory over the great King of Perſia's fleet*; that Pericles was an able *miniſter of ſtate, an excellent orator, and a man of letters:* and, laſtly, that Phocion, beſides the ſucceſs of his arms, was alſo renowned for his *negotiations abroad, having in an embaſſy brought the greateſt monarch of the world at that time to the terms of an honourable peace, by which his country was preſerved.*

I ſhall conclude my remarks upon Athens with the character given us of that people by Polybius. "About this time, *ſays he*, the Athenians were "governed by two men; quite ſunk in their af-"fairs; had little or no commerce with the reſt of "Greece, and were become great reverencers of "crowned heads."

For, from the time of Alexander's captains till Greece was ſubdued by the Romans, to the latter part of which this deſcription of Polybius falls in, Athens never produced one famous man either for councils or arms, or hardly for learning. And indeed it was a dark inſipid period thro' all Greece: for except the Achaian league under Aratus and Philopœmen; and the endeavours of Agis and Cleomenes to reſtore the ſtate of Sparta, ſo frequently haraſſed by tyrannies occaſioned by the popular practices of the Ephori, there was very lit-

tle worth recording. All which consequences may perhaps be justly imputed to this degeneracy of Athens.

CHAP. III.

Of the dissensions between the Patricians and Plebeians in Rome, with the consequences they had upon that state.

HAving in the foregoing chapter confined myself to the proceedings of the commons only by the method of *impeachments* against particular persons, with the fatal effects they had upon the state of Athens, I shall now treat of the dissensions at Rome between the people and the collective body of the Patricians or Nobles. It is a large subject, but I shall draw it into as narrow a compass as I can.

As Greece, from the most ancient accounts we have of it, was divided into several kingdoms, so was most part of Italy * into several petty commonwealths. And as those kings in Greece are said to have been deposed by their people upon the score of their arbitrary proceedings, so on the contrary the commonwealths of Italy were all swallowed up, and concluded in the tyranny of the Roman emperors. However, the differences between those Grecian monarchies and Italian republics were not very great: for, by the accounts Homer gives us of those Grecian princes who came to the siege of Troy, as well as by several passages in the Odyssee, it is manifest, that the power of these princes in their several states was much of a size with that of

* Dionys. Halicar.

the

the kings in Sparta, the archon at Athens, the the ſuffetes at Carthage, and the conſuls in Rome: ſo that a limited and divided power ſeems to have been the moſt ancient and inherent principles of both thoſe people in matters of government. And ſuch did that of Rome continue from the time of Romulus, though with ſome interruptions, to Julius Cæſar, when it ended in the tyranny of a ſingle perſon. During which period (not many years longer than from the Norman conqueſt to our age) the Commons were growing, by degrees, into power and property, gaining ground upon the Patricians, as it were, inch by inch, till at laſt they quite overturned the balance, leaving all doors open to the practices of popular and ambitious men, who deſtroyed the wiſeſt republic, and enſlaved the nobleſt people that ever entered upon the ſtage of the world. By what ſteps and degrees this was brought to paſs, ſhall be the ſubject of my preſent inquiry

While Rome was governed by kings, the monarchy was altogether elective. Romulus himſelf, when he had built the city, was declared King by the univerſal conſent of the people, and by augury, which was there underſtood for divine appointment. Among other diviſions he made of the people, one was into Patricians and Plebeians: the former were like the Barons of England ſome time after the conqueſt; and the latter are alſo deſcribed to be almoſt exactly what our Commons were then. For they were dependents upon the Patricians, whom they choſe for their patrons and protectors, to anſwer for their appearance, and defend them in any proceſs: they alſo ſupplied their patrons with money, in exchange for their protection. This cuſtom of *patronage*, it ſeems, was very ancient, and long practiſed among the Greeks.

Out of theſe Patricians Romulus choſe an hundred to be a *ſenate*, or *grand council*, for advice and aſſiſtance to him in the adminiſtration. The ſenate there-

therefore originally conſiſted all of *nobles*, and were of themſelves a *ſtanding council*, the *people* being only convoked upon ſuch occaſions as, by this inſtitution of Romulus, fell into their cogniſance: thoſe were to conſtitute magiſtrates, to give their votes for making laws, and to adviſe upon entering on a war. But the two former of theſe popular privileges were to be confirmed by authority of the ſenate; and the laſt was only permitted at the King's pleaſure. This was the utmoſt extent of power pretended to by the Commons in the time of Romulus; all the reſt being divided between the King and the ſenate; the whole agreeing very nearly with the conſtitution of England for ſome centuries after the conqueſt.

After a year's *inter-regnum* from the death of Romulus, the ſenate, of their own authority, choſe a ſucceſſor, and a ſtranger, merely upon the fame of his virtue, without aſking the conſent of the commons; which cuſtom they likewiſe obſerved in the two following kings. But in the election of Tarquinius Priſcus, the fifth King, we firſt hear mentioned, that it was done *populi impetrata venia*; which indeed was but very reaſonable for a free people to expect; though I cannot remember in my little reading, by what incidents they were brought to advance ſo great a ſtep. However it were, this prince, in gratitude to the people by whoſe conſent he was choſen, elected a hundred ſenators out of the commons, whoſe number, with former additions, was now amounted to three hundred.

The people having once diſcovered their own ſtrength, did ſoon take occaſion to exert it, and that by very great degrees. For at this King's death, who was murdered by the ſons of a former, being at a loſs for a ſucceſſor, Servius Tullius, a ſtranger, and of mean extraction, was choſen protector of the kingdom by the *people*, without the conſent of the

the ſenate; at which the nobles being diſpleaſed, he wholly applied himſelf to gratify the commons, and was by them declared and confirmed no longer Protector, but King.

This prince firſt introduced the cuſtom of giving freedom to ſervants, ſo as to become citizens of equal privileges with the reſt, which very much contributed to increaſe the power of the *people*.

Thus in a very few years the commons proceeded ſo far, as to wreſt even the power of chuſing a king entirely out of the hands of the nobles; which was ſo great a leap, and cauſed ſuch a convulſion and ſtruggle in the ſtate, that the conſtitution could not bear it; but civil diſſenſions aroſe, which immediately were followed by the tyrany of a ſingle perſon, as this was by the utter ſubverſion of the regal government, and by a ſettlement upon a new foundation. For the nobles, ſpited at this indignity done them by the commons, firmly united in a body, depoſed this prince by plain force, and choſe Tarquin the Proud, who running into all the forms and methods of tyranny, after a cruel reign, was expelled by an univerſal concurrence of nobles and people, whom the miſeries of his reign had reconciled.

When the conſular government began, the balance of power between the nobles and plebeians was fixed anew: the two firſt conſuls were nominated by the nobles, and confirmed by the commons; and a law was enacted, that no perſon ſhould bear any magiſtracy in Rome, *injuſſu populi*, that is, *without conſent of the commons*.

In ſuch turbulent times as theſe, many of the poorer citizens had contracted numerous debts either to the richer ſort among themſelves, or to ſenators and other nobles; and the caſe of debtors in Rome for the firſt four * centuries was, after

* Ab urbe condita; *from the building of the city*.

the

the ſet time for payment, no choice but either to pay or be the creditor's ſlave. In this juncture the commons leave the city in mutiny and diſcontent, and will not return but upon condition to be acquitted of all their debts; and moreover, that certain magiſtrates be choſen yearly, whoſe buſineſs it ſhall be to defend the commons from injuries. Theſe are called *tribunes* of the people, their perſons are held ſacred and inviolable, and the people bind themſelves by oath never to abrogate the office. By theſe tribunes, in proceſs of time, the people were groſsly impoſed on to ſerve the turns or occaſions of revengeful or ambitious men, and to commit ſuch exorbitancies as could not end but in the diſſolution of the government.

Theſe tribunes, a year or two after their inſtitution, kindled great diſſenſions between the nobles and the commons on the account of Coriolanus, a nobleman whom the latter had *impeached*, and the conſequences of whoſe impeachment (if I had not confined myſelf to Grecian examples for that part of my ſubject) had like to have been ſo fatal to their ſtate. And from this time the tribunes began a cuſtom of accuſing to the people whatever nobles they pleaſed, ſeveral of whom were baniſhed or put to death in every age.

At this time the Romans were very much engaged in wars with their neighbouring ſtates; but upon the leaſt intervals of peace the quarrels between the nobles and plebeians would revive; and one of the moſt frequent ſubjects of their differences was the *conquered lands*, which the commons would fain have divided among the public; but the ſenate could not be brought to give their conſent. For ſeveral of the wiſeſt among the nobles began to apprehend the growing power of the people; and therefore knowing what an acceſſion thereof would accrue to them by ſuch an addition of property, uſed all means to prevent it. For this the Appian family

family was moſt noted, and thereupon moſt hated by the commons. One of them having made a ſpeech againſt this diviſion of lands, was impeached by the people of high treaſon, and a day appointed for his trial; but diſdaining to make his defence, he choſe rather the uſual Roman remedy of killing himſelf: after whoſe death the commons prevailed, and the lands were divided among them.

This point was no ſooner gained, but new diſſentions began: for the plebeians would fain have a law enacted, to lay all mens rights and privileges upon the ſame level; and to enlarge the power of every magiſtrate within his own juriſdiction, as much as that of the conſuls. The tribunes alſo obtained to have their number doubled, which before was five: and the author tells us *, that their inſolence and power increaſed with their number, and the ſeditions were alſo doubled with it.

By the beginning of the fourth century from the building of Rome, the tribunes proceeded ſo far in the name of the commons, as to accuſe and fine the conſuls themſelves, who repreſented the kingly power. And the ſenate obſerving, how in all contentions they were forced to yield to the tribunes and people, thought it their wiſeſt courſe to give way alſo to time; therefore a decree was made to ſend ambaſſadors to Athens, and to the other Grecian commonwealths planted in that part of Italy called Græcia Major, to make a collection of the beſt laws; out of which, and ſome of their own, a new complete body of law was formed, afterwards known by the name of the *laws of the twelve tables*.

To digeſt theſe laws into order ten men were choſen, and the adminiſtration of all affairs left in their hands; what uſe they made of it, has been already ſhewn. It was certainly a great revolution,

* Dionyſ. Halicar.

produced

produced entirely by the many unjuſt incroachments of the people; and might have wholly changed the fate of Rome, if the folly and vice of thoſe who were chiefly concerned, could have ſuffered it to take root.

A few years after, the commons made farther advances on the power of the nobles; demanding among the reſt that the conſulſhip, which hitherto had only been diſpoſed to the former, ſhould now lie in common to the pretenſions of any Roman whatſoever. This though it failed at preſent, yet afterwards obtained, and was a mighty ſtep to the ruin of the commonwealth.

What I have hitherto ſaid of Rome, has been chiefly collected out of that exact and diligent writer Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus, whoſe hiſtory, thro' the injury of time, reaches no farther than to the beginning of the fourth century after the building of Rome. The reſt I ſhall ſupply from other authors; though I do not think it neceſſary to deduce this matter any farther ſo very particularly, as I have hitherto done.

To point at what time the balance of power was moſt equally held between the *Lords* and *Commons* in Rome, would perhaps admit a controverſy. Polybius tells us *, that in the ſecond Punic war the Carthaginians were declining, becauſe the balance was got too much on the ſide of the people; whereas the Romans were in their greateſt vigour by the power remaining in the ſenate: yet this was between two and three hundred years after the period Dionyſius ends with: in which time the commons had made ſeveral further acquiſitions. This however muſt be granted, that (till about the middle of the fourth century), when the ſenate appeared reſolute at any time upon exerting their authority, and adhered cloſely together, they did often carry

* Fragm. lib. 6.

their

their point. Beſides, it is obſerved by the beſt authors †, that in all the quarrels and tumults at Rome, from the expulſion of the kings, though the people frequently proceeded to rude contumelious language, and ſometimes ſo far as to pull and hale one another about the forum, yet no blood was ever drawn in any popular commotions, till the time of the Gracchi: however, I am of opinion; that the balance had begun many years before to lean to the popular ſide. But this default was corrected, partly by the principle juſt mentioned, of never drawing blood in a tumult; partly by the warlike genius of the people, which in thoſe ages was almoſt perpetually employed; and partly by their great commanders, who by the credit they had in their armies fell into the ſcales as a further counterpoiſe to the growing power of the people. Beſides, Polybius, who lived in the time of Scipio Africanus the younger, had the ſame apprehenſions of the continual incroachments made by the commons; and being a perſon of as great abilities, and as much ſagacity, as any of his age, from obſerving the corruptions, which, he ſays, had already entered into the Roman conſtitution, did very nearly foretel what would be the iſſue of them. His words are very remarkable, and with little addition may be rendered to this purpoſe. "That "thoſe abuſes and corruptions, which in time de"ſtroy a government, are ſown along with the "ſeeds of it, and both grow up together; and "that as ruſt eats away iron, and worms devour "wood, and both are a ſort of plagues born and "bred along with the ſubſtance they deſtroy; ſo "with every form and ſcheme of government that "man can invent, ſome vice or corruption creeps "in with the very inſtitution, which grows up

† Dionyſ. Halicar. Plutarch, &c.

"alon

" along with, and at last destroys it *." The same author, in another place †, ventures so far as to guess at the particular fate which would attend the Roman government. He says, its ruin would arise from the popular tumults, which would introduce a *dominatio plebis*, or tyranny of the people; wherein it is certain he had reason, and therefore might have adventured to pursue his conjectures so far, as to the consequences of a popular tyrranny, which, as perpetual experience teaches, never fails to be followed by the arbitrary government of a single person.

About the middle of the fourth century from the building of Rome, it was declared lawful for *nobles* and *plebeians* to intermarry; which custom, among many other states, has proved the most effectual means to ruin the former, and raise the latter.

And now the greatest employments in the state were, one after another, by laws forcibly enacted by the *commons*, made free to the people, the consulship itself, the office of censor, that of the quæstors or commissioners of the treasury, the office of prætor or chief justice, the priesthood, and even that of dictator: the senate, after long opposition, yielding merely for present quiet to the continual urging clamours of the *commons*, and of the *tribunes* their advocates. A law was likewise enacted, that the *plebiscita*, or a *vote of the house of commons*, should be of universal obligation; nay, in time the method of enacting laws was wholly inverted; for whereas the senate used of old to confirm the *plebiscita*, the people did at last, as they pleased, confirm or disannul the *senatusconsulta* *.

Appius Claudius brought in a custom of admit-

* Lib. 5. † Frag. lib. 6.
* Dionys. lib. 2.

ting

ting to the ſenate the ſons of freed men, or of ſuch who had once been ſlaves; by which, and ſucceeding alterations of the like nature, that great council degenerated into a moſt corrupt and factious body of men, divided againſt itſelf; and its authority became deſpiſed.

The century and half following, to the end of the third Punic war, by the deſtruction of Carthage, was a very buſy period at Rome; the intervals between every war being ſo ſhort, that the *tribunes* and *people* had hardly leiſure or breath to engage in domeſtic diſſentions: however, the little time they could ſpare, was generally employed the ſame way. So Terentius Leo, a *tribune*, is recorded to have baſely proſtituted the privileges of a *Roman* citizen, in perfect ſpite to the *nobles*. So the great African Scipio, and his brother, after all their mighty ſervices, were impeached by an ungrateful *commons*.

However, the warlike genius of the people, and continual employment they had for it, ſerved to divert this humour from running into a head, till the age of the Gracchi.

Theſe perſons entering the ſcene in the time of a full peace, fell violently upon advancing the power of the people by reducing into practice all thoſe incroachments, which they had been ſo many years gaining. There were at that time certain *conquered lands* to be divided, beſide a *great private eſtate left by a king*: theſe the *tribunes*, by procurement of the elder Gracchus, declared by their legiſlative authority, were not to be diſpoſed of by the *nobles*, but by the *commons* only. The younger brother purſued the ſame deſign; and, beſides, obtained a law, that all Italians ſhould vote at elections, as well as the citizens of Rome: in ſhort, the whole endeavours of them both perpetually turned upon retrenching the *nobles* authority in all things, but eſpecially in the matter of *judicature*. And though

they both loſt their lives in thoſe purſuits, yet they traced out ſuch ways as were afterwards followed by Marius, Sylla, Pompey, and Cæſar, to the ruin of the Roman freedom and greatneſs.

For in the time of Marius, Saturninus a tribune procured a law, that the ſenate ſhould be bound by oath to agree to whatever the people would enact: and Marius himſelf, while he was in that office of tribune, is recorded to have, with great induſtry, uſed all endeavours for depreſſing the *nobles*, and raiſing the people, particularly for cramping the former in their *power of judicature*, which was *their moſt ancient inherent right*.

Sylla by the ſame meaſures became abſolute tyrant of Rome: he added three hundred commons to the ſenate, which perplexed the power of the whole order, and rendered it ineffectual; then flinging off the maſk, he aboliſhed the office of tribune, as being only a ſcaffold to tyranny, whereof he had no further uſe.

As to Pompey and Cæſar, Plutarch tells us, that their union for pulling the *nobles* (by their credit with the people) was the cauſe of the civil war, which ended in the tyranny of the latter; both of them in their conſulſhips having uſed all endeavours and occaſions for ſinking the authority of the *patricians*, and giving way to all incroachments of the people, wherein they expected beſt to find their own account.

From this deduction of popular incroachments in Rome, the reader will eaſily judge how much the balance was fallen upon that ſide. Indeed by this time the very foundation was removed, and it was a moral impoſſibility, that the republic could ſubſiſt any longer: for the *commons* having uſurped the offices of ſtate, and trampled on the ſenate, there was no government left but *dominatio plebis*. Let us therefore examine how they proceeded in this conjuncture.

I think

I think it is an univerſal truth, that the people are much more dextrous at pulling down and ſetting up, than at preſerving what is fixed; and they are not fonder of ſeizing more than their own, than they are of delivering it up again to the *worſt bidder*, with their own into the bargain. For although in their corrupt notions of divine worſhip, they are apt to multiply their gods; yet their earthly devotion is ſeldom paid to above one idol at a time, of their own creation, whoſe *oar* they pull with leſs murmuring and much more ſkill, than when they *ſhare the leading*, or even *hold the helm*.

The ſeveral provinces of the Roman empire were now governed by the great men of their ſtate; thoſe upon the frontiers with powerful armies either for conqueſt or defence. Theſe governors, upon any deſigns of revenge or ambition, were ſure to meet with a divided power at home, and therefore bent all their thoughts and applications to cloſe in with the people, who were now, by many degrees, the ſtronger party. Two of the greateſt ſpirits that Rome ever produced, happened to live at the ſame time, and to be engaged in the ſame purſuit; and this at a conjuncture the moſt dangerous for ſuch a conteſt: Theſe were Pompey and Cæſar, two ſtars of ſuch a magnitude, that their *conjunction* was as likely to be fatal, as their *oppoſition*.

The *tribunes* and people, having now ſubdued all competitors, began the laſt game of a prevalent populace, which is that of chuſing themſelves a *maſter*; whiles the noble foreſaw, and uſed all endeavours left them to prevent it. The people at firſt made Pompey their admiral, with full power over all the Mediterranean, ſoon after captain-general of all the Roman forces, and governor of Aſia. Pompey, on the other ſide, reſtored the office of *tribune*, which Sylla had put down; and in his conſulſhip procured a law for *examining into the*

miscarriages of men in office or command, for twenty years past. Many other examples of Pompey's popularity are left us on record, who was a perfect favourite of the people, and designed to be more; but his pretensions grew stale for want of a timely opportunity of introducing them upon the stage. For Cæsar, with his legions in Gaul, was a perpetual check upon his designs; and, in the arts of pleasing the people did soon after get many lengths beyond him. For he tells us himself, that the senate, by a bold effort, having made some severe decrees against his proceedings, and against the tribunes, these all left the city, and went over to his party, and consequently along with them the affections and interests of the people; which is further manifest from the accounts he gives us of the citizens in several towns mutinying against their commanders, and delivering both to his devotion. Besides, Cæsar's public and avowed pretensions for beginning the civil war, were to restore the tribunes and people oppressed (as he pretended) by the *nobles*.

This forced Pompey, against his inclinations, upon the necessity of changing sides, for fear of being forsaken by both; and of closing in with the senate and chief magistrates, by whom he was chosen general against Cæsar.

Thus at length *the senate* (at least the primitive part of them, the *nobles*) under Pompey, and the *commons* under Cæsar, came to a final decision of the long quarrels between them. For, I think, the ambition of private men did by no means begin or occasion this war; though civil dissensions never fail of introducing and spiriting the ambition of private men; who thus become indeed the great instruments for deciding of such quarrels, and at last are sure to seize on the prize. But no man, that sees a flock of vultures hovering over two armies ready to engage, can justly charge the blood

blood drawn in the battle to them, though the carcaſes fall to their ſhare. For while the balance of power is equally held, the ambition of private men, whether orators or great commanders, gives neither danger or fear, nor can poſſibly enſlave their country; but that once broken, the divided parties are forced to unite each to its head, under whoſe conduct or fortune one ſide is at firſt victorious, and at laſt both are ſlaves. And to put it paſt diſpute, that this entire ſubverſion of the Roman liberty and conſtitution was altogether owing to thoſe meaſures, which had broke the balance between the *patricians* and *plebeians*, whereof the ambition of particular men was but an effect and conſequence, we need only conſider, that when the uncorrupted part of the ſenate had, by the death of Cæſar, made one great effort to reſtore their former ſtate and liberty, the ſucceſs did not anſwer their hopes, but that whole aſſembly was ſo ſunk in its authority, that thoſe patriots were forced to fly, and give way to the madneſs of the people, who, by their own diſpoſitions, ſtirred up with the harangues of their orators, were now wholly bent upon ſingle and deſpotic ſlavery. Elſe, how could ſuch a profligate as Antony, or a boy of eighteen, like Octavius, ever dare to dream of giving the law to ſuch an empire and people? wherein the latter ſucceeded, and entailed the vileſt tyranny, that heaven in its anger ever inflicted on a corrupt and poiſoned people. And this, with ſo little appearance at Cæſar's death, that when Cicero wrote to Brutus, how he had prevailed by his credit with Octavius to promiſe him [Brutus] pardon and ſecurity for his perſon, that great Roman received the notice with the utmoſt indignity, and returned Cicero an anſwer, yet upon record, full of the higheſt reſentment and contempt for ſuch an offer, and from ſuch a hand.

Here ended all ſhew or ſhadow of liberty in Rome. Here was the repoſitory of all the wiſe contentions and ſtruggles for power between the nobles and commons, lapped up ſafely in the boſom of a Nero and a Caligula, a Tiberius and a Domitian.

Let us now ſee from this deduction of particular impeachments, and general diſſenſions in Greece and Rome, what concluſions may naturally be formed for inſtruction of any other ſtate, that may haply upon many points labour under the like circumſtances.

CHAP. IV.

UPON the ſubject of *impeachments* we may obſerve, that the cuſtom of accuſing the *nobles* to the *people* either by themſelves, or their orators, (now ſtyled an *impeachment in the name of the commons*), hath been very ancient both in Greece and Rome, as well as Carthage; and therefore may ſeem to be the inherent right of a free people, nay, perhaps it is really ſo: But then it is to be conſidered, firſt, that this cuſtom was peculiar to republics, or ſuch ſtates where the adminiſtration lay principally in the hands of the commons, and ever raged more or leſs according to their incroachments upon abſolute power; having been always looked upon, by the wiſeſt men and beſt authors of thoſe times, as an effect of licentiouſneſs, and not of liberty; a diſtinction, which no multitude, either *repreſented* or *collective*, hath been at any time very nice in obſerving. However, perhaps this cuſtom in a popular ſtate of impeaching particular men may ſeem to be nothing elſe, but the people's

people's chuſing upon occaſion to exerciſe their own juriſdiction in perſon; as if a king of England ſhould ſit as chief juſtice in his court of king's bench; which, they ſay, in former times, he ſometimes did. But in Sparta, which was called a kingly government, though the people were, perfectly free, yet becauſe the adminiſtration was in the two kings and the *ephori* with the aſſiſtance of the ſenate, we read of no impeachments by the people; nor was the proceſs againſt great men, either upon account of ambition or ill conduct, though it reached ſometimes to kings themſelves, ever formed that way, as I can recollect, but only paſſed through thoſe hands, where the adminiſtration lay. So likewiſe during the regal government in Rome, though it was inſtituted a mixed monarchy, and the people made great advances in power, yet I do not remember to have read of one impeachment from the commons againſt a patrician, until the conſular ſtate began, and the people had made great incroachments upon the adminiſtration.

Another thing to be conſidered is, that allowing this right of impeachment to be as inherent as they pleaſe, yet, if the commons have been perpetually miſtaken in the merits of the cauſes and the perſons, as well as in the conſequences of ſuch impeachments upon the peace of the ſtate we cannot conclude leſs, than that the commons in Greece and Rome (whatever they may be in other ſtates) were by no means qualified either as proſecutors or judges in ſuch matters; and therefore, that it would have been prudent, to have reſerved theſe privileges dormant, never to be produced but upon very great and urging occaſions, where the ſtate is in apparent danger, the univerſal body of the people in clamours againſt the adminiſtration, and no other remedy in view. But for a few popular orators or tribunes, upon the ſcore of "perſonal

" ſonal piques ; *or*, to employ the pride they con-
" ceive in ſeeing themſelves at the head of a party;
" *or*, as a method for advancement ; *or* moved by
" certain powerful arguments that could make
" Demoſthenes philipize : " for ſuch men, I ſay, when the ſtate would of itſelf gladly be quiet, and hath, beſides, affairs of the laſt importance upon the anvil, to " impeach Miltiades * after a great " naval victory, for not purſuing the Perſian fleet : " to impeach Ariſtides, the perſon moſt verſed a-
" mong them in the knowledge and practice of
" their laws, for a blind ſuſpicion of his acting in
" an arbitrary way (that is, as they expound it,
" not in concert with the people) : to impeach
" Pericles, after all his ſervices, for a few incon-
" ſiderable accounts ; *or* to impeach Phocion, who
" had been guilty of no other crime but negotiat-
" ing a treaty for the peace and ſecurity of his
" country ;" What could the continuance of ſuch proceedings end in, but the utter diſcouragement of all virtuous actions and perſons, and conſequently in the ruin of a ſtate? Therefore the hiſtorians of thoſe ages ſeldom fail to ſet this matter in all its lights, leaving us the higheſt and moſt honourable *ideas* of thoſe perſons, who ſuffered by the perſecution of the people, together with the fatal conſequences they had, and how the perſecutors ſeldom failed to repent, when it was too late.

Theſe impeachments perpetually falling upon many of the beſt men both in Greece and Rome, are a cloud of witneſſes, and examples enough to diſcourage men of virtue and abilities from engaging in the ſervice of the public ; and help on the other ſide to introduce the ambitious, the covetous, the ſuperficial, and the ill-deſigning ; who are as apt to

* Though in other paſſages Lord Orford's character is ſuppoſed to be drawn under the name of Themiſtocles, yet he ſeems to be repreſented by Miltiades here; for Themiſtocles was not impeached at all. See p. 92.

be

be bold, and forward, and meddling, as the former are to be cautious, and modeſt, and reſerved. This was ſo well known in Greece, that an eagerneſs after employments in the ſtate was looked upon by wiſe men, as the worſt title a man could ſet up; and made Plato ſay, "That if all men were a "good as they ought, the quarrel in a common-"wealth would be not as it is now, who *ſhould* be "miniſters of ſtate, but who ſhould *not* be ſo." And Socrates * is introduced by Xenophon ſeverely chiding a friend of his for not entering into the publick ſervice, when he was every way qualified for it; ſuch a backwardneſs there was at that time among good men to engage with an uſurping people, and a ſet of *pragmatical ambitious orders*. And Diodorus tells us †, that when the *petaliſm* was erected at Syracuſe, in imitation of the *oſtraciſm* ‡ at Athens, it was ſo notoriouſly levelled againſt all who had either birth or merit to recommend them, that whoever poſſeſſed either, withdrew for fear, and would have no concern in public affairs. So that the people themſelves were forced to abrogate it for fear of bringing all things into confuſion.

There is one thing more to be obſerved, wherein all the popular impeachments in Greece and Rome ſeem to have agreed; and that was, a notion they had of being concerned in *point of honour* to condemn whatever perſon they impeached, however frivolous the articles were, upon which they began,

* Lib. Memorab. † Lib. 11.

‡ *Oſtraciſm* was a kind of popular ſentence to baniſhment paſſed againſt men whoſe perſonal influence, from whatever cauſe, was thought to render them dangerous to the ſtate; the votes were given by writing the name of the perſon on a ſhell by the Greeks called ὄστρακον, and caſting the ſhell into an urn.

Petaliſm was a ſentence nearly of the ſame kind; and as *oſtraciſm* was denominated from the ſhell on which the name of the ſuſpected party was written, *petaliſm* took its name from πέταλον, a leaf, which the Syracuſans uſed for the ſame purpoſe.

or

or however weak the surmises, whereon they were to proceed in their proofs. For, to conceive that the body of the people could be mistaken, was an indignity not to be imagined, till the consequences had convinced them, when it was past remedy. And I look upon this as a fate, to which all popular accusations are subject; though I should think that the saying, *Vox populi, vox Dei*, ought to be understood of the universal bent and current of a people, not of the *bare majority* of a few representatives, which is often procured by *little arts*, and great industry and application; wherein those who engage in the pursuits of malice and revenge, are much more sedulous than such as would prevent them.

From what hath been deduced of the *dissensions* in Rome between the two bodies of patricians and plebeians, several reflections may be made.

First, That when the balance of power is duly fixed in a state, nothing is more dangerous or unwise, than to give way to the *first steps* of popular incroachments; which is usually done either in hopes of procuring ease and quiet from some vexatious clamour, or else *made merchandise, and merely bought and sold*. This is breaking into a constitution to serve a present expedient, or supply a present exigency; the remedy of an empiric, to stifle the present pain, but with certain prospect of sudden and terrible returns. When a child grows easy and content by being humoured; and when a lover becomes satisfied by small compliances, without further pursuits; then expect to find popular assemblies content with small concessions. If there could one single example be brought from the whole compass of history, of any one popular assembly, who, after beginning to contend for power, ever sat down quietly with a certain share; or if one instance could be produced of a popular assembly, that ever knew, or proposed, or declared, what share

ſhare of power was their due; then might there be ſome hopes, that it were a matter to be adjuſted by reaſonings, by conferences, or debates: but ſince all that is manifeſtly otherwiſe, I ſee no other courſe to be taken in a ſettled ſtate, than a ſteady conſtant reſolution in thoſe to whom the reſt of the balance is intruſted, never to give way ſo far to popular clamours, as to make the leaſt breach in the conſtitution, through which a million of abuſes and incroachments will certainly in time force their way.

Again, from this deduction it will not be difficult to gather and aſſign certain marks of popular incroachments; by obſerving of which, thoſe who hold the balance in a ſtate may judge of the degrees, and, by early remedies and application, put a ſtop to the fatal conſequences that would otherwiſe enſue. What thoſe marks are, hath been at large deduced, and need not be here repeated.

Another conſequence is this: That (with all reſpect for popular aſſemblies be it ſpoke) it is hard to recollect one folly, infirmity, or vice, to which a ſingle man is ſubjected, and from which a body of commons, either collective or repreſented, can be wholly exempt. For, beſides that they are compoſed of men, with all their infirmities about them, they have alſo the ill fortune to be generally led and influenced by the very worſt among themſelves, I mean, *popular orators, tribunes*, or, as they are now ſtyled, *great ſpeakers, leading men*, and the like. From whence it comes to paſs, that in the reſults we have ſometimes found the ſame ſpirit of cruelty and revenge, of malice and pride, the ſame blindneſs, and obſtinacy, and unſteadineſs, the ſame ungovernable rage and anger, the ſame injuſtice, ſophiſtry, and fraud, that ever lodged in the breaſt of any individual.

Again, in all free ſtates the evil to be avoided is *tyranny*, that is to ſay, the *ſumma imperii*, or unlimited power ſolely in the hands of the *one*, the

few,

few, or the *many*. Now, we have shewn, that although most revolutions of government in Greece and Rome began with the tyranny of the people, yet they generally concluded in that of a single person; so that an usurping populace is its own *dupe*; a mere underworker, and a purchaser in trust for some single tyrant, whose state and power they advance to their own ruin, with as blind an instinct, as those worms that die with weaving magnificent habits for beings of a superior nature to their own.

CHAP. V.

SOme reflections upon the late public proceedings among us, and that variety of factions into which we are still so intricately engaged, gave occasion to this discourse. I am not conscious, that I have forced one example, or put it into any other light than it appeared to me long before I had thought of producing it.

I cannot conclude without adding some particular remarks upon the present posture of affairs and dispositions in this kingdom.

The fate of empire is grown a common-place: That all forms of government having been instituted by men, must be mortal, like their authors, and have their periods of duration limited as well as those of private persons. This is a truth of vulgar knowledge and observation; but there are few who turn their thoughts to examine how those diseases in a state are bred, that hasten its end; which would however be a very useful inquiry. For, though we cannot prolong the period of a commonwealth beyond the decree of heaven, or the date

date of its nature, any more than human life beyond the ſtrength of the ſeminal virtue; yet we may manage a ſickly conſtitution, and preſerve a ſtrong one; we may watch and prevent accidents; we may turn off a great blow from without, and purge away an ill humour that is lurking within; and by theſe, and other ſuch methods, render a ſtate long-lived though not immortal. Yet ſome phyſicians have thought, that if it were practicable to keep the ſeveral humours of the body in an exact equal balance of each with its oppoſite, it might be immortal, and ſo perhaps would a political body, if the balance of power could be always held exactly even. But, I doubt, this is as impoſſible in practice as the other.

It hath an appearance of fatality, and that the period of a ſtate approacheth, when a concurrence of many circumſtances both within and without, unite towards its ruin; while the whole body of the people are either ſtupidly negligent, or elſe giving in with all their might to thoſe very practices that are working their deſtruction. To ſee whole bodies of men breaking a conſtitution by the very ſame errors, that ſo many have been broke before; to obſerve oppoſite parties, who can agree in nothing elſe, yet firmly united in ſuch meaſures as muſt certainly ruin their country; in ſhort, to be encompaſſed with the greateſt dangers from without, to be torn by many virulent factions within; then to be ſecure and ſenſeleſs under all this, and to make it the very leaſt of our concern; theſe, and ſome others that might be named, appear to me to be the moſt likely ſymptoms in a ſtate of a *ſickneſs unto death.*

Quod procul a nobis flectat fortuna gubernans:
Et ratio potius, quam res perſuadeat ipſa. Lucr.

There are ſome conjunctures, wherein the death

or diſſolution of government is more lamentable in its conſequences, than it would be in others. And, I think, a ſtate can never arrive to its period in a more deplorable *criſis*, than at a time when ſome *prince in the neighbourhood*, of vaſt power and ambition, lies hovering like a vulture to devour, or at leaſt diſmember its dying carcaſe; by which means it becomes only a province or acquiſition to ſome mighty monarchy, without hopes of a reſurrection.

I know very well, there is a ſet of ſanguine tempers, who deride and ridicule, in the number of fopperies, all ſuch apprehenſions as theſe. They have it ready in their mouths, that the people of England are of a genius and temper never to admit ſlavery among them; and they are furniſhed with a great many common places upon that ſubject. But it ſeems to me, that ſuch diſcourſers do reaſon upon ſhort views, and a very moderate compaſs of thought. For I think it a great error to count upon the genius of a nation as a ſtanding argument in all ages, ſince there is hardly a ſpot of ground in Europe, where the inhabitants have not frequently and entirely changed their temper and genius. Neither can I ſee any reaſon, why the genius of a nation ſhould be more fixed in the point of government, than in their morals, their learning, their religion, their common humour and converſation, their diet and their complexion; which do all notoriouſly vary almoſt in every age, and may every one of them have great effects upon mens notions of government.

Since the Norman conqueſt the balance of power in England hath often varied, and ſometimes been wholly overturned; the part which the commons had in it, *(that moſt diſputed point), in its original, progreſs, and extent*, was, by their own confeſſions, but a very inconſiderable ſhare. Generally ſpeaking, they have been gaining ever ſince, though with

with frequent interruptions and ſlow progreſs. The aboliſhing of *villanage*, together with the cuſtom introduced (or permitted) among the nobles of ſelling their lands in the reign of Henry VII. was a mighty addition to the power of the commons: yet I think a much greater happened in the time of his ſucceſſor, at the diſſolution of the abbeys; for this turned the *clergy* wholly out of the ſcale, who had ſo long filled it; and placed the *commons* in their ſtead; who in a few years became poſſeſſed of vaſt quantities of thoſe and other lands, by grant or purchaſe. About the middle of Q. Eliſabeth's reign, I take the power between the nobles and the commons to have been in more equal balance, than it was ever before or ſince. But then, or ſoon after, aroſe a faction in England, which, under the name of *Puritan*, began to grow popular by molding up their new ſchemes of religion with republican principles in government; and, gaining upon the *prerogative* as well as the *nobles*, under ſeveral denominations, for the ſpace of about ſixty years, did at laſt overthrow the conſtitution, and, according to the uſual courſe of ſuch revolutions, did introduce a tyranny, firſt of the people, and then of a ſingle perſon.

In a ſhort time after, the old government was revived. But the progreſs of affairs for almoſt thirty years, under the reigns of two weak princes *, is a ſubject of a very different nature; when the balance was in danger to be overturned by the hands that held it, which was at laſt very ſeaſonably prevented by the late revolution. However, as it is the talent of human nature to run from one extreme to another, ſo in a very few years we have made mighty leaps from prerogative-heights into the depths of popularity, and, I doubt, to the very laſt degree that our conſtitution will bear. It

* Charles II. and James II.

were to be wiſhed that the moſt auguſt aſſembly of the commons would pleaſe to form a *pândect* of their own power and privileges, to be confirmed by the entire legiſlative authority, and that in as ſolemn a manner (if they pleaſe) as the *magna charta*. But to fix one foot of their compaſs wherever they think fit, and extend the other to ſuch terrible lengths, without deſcribing any circumference at all, is to leave us and themſelves in a very uncertain ſtate, and in a ſort of *rotation*, that the author † of the *Oceana* never dreamed on. I believe the moſt hardy tribune will not venture to affirm at preſent, that any juſt fears of incroachment are given us from the regal power, or the *few:* and is it then impoſſible to err on the other ſide? How far muſt we proceed, or where ſhall we ſtop? *The raging of the ſea*, and *the madneſs of the people* are put together in holy writ; and it is God alone who can ſay to either, *Hitherto ſhalt thou paſs, and no further*.

The balance of power in a limited ſtate is of ſuch abſolute neceſſity, that Cromwell himſelf, before he had perfectly confirmed his tyranny, having ſome occaſions for the appearance of a parliament, was forced to create and erect an entire new houſe of Lords, ſuch as it was, for a counterpoiſe to the commons. And indeed, conſidering the vileneſs of the clay, I have ſometimes wondered, that no tribune of that age durſt ever venture to aſk the *potter*, *What doſt thou make?* But it was then about the laſt act of a popular uſurpation, and *fate* or *Cromwell* had already prepared them for that of a ſingle perſon.

† Mr. James Harrington, ſometime in the ſervice of King Charles I. after whoſe death he drew up and printed a form of popular government, intitled, "The commonwealth of Oceana: He endeavoured likewiſe to promote this ſcheme by public diſcourſes at a nightly meeting of ſeveral curious gentlemen in New-palace yard, Weſtminſter. This club was called the *Rota*; and Mr. Henry Nevil, one of its members, propoſed to the then houſe of Commons, that a third part of the ſenate ſhould *rote* out by ballot every year, and be incapable of being elected again for three years to come.

I have been often amazed at the rude, paſſionate, and miſtaken reſults, which have at certain times fallen from great aſſemblies, both ancient and modern, and of other countries as well as our own. This gave me the opinion I mentioned a while ago, that public conventions are liable to all the infirmities, follies, and vices of private men. To which if there be any exception, it muſt be of ſuch aſſemblies, who act by "univerſal concert, upon public "principles, and for public ends;" ſuch as proceed upon debates without "unbecoming warmths, or "influence from particular leaders and inflam-"ers;" ſuch whoſe members, inſtead of "canvaſ-"ſing to procure majorities for their private opi-"nions, are ready to comply with general ſober "reſults, though contrary to their own ſenti-"ments." Whatever aſſemblies act by theſe and other methods of the like nature, muſt be allowed to be exempt from ſeveral imperfections, to which particular men are ſubjected. But I think the ſource of moſt miſtakes and miſcarriages in matters debated by public aſſemblies, ariſeth from the influence of private perſons upon great numbers, ſtyled, in common phraſe, *leading men and parties*. And therefore when we ſometimes meet a *few words* put together, which is called the *vote* or *reſolution* of an aſſembly, and which we cannot poſſibly reconcile to *prudence* or *public good*, it is moſt charitable to conjecture, that ſuch a vote has been conceived, and born, and bred in a private brain, afterwards raiſed and ſupported by an obſequious party, and then with uſual methods confirmed by an *artificial* majority. For let us ſuppoſe five hundred men, mixed in point of ſenſe and honeſty, as uſually aſſemblies are; and let us ſuppoſe theſe men propoſing, debating, reſolving, voting, according to the mere natural motions of their own little or much reaſon and underſtanding; I do allow, that abundance of indigeſted and abortive, many perni-

cious and fooliſh overtures would ariſe, and float a few minutes; but then they would die and diſappear. Becauſe this muſt be ſaid in behalf of human kind, that common ſenſe and plain reaſon, while men are diſengaged from acquired opinions, will ever have ſome general influence upon their minds; whereas the ſpecies of folly and vice are infinite, and ſo different in every individual, that they could never procure a majority, if other corruptions did not enter to pervert mens underſtandings, and miſguide their wills.

To deſcribe how parties are bred in an aſſembly, would be a work too difficult at preſent, and perhaps not altogether ſafe. *Periculoſæ plenum opus aleæ.* Whether thoſe who are leaders, uſually arrive at that ſtation more by a ſort of inſtinct or ſecret compoſition of their nature, or influence of the ſtars, than by the poſſeſſion of any great abilities, may be a point of much diſpute: but when the leader is once fixed, there will never fail to be followers. And man is ſo apt to *imitate*, ſo much of the nature of *ſheep*, *imitatores*, *ſervum pecus*, that whoever is ſo bold to give the firſt *great leap over the heads of thoſe about him*, though he be the worſt of the flock, ſhall be quickly followed by the reſt. Beſides, when parties are once formed, the ſtragglers look ſo ridiculous, and become ſo inſignificant, that they have no other way, but to run into the herd, which at leaſt will hide and protect them; and where to be much conſidered, requires only to be very violent.

But there is one circumſtance with relation to parties, which I take to be of all others moſt pernicious in a ſtate; and I would be glad any partiſan would help me to a tolerable reaſon, that becauſe Clodius and Curio happen to agree with me in a few ſingular notions, I muſt therefore blindly follow them in all: or, to ſtate it at beſt, that becauſe Bibulus the *party-man* is perſuaded that Clodius

dius and Curio do really propoſe the good of their country as their chief end; therefore Bibulus ſhall be wholly guided and governed by them in the means and meaſures towards it. Is it enough for Bibulus, and the reſt of the herd, to ſay without further examining, *I am of the ſide with Clodius, or I vote with Curio?* Are theſe proper methods to form and make up what they think fit to call the *united wiſdom of the nation?* Is it not poſſible, that upon ſome occaſion Clodius may be bold and inſolent, borne away by his paſſion, malicious, and revengeful? That Curio may be corrupt, and expoſe to ſale his tongue, or his pen? I conceive it far below the dignity both of human nature, and human reaſon, to be engaged in any party, the moſt plauſible ſoever, upon ſuch ſervile conditions.

This influence of *one* upon *many*, which ſeems to be as great in a people *repreſented*, as it was of old in the commons *collective*, together with the conſequences it hath had upon the legiſlature, hath given me frequent occaſion to reflect upon what Diodorus tells us of one Charondas, a lawgiver to the Sybarites, an ancient people of Italy, who was ſo averſe from all innovation, eſpecially when it was to proceed from particular perſons, (and, I ſuppoſe, that he might put it out of the power of men, fond of their own notions, to diſturb the conſtitution at their pleaſures, by advancing private ſchemes), that he provided a ſtatute, that whoever propoſed any alteration to be made, ſhould ſtep out and do it with a rope about his neck: if the matter propoſed were generally approved, then it ſhould paſs into a law; if it went in the negative, the propoſer to be immediately *hanged*. Great miniſters may talk of what projects they pleaſe; but I am deceived, if a more effectual one could ever be found for *taking off* (as the preſent phraſe is) thoſe hot, unquiet ſpirits, who diſturb aſſemblies, and obſtruct public affairs, by gratifying their pride,

pride, their malice, their ambition, or their avarice.

Thoſe who in a late reign began the diſtinction between the *perſonal* and *politic* capacity, ſeem to have had reaſon, if they judged of princes by themſelves; for I think, there is hardly to be found through all nature a greater difference between two things, than there is between a repreſenting commoner in the function of his public calling, and the ſame perſon when he acts in the common offices of life. Here he allows himſelf to be upon a level with the reſt of mortals: here he follows his own reaſon, and his own way; and rather affects a ſingularity in his actions and thoughts, than ſervilely to copy either from the wiſeſt of his neighbours. In ſhort, here his folly and his wiſdom, his reaſon and his paſſions, are all of his own growth, not the echo or infuſion of other men. But when he is got near the walls of his aſſembly, he aſſumes and affects an entire ſet of very different airs; he conceives himſelf a being of a ſuperior nature to thoſe *without*, and acting in a ſphere, where the vulgar methods for the conduct of human life can be of no uſe. He is liſted in a party, where he neither knows the temper, nor deſigns, nor perhaps the perſon of his leader; but whoſe opinions he follows and maintains with a zeal and faith as violent, as a young ſcholar does thoſe of a philoſopher, whoſe ſect he is taught to profeſs. He hath neither opinions, nor thoughts, nor actions, nor talk, that he can call his own, but all conveyed to him by his leader, as wind is through an organ. The nouriſhment he receives, hath been not only *chewed*, but *digeſted*, before it comes into his mouth. Thus inſtructed, he follows the *party* right or wrong through all its ſentiments, and acquires a courage and ſtiffneſs of opinion not at all congenial with him.

This encourages me to hope, that, during the preſent

preſent lucid interval, the members retired to their homes may ſuſpend a while their *acquired* complexions, and taught by the calmneſs of the ſcene and the ſeaſon, reaſſume the *native* ſedateneſs of their temper. If this ſhould be ſo, it would be wiſe in them, as individual and private mortals, to look back a little upon the ſtorms they have *raiſed* as well as thoſe they have *eſcaped:* to reflect, that they have been authors of a new and wonderful thing in England, which is, for a houſe of Commons to loſe the univerſal favour of the numbers they repreſent; to obſerve, how thoſe whom they thought fit to perſecute for righteouſneſs ſake, have been openly careſſed by the people; and to remember how themſelves ſat in fear of their perſons from popular rage. Now, if they would know the ſecret of all this unprecedented proceeding in their *maſters*, they muſt not impute it to their freedom in debate, or declaring their opinions, but to that unparliamentary abuſe of *ſetting individuals upon their ſhoulders*, who were hated by God and man. For, it ſeems, the maſs of the people, in ſuch conjunctures as this, have opened their eyes, and will not endure to be governed by Clodius and Curio at the head of their Myrmidons, though theſe be ever ſo numerous, and compoſed of their own repreſentatives.

This averſion of the people againſt the late proceedings of the Commons is an accident, that, if it laſt a while, might be improved to good uſes for ſetting the balance of power a little more upon an equality, than their late meaſures ſeem to promiſe or admit. This accident may be imputed to two cauſes: the firſt is an univerſal fear and apprehenſion of the greatneſs and power of France, whereof the people in general ſeem to be very much and juſtly poſſeſſed, and therefore cannot but reſent to ſee it, in ſo critical a juncture, wholly laid aſide by their miniſters, the Commons. The other cauſe is

is a great love and ſenſe of gratitude in the people towards their preſent king, grounded upon a long opinion and experience of his merit, as well as conceſſions to all their reaſonable deſires; ſo that it is for ſome time they have begun to ſay, and to fetch inſtances, where he hath in many things been hardly uſed. How long theſe humours may laſt (for paſſions are momentary, and eſpecially thoſe of a multitude), or what conſequences they may produce, a little time will diſcover. But whenever it comes to paſs, that a popular aſſembly, free from ſuch obſtructions, and already poſſeſſed of more power, than an equal balance will allow, ſhall continue to think they have not enough, but by cramping the hand that holds the balance, and by *impeachments* or *diſſenſions* with the nobles, endeavour ſtill for more; I cannot poſſibly ſee, in the common courſe of things, how the ſame cauſes can produce different effects, and conſequences among us, from what they did in Greece and Rome.

The PUBLIC SPIRIT of the WHIGS, set forth in their generous encouragement of the author of the CRISIS *.

With some observations on the seasonableness, candor, erudition, and style of that treatise.

[Upon the first publication of this pamphlet, all the Scots Lords then in London went in a body, and complained to Queen ANNE of the affront put on them and their nation by the author of this treatise. Whereupon a proclamation was published by her Majesty, offering a reward of 300 l. to discover him. The reason for offering so small a sum was, that the Queen and ministry had no desire to have the author taken into custody.]

I Cannot, without some envy, and a just resentment against the opposite conduct of others, reflect upon that generosity and tenderness, wherewith the heads and principal members of a struggling

* It was written in the year 1712, by the consent, if not the encouragement, of the ministers of that æra, in answer to the Crisis, by Sir Richard Steele. *Orrery.*

The noble commentator who appears in another instance to have given an account of the works of his author, from a perusal of no more than a title (*a*) in the Dublin editions, has been betrayed into mistakes, which, if he had read the piece, he would have escaped. This tract, in the title which his Lordship consulted, is said to have been written in the year 1712: but in that part of it which most deserves the notice of a critic, because it occasioned a complaint in the house of Lords, mention is made of a motion to dissolve the union, which did not happen till 1713. The complaint, which is said in the note to happen upon the *first* publication, was made the 2d of March 1713-14, and the pamphlet, according to the custom of printers, was dated 1714.

(*a*) *See the note on Voyage to Brobdingnag, chap.* 6. *vol.* 4.

In

gling faction treat thoſe who will undertake to hold a pen in their defence. And the behaviour of theſe patrons is yet the more laudable, becauſe the benefits they confer are almoſt *gratis*. If any of their labourers can ſcratch out a pamphlet, they deſire no more; there is no queſtion offered about the wit, the ſtyle, the argument. Let a pamphlet come out upon demand in a proper juncture, you ſhall be well and certainly paid; you ſhall be paid beforehand; every one of the party who is able to read, and can ſpare a ſhilling, ſhall be a ſubſcriber; ſeveral thouſands of each production ſhall be ſent among their friends through the kingdom; the work ſhall be reported admirable, ſublime, unanſwerable; ſhall ſerve to raiſe the ſinking clamours, and confirm the ſcandal of introducing Popery and the Pretender upon the Queen and her miniſters.

Among the preſent writers on that ſide I can recollect but three of any great diſtinction, which are the *Flying Poſt*, Mr. Dunton, and the author of the Criſis *. The firſt of theſe ſeems to have been much ſunk in reputation, ſince the ſudden retreat of the *only true genuine original author, Mr. Ridpath*, who is celebrated by the *Dutch gazeteer as one of the beſt pens in England.* Mr. Dunton hath been longer and more converſant in books than any of the three, as well as more voluminous in his productions: however, having employed his ſtudies in

In the ſtyle and conduct, this is one of the boldeſt, as well as one of the moſt maſterly tracts that Swift ever wrote. And I cannot help obſerving, that on whatever topic he employs his pen, the ſubject which he treats of is always ſo excellently managed, as to ſeem to have been the whole ſtudy and application of his life: ſo that he appears the greateſt maſter, through a greater variety of materials, than perhaps have been diſcuſſed by any other author. *Orrery.*

* Mr. Steele was expelled the houſe of Commons for this pamphlet, at the very ſame time that the houſe of Lords was moved againſt the Dean for the reply.

ſo

so great a variety of other subjects, he hath, I think, but lately turned his genius to politics. His famous tract, intitled, *Neck, or nothing*, must be allowed to be the shrewdest piece, and written with the most spirit of any which hath appeared from that side since the change of the ministry: it is indeed a most cutting satire upon the Lord Treasurer and Lord Bolingbroke, and I wonder none of our friends ever undertook to answer it. I confess I was at first of the same opinion with several good judges, who, from the style and manner, suppose it to have issued from the sharp pen of the Earl of Nottingham; and I am still apt to think it might receive his Lordship's last hand. The third and principal of this triumvirate is the author of the *Crisis*; who, although he must yield to the *Flying Post* in knowledge of the world, and skill in politics, and to Mr. Dunton in keenness of satire and variety of reading, hath yet other qualities enough to denominate him a writer of a superior class to either; provided he would a little regard the propriety and disposition of his words, consult the grammatical part, and get some information in the subject he intends to handle.

Omitting the generous countenance and encouragement that have been shewn to the persons and productions of the two former authors, I shall here only consider the great favour conferred upon the last. It hath been advertised for several months in the *Englishman* *, and other papers, that a pamphlet, called *the Crisis*, should be published at a proper time in order to open the eyes of the nation. It was proposed to be printed by subscription, price a shilling. This was a little out of form; because subscriptions are usually begged only for books of great price, and such as are not likely to have a ge-

* A paper written by the same author, in favour of the preceding administration.

neral ſale. Notice was likewiſe given of what this pamphlet ſhould contain; only an extract from certain acts of parliament relating to the ſucceſſion, which at leaſt muſt ſink nine pence in the ſhilling, and leave but three pence for the author's political reflections; ſo that nothing very wonderful or deciſive could be reaſonably expected from this performance. But a work was to be done, a hearty writer to be encouraged, and accordingly many thouſand copies were beſpoke. Neither could this be ſufficient; for when we expected to have our bundles delivered us, all was ſtopt; the friends to the cauſe ſprang a new project; and it was advertiſed that the Criſis could not appear, till the ladies had ſhewn their zeal againſt the pretender, as well as the men: againſt the pretender in the bloom of his youth, reported to be handſome, and endued with an underſtanding exactly of a ſize to pleaſe the ſex. I ſhould be glad to have ſeen a printed liſt of the fair ſubſcribers prefixed to this pamphlet; by which the Chevalier might know, he was ſo far from *pretending* to a monarchy here, that he could not ſo much as *pretend* to a miſtreſs.

At the deſtined period, the firſt news we hear, is of a huge train of dukes, earls, viſcounts, barons, knights, eſquires, gentlemen, and others, going to Sam. Buckley's the publiſher of the Criſis, to fetch home their cargoes, in order to tranſmit them by dozens, ſcores, and hundreds into the ſeveral counties, and thereby to prepare the wills and underſtandings of their friends againſt the approaching ſeſſions. Aſk any of them, whether they have read it? they will anſwer, No; but they have ſent it every where, and it will do a world of good. It is a pamphlet, and a pamphlet, they hear, againſt the miniſtry; talks of ſlavery, France, and the Pretender: they deſire no more; it will ſettle the wavering, confirm the doubtful, inſtruct the ignorant, inflame the clamorous, although it never be

once

once looked into. I am told by thoſe who are expert in the trade, that the author and bookſeller of this twelve-penny treatiſe will be greater gainers than from one edition of any folio that hath been publiſhed theſe twenty years. What needy writer would not ſolicit to work under ſuch maſters, who will pay us beforehand, take off as much of our ware as we pleaſe at our own rates, and trouble not themſelves to examine either before or after they have bought it, whether it be ſtaple or no?

But, in order to illuſtrate the implicit munificence of theſe noble patrons, I cannot take a more effectual method than by examining the production itſelf; by which we ſhall eaſily find that it was never intended, further than from the noiſe, the bulk, and the title of *Criſis*, to do any ſervice to the factious cauſe. The entire piece conſiſts of a title-page, a dedication to the clergy, a preface, an extract from certain acts of parliament, and about ten pages of dry reflections on the proceedings of the Queen and her ſervants; which his coadjutors, the Earl of Nottingham, Mr. Dunton, and the Flying Poſt, had long ago ſet before us in a much clearer light.

In Popiſh countries, when ſome impoſter cries out, *A miracle! a miracle!* it is not done with a hope or intention of converting heretics, but confirming the deluded vulgar in their errors: and ſo the cry goes round without examining into the cheat. Thus the Whigs among us give about the cry, *A pamphlet! a pamphlet! The Criſis! the Criſis!* not with a view of convincing their adverſaries, but to raiſe the ſpirits of their friends, recall their ſtragglers, and unite their numbers by ſound and impudence; as bees aſſemble and cling together by the noiſe of braſs.

That no other effect could be imagined or hoped for by the publication of this timely treatiſe, will be manifeſt from ſome obvious reflections upon the

ſeveral parts of it; wherein the follies, the falſehoods, or the abſurdities, appear ſo frequent, that they may boldly contend for number with the lines.

When the hawker holds this pamphlet towards you, the firſt words you perceive are, *The Criſis*; or, *A Diſcourſe*, &c. The interpreter of Suidas gives four tranſlations of the word *Criſis*; any of which may be as properly applied to this author's letter to the bailiff of Stockbridge *. Next, what he calls *a diſcourſe* conſiſts only of two pages, prefixed to twenty-two more, which contain extracts from acts of parliament; for as to the twelve laſt pages, they are provided for by themſelves in the title, under the name of *Some ſeaſonable remarks on the danger of a* Popiſh *ſucceſſor*. Another circumſtance worthy of our information in the title-page, is, that the crown hath been ſettled *by previous acts*. I never heard of any act of parliament that was not previous to what it enacted, unleſs thoſe two, by which the Earl of Strafford and Sir John Fenwick loſt their heads, may paſs for exceptions. *A diſcourſe, repreſenting from the moſt authentic records*, &c. He hath borrowed this expreſſion from ſome writer who probably underſtood the words; but this gentleman hath altogether miſapplied them; and, under favour, he is wholly miſtaken; for a heap of extracts from ſeveral acts of parliament cannot be called a diſcourſe; neither do I believe he copied them from the moſt authentic records, which, as I take it, are lodged in the Tower, but out of ſome common printed copy. I grant there is nothing material in all this, further than to ſhew the generoſity of our adverſaries in encouraging a writer,

* Steele addreſſed a letter to the Bailiff of Stockbridge, who appears to have been returning officer for this borough, which Steele repreſented in parliament.

who

who cannot furniſh out ſo much as a title-page with propriety or common ſenſe.

Next follows the dedication to the clergy of the church of England, wherein the modeſty and the meaning of the firſt paragraphs are hardly to be matched. He tells them, he hath made a "comment upon the acts of ſettlement, *which he* lays "before them, and conjures them to recommend "in their writings and diſcourſes to their fellow-"ſubjects: *and he doth all this,* out of a juſt defe-"rence to their great power and influence." This is the right Whig ſcheme of directing the clergy what to preach. The Archbiſhop of Canterbury's juriſdiction extends no farther than over his own province; but the author of the Criſis conſtitutes himſelf vicar-general over the whole clergy of the church of England. The biſhops in their letters or ſpeeches to their own clergy proceed no farther than to *exhortation*; but this writer *conjures* the whole clergy of the church to *recommend* his *comment upon the laws* of the land, *in their writings and diſcourſes*. I would fain know, who made him a *commentator upon the laws* of the land: after which it will be time enough to aſk him, by what authority he directs the clergy *to recommend his* comments from the pulpit or the preſs?

He tells the clergy, *there are two circumſtances which place the minds of the people under their direction*; the firſt circumſtance is their education; the ſecond circumſtance is the tenths of our lands. This laſt, according to the Latin phraſe, is ſpoken *ad invidiam*; for he knows well enough, they have not a twentieth: but if you take it in his own way, the landlord has nine parts in ten of the people's minds under his direction. Upon this rock the author before us is perpetually ſplitting, as often as he ventures out beyond the narrow bounds of his literature. He hath a confuſed remembrance of words ſince he left the univerſity; but hath loſt

half their meaning, and puts them together with no regard, except to their cadence; as I remember a fellow nailed up maps in a gentleman's closet, some sideling, others upside down, the better to adjust them to the pannels.

I am sensible it is of little consequence to their cause, whether this defender of it understands grammar or no; and if what he would fain say, discovered him to be a wellwisher to reason or truth, I would be ready to make large allowances. But when, with great difficulty, I descry a composition of rancour and falsehood, intermixed with plausible nonsense, I feel a struggle between contempt and indignation at seeing the character of a *censor*, a *guardian*, *an Englishman*, a *commentator* on the *laws*, an *instructor* of the *clergy*, assumed by a child of obscurity without one single qualification to support them.

This writer, who either affects, or is commanded of late to copy after the Bishop of Sarum, hath, out of the pregnancy of his invention, found out an old way of insinuating the grossest reflections under the appearance of admonitions; and is so judicious a follower of the prelate, that he taxes the clergy for "inflaming their people with appre-"hensions of danger to them and their constitu-"tion, from men who are innocent of such de-"signs;" when he must needs confess, the whole *design* of his pamphlet is to *inflame the people with apprehensions of danger* from the present ministry, whom *we* believe to be at least as *innocent men* as the last.

What shall I say to a pamphlet, where the malice and falsehood of every line would require an answer, and where the dulness and absurdities will not deserve one?

By his pretending to have always maintained an inviolable respect to the clergy, he would insinuate, that those papers among the *Tatlers* and *Spectators*, where

where the whole order is abuſed, were not his own. I will appeal to all who know the flatneſs of his ſtyle, and the barrenneſs of his invention, whether he doth not groſsly prevaricate? was he ever able to walk without leading-ſtrings, or ſwim without bladders, without being diſcovered by his hobbling and his ſinking? hath he adhered to his character in his paper called the *Engliſhman*, whereof he is allowed to be the ſole author without any competition? what does he think of the letter ſigned by himſelf, which relates to Moleſworth *, in whoſe defence he affronts the whole convocation of Ireland?

It is a wiſe maxim, That becauſe the clergy are no civil lawyers, they ought not to preach obedience to governors; and therefore they ought not to preach temperance, becauſe they are no phyſicians. Examine all this author's writings, and then point me out a divine who knoweth leſs of the conſtitution of England than he; witneſs thoſe many egregious blunders in his late papers, where he pretended to dabble in the ſubject.

But the clergy have, it ſeems, imbibed their notions of power and obedience, abhorrent from our laws, "from the pompous ideas of imperial greatneſs, and the ſubmiſſion to abſolute emperors." This is groſs ignorance, below a ſchool-boy in his Lucius Florus. The Roman hiſtory wherein lads are inſtructed, reacheth little above eight hundred years, and the authors do every where inſtil republican principles; and from the account of nine in twelve of the firſt emperors we learn to have a

* The Right Honourable Robert Moleſworth, Eſq; one of the privy council, and member of the houſe of Commons, created a peer by King George I. The lower houſe of convocation there preferred a complaint againſt him for diſreſpectful words, which being repreſented in England, he was removed from the council: to juſtify him againſt this complaint, was the ſubject of Steele's letter.

deteſta-

deteſtation againſt tyranny. The Greeks carry this point yet a great deal higher, which none can be ignorant of, who hath read or heard them quoted. This gave Hobbes the occaſion of advancing a poſition directly contrary, That the youth of England were corrupted in their political principles by reading the hiſtories of Rome and Greece which, having been written under republics, taught the readers to have ill notions of monarchy. In this aſſertion there was ſomething ſpecious, but that advanced by the Criſis could only iſſue from the profoundeſt ignorance.

But would you know his ſcheme of education for young gentlemen at the univerſity? it is, That they ſhould ſpend their time in peruſing thoſe acts of parliament, whereof his pamphlet is an extract, which, "if it had been done, the kingdom would "not be in its preſent condition, but every mem- "ber ſent into the world thus inſtructed ſince the "revolution, would have been an advocate for "our rights and liberties."

Here now is a project for getting more money by the Criſis; to have it read by tutors in the univerſities. I thoroughly agree with him, that if our ſtudents had been thus employed for twenty years paſt, "the kingdom had not been in its pre- "ſent condition:" But we have too many of ſuch proficients already among the young nobility and gentry, who have gathered up their politics from chocolate-houſes, and factious clubs, and who, if they had ſpent their time in hard ſtudy at Oxford or Cambridge, we might indeed have ſaid, that the factious part of this kingdom *had not been in its preſent condition*, or have ſuffered themſelves to be taught, that a few acts of parliament, relating to the ſucceſſion, are preferable to all other *civil inſtitutions* whatſoever. Neither did I ever before hear, that an act of parliament relating to one

one particular point could be called a civil inſtitution.

He ſpends almoſt a quarto page in telling the clergy, that they will be certainly perjured, if they bring in the pretender, whom they have abjured; and he wiſely reminds them, that they have ſworn without equivocation or mental reſervation; otherwiſe the clergy might think fit, that as ſoon as they received the pretender, and turned Papiſts, they would be free from their oath.

This honeſt, civil, ingenious gentleman knows in his conſcience, that there are not ten clergymen in England, except nonjurors, who do not abhor the thoughts of the pretender reigning over us, much more than himſelf. But this is the ſpittle of the Biſhop of Sarum *, which our author licks up, and ſwallows, and then coughs out again with an addition of his own phlegm. I would fain ſuppoſe the body of the clergy were to return an anſwer by one of their members to theſe worthy counſellors. I conceive it might be in the following terms.

My Lord, and Gentleman,

" The clergy command me to give you thanks " for your advice; and if they knew any crimes, " from which either of you were as free, as they " are from thoſe which you ſo earneſtly exhort " them to avoid, they would return your favour " as near as poſſible in the ſame ſtyle and manner. " However, that your advice may not be wholly loſt, " particularly that part of it which relates to the " pretender, they deſire you would apply it to " more proper perſons. Look among your own " leaders; examine which of them engaged in a " plot to reſtore the late K. James, and received " pardons under his ſeal; examine which of them

* Dr. Gilbert Burnet.

have

" have been since tampering with his pretended son, " and, to gratify their ambition, their avarice, " their malice and revenge, are now willing to re- " store him at the expence of the religion and li- " berty of their country. Retire, good my Lord, " with your pupil, and let us hear no more of these " hypocritical insinuations, lest the Queen and " ministers, who have been hitherto content with " only *disappointing* the lurking villanies of your " faction, may be at last provoked to *expose* " them."

But his respect for the clergy is such, that he doth not insinuate, as if they really had these evil dispositions; he only *insinuates*, that they give *too much cause* for such *insinuations*.

I will, upon occasion, strip some of his *insinuations* from their generality and solecisms, and drag them into the light. His dedication to the clergy is full of them, because here he endeavours to mold up his rancour and civility together; by which constraint he is obliged to shorten his paragraphs, and to place them in such a light that they obscure one another. Supposing therefore, that I have scraped off his good manners in order to come at his meaning, which lies under; he tells the clergy, that the favour of the Queen and her ministers is but a *colour of zeal towards them*; that the people were deluded by a groundless cry of the church's danger at Sacheverel's trial; that the clergy, as they are *men of sense and honour*, ought to preach this truth to their several congregations; and let them know, that the true design of the present men in power in that, and all their proceedings since in favour of the church, was to bring in Popery, France and the Pretender, and to inslave all Europe, contrary to the *laws of our country, the power of the legislature, the faith of nations, and the honour of God*.

I cannot

I cannot see why the clergy, as *men of sense and men of honour*, (for he appeals not to them as men of *religion*), should not be allowed to know when they are in danger, and be able to guess whence it comes, and, and who are their protectors. The design of their destruction indeed may have been projected in the dark: But when all was ripe, their enemies proceeded to so many overt acts in the face of the nation, that it was obvious to the meanest people, who wanted no other motives to rouse them. On the other side, can this author or the wisest of his faction, assign one single act of the present ministry any way tending towards bringing in the pretender, or to weaken the succession of the house of Hanover? Observe then the reasonableness of this gentleman's advice: The clergy, the gentry, and the common people had the utmost apprehensions of danger to the church under the late ministry; yet then it was the greatest impiety to *inflame the people with any such apprehensions*. His danger of a *Popish* successor from any steps of the present ministry is an artificial calumny, raised and spread against the conviction of the iventors, pretended to be believed only by those who abhor the constitution in church and state; an obdurate faction, who compass heaven and earth to restore themselves upon the ruin of their country; yet here our author *exhorts the clergy* to preach up this imaginary danger to their people, and disturb the public peace with his strained seditious comments.

But how comes this gracious licence to the clergy from the *Whigs* to concern themselves with politics of any sort, although it be only the glosses and comments of Mr. Steele? The speeches of the managers at Sacheverel's trial, particularly those of Stanhope, Lechmere, King, Parker *, and some

* These persons were created peers by K. George I.

others,

others, seemed to deliver a different doctrine. Nay, this very dedication complains of *some in holy orders, who have made the constitution of their country* (in which and the *Coptic* Mr. Steele is equally skilled) *a very little part of their study, and yet made obedience and government the frequent subjects of their discourses.* This difficulty is easily solved; for by *politics* they mean *obedience.* Mr. Hoadley*, who is a champion for resistance, was never charged with meddling out of his function; Hugh Peters, and his brethren, in the times of usurpation had full liberty to preach up sedition and rebellion; and so here Mr. Steele issues out his licence to the clergy to preach up the *danger of a popish pretender* in defiance of the Queen and her administration.

Every whiffler in a laced coat, who frequents the chocolate-house, and is able to spell the title of a pamphlet, shall talk of the constitution with as much plausibility as this very solemn writer, and with as good a grace blame the clergy for meddling with politics, which they do not understand. I have known many of these able politicians furnished, before they were of age, with all the necessary topics of their faction, and by the help of about twenty polysyllable capable of maintaining an argument, that would shine in the Crisis; whose author gathered up his little stock from the same schools, and hath written from no other fund.

But after all, it is not clear to me, whether this gentleman addresseth himself to the clergy of England in general, or only to those very few (hardly enough, in case of a change, to supply the mortality of those *self-denying prelates* he celebrates) who

* Dr. Benjamin Hoadly, created Bishop of Bangor by K. George I. in 1715; translated to Hereford in 1721, to Salisbury in 1723, and to Winchester in 1734.

are

are in his principles, and among these only such as live in and about London; which probably will reduce the number to about half a dozen at most. I should incline to guess the latter; because he tells them they "are surrounded by a learned, wealthy, "knowing gentry, who know with what firmness, "self-denial, and charity the bishops adhered to "the public cause, and what contumelies those "clergymen have undergone, *&c.* who adhered to "the cause of truth." By those terms, "the pu-"blic cause, and the cause of truth," he understands the *cause* of the Whigs, in opposition to the Queen and her servants; therefore by the "learn-"ed, wealthy, and knowing gentry," he must understand the *bank* and *East-India Company*, and those other merchants or citizens within the bills of mortality, who have been strenuous against the church and crown, and whose spirit of faction hath lately got the better of their interest. For let him search all the rest of the kingdom, he will find the *surrounded* clergy, and the *surrounding* gentry wholly strangers to the merits of those prelates; and adhering to a very different *cause of truth*, as will soon, I hope, be manifest by a fair appeal to the representatives of both.

It was very unnecessary in this writer to bespeak the treatment of *contempt and derision*, which the clergy are to expect from his faction, whenever they come into power. I believe that venerable body is in very little concern after what manner their most mortal enemies intend to *treat* them, whenever it shall please God for our sins to visit us with so fatal an event; which I hope it will be the united endeavours both of clergy and laity to hinder. It would be some support to this hope, if I could have any opinion of his predicting talent, (which some have ascribed to people of this author's character), where he tells us, that *noise and wrath will not always pass for zeal.* What other instances of zeal hath this gentleman or the rest of

his party been able to produce? If clamour be *noise*, it is but opening our ears to know from what side it comes; and if sedition, scurrility, slander, and calumny be the fruit of *wrath*, read the pamphlets and papers issuing from the *zealots* of that faction, or visit their clubs and coffee-houses, in order to form a judgment of the tree.

When Mr. Steele tells us, "we have religion "that wants no support from the enlargement of "secular power, but is well supported by the wis- "dom and piety of its preachers, and its own "native truth;" it would be good to know what religion he professeth: for the clergy to whom he speaks will never allow him a member of the church of England. They cannot agree, that the *truth* of the gospel, and the *piety* and *wisdom* of its preachers, are a sufficient *support* in an evil age against infidelity, faction, and vice, without the assistance of *secular power*; unless God would please to confer the gift of miracles on those who wait at the altar. I believe they venture to go a little further, and think, that upon some occasions they want a little *enlargement of assistance from the secular power* against *Atheists*, *Deists*, *Socinians*, and other heretics. Every first Sunday in Lent a part of the Liturgy is read to the people, in the preface to which the church declares her wishes for the restoring of that discipline she formerly had, and which, for some years past, hath been more wanted than ever. But of this no more, lest it might *insinuate jealousies between the clergy and laity*; which, the author tells us, is the "policy of vain ambitious men among "the former, in hopes to derive from their order "a veneration they cannot deserve from their vir- "tue." If this be their method for procuring veneration, it is the most singular that ever was thought on; and the clergy would then indeed have no more to do with politics of any sort than Mr. Steele or his faction will allow them.

Having

Having thus toiled through his dedication, I proceed to consider his preface, which, half consisting of quotation, will be so much the sooner got through. It is a very unfair thing in any writer to employ his *ignorance* and *malice* together; because it gives his answerer double work: it is like the sort of sophistry that the logicians call *two mediums*, which are never allowed in the same syllogism. A writer with a weak head, and a corrupt heart, is an over-match for any single pen; like a hireling jade, dull and vicious, hardly able to stir, yet offering at every turn to kick.

He begins his preface with such an account of the original of power, and the nature of civil institutions, as I am confident was never once imagined by any writer upon government, from Plato to Mr. Locke. Give me leave to transcribe his first paragraph. "I never saw an unruly croud of "people cool by degrees into temper, but it gave "me an idea of the original of power, and the na- "ture of civil institutions. One particular man "has usually in those cases, from the dignity of "his appearance, or other qualities known or ima- "gined by the multitude, been received into sud- "den favour and authority; the occasion of their "difference has been represented to him, and the "matter referred to his decision."

I have known a poet, who never was out of England, introduce a fact by way of simile, which could probably no where happen nearer than in the plains of Lybia; and begin with, *So I have seen* *. Such a fiction, I suppose, may be justified by poetical licence; yet Virgil is much more modest. This paragraph of Mr. Steele's, which he sets down as an observation of his own, is a miserable mangled translation of six verses out of that famous poet, who speaks after this manner: *As when a*

* See the Περὶ βάθους, vol. 5.

ſedition ariſes in a great multitude, &c. *then if they ſee a wiſe grave man*, &c. Virgil, who lived but a little after the ruin of the Roman republic, where ſeditions often happened, and the force of oratory was great among the people, made uſe of a ſimile, which Mr. Steele turns into a fact after ſuch a manner, as if he had ſeen it a hundred times; and builds upon it a ſyſtem of the origin of government. When the vulgar here in England aſſemble in a riotous manner, (which is not very frequent of late years), the prince takes a much more effectual way than that of ſending orators to appeaſe them: but Mr. Steele imagines ſuch a croud of people as this, where there is no government at all; their *unruline/s* quelled, and their paſſions *cooled* by a particular man, whoſe great qualities they had known before. Such an aſſembly muſt have riſen ſuddenly from the earth, and the *man of authority* dropt from the clouds; for without ſome previous form of government no ſuch croud did ever yet aſſemble, or could poſſibly be acquainted with the merits and dignity of any *particular man* among them. But to purſue his ſcheme; this man of authority, who *cools* the *croud* by degrees, and to whom they all appeal, muſt of neceſſity prove either an open or *clandeſtine tyrant*. A *clandeſtine tyrant* I take to be a king of Brentford, who keeps his army in diſguiſe; and whenever he happens either to die naturally, be knocked on the head, or depoſed, the people calmly *take further meaſures and improve upon what was begun under his unlimited power*. All this our author tells us, with extreme propriety, *is what ſeems reaſonable to common ſenſe*; that is, in other words, it ſeems *reaſonable to reaſon*. This is what he calls *giving an idea of the original of power, and the nature of civil inſtitutions*. To which I anſwer, with great phlegm, that I defy any man alive to ſhew me, in double the number of lines, although writ by the ſame author, ſuch a complicated

cated ignorance in hiſtory, human nature, or politics, as well as in the ordinary proprieties of thought or of ſtyle.

But it ſeems theſe profound ſpeculations were only premiſed to introduce ſome quotations in favour of *reſiſtance*. What hath *reſiſtance* to do with the ſucceſſion of the houſe of Hanover, that the Whig writers ſhould perpetually affect to tag them together? I can conceive nothing elſe, but that their hatred to the Queen and miniſtry puts them upon thoughts of introducing the ſucceſſor by *another* revolution. Are caſes of *extreme neceſſity* to be produced as common maxims, by which we are always to proceed? Should not theſe gentlemen ſometimes inculcate the general rule of obedience, and not always the exception of reſiſtance? ſince the former hath been the perpetual dictate of all laws both divine and civil, and the latter is ſtill in diſpute.

I ſhall meddle with none of the paſſages he cites to prove the lawfulneſs of reſiſting princes, except that from the preſent Lord Chancellor's * ſpeech in defence of Dr. Sacheverel; that "there are extraordinary caſes, caſes of neceſſity, which are implied, although not expreſſed, in the general rule [of obedience]." Theſe words, very clear in themſelves, Mr. Steele explains into nonſenſe; which in any other author I ſhould ſuſpect to have been intended as a reflection upon as great a perſon as ever filled or adorned that high ſtation: but I am ſo well acquainted with his pen, that I much more wonder how it can trace out a true quotation than a falſe comment. To ſee him treat my Lord Harcourt with ſo much civility, looks indeed a little

* Sir Simon Harcourt, who, at the time of Sacheverel's trial, had reſigned his place of attorney-general, which he afterwards accepted again; upon the change of the miniſtry, he was made Lord Keeper, and in 1711 created a baron.

ſuſpicious, and as if he had malice in his heart. He calls his Lordſhip *a very great man*, and *a great living authority*; places himſelf in company with Gen. Stanhope and Mr. Hoadley; and, in ſhort, takes the moſt effectual method in his power of ruining his Lordſhip in the opinion of every man, who is wiſe or good. I can only tell my Lord Harcourt for his comfort, that theſe praiſes are encumbered with the doctrine of *reſiſtance*, and the true revolution-principles; and provided he will not allow Mr. Steele for his commentator, he may hope to recover the honour of being libelled again, as well as his ſovereign and fellow-ſervants.

We now come to the Criſis; where we meet with two pages by way of introduction to thoſe extracts from acts of parliament, that conſtitute the body of his pamphlet. This introduction begins with a definition of liberty, and then proceeds in a panegyric upon that great bleſſing. His panegyric is made up of half a dozen ſhreds, like a ſchoolboy's theme, beaten general topics, where any other man alive might wander ſecurely; but this politician, by venturing to vary the good old phraſes, and give them a new turn, commits an hundred ſoleciſms and abſurdities. The weighty truths, which he endeavours to preſs upon his reader, are ſuch as theſe. *That liberty is a very good thing*; that *without liberty we cannot be free*; that *health is good, and ſtrength is good, but liberty is better than either*; that *no man can be happy without the liberty of doing whatever his own mind tells him is beſt*; that *men of quality love liberty, and common people love liberty*; even women and children love liberty; and you cannot pleaſe them better than by letting them do what they pleaſe. Had Mr. Steele contented himſelf to deliver theſe and the like maxims in ſuch intelligible terms, I could have found where we agreed and where we differed. But let us hear ſome of theſe axioms, as he hath involved them. "We cannot

"poſſeſs

" poſſeſs our ſouls with pleaſure and ſatisfaction,
" except we preſerve in ourſelves that ineſtimable
" bleſſing, which we call liberty. By liberty I de-
" ſire to be underſtood to mean the happineſs of
" mens living, *&c.*——*The true* life of man con-
" ſiſts in conducting it according to his own juſt
" ſentiments and innocent inclinations——man's
" being is degraded below that of a free agent,
" when his affections and paſſions are no longer
" governed by the dictates of his own mind.——
" Without liberty our health (*among other things*)
" may be at the will of a tyrant employed to our
" own ruin and that of our fellow-creatures." If there be any of theſe maxims which is not groſsly defective in truth, in ſenſe, or in grammar, I will allow them to paſs for uncontrollable. By the firſt, omitting the pedantry of the whole expreſſion, there are not above one or two nations in the world, where any one man can *poſſeſs his ſoul with pleaſure and ſatisfaction.* In the ſecond, he *deſires to be underſtood to mean*; that is, he deſires to be meant to mean, or to be underſtood to underſtand. In the third, *the life of man conſiſts in conducting* his life. In the fourth he affirms, that *mens beings are degraded, when their paſſions are no longer governed by the dictates of their own minds*; directly contrary to the leſſons of all moraliſts and legiſlators; who agree unanimouſly, that the paſſions of men muſt be under the government of reaſon and law; neither are laws of any other uſe than to correct the irregularity of our affections. By the laſt, *our health is ruinous to ourſelves and other men when a tyrant pleaſes*; which I leave to him to make out.

I cannot ſufficiently commend our anceſtors for tranſmitting to us the bleſſing of liberty; yet having *laid out their blood and treaſure upon the purchaſe*, I do not ſee how they *acted parſimoniouſly*; becauſe I can conceive nothing more generous than that of employing our blood and treaſure for the ſervice of others.

others. But I am ſuddenly ſtruck with the thought, that I have found his meaning; our anceſtors acted parſimoniouſly, becauſe they only ſpent their own treaſure for the the good of their poſterity; whereas we ſquandered away the treaſures of our poſterity too; but whether they will be thankful, and think it was done for the preſervation of their liberty, muſt be left to themſelves for a deciſion.

I verily believe, although I could not prove it in Weſtminſter-hall before a Lord Chief Juſtice, that by *enemies to our conſtitution*, and *enemies to our preſent eſtabliſhment*, *Mr. Steele would deſire to be underſtood to mean* my Lord Treaſurer and the reſt of the miniſtry: *by thoſe who are grown ſupine in proportion to the danger to which our liberty is every day more expoſed*, I ſhould gueſs he means the Tories: and by *honeſt men who ought to look up with a ſpirit that becomes honeſty*, he underſtands the Whigs. I likewiſe believe he would take it ill, or think me ſtupid, if I did not thus expound him. I ſay then, that, according to this expoſition, the four great officers of ſtate, together with the reſt of the cabinet council (except the archbiſhop of Canterbury *), are *enemies to our eſtabliſhment*, *making artful and open attacks upon our conſtitution*, and are now *practiſing indirect arts*, *and mean ſubtilties to weaken the ſecurity of thoſe acts of parliament* for ſettling the ſucceſſion in the houſe of Hanover. The firſt and moſt notorious of theſe criminals is, Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford, Lord High Treaſurer, who is reputed to be chief miniſter: the ſecond is, James Butler, Duke of Ormond, who commands the army, and deſigns to employ it in bringing over the pretender: the third is, Henry St. John, Lord Viſcount Bolingbroke, ſecretary of ſtate, who muſt be ſuppoſed to hold a conſtant correſpondence at the court of Bar le Duc, as the late Earl of Godolphin

* Dr. Tenniſon.

did

did with that at St. Germains: and to avoid tediouſneſs, Mr. Bromley †, and the reſt, are employed in their ſeveral diſtricts to the ſame end. Theſe are the opinions which Mr. Steele and his faction, under the direction of their leaders, are endeavouring, with all their might, to propagate among the people of England concerning the preſent miniſtry; with what reſervation to the honour, wiſdom, or juſtice of the Queen, I cannot determine; who, by her own free choice, after long experience of their abilities and integrity, and in compliance to the general wiſhes of her people, called them to her ſervice. Such an accuſation againſt perſons in ſo high truſt ſhould require, I think, at leaſt one ſingle overt act to make it good. If there be no other choice of perſons fit to ſerve the crown without danger from the pretender, except among thoſe who are called the Whig party, the Hanover ſucceſſion is then indeed in a very deſperate ſtate: that illuſtrious family will have almoſt nine in ten of the kingdom againſt it, and thoſe principally of the landed intereſt; which is moſt to be depended upon in ſuch a nation as ours.

I have now got as far as his extracts, which I ſhall not be at the pains of comparing with the originals, but ſuppoſe he hath gotten them fairly tranſcribed: I only think, that whoever is patentee for printing acts of parliament may have a very fair action againſt him for invaſion of property: but this is none of my buſineſs to inquire into.

After two and twenty pages ſpent in reciting acts of parliament, "he deſires leave to repeat the hiſtory and progreſs of the union;" upon which I have ſome few things to obſerve.

This *work*, he tells us, *was unſucceſsfully attempted by ſeveral of her Majeſty's predeceſſors*; although

† Speaker of the houſe of Commons.

I do

I do not remember † it was ever thought on by any except K. James I. and the late K. William. I have read indeed that ſome ſmall overtures were made by the former of theſe princes towards an union between the two kingdoms, but rejected with indignation and contempt by the Engliſh: and the hiſtorian tells us, that how degenerate and corrupt ſoever the court and parliament then were, they would not give ear to ſo infamous a propoſal. I do not find, that any of the ſucceeding princes before the revolution ever reſumed the deſign; becauſe it was a project for which there could not poſſibly be aſſigned the leaſt reaſon or neceſſity; for I defy any mortal to name one ſingle advantage that England could ever expect from ſuch an union.

But towards the end of the late King's reign, upon apprehenſions of the want of iſſue from him or the Princeſs Anne, a propoſition for uniting both kingdoms was begun; becauſe Scotland had not ſettled their crown upon the houſe of Hanover, but left themſelves at large in hopes to make their advantage; and it was thought highly dangerous to leave that part of the iſland, inhabited by a poor fierce northern people, at liberty to put themſelves under a different king. However, the oppoſition to this work was ſo great, that it could not be overcome until ſome time after her preſent Majeſty came to the crown; when by the weakneſs or corruption of a certain miniſter, ſince dead, an act of parliament was obtained for the Scots, which gave them leave to arm themſelves ‡; and ſo the union became neceſſary, not for any actual good it could poſſibly do us, but to avoid a probable evil; and at the ſame time ſave an obnoxious miniſter's head; who was ſo wiſe as to take the firſt opportunity of

‡ The author's memory failed him a little in this aſſertion, as one of his anſwerers obſerved.

† See the Examiner, No XIX. at the end, vol. 2.

procuring

procuring a general pardon by act of parliament, because he could not, with so much decency and safety, desire a particular one for himself. These facts are well enough known to the whole of the kingdom. And I remember, discoursing above six years ago with the most considerable * person of the adverse party, and a great promoter of the union, he frankly owned to me, that this necessity, brought upon us by the wrong management of the Earl of Godolphin, was the only cause of the union.

Therefore I am ready to grant two points to the author of the Crisis: *first*, That the union became necessary for the cause above related; because it prevented this island from being governed by two kings; which England would never have suffered; and it might probably have cost us a war of a year or two to reduce the Scots. *Secondly*, That it would be dangerous to break this union, at least in this juncture, while there is a pretender abroad, who might probably lay hold of such an opportunity. And this made me wonder a little at the spirit of faction last summer among some people, who having been the great promoters of the *union*, and several of them the principal gainers by it †, could yet proceed so far as to propose in the house of Lords, that it should be dissolved; while at the same time those peers, who had ever opposed it in the beginning, were then for preserving it, upon the reason I have just assigned, and which the author of the Crisis hath likewise taken notice of.

* Lord Somers.

† The Duke of Argyle, who zealously promoted the union, the Earl of Mar, Mr. Lockhart, and Mr. Cockburn, having been deputed on purpose, remonstrated to the Queen against the malt-tax, which they said would probably prompt the Scots to declare the union dissolved. The Earl of Findlater soon after moved the house of Lords, for leave to bring in a bill for dissolving the union. He was seconded by the Earl of Mar, and supported by Lord Eglinton, the Earl of Hay, the Duke of Argyle, and others.

But

But when he tells us, *the Engliſhmen ought, in generoſity, to be more particularly careful in preſerving this union*, he argues like himſelf. *The late kingdom of Scotland*, ſaith he, *had as numerous a nobility as England*, &c. They had indeed; and to that we owe one of the great and neceſſary evils of the union upon the foot it now ſtands. Their nobility is indeed ſo numerous, that the whole revenues of their country would be hardly able to maintain them according to the dignity of their titles; and what is infinitely worſe, they are never likely to be extinct until the laſt period of all things; becauſe the greateſt part of them deſcend to heirs general. I imagine a perſon of quality prevailed on to marry a woman much his inferior, and without a groat to her fortune, and her friends arguing ſhe was as good as her huſband, becauſe ſhe brought him as numerous a family of relations and ſervants as ſhe found in his houſe. Scotland, in the taxes, is obliged to contribute one penny for every forty pence laid upon England; and the repreſentatives they ſend to parliament are about a thirteenth. Every other Scots peer hath all the privileges of an Engliſh one, except that of ſitting in parliament, and even precedence before all of the ſame title that ſhall be created for the time to come. The penſions and employments poſſeſſed by the natives of that country now among us, do amount to more than the whole body of their nobility ever ſpent at home; and all the money they raiſe upon the public is hardly ſufficient to defray their civil and military liſts. I could point out ſome with great titles, who affected to appear very vigorous for diſſolving the union, although their whole revenues before that period would have ill maintained a Welſh juſtice of the peace; and have ſince gathered more money than ever any Scotſman, who had not travelled, could form an idea of.

I have only one thing more to ſay upon occaſion of

of the union-act; which is, that the author of the Crisis may be fairly proved, from his own citations, to be guilty of HIGH TREASON. In a paper of his called the Englishman, of October 29. there is an advertisement about taking in subscriptions for printing the Crisis, where the title is published at length with the following clause, which the author thought fit to drop in the publication; [" and that " no power on earth can bar, alter, or make void " the present settlement of the crown, &c." By Richard Steele.] In his extract of an act of parliament made since the union, it appears to be " high treason for any person, by writing or print- " ing, to maintain and affirm, that the kings or " queens of this realm, with and by the authority " of parliament, are not able to make laws and " statutes of sufficient force and validity to limit " and bind the crown, and the descent, limitation, " inheritance, and government thereof." This act being subsequent to the settlement of the crown, confirmed at the union, it is probable some friend of the author advised him to leave out those *treasonable* words in the printed title-page, which he had before published in the *advertisement*; and accordingly we find, that in the treatise itself he only " of- " fers it to every good subject's consideration, whe- " ther this article of the settlement of the crown is " not as firm as the union itself, and as the settle- " ment of Episcopacy in England, &c." And he thinks the " Scots understood it so, that the suc- " cession to the crown was never to be controvert- " ed."

These I take to be only treasonable insinuations; but the advertisement before-mentioned is actually *high-treason*; for which the author ought to be prosecuted, if that would avail any thing under a jurisdiction, where cursing the QUEEN is not above the penalty of twenty marks.

Nothing is more notorious than that the *Whigs* of

late years, both in their writings and discourses, have affected, upon all occasions, to allow the legitimacy of the pretender. This makes me a little wonder to see our author labouring to prove the contrary, by producing all the popular chat of those times, and other solid arguments from Fuller's narrative: but it must be supposed, that this gentleman acts by the commands of his superiors, who have thought fit at this juncture to issue out new orders for reasons best known to themselves. I wish they had been more clear in their directions to him upon that weighty point, whether the settlement of the succession in the house of Hanover be alterable or no. I have observed where, in his former pages, he gives it in the negative; but in the turning of a leaf, he hath wholly changed his mind. He tells us, "he wonders there can be found any Briton "weak enough to contend against a power in their "own nation, which is practised in a much greater "degree in other states: and how hard it is, that "Britain should be debarred the privilege of esta-"blishing its own security, by relinquishing only "those branches of the royal line, which threaten "it with destruction; whilst other nations never "scruple upon less occasions to go much greater "lengths;" of which he produceth instances in France, Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia; and then adds, "can Great Britain help to advance men to other "thrones, and have no power in limiting its own? "How can a senator, capable of doing honour to "Sir Thomas Hanmer," be guilty of such ridiculous inconsistencies? The author of the "Conduct "of the allies," says he, "hath dared to drop in-"sinuations about altering the succession." The "author of the "Conduct of the allies" writes sense and English; neither of which the author of the Crisis understands. The former thinks it "wrong in point of policy to call in a foreign "power to be guarantee of our succession, because

"it

" it puts it out of the power of our own legiſlature " to change our ſucceſſion without the conſent of " that prince or ſtate who is guarantee, whatever " neceſſity may happen in future times." Now, if it be high treaſon to affirm by writing, that the legiſlature hath no ſuch power; and if Mr. Steele thinks it ſtrange, that Britain ſhould be debarred this privilege, what could be the crime of putting ſuch a caſe, that in future ages a neceſſity might happen of limiting the ſucceſſion, as well as it hath happened already?

When Mr. Steele " reflects upon the many ſo- " lemn, ſtrong barriers (to our ſucceſſion) of laws " and oaths, &c." he " thinks all fear vaniſheth " before them." I think ſo too, provided the epithet *ſolemn* goes for nothing; becauſe, although I have often heard of a *ſolemn* day, a *ſolemn* feaſt, and a *ſolemn* coxcomb, yet I can conceive no idea to myſelf of a *ſolemn barrier*. However, be that as it will, his *thoughts*, it ſeems, *will not let him reſt, but, before he is aware, he aſks himſelf ſeveral queſtions*; and ſince he cannot reſolve them, I will endeavour to give him what ſatisfaction I am able. The firſt is, *What are the marks of a laſting ſecurity?* To which I anſwer, that the ſigns of it in a kingdom or ſtate are, firſt, good laws; and, ſecondly, thoſe laws well executed: we are pretty well provided with the former, but extremely defective in the latter. —— Secondly, *What are our tempers and our hearts at home?* If by *ours* he means thoſe of himſelf and his abettors, they are moſt damnably wicked; impatient for the death of the QUEEN; ready to gratify their ambition and revenge by all deſperate methods; wholly alienate from truth, law, religion, mercy, conſcience, or honour. ——Thirdly, *In what hands is power lodged abroad?* To anſwer the queſtion naturally, Louis XIV. is King of France, Philip V. (by the counſel and acknowledgments of the Whigs) is King of Spain, and ſo on.

If by power he means money; the Duke of Marlborough is thought to have more ready money than all the kings of Chriſtendom together; but by the peculiar diſpoſition of providence it is locked up in a trunk, to which his ambition hath no key; and that is our ſecurity. —— Fourthly, *Are our unnatural diviſions our ſtrength?* I think not; but they are the ſign of it, for being *unnatural* they cannot laſt; and this ſhews, that *union*, the foundation of all ſtrength, is more agreeable to our nature.—— Fifthly, *Is it nothing to us, which of the princes of Europe has the longeſt ſword?* Not much, if we can tie up his hands, or put a ſtrong *ſhield* into thoſe of his neighbours; or if our *ſword* be as *ſharp* as his is *long*; or if it be neceſſary for him to turn his *own ſword* into a *ploughſhare*; or if ſuch a *ſword* happeneth to be in the hands of an *infant*, or ſtruggled for by two competitors. —— Sixthly, *The powerful hand that deals out crowns and kingdoms all around us, may it not in time reach a king out to us too?* If the *powerful hand* he means be that of France, it may *reach out* as many kings as it pleaſeth; but we will not accept them. Whence does this man get his intelligence? I ſhould think, even his brother Ridpath might furniſh him with better. What *crowns* or *kingdoms* hath France dealt about? Spain was given by the will of the former King, in conſequence of that infamous treaty of *partition*, the adviſer of which will, I hope, never be forgot in England. Sicily was diſpoſed of by her Majeſty of Great Britain; ſo in effect was Sardinia. France indeed once *reached out* a king to Poland, but the people would not receive him. This queſtion of Mr. Steele's was therefore only put *in terrorem*, without any regard to truth.——Seventhly, *Are there no pretenſions to our crown that can ever be revived?* There may, for ought I know, be about a dozen; and thoſe in time may poſſibly beget a hundred; but we muſt do as well as we can. Captain Beſſus, when

when he had fifty challenges to anſwer, proteſted he could not fight above three duels a-day. " If " the pretender ſhould fail," ſays the writer, " the " French King has in his quiver a ſucceſſion of " them; the Ducheſs of Savoy, or her ſons, or " the Dauphin her grandſon." Let me ſuppoſe the Chevalier de St. George to be dead; the Ducheſs of Savoy will then be a *pretender*, and conſequently muſt leave her huſband, becauſe his Royal Highneſs (for Mr. Steele has not yet acknowledged him for a king) is in alliance with her Britiſh Majeſty; her ſons when they grow *pretenders*, muſt undergo the ſame fate. But I am at a loſs how to diſpoſe of the Dauphin, if he happen to be King of France before *the pretenderſhip* to Britain falls to his ſhare; for I doubt he will never be perſuaded to remove out of his own kingdom, only becauſe it is too near England.

But " the Duke of Savoy did, ſome years ago, " put in his claim to the crown of England in right " of his wife, and he is a prince of great capacity, " in ſtrict alliance with France, and may therefore " very well add to our fears of a Popiſh ſucceſſor." Is it the fault of the preſent, or of any miniſtry, that this prince put in his claim? muſt we give him opium to deſtroy his *capacity*? or can we prevent his alliance with any prince, who is in peace with her Majeſty? Muſt we ſend to ſtab or poiſon all the *Popiſh* princes, who have any pretended title to our crown by the proximity of blood? What, in the name of God, can theſe people drive at! what is it they demand! Suppoſe the preſent Dauphin were now a man, and King of France, and next *Popiſh* heir to the crown of England; is he not excluded by the laws of the land? But what regard will he have to our laws? I anſwer, Hath not the QUEEN as good a title to the crown of France? and how is ſhe excluded, but by their law againſt the ſucceſſion of females, which we are not bound to ac-

knowledge? And is it not in our power to exclude female ſucceſſors, as well as in theirs? If ſuch a pretence ſhall prove the cauſe of a war, what human power can prevent it! But our cauſe muſt neceſſarily be good and righteous; for either the kings of England have been unjuſtly kept out of the poſſeſſion of France, or the Dauphin, although neareſt of kin, can have no legal title to England. And he muſt be an ill prince indeed, who will not have the hearts and hands of ninety-nine in an hundred among his ſubjects againſt ſuch a *Popiſh pretender*.

I have been the longer in anſwering the ſeventh queſtion, becauſe it led me to conſider all he had afterwards to ſay upon the ſubject of the *pretender*. ——— Eightly, and laſtly, he aſks himſelf, *Whether Popery and Ambition are become tame and quiet neighbours?* In this I can give him no ſatisfaction, becauſe I never was in that ſtreet where they live; nor do I converſe with any of their friends; only I find they are perſons of a very evil reputation. But I am told for certain, that *Ambition* hath removed her lodging, and lives the very next door to *Faction*, where they keep ſuch a racket, that the whole pariſh is diſturbed, and every night in an uproar.

Thus much in anſwer to thoſe eight *uneaſy queſtions* put by the author to himſelf in order to *ſatisfy every Briton*, and give him an occaſion of *taking an impartial view of the affairs of Europe in general, as well as of Great Britain in particular*.

After enumerating the great actions of the *confederate* armies under the command of Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough, Mr Steele obſerves, in the bitterneſs of his ſoul, that the "Britiſh ge-"neral, however unaccountable it may be to po-"ſterity, was not permitted to enjoy the fruits of "his glorious labour." Ten years *fruits*, it ſeems, were not ſufficient, and yet they were the fruitful-

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left campaigns that ever any general cropt. However, I cannot but hope, that posterity will not be left in the dark, but some care taken both of her Majesty's glory, and the reputation of those she employs. An impartial historian may tell the world (and the next age will easily believe what it continues to feel), that the avarice and ambition of a few factious insolent subjects had almost destroyed their country, by continuing a ruinous war in conjunction with allies, for whose sakes principally we fought, who refused to bear their just proportion of the charge, and were connived at in their refusal, for private ends: that these factious people treated the best and kindest of sovereigns with insolence, cruelty, and ingratitude (of which he will be able to produce several instances): that they encouraged persons and principles alien from our religion and government in order to strengthen their faction: he will tell the reasons, why the *general* and *first minister* were seduced to be heads of this faction, contrary to the opinions they had always professed. Such an historian will shew many reasons, which made it necessary to remove the general and his friends, who, knowing the bent of the nation was against them, expected to lose their power, when the war was at an end. Particularly, the historian will discover the whole intrigue of the Duke of Marlborough's endeavouring to procure a commission to be *general for life*, * ; wherein justice will be done to a person at that time of high station in the law, who (I mention it to his honour) advised the Duke, when he was consulted upon it, not to accept of such a *commission* By these and many other instances, which time will bring to light, it may perhaps appear not very unaccountable to posterity, why this great man was dismissed

* See the Examiner, No XIX, and the subsequent papers, vol. 2

at

at laſt; but rather why he was diſmiſſed no ſooner.

But this is entering into a wide field, I ſhall therefore leave *poſter.ty* to the information of better hiſtorians than the author of the Criſis, or myſelf; and go on to inform the preſent age in ſome facts, which this great orator and politician thinks fit to miſrepreſent with the utmoſt degree either of natural or wilful ignorance. He aſſerts, that in the Duke of Ormond's campaign, "after a ſuſpen-" ſion of arms between Great Britain and France, " proclaimed at the head of the armies, the Bri-" tiſh troops, in the midſt of the enemy's garri-" ſons, withdrew themſelves from their confede-" rates." The fact is directly otherwiſe; for the Britiſh troops were moſt infamouſly deſerted by the confederates, after all that could be urged by the Duke of Ormond and the Earl of Strafford to preſs the confederate generals not to forſake them. The Duke was directed to avoid engaging in any action, until he had further orders, becauſe an account of the King of Spain's renunciation was every day expected: This the Imperialiſts and Dutch knew well enough; and therefore propoſed to the Duke, in that very juncture, to engage the French, for no other reaſon but to render deſperate all the Queen's meaſures towards a peace. Was not the certain poſſeſſion of Dunkirk of equal advantage to the uncertainty of a battle? A whole campaign under the Duke of Marlborough, with ſuch an acquiſition, although at the coſt of many thouſand lives, and ſeveral millions of money, would have been thought very gloriouſly ended.

Neither, after all, was it a new thing either in the Britiſh general or the Dutch deputies to refuſe fighting, when they did not approve it. When the Duke of Marlborough was going to inveſt Bouchain, the deputies of the States preſſed him in vain to engage the enemy; and one of them was ſo far diſcontented

diſcontented upon his Grace's refuſal, that he preſently became a partizan of the peace; yet I do not remember any clamour then raiſed here againſt the Duke upon that account. Again, when the French invaded Doway, after the confederates had deſerted the Duke of Ormond, Prince Eugene was violently bent upon a battle, and ſaid, they ſhould never have another ſo good an opportunity; but Monſieur ——, a private deputy, roſe up, and oppoſed it ſo far, that the Prince was forced to deſiſt. Was it then more criminal in the Duke of Ormond to refuſe fighting by expreſs command of the Queen, and in order to get poſſeſſion of Dunkirk, than for the Duke of Marlborough to give the ſame refuſal without any ſuch orders, or any ſuch advantage? or ſhall a Dutch deputy aſſume more power than the Queen of Great Britain's general, acting by the immediate commands of his ſovereign?

The *Emperor and the empire* (ſays Mr. Steele, by way of admiration) *continue the war!* Is his Imperial Majeſty able to continue it or no? if he be, then Great Britain hath been ſtrangely uſed for ten years paſt: then how came it to paſs, that of above thirty thouſand men in his ſervice in Italy at the time of the battle of Turin, there were not above four thouſand paid by himſelf? if he be not able to continue it, why does he go on? The reaſons are clear; becauſe the war only affects the princes of the empire (whom he is willing enough to expoſe), but not his own dominions. Beſides, the Imperial miniſters are in daily expectation of the Queen's death, which they hope will give a new turn to affairs, and rekindle the war in Europe upon the old foot; and we know how the miniſters of that court publicly aſſign it for a reaſon of their obſtinacy againſt peace, that they hope for a ſudden revolution in England. In the mean time this appearance of the Emperor's being forſaken by his

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ally, will ſerve to increaſe the clamour, both here and in Holland, againſt her Majeſty and thoſe ſhe employs.

Mr. Steele ſays, "there can be no crime in affirming, if it be truth, that the houſe of Bourbon is at this juncture become more formidable, and bids fairer for an univerſal monarchy, and to ingroſs the whole trade of Europe, than it did before the war."

No *crime in affirming it, if it be truth.* I will for once allow his propoſition. But if it be falſe, then I affirm, that whoever advanceth ſo ſeditious a falſehood deſerves to be hanged. Doth he mean by the houſe of Bourbon, the two kings of France and Spain? If ſo, I reject his meaning, which would inſinuate, that the intereſts and deſigns of both thoſe princes will be the ſame; whereas they are more oppoſite than thoſe of any two other monarchs in Chriſtendom. This is the old fooliſh ſlander ſo frequently flung upon the peace, and as frequently refuted. Theſe factious undertakers of the preſs write with great advantage; they ſtrenuouſly affirm a thouſand falſehoods without fear, wit, conſcience, or knowledge; and we, who anſwer them, muſt be at the expence of an argument for each; after which, in the very next pamphlet we ſee the ſame aſſertions produced again, without the leaſt notice of what hath been ſaid to diſprove them. By the houſe of Bourbon doth he mean only the French King for the time being: if ſo, and his aſſertion be true, then that prince muſt either deal with the devil, or elſe the money and blood ſpent in our ten years victories againſt him, might as well have continued in the purſes and veins of her Majeſty's ſubjects.

But the *particular* aſſertions of this author are eaſier detected than his *general* ones; I ſhall therefore proceed upon examining the former. For inſtance: I deſire him to aſk the Dutch, who can

beſt

beſt inform him, *why they delivered up Traerbach to the Imperialiſts?* For, as to the Queen, her Majeſty was never once conſulted in it; whatever his preceptors, the politicians of Button's coffeehouſe, may have informed him to the contrary.

Mr. Steele affirms, that "the French have be-"gun the demolition of Dunkirk contemptuouſly "arbitrarily their own way." The governor of the town, and thoſe gentlemen intruſted with the inſpection of this work, do aſſure me, that the fact is altogether otherwiſe; that the method preſcribed by thoſe whom her Majeſty employs, hath been exactly followed, and that the works are already demoliſhed. I will venture to tell him further, that the demolition was ſo long deferred in order to remove thoſe difficulties, which the barrier-treaty hath put us under; and the event hath ſhewn, that it was prudent to proceed no faſter, until thoſe difficulties were got over. The *mole* and *harbour* could not be deſtroyed, until the ſhips were got out; which, by reaſon of ſome profound ſecrets of ſtate, did not happen until the other day. Who *gave him thoſe juſt ſuſpicions, that the mole and harbour will never be deſtroyed?* what is it he would now inſinuate? that the miniſtry is bribed to leave the moſt important part of the work undone; or that the pretender is to invade us from thence; or that the Queen hath entered into a conſpiracy with her ſervants to prevent the good effects of the peace, for no other end, but to loſe the affections of her people, and endanger herſelf.

Inſtead of any further information, which I could eaſily give, but which no honeſt man can want, I venture to affirm, that the mole and harbour of Dunkirk will, in a ſhort time, be moſt effectually deſtroyed; and at the ſame time I venture to propheſy, that neither Mr. Steele, nor his faction will ever confeſs they believe it.

After

After all, it is a little hard that the Queen cannot be allowed to demoliſh this town in whatever manner ſhe pleaſes to fancy. Mr. Steele muſt have it done his own way, and is angry the French have pretended to do it theirs; and yet he wrongs them into the bargain. For my own part, I do ſeriouſly think the Moſt Chriſtian King to be a much better friend of her Majeſty's than Mr. Steele, or any of his faction. Beſides, it is to be conſidered, that he is a monarch and a relation; and therefore, if I were a privy counſellor, and my advice to be aſked, which of thoſe two GENTLEMEN BORN * ſhould have the direction in the demolition of Dunkirk, I would give it to the former; becauſe I look upon Mr. Steele, in quality of a member of his party, to be much more ſkilful in *demoliſhing at home* than *abroad*.

There is a proſpect of more danger to the balance of Europe, and to the trade of Britain, from the Emperor over-running Italy, than from France over-running the *empire*; that his Imperial Majeſty entertains ſuch thoughts, is viſible to the world; And although little can be ſaid to juſtify many actions of the French King, yet the worſt of them have never equalled the Emperor's arbitrary keeping the poſſeſſion of Milan, directly contrary to his oath, and to the expreſs words of the *golden bull*, which oblige him to deliver up every *fief* that falls, or elſe they muſt all, in the courſe of time, lapſe into his own hands.

I was at a loſs, who it was that Mr. Steele hinted at ſome time ago, by *the powerful hand that deals out crowns and kingdoms all around us*: I now plainly find he meant no other hand but his own. He hath dealt out the crown of Spain to France; to France he hath given leave to invade the *empire* next ſpring with two hundred thouſand men; and

* Mr. Steele often ſtyles himſelf ſo.

NOW,

now, at last he deals to France the *Imperial* dignity; *and so farewell liberty*; *Europe will be French*. But in order to bring all this about, *the capital of Austria, the residence of his Imperial Majesty*, must continue to be *visited by the plague*, of which the Emperor must die, and so the thing is done.

Why should not I venture to *deal out* one *sceptre* in my turn, as well as Mr. Steele? I therefore *deal out* the *empire* to the Elector of Saxony, upon failure of issue to this emperor at his death; provided the Whigs will prevail on the *son* to turn *Papist* to get an *empire*, as they did upon the *father* to get a *kingdom*. Or if this prince be not approved of I *deal it out* in his stead to the Elector of Bavaria: And in one or the other of these I dare engage to have all Christendom to second me, whatever the spleen, in the shape of politics, may dictate to the author of the Crisis.

The design of Mr. Steele in *representing the circumstances of the affairs of Europe* is to signify to the world, that all Europe is put in the high road to slavery by the corruption of her Majesty's present ministers; and so he goes on to Portugal; which, "having during the war supplied us with gold, in "exchange for our woollen manufactures, hath "only at present a suspension of arms for its pro-"tection, to last no longer than till the Catalo-"nians are reduced; and then the old pretensions "of Spain to Portugal will be revived:" And Portugal, when once inslaved by Spain, falls naturally with the rest of Europe into the gulf of France. In the mean time let us see, what relief a little truth can give this unhappy kingdom. That Portugal hath yet no more than a suspension of arms, they may thank themselves, because they came so late into the treaty; and that they came so late they may thank the Whigs, whose false representations they were so weak to believe. However, the Queen hath voluntarily given them

a guarantee to defend them againſt Spain, until the peace ſhall be made; and ſuch terms after the peace are ſtipulated for them, as the Portugueſe themſelves are contented with.

Having mentioned the Catalonians, he puts the queſtion, *Who can name the Catalonians without a tear?* That can I; for he hath told ſo many melancholy ſtories without one ſyllable of truth, that he hath blunted the edge of my fears, and I ſhall not be ſtartled at the worſt he can ſay. What he affirms concerning the Catalonians, is included in the following particulars; firſt, *that they were drawn into the war by the encouragement of the maritime powers*; by which are underſtood England and Holland: But he is too good a friend of the Dutch to give them any part of the blame. 2dly, That *they are now abandoned and expoſed to the reſentment of an enraged prince.* 3dly, That *they always oppoſed the perſon and intereſt of that prince*, who is their preſent King. Laſtly, that *the doom is dreadful of thoſe, who ſhall, in the ſight of God, be eſteemed their deſtroyers.* And if we interpret the inſinuation he makes, according to his mind, the deſtruction of thoſe people muſt be imputed to the preſent miniſtry.

I am ſometimes, in charity, diſpoſed to hope, that this writer is not always ſenſible of the flagrant falſehoods he utters, but is either biaſſed by an inclination to believe the worſt, or a want of judgment to chuſe his informers. That the Catalonians were *drawn into the war by the encouragement of her Majeſty*, ſhould not in decency have been affirmed until about fifty years hence; when it might be ſuppoſed there would be no living witneſs left to diſprove it. It was only upon the aſſurances of a revolt given by the Prince of Heſſe and others, and their invitation, that the Queen was prevailed with to ſend her forces upon that expedition. When Barcelona was taken by a moſt

un

unexpected accident of a bomb lighting on the magazine, then indeed the Catalonians revolted, having before submitted and sworn allegiance to Philip, as much as any other province of Spain. Upon the peace between that crown and Britain, the Queen, in order to ease the Emperor, and save his troops, stipulated with King Philip for a neutrality in Italy, and that his Imperial Majesty should have liberty to evacuate Catalonia; upon condition of absolute indemnity to the Catalonians, with an entire restitution to their honours, dignities, and estates. As this neutrality was never observed by the Emperor, so he never effectually evacuated Catalonia; for although he sent away the main body, he left behind many officers and private men, who now spiritup and assist those obstinate people to continue in their rebellion. It is true indeed that King Philip did not absolutely *restore* the Catalans to *all* their old privileges, of which they never made other use than as an encouragement to rebel; but admitted them to the same privileges with his subjects of Castile, particularly to the liberty of trading, and having employments in the West-Indies, which they *never enjoyed before*. Besides, the Queen reserved to herself the power of procuring farther immunities for them, wherein the Most Christian King was obliged to second her: For his Catholic Majesty intended no more than to retrench those privileges, under the pretext of which they now rebel, as they had formerly done in favour of France. *How dreadful then must be the doom of those* who hindered these people from submitting to the gentle terms offered them by their prince! and who although they be conscious of their own inability to furnish one single ship for the support of the Catalans, are at this instant spurring them on to their ruin by promises of aid in protection!

Thus much in answer to Mr. Steele's account of

the affairs of Europe, from which he dedueth the univerſal monarchy of France, and the danger of I know not how many *Popiſh ſucceſſors* to Britain. His political reflections are as good as his facts. " We muſt obſerve, *ſays he*, that the perſon who " ſeems to be the moſt favoured by the French " King in the late treaties, is the Duke of Sa- " voy." Extremely right; for whatever that prince got by the peace, he owes intirely to her Majeſty, as a juſt reward for his having been ſo firm and uſeful an ally; neither was France brought with more difficulty to yield any one point than that of allowing the Duke ſuch a barrier as the Queen inſiſted on.

" He is become the moſt powerful prince in " Italy." I had rather ſee *him* ſo than the Emperor. " He is ſuppoſed to have entered into a " a ſecret and ſtrict alliance with the houſe of " Bourbon." This is one of thoſe facts wherein I am moſt inclined to believe the author, becauſe it is what he muſt needs be utterly ignorant of: and therefore may poſſibly be true.

I thought indeed we ſhould be ſafe from all Popiſh ſucceſſors as far as Italy, becauſe of the prodigious clutter about ſending the pretender thither. But they will never agree where to fix their *longitude*. The Duke of Savoy is the more dangerous for removing to Sicily: He *adds to our fears* for being *too near*. So " whether France conquer " Germany, or be in peace and good unde ſtand- " ing with it; *either event* will put us and Holland " at the mercy of France," which hath a quiver full of pretenders at its back, whenever the Chevalier ſhall die.

This was juſt the logic of poor Prince Butler, a ſplenetic madman, whom every body may remember about the town. Prince Pamphilio in Italy employed emiſſaries to torment Prince Butler here. But what if Prince Pamphilio die? Why then

then he had left in his will, that his heirs and executors torment Prince Butler for ever.

I cannot think it a misfortune what Mr. Steele affirms, that "treasonable books lately dispersed "among us striking apparently at the Hanover "succession, have passed almost without observa-"tion from the generality of the people:" Because it seems a certain sign, that the *generality of the people* are well disposed to that illustrious family: But I look upon it as a great evil, to see *seditious books dispersed among us, apparently striking at the* Queen and her administration, at the constitution of church and state, and at all religion; yet *passing without observation from the generality of those in power*; but whether this remissness may be imputed to Whitehall, or Westminster-hall, is other mens business to inquire. Mr. Steele knows in his conscience, that the *queries concerning the pretender* issued from one of his own party. And as for the poor nonjuring clergyman, who was trusted with committing to the press a late book *on the subject* of *hereditary right*, by a strain of the *summum jus*, he is now, as I am told, with half a score children, starving and rotting among thieves and pick-pockets in the common room of a stinking jail *. I have never seen either the book or the publisher; however, I would fain ask one single person † in the world a question; why he hath so often drank the abdicated King's health upon his knees?——But the transition is natural and frequent, and I shall not trouble him for an answer.

It is the hardest case in the world, that Mr. Steele should take up the artificial reports of his own faction, and then put them off upon the world as *additional fears of a Popish successor*. I can assure him, that no good subject of the Queen is under

* Upon his conviction he was committed to the Marshalsea, and at his sentence, to the Queen's bench for three years.

† Parker, afterward Lord Chancellor.

the leaſt concern, whether the pretender be converted or no, farther than their wiſhes, that all men would embrace the true religion. But reporting backwards and forwards upon this point, helps to keep up the noiſe, and is a topic for Mr. Steele to enlarge himſelf upon, by ſhewing how little we can depend on ſuch converſions, by collecting a liſt of *Popiſh* cruelties, and repeating after himſelf and the Biſhop of Sarum the diſmal effects likely to follow upon the return of that ſuperſtition among us.

But as this writer is reported by thoſe who know him to be what the French call *journalier*, his fear and courage operating according to the weather in our uncertain climate; I am apt to believe the two laſt pages of his Criſis were written on a *ſun-ſhine day*. This I gueſs from the general tenor of them, and particularly from an unwary aſſertion, which, if he believes as firmly as I do, will at once overthrow all his foreign and domeſtic "fears of a "Popiſh ſucceſſor. As divided a people as we are, "thoſe who ſtand for the houſe of Hanover are "INFINITELY ſuperior in number, wealth, cou-"rage, and all arts military and civil, to thoſe in "the contrary intereſt; beſides which we have the "laws, I ſay, the laws, on our ſide. The laws, I ſay, "the laws." This elegant repetition is, I think, a little out of place; for the ſtreſs might better have been laid upon ſo great a majority of the nation; without which I doubt the laws would be of little weight, although they be very good additional ſecurities. And if what he here aſſerts be true, as it certainly is, although he aſſert it, (for I allow even the majority of his own party to be againſt the pretender), there can be no danger of a Popiſh ſucceſſor, except from the unreaſonable jealouſies of the *beſt* among that party, and from the malice, the avarice, or ambition of the *worſt*; without which Britain would be able to defend her ſucceſſion againſt all her enemies both at home and abroad.

broad. Moſt of the dangers from abroad, which he enumerates as the conſequences of this very bad peace made by the Queen, and approved by parliament, muſt have ſubſiſted under any peace at all; unleſs, among other projects equally feaſible, we could have ſtipulated to cut the throats of every *Popiſh* relation to the royal family.

Well, by this author's own confeſſion a number infinitely ſuperior, and the beſt circumſtantiated imaginable, are for the *ſucceſſion* in the houſe of Hanover. This *ſucceſſion* is eſtabliſhed, confirmed, and ſecured by ſeveral laws; her Majeſty's repeated declarations, and the oaths of all her ſubjects, engage both her and them to preſerve what thoſe laws have ſettled. This is a ſecurity indeed, a *ſecurity* adequate at leaſt to the importance of the thing; and yet, according to the Whig ſcheme, as delivered to us by Mr. Steele and his coadjutors, is altogether inſufficient; and the ſucceſſion will be defeated, the pretender brought in, and *popery* eſtabliſhed among us, without the farther aſſiſtance of this writer and his faction.

And what ſecurities have our adverſaries ſubſtituted in the place of theſe? A club of politicians, where Jenny Man preſides; a Criſis written by Mr. Steele; a confederacy of knaviſh ſtockjobbers to ruin credit; a report of the Queen's death; an *effigies* of the pretender run twice through the body by a valiant Peer; a ſpeech by the author of the Criſis; and, to ſum up all, an unlimited freedom of reviling her Majeſty and thoſe ſhe employs.

I have now finiſhed the moſt diſguſtful taſk that ever I undertook. I could with more eaſe have written *three* dull pamphlets, than remarked upon the falſehoods and abſurdities of *one*. But I was quite confounded laſt Wedneſday, when the printer came with another pamphlet in his hand, written by the ſame author, and intitled, *The Engliſhman, being*

being the close of the paper so called, &c. He desired I would read it over, and consider it in a paper by itself; which last I absolutely refused. Upon perusal I found it chiefly an invective against Toby, the ministry, the Examiner, the clergy, the Queen, and the Post-boy; yet at the same time with great justice exclaiming against those who presumed to offer the least word against the heads of that faction whom her Majesty discarded. The author likewise proposeth an *equal division of favour and employments* between the *Whigs* and *Tories*; for if the former *can have no part or portion in David* *, *they desire no longer to be his subjects*. He insists, that her Majesty *hath exactly followed Monsieur Tughe's memorial* † *against demolishing of Dunkirk*. He reflects with *great satisfaction on the good already done to his country by the Crisis*. *Non nobis, Domine, non nobis*, &c.——He gives us hopes that he will leave off writing, *and consult his own quiet and happiness*; and concludes with a *letter to a friend at court*. I suppose by the style of *old friend*, and the like, it must be some body *there* of his own level; among whom his party have indeed more *friends* than I could wish. In this letter he asserts, that the present ministers were not educated in the church of England, but are *new converts from Presbytery*. Upon which I can only reflect, how blind the malice of that man must be, who invents a groundless lie in order to defame his superiors, which would be no disgrace if it had been a truth. And he concludes with making three demands, "for the "satisfaction of himself, *and other* male-contents.

* What portion have we in David?

† "Tughe was deputed by the magistrates of Dunkirk to intercede with the Queen, that she would recall part of her sentence "concerning Dunkirk, by causing her thunderbolts to fall only on "the martial works, and to spare the moles and dykes, which in "their naked condition could be no more than objects of pity."

First,

" *First*, the demolition of the harbour of Dun-
" kirk. *Secondly*, that Great Britain and France
" would heartily join againſt the exorbitant power
" of the Duke of Lorrain, and force the pretend-
" er from his aſſylum at Bar le Duc. *Laſtly*, that
" his Electoral Highneſs of Hanover would be ſo
" grateful to ſignify to all the world the perfect
" good underſtanding he hath with the court of
" England, in as plain terms as her Majeſty was
" pleaſed to declare ſhe had with that houſe on her
" part."

As to the firſt of theſe demands, I will venture to undertake it ſhall be granted; but then Mr. Steele and his brother *male-contents* muſt promiſe to believe the thing is done, after thoſe employed have made their report; or elſe bring vouchers to diſprove it. Upon the ſecond, I cannot tell whether her Majeſty will engage in a war againſt the Duke of Lorrain to *force him to remove the pretender*; but I believe if the parliament ſhould think it neceſſary to addreſs upon ſuch an occaſion, the Queen will move that prince to ſend him away. His laſt demand, offered under the title of a *wiſh*, is of ſo inſolent and ſeditious a ſtrain, that I care not to touch it. Here he directly chargeth her Majeſty with delivering a falſehood to her parliament from the throne; and declares he will not believe her, until the Elector of Hanover himſelf ſhall vouch for the truth of what ſhe hath ſo ſolemnly affirmed.

I agree with this writer, that it is an idle thing in his antagoniſts to trouble themſelves upon the *articles of his birth, education*, or *fortune*; for whoever writes at this rate of his ſovereign, to whom he owes ſo many perſonal obligations, I ſhould never inquire whether he be a GENTLEMAN BORN, but whether he be a HUMAN CREATURE.

The

The Conduct of the ALLIES, and of the LATE MINISTRY, in beginning and carrying on the present war *.

Written in the year 1712.

Partem tibi Gallia nostri
Eripuit; partem duris Hispania bellis:
Pars jacet Hesperia, totoque exercitus orbe
Te vincente perit.

Odimus accipitrem quia semper vivit in armis.
Victrix provincia plorat.

PREFACE.

I Cannot sufficiently admire the industry of a sort of men, wholly out of favour with the prince and people, and openly professing a separate interest from the bulk of the landed men, who yet are able to raise at this juncture so great a clamour

* To this tract and the Examiner, which make vol. 5. of the Irish edition, there is a preface in the name of the publisher, which Lord Orrery ascribes to Swift for no other apparent reason, than to accuse him of praising himself. But, besides the incorrectness of the style, which his Lordship supposes to be affected, there is an assertion, that these papers produced the change in the Queen's ministry, which even in his Lordship's opinion they were written to *defend*, and to which they appear by their date as well as tenor to be *subsequent*; an absurdity of which Swift even in the character of a publisher, cannot be supposed to have been guilty.

against

againſt a peace, without offering one ſingle reaſon, but what we find in their *ballads*. I lay it down for a maxim, That no reaſonable man, whether *Whig* or *Tory*, (ſince it is neceſſary to uſe thoſe fooliſh terms), can be of opinion for continuing the war upon the foot it now is, unleſs he be a gainer by it, or hopes it may occaſion ſome new turn of affairs at home to the advantage of his party; or, laſtly, unleſs he be very ignorant of the kingdom's condition, and by what means we have been reduced to it. Upon the two firſt caſes, where intereſt is concerned, I have nothing to ſay; but as to the laſt, I think it highly neceſſary that the public ſhould be freely and impartially told what circumſtances they are in, after what manner they have been treated by thoſe whom they truſted ſo many years with the diſpoſal of their blood and treaſure, and what the conſequences of this management are like to be upon themſelves and their poſterity.

Thoſe who, either by writing or diſcourſe, have undertaken to defend the proceedings of the late miniſtry in the management of the war, and of the treaty at Gertruydenburg, have ſpent time in celebrating the conduct and valour of our leaders and their troops, in ſumming up the victories they have gained, and the towns they have taken. Then they tell us what high articles were inſiſted on by our miniſters and thoſe of the confederates, and what pains both were at in perſuading France to accept them. But nothing of this can give the leaſt ſatisfaction to the juſt complaints of the kingdom. As to the war, our grievances are, that a greater load has been laid on us than was either juſt or neceſſary, or than we have been able to bear; that the groſſeſt impoſitions have been ſubmitted to for the advancement of private wealth and power, or in order to forward the more dangerous deſigns of a *faction*, to both which a peace would have put

an end; and that the part of the war which was chiefly our province, which would have been moſt beneficial to us, and deſtructive to the enemy, was wholly neglected. As to a peace, we may complain of being deluded by a *mock-treaty*, in which thoſe who negotiated took care to make ſuch demands as they knew were impoſſible to be complied with; and therefore might ſecurely preſs every article as if they were in earneſt.

Theſe are ſome of the points I deſign to treat of in the following diſcourſe; with ſeveral others which I thought it neceſſary at this time for the kingdom to be informed of. I think I am not miſtaken in thoſe facts I mention; at leaſt not in any circumſtance ſo material as to weaken the conſequences I draw from them.

After ten years wars with perpetual ſucceſs, to tell us it is yet impoſſible to have a good peace, is very ſurpriſing, and ſeems ſo different from what hath ever happened in the world before, that a man of any party may be allowed ſuſpecting, that we have been either ill uſed, or have not made the moſt of our victories, and might therefore deſire to know where the difficulty lay. Then it is natural to inquire into our preſent condition; how long we ſhall be able to go on at this rate; what the conſequences may be upon the preſent and future ages; and whether a peace without that impracticable point, which ſome people do ſo much inſiſt on, be really ruinous in itſelf, or equally ſo with the continuance of the war.

The

The Conduct of the ALLIES, &c *.

THE motives that may engage a wise prince or state in war, I take to be one or more of these: either to check the overgrown power of some ambitious neighbour; to recover what hath been unjustly taken from them; to revenge some injury they have received (which all political casuists allow); to assist some ally in a just quarrel, or, lastly to defend themselves when they are invaded. In all these cases the writers upon politics admit a war to be justly undertaken. The last is what hath been usually called *pro aris et focis*; where no expence or endeavour can be too great, because all we have is at stake, and consequently our utmost force to be exerted; and the dispute is soon determined either in safety or utter destruction. But in the other four, I believe it will be found, that no monarch or commonwealth did ever engage beyond a certain degree; never proceeding so far as to exhaust the strength and substance of their country by anticipations and loans, which in a few years must put them in a worse condition, than any they could

* This was written preparatory to the peace which the ministers were then concerting, and which was afterwards perfected at Utrecht. It begins by reflections on war in general, and then particularly mentions the several civil wars in our kingdom.—Unhappy country! torn to pieces by her own sons: a wretched mother of vultures, for whom, like Tityus, she produces new intrails only to be devoured. *Orrery.*

This tract, and remarks on the barrier-treaty contain the principal facts which the author of John Bull has thrown into allegory: and greatly illustrates that piece, of which indeed it is possible they were the ground-work.

reaſonably apprehend from thoſe evils, for the preventing of which they firſt entered into the war; becauſe this would be to run into real infallible ruin, only in hopes to remove what might perhaps but appear ſo by a probable ſpeculation.

And as a war ſhould be undertaken upon a juſt and prudent motive, ſo it is ſtill more obvious, that a prince ought maturely to conſider the condition he is in, when he enters on it; whether his coffers be full, his revenues clear of debts, his people numerous and rich, by a long peace and free trade, not over-preſſed with many burdenſome taxes; no violent faction ready to diſpute his juſt prerogative, and thereby weaken his authority at home, and leſſen his reputation abroad. For, if the contrary of all this happen to be his caſe, he will hardly be perſuaded to diſturb the world's quiet and his own, while there is any other way left of preſerving the latter with honour and ſafety.

Suppoſing the war to have commenced upon a juſt motive; the next thing to be conſidered is, when a prince ought in prudence to receive the overtures of a peace; which I take to be, either when the enemy is ready to yield the point originally contended for; or when that point is found impoſſible to be ever attained; or when contending any longer, although with probability of gaining that point at laſt, would put ſuch a prince and his people in a worſe condition than the preſent loſs of it. All which conſiderations are of much greater force, where a war is managed by an alliance of many confederates, which, in the variety of intereſts among the ſeveral parties, is liable to ſo many unforeſeen accidents.

In a confederate war, it ought to be conſidered, which party has the deepeſt ſhare in the quarrel: for although each may have their particular reaſons, yet one or two among them will probably be more concerned than the reſt, and therefore ought

to

to bear the greateſt part of the burthen, in proportion to their ſtrength. For example; two princes may be competitors for a kingdom, and it will be your intereſt to take the part of him who will probably allow you good conditions of trade, rather than of the other, who poſſibly may not. However, that prince whoſe cauſe you eſpouſe, although never ſo vigorouſly, is the principal in that war, and you, properly ſpeaking, are but a ſecond. Or a commonwealth may lie in danger to be overrun by a powerful neighbour, which in time may produce very bad conſequences upon your trade and liberty: it is therefore neceſſary, as well as prudent, to lend them aſſiſtance, and help them to win a ſtrong ſecure frontier; but as they muſt in courſe be the firſt and greateſt ſufferers, ſo in juſtice they ought to bear the greateſt weight. If a houſe be on fire, it behoves all in the neighbourhood to run with buckets to quench it; but the owner is ſure to be undone firſt; and it is not impoſſible, that thoſe at next door may eſcape by a ſhower from heaven, or the ſtillneſs of the weather, or ſome other favourable accident.

But if an ally, who is not ſo immediately concerned in the good or ill fortune of the war, be ſo generous as to contribute more than the principal party, and even more in proportion to his abilities, he ought at leaſt to have his ſhare in what is conquered from the enemy; or, if his romantic diſpoſition tranſport him ſo far, as to expect little or nothing from this, he might however hope, that the principals would make it up in dignity and reſpect; and he would ſurely think it monſtrous to find them intermeddling in his domeſtic affairs, preſcribing what ſervants he ſhould keep or diſmiſs, preſſing him perpetually with the moſt unreaſonable demands, and at every turn threatening to break the alliance if he will not comply.

From these reflections upon war in general, I descend to consider those wars wherein England hath been engaged since the conquest. In the civil wars of the barons, as well as those between the houses of York and Lancaster, great destruction was made of the nobility and gentry; new families raised, and old ones extinguished; but the money spent on both sides was employed and circulated at home; no public debts contracted; and a very few years of peace quickly set all right again.

The like may be affirmed even of that unnatural rebellion against K. Charles I. The usurpers maintained great armies in constant pay, had almost continual war with Spain or Holland; but managing it by their fleets, they increased very much the riches of the kingdom, instead of exhausting them.

Our foreign wars were generally against Scotland or France; the first being in this island carried no money out of the kingdom, and were seldom of long continuance. During our first wars with France we possessed great dominions in that country, where we preserved some footing till the reign of Q. Mary; and although some of our later princes made very chargeable expeditions thither, a subsidy and two or three fifteenths cleared all the debt. Besides, our victories were then of some use as well as glory; for we were so prudent to fight, and so happy to conquer, only for our ourselves.

The Dutch wars in the reign of King Charles II. although begun and carried on under a very corrupt administration, and much to the dishonour of the crown, did indeed keep the King needy and poor by discontinuing or discontenting his parliament, when he most needed their assistance; but neither left any debt upon the nation, nor carried any money out of it.

At the *revolution* a general war broke out in Europe, wherein many princes joined in alliance against

gainſt France to check the ambitious deſigns of that monarch; and here the Emperor, the Dutch, and England were principals. About this time the cuſtom firſt began among us of borrowing millions upon funds of intereſt. It was pretended, that the war could not poſſibly laſt above one or two campaigns; and that the debts contracted might be eaſily paid in a few years by a gentle tax, without burthening the ſubject. But the true reaſon for embracing this expedient was the ſecurity of a new prince not firmly ſettled on the throne. People were tempted to lend by great premiums and large intereſt; and it concerned them nearly to preſerve that government, which they had truſted with their money. The perſon * ſaid to have been author of ſo deteſtable a project, lived to ſee ſome of its fatal conſequences, whereof his grandchildren will not ſee an end. And this pernicious counſel cloſed very well with the poſture of affairs at that time: for a ſet of upſtarts, who had little or no part in the *revolution*, but valued themſelves upon their noiſe and pretended zeal when the work was over, were got into credit at court, by the merit of becoming undertakers and projectors of loans and funds: theſe finding, that the gentlemen of eſtates were not willing to come into their meaſures, fell upon thoſe new ſchemes of raiſing money, in order to create a moneyed intereſt that might in time vie with the landed, and of which they hoped to be at the head.

The ground of the firſt war, for ten years after the *revolution*, as to the part we had in it, was to make France acknowledge the late King, and to recover Hudſon's bay. But during the whole war the ſea was almoſt entirely neglected, and the greateſt part of *ſix* millions annually employed to enlarge the frontier of the Dutch. For the King was

* Dr. Burnet, Biſhop of Sarum.

a general, but not an admiral; and although King of England, was a native of Holland.

After ten years fighting to little purpose, after the loss of above an hundred thousand men, and a debt remaining of twenty millions, we at length hearkened to the terms of peace, which was concluded with great advantages to the empire and Holland, but none at all to us; and clogged soon after with the famous treaty of *partition*, by which Naples, Sicily, and Lorrain were to be added to the French dominions; or if that crown should think fit to set aside the treaty, upon the Spaniards refusing to accept it, as they declared they would to the several parties at the very time of transacting it, then the French would have pretensions to the whole monarchy. And so it proved in the event; for the late King of Spain, reckoning it an indignity to have his territories cantoned out into parcels by other princes during his own life, and without his consent, rather chose to bequeath the monarchy entire to a younger son of France; and this prince was acknowledged for King of Spain both by us and Holland.

It must be granted, that the counsels of entering into this war were violently opposed by the *church-party*, who first advised the late King to acknowledge the Duke of Anjou; and particularly it is affirmed, that a certain *great person* *, who was then in the church-interest, told the King in November 1701, that since his Majesty was determined to engage in a war so contrary to his private opinion, he could serve him no longer, and accordingly gave up his employment; although he happened afterwards to change his mind, when he was to be at the head of the treasury, and have the sole management of affairs at home, while those abroad

* Earl of Godolphin.

were

were to be in the hands of *one* * whose advantage by all sorts of ties he was engaged to promote.

The declarations of war against France and Spain, made by us and Holland, are dated within a few days of each other. In that published by the States they say very truly, that " they are nearest and " most exposed to the fire; *that* they are blocked " up on all sides, and actually attacked by the " Kings of France and Spain; *that* their declara- " tion is the effect of an urging and pressing ne- " cessity:" with other expressions to the same pur- pose. They " desire the assistance of all kings " and princes," &c. The grounds of their quar- rel with France are such as only affect themselves, or at least more immediately than any other prince or state; such as, " the French refusing to grant " the tariff promised by the treaty of Ryswick; " the loading the Dutch inhabitants settled in " France with excessive duties, contrary to the " said treaty; the violation of the *partition-treaty* " by the French accepting the King of Spain's will, " and threatening the States if they would not " comply; the seizing the Spanish Netherlands by " the French troops, and turning out the Dutch, " who, by permission of the late King of Spain, " were in garrison there, by which means that re- " public was deprived of her barrier, contrary to " the treaty of *partition*, where it was particularly " stipulated, that the Spanish Netherlands should " be left to the Archduke." They alledged, that " the French king governed Flanders as his own, " although under the name of his grandson, and " sent great numbers of troops thither to fright " them †; that he had seized the city and citadel " of Liege; had possessed himself of several places

* Duke of Marlborough.

† This the author of John Bull calls, " frighting the children " out of their bread and butter."

" in

" in the archbiſhopric of Cologne, and maintained " troops in the county of Wolfenbuttel, in order " to block up the Dutch on all ſides: and cauſed " his reſident to give in a memorial, wherein he " threatened the States to act againſt them if they " refuſed complying with the contents of that me- " morial."

The Queen's declaration of war is grounded upon the *grand alliance*, as this was upon the unjuſt uſurpations and incroachments of the French king; whereof the inſtances produced are, " his keeping " in poſſeſſion a great part of the Spaniſh domi- " nions, ſeizing Milan and the Spaniſh Low-Coun- " tries, making himſelf maſter of Cadiz, &c.; " and inſtead of giving ſatisfaction in theſe points, " his putting an indignity and affront on her Ma- " jeſty and kingdoms, by declaring the pretended " Prince of Wales King of England," &c. Which laſt was the only perſonal quarrel we had in the war; and even this was poſitively denied by France, that King being willing to acknowledge her Majeſty.

I think it plainly appears by both declarations, that England ought no more to have been a principal in this war than Pruſſia, or any other power, who came afterwards into that alliance; Holland was firſt in danger, the French troops being at that time juſt at the gates of Nimeguen. But the complaints made in our declaration do all, except the laſt, as much or more concern almoſt every prince in Europe.

For, among the ſeveral parties who came firſt or laſt into this confederacy, there were few but who in proportion had more to get or to loſe, to hope or to fear, from the good or ill ſucceſs of this war than we. The Dutch took up arms to defend themſelves from immediate ruin; and by a ſucceſsful war, they propoſed to have a larger extent of country, and a better frontier againſt France. The

Emperor

Emperor hoped to recover the monarchy of Spain, or ſome part of it, for his younger ſon, chiefly at the expence of us and Holland. The King of Portugal had received intelligence, that Philip deſigned to renew the old pretenſions of Spain upon that kingdom, which is ſurrounded by the other on all ſides, except towards the ſea; and could therefore only be defended by *maritime powers*. This, with the advantageous terms offered by King Charles, as well as by us, prevailed with that prince to enter into the alliance. The Duke of Savoy's temptations and fears were yet greater: the main charge of the war on that ſide was to be ſupplied by England, and the profit to redound to him. In caſe Milan ſhould be conquered, it was ſtipulated, that his Highneſs ſhould have the duchy of Montferrat belonging to the Duke of Montua, the provinces of Alexandria, and Valencia, and Lomellino, with other lands between the Po and the Tanaro, together with Vigevenaſco, or in lieu of it an equivalent out of the province of Novara, adjoining to his own ſtate; beſides, whatever elſe could be taken from France on that ſide by the confederate forces. Then he was in terrible apprehenſions of being ſurrounded by France, who had ſo many troops in the Milaneſe, and might have eaſily ſwallowed up his whole duchy.

The reſt of the allies came in purely for ſubſidies, whereof they ſunk conſiderable ſums into their own coffers, and refuſed to ſend their *contingent* to the Emperor, alledging their troops were already hired by England and Holland.

Some time after the Duke of Anjou's ſucceeding to the monarchy of Spain, in breach of the *partition*-treaty, the queſtion here in England was, whether the peace ſhould be continued, or a new war begun? Thoſe who were for the former, alledged the debts and difficulties we laboured under; that both we and the Dutch had already acknowledged

ledged Philip for King of Spain; that the inclinations of the Spaniards to the houſe of Auſtria, and their averſion from that of Bourbon, were not ſo ſurely to be reckoned upon as ſome would pretend; that we thought it a piece of inſolence as well as injuſtice in the French to offer putting a king upon us, and the Spaniards would conceive we had as little reaſon to force one upon them: That it was true, the nature and genius of thoſe two people differed very much, and ſo would probably continue to do, as well under a king of French blood as one of Auſtrian; but that if we ſhould engage in a war for dethroning the Duke of Anjou, we ſhould certainly effect what, by the progreſs and operations of it, we endeavoured to prevent; I mean an union of intereſt and affections between the two nations; for the Spaniards muſt of neceſſity call in French troops to their aſſiſtance; this would introduce French counſellors into King Philip's court, and this, by degrees would habituate and reconcile the two nations: That to aſſiſt King Charles by Engliſh and Dutch forces would render him odious to his new ſubjects, who have nothing in ſo great abomination as thoſe whom they hold for *heretics*; that the French would by this means become maſters of the treaſures in the Spaniſh Weſt-Indies; that in the laſt war, when Spain, Cologne, and Bavaria were in our alliance, and by a modeſt computation brought ſixty thouſand men into the field againſt the common enemy; when Flanders, the ſeat of war, was on our ſide, and his Majeſty, a prince of great valour and conduct, at the head of the whole confederate army; yet we had no reaſon to boaſt of our ſucceſs; how then ſhould we be able to oppoſe France with thoſe powers againſt us, which would carry ſixty thouſand men from us to the enemy; and ſo make us upon the balance weaker by one hundred and twenty

ty thouſand men at the beginning of this war, than of that in 1688?

On the other ſide, thoſe whoſe opinion, or ſome private motives, inclined them to give their advice for entering into a new war, alledged how dangerous it would be for England that Philip ſhould be King of Spain; that we could have no ſecurity for our trade while that kingdom was ſubject to a prince of the Bourbon family, nor any hopes of preſerving the balance of Europe, becauſe the grandfather would in effect be king, while his grandſon had but the title, and thereby have a better opportunity than ever of purſuing his deſign for univerſal monarchy. Theſe and the like arguments prevailed; and ſo without offering at any other remedy, without taking time to conſider the conſequences, or to reflect on our own condition, we haſtily engaged in a war, which hath coſt us ſixty millions; and after repeated, as well as unexpected, ſucceſs in arms, hath put us and our poſterity in a worſe condition, not only than any of our allies, but even our conquered enemies themſelves.

The part we have acted in the conduct of this whole war, with reference to our allies abroad, and to a prevailing faction at home, is what I ſhall now particularly examine; where, I preſume, it will appear, by plain matters of fact, that no nation was ever ſo long or ſo ſcandalouſly abuſed by the folly, the temerity, the corruption, and the ambition of its domeſtic enemies; or treated with ſo much inſolence, injuſtice, and ingratitude by its foreign friends.

This will be manifeſt by proving the three following points.

Firſt, That, againſt all manner of prudence or common reaſon, we engaged in this war as principals, when we ought to have acted only as auxiliaries.

Secondly,

Secondly, That we ſpent all our vigour in purſuing that part of the war, which could leaſt anſwer the end we propoſed by beginning it; and made no efforts at all, where we could have moſt weakened the common enemy, and at the ſame time enriched ourſelves.

Laſtly, That we ſuffered each of our allies to break every article in thoſe treaties and agreements by which they were bound, and to lay the burden upon us.

Upon the firſt of theſe points, that we ought to have entered into this war only as auxiliaries, let any man reflect upon our condition at that time: Juſt come out of the moſt tedious, expenſive, and unſucceſsful war that ever England had been engaged in *; ſinking under heavy debts of a nature and degree never heard of by us or our anceſtors; the bulk of the gentry and people heartily tired of the war, and glad of a peace, although it brought no other advantage but itſelf; no ſudden proſpect of leſſening our taxes, which were grown as neceſſary to pay our debts as to raiſe armies; a ſort of artificial wealth of funds and ſtocks in the hands of thoſe who, for ten years before, had been plundering the public; many corruptions in every branch of our government that needed reformation. Under theſe difficulties, from which twenty years peace, and the wiſeſt management, could hardly recover us, we declared war againſt France, fortified by the acceſſion and alliance of thoſe powers I mentioned before, and which, in the former war, had been parties in our confederacy. It is very obvious, what a change muſt be made in the balance by ſuch weights taken out of our ſcale and put into theirs; ſince it was manifeſt by ten years experience, that France, with-

* I was then lean, being juſt come out of a fit of ſickneſs. *John Bull.*

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out thoſe additions of ſtrength, was able to maintain itſelf againſt us. So that human probabilty ran with mighty odds on the other ſide; and in this caſe nothing under the moſt extreme neceſſity ſhould force any ſtate to engage in a war. We had already acknowledged Philip for King of Spain; neither does the Queen's declaration of war take notice of the Duke of Anjou's ſucceſſion to that monarchy as a ſubject of quarrel, but the French King's governing it as if it were his own; his ſeizing Cadiz, Milan, and the Spaniſh Low Countries, with the dignity of proclaiming the pretender. In all which we charge that prince with nothing directly relating to us, excepting the laſt: And this, although indeed a great affront, might eaſily have been redreſſed without a war; for the French court declared they did not acknowledge the pretender, but only gave him the title of King, which was allowed to Auguſtus by his enemy of Sweden, who had driven him out of Poland, and forced him to acknowledge Staniſlaus.

It is true indeed, the danger of the Dutch, by ſo ill a neighbourhood in Flanders, might affect us very much in the conſequences of it; and the loſs of Spain to the houſe of Auſtria, if it ſhould be governed by French influence and French politics, might in time be very pernicious to our trade. It would therefore have been prudent, as well as generous and charitable, to help our neighbour; and ſo we might have done without injuring ourſelves; for, by an old treaty with Holland we were bound to aſſiſt that republic with ten thouſand men, whenever they were attacked by the French; whoſe troops, upon the King of Spain's death, taking poſſeſſion of Flanders in right of Philip, and ſecuring the Dutch garriſons till they would acknowledge him, the States-General, by memorials from their envoy here, demanded only the ten thouſand men we were obliged to give them by virtue of that

treaty. And I make no doubt, but the Dutch would have exerted themſelves ſo vigorouſly, as to be able with that aſſiſtance alone to defend their frontiers; or, if they had been forced to a peace, the Spaniards, who abhor diſmembering their monarchy, would never have ſuffered the French to poſſeſs themſelves of Flanders. At that time they had none of thoſe endearments to each other, which this war hath created; And whatever hatred and jealouſy were natural between the two nations would then have appeared. So that there was no ſort of neceſſity for us to proceed farther, although we had been in a better condition. But our politicians at that time had other views; and a new war muſt be undertaken upon the advice of thoſe, who with their partiſans and adherents, were to be the ſole gainers by it. A grand alliance was therefore made between the Emperor, England, and the States-General; by which, if the injuries complained of from France were not remedied in two months, the parties concerned were obliged mutually to aſſiſt each other *with their whole ſtrength*.

Thus we became parties in a war in conjunction with two allies, whoſe ſhare in the quarrel was beyond all proportion greater than ours. However, I can ſee no reaſon from the words of the grand alliance, by which we were obliged to make thoſe prodigious expences we have ſince been at. By what I have always heard and read, I take the *whole ſtrength of a nation*, as underſtood in that treaty, to be the utmoſt that a prince can raiſe annually from his ſubjects. If he be forced to mortgage and borrow, whether at home or abroad, it is not, properly ſpeaking, *his own ſtrength*, or that of the nation, but the entire ſubſtance of particular perſons, which not being able to raiſe out of the annual income of his kingdom, he takes upon ſecurity, and

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can only pay the intereſt. And, by this method, one part of the nation is pawned to the other, with hardly a poſſibility left of being ever redeemed.

Surely it would have been enough for us to have ſuſpended the payment of our debts contracted in the former war; and to have continued our land and malt-tax, with thoſe others, which have ſince been mortgaged; theſe, with ſome additions, would have made up ſuch a ſum, as with prudent management, might, I ſuppoſe, have maintained an hundred thouſand men by ſea and land; a reaſonable *quota* in all conſcience for that ally, who apprehended leaſt danger, and expected leaſt advantage. Nor can we imagine, that either of the confederates, when the war began, would have been ſo unreaſonable as to refuſe joining with us upon ſuch a foot, and expect that we ſhould every year go between three and four millions in debt (which hath been our caſe), becauſe the French could hardly have contrived any offers of a peace ſo ruinous to us as ſuch a war. Poſterity will be at a loſs to conceive, what kind of ſpirit could poſſeſs their anceſtors, who, after ten years ſuffering by the unexampled politics of a nation maintaining a war by annually pawning itſelf; and during a ſhort peace, while they were looking back with horror on the heavy loads of debts they had contracted, univerſally condemning thoſe pernicious counſels which had occaſioned them; racking their inventions for ſome remedies or expedients to mend their ſhattered condition; I ſay, that theſe very people, without giving themſelves time to breathe, ſhould again enter into a more dangerous, chargeable, and expenſive war for the ſame or perhaps a greater period of time, and without any apparent neceſſity. It is obvious in a private fortune, that whoever annually runs out, and continues the ſame expences, muſt every year mortgage a greater quantity of land than he

did before; and as the debt doubles and trebles upon him, ſo doth his inability to pay it. By the ſame proportion we have ſuffered twice as much by this laſt ten years war, as we did by the former; and if it were poſſible to continue it five years longer at the ſame rate, it would be as great a burden as the whole twenty. This computation being ſo eaſy and trivial as it is almoſt a ſhame to mention it; poſterity would think, that thoſe who firſt adviſed the war wanted either the ſenſe or the honeſty to conſider it.

And as we have waſted our ſtrength and vital ſubſtance in this profuſe manner, ſo we have ſhamefully miſapplied it to ends at leaſt very different from thoſe for which we undertook the war, and often to effect others which after a peace we may ſeverely repent. This is the ſecond article I propoſed to examine.

We have now for ten years together turned the whole force and expence of the war where the enemy was beſt able to hold us at a bay; where we could propoſe no manner of advantage to ourſelves; where it was highly impolitic to enlarge our conqueſt; utterly neglecting that part, which would have ſaved and gained us many millions, which the perpetual maxims of our government teach us to purſue; which would have ſooneſt weakened the enemy, and muſt either have promoted a ſpeedy peace, or enabled us to continue the war.

Thoſe who are fond of continuing the war, cry up our conſtant ſucceſs at a moſt prodigious rate, and reckon it infinitely greater than in all human probability we had reaſon to hope. Ten glorious campaigns are paſſed, and now at laſt, like the ſick man, we are juſt expiring with all ſorts of good ſymptoms. Did the adviſers of this war ſuppoſe it would continue ten years without expecting the ſucceſs we have had; and yet at the ſame time

determine,

determine, that France muſt be reduced, and Spain ſubdued, by employing our whole ſtrength upon Flanders? Did they believe, the laſt war left us in a condition to furniſh ſuch vaſt ſupplies for ſo long a period without involving us and our poſterity in inextricable debts? If, after ſuch miraculous *doings* we are not yet in a condition of bringing France to our terms, nor can tell when we ſhall be ſo, although we ſhould proceed without any reverſe of fortune; what could we look for in the ordinary courſe of things, but a Flanders war of at leaſt twenty years longer? Do they indeed think, a town taken for the Dutch is a ſufficient recompenſe to us for ſix millions of money; which is of ſo little conſequence to determine the war, that the French may yet hold out a dozen years more, and afford a town every campaign at the ſame price?

I ſay not this by any means to detract from the army, or its leaders. Getting into the enemy's lines, paſſing rivers, and taking towns, may be actions attended with many glorious circumſtances: but when all this brings no real ſolid advantage to us; when it hath no other end than to enlarge the territories of the Dutch, and increaſe the fame and wealth of our general; I conclude, however it comes about, that things are not as they ſhould be; and that ſurely our forces and money might be better employed, both towards reducing our enemy, and working out ſome benefit to ourſelves. But the caſe is ſtill much harder; we are deſtroying many thouſand lives, exhauſting our ſubſtance, not for our own intereſt, which would be but common prudence; not for a thing indifferent, which would be ſufficient folly; but perhaps to our own deſtruction, which is perfect madneſs. We may live to feel the effects of our own valour more ſenſibly, than all the conſequences we imagine from the dominions of Spain in the Duke of Anjou. We have conquered a noble territory for the ſtates,

that will maintain ſufficient troops to defend itſelf, and feed many hundred thouſand inhabitants; where all our encouragement will be given to introduce and improve manufactures, which was the only advantage they wanted; and which, added to their ſkill, induſtry, and parſimony, will enable them to underſell us in every market of the world.

Our ſupply of forty thouſand men according to the firſt ſtipulation, added to the quotas of the Emperor and Holland, which they were obliged to furniſh, would have made an army of near two hundred thouſand, excluſive of garriſons, enough to withſtand all the power that France could bring againſt it; and we might have employed the reſt much better both for the common cauſe and our own advantage.

The war in Spain muſt be imputed to the credulity of our miniſters, who ſuffered themſelves to be perſuaded by the Imperial court, that the Spaniards were ſo violently affected to the houſe of Auſtria, as upon the firſt appearance there with a few troops under the Archduke, the whole kingdom would immediately revolt. This we tried; and found the Emperor to have deceived either us or himſelf. Yet there we drove on the war at a prodigious diſadvantage with great expence; and, by a moſt corrupt management, the only general *, who, by a courſe of conduct and fortune almoſt miraculous, had nearly put us into poſſeſſion of that kingdom, was left wholly unſupported, expoſed to the envy of his rivals, diſappointed by the caprices of a young unexperienced prince, under the guidance of a rapacious German miniſtry, and at laſt called home in diſcontent. By which our armies, both in Spain and Portugal, were made a ſacrifice to avarice, ill conduct, or treachery.

In common prudence we ſhould either have

* The Earl of Peterborough.

puſhed

puſhed that war with the utmoſt vigour in ſo fortunate a juncture, eſpecially ſince the gaining that kingdom was the great point for which we pretended to continue the war; or at leaſt when we had *found*, or *made* that deſign impracticable, we ſhould not have gone on in ſo expenſive a management of it; but have kept our troops on the defenſive in Catalonia, and purſued ſome other way more effectual for diſtreſſing the common enemy and advantaging ourſelves.

And what a noble field of honour and profit had we before us wherein to employ the beſt of our ſtrength, which, againſt all maxims of Britiſh policy, we ſuffered to lie wholly neglected! I have ſometimes wondered how it came to paſs, that the ſtyle of *maritime powers*, by which our allies in a ſort of contemptuous manner uſually couple us with the Dutch, did never put us in mind of the ſea; and while ſome politicians were ſhewing us the way to Spain by Flanders, others to Savoy or Naples, that the Weſt Indies ſhould never come into their heads. With half the charge we have been at, we might have maintained our original *quota* of forty thouſand men in Flanders, and at the ſame time by our fleets and naval forces have ſo diſtreſſed the Spaniards in the north and ſouth ſeas of America, as to prevent any returns of money from thence except in our own bottoms. This is what beſt became us to do as a *maritime power*; this, with any common degree of ſucceſs, would ſoon have compelled France to the neceſſities of a peace, and Spain to acknowledge the Archduke. But while we for ten years have been ſquandering away our money upon the continent, France hath been wiſely ingroſſing all the trade of Peru, going directly with their ſhips to Lima and other ports, and there receiving ingots of gold and ſilver for French goods of little value; which, beſides the mighty advantage to their nation at preſent, may

divert

divert the channel of that trade for the future, ſo beneficial to us, who uſed to receive annually ſuch vaſt ſums at Cadiz for our goods ſent thence to the Spaniſh Weſt Indies. All this we tamely ſaw and ſuffered without the leaſt attempt to hinder it; except what was performed by ſome private men at Briſtol, who, inflamed by a true ſpirit of courage and induſtry, did, about three years ago, with a few veſſels, fitted out at their own charge, make a moſt ſucceſsful voyage into thoſe parts; took one of the Aquapulco ſhips, very narrowly miſſed the other, and are lately returned laden with unenvied wealth, to ſhew us what might have been done with the like management by a public undertaking. At leaſt we might eaſily have prevented thoſe great returns of money to France and Spain, although we could not have taken it ourſelves. And if it be true, as the advocates for war would have it, that the French are now ſo impoveriſhed, in what condition muſt they have been if that iſſue of wealth had been ſtopped?

But great events often turn upon very ſmall circumſtances. It was the kingdom's misfortune, that the ſea was not the Duke of Marlborough's element; otherwiſe the whole force of the war would infallibly have been beſtowed there, infinitely to the advantage of his country, which would then have gone hand in hand with his own. But it is very truly objected, that if we alone had made ſuch an attempt as this, Holland would have been jealous; or if we had done it in conjunction with Holland, the houſe of Auſtria would have been diſcontented. This hath been the ſtyle of late years; which whoever introduced among us, they have taught our allies to ſpeak after them. Otherwiſe it could hardly enter into any imagination, that while we are confederates in a war with thoſe who are to have the whole profit, and who leave a double ſhare of the burden upon us, we dare not think

think of any design (although against the common enemy) where there is the least prospect of doing good to our own country, for fear of giving umbrage and offence to our allies, while we are ruining ourselves to conquer provinces and kingdoms for them. I therefore confess with shame, that this objection is true: for it is very well known, that while the design of Mr. Hill's expedition * remained a secret, it was suspected in Holland and Germany to be intended against Peru; whereupon the Dutch made every where their public complaints; and the ministers at Vienna talked of it as an *insolence in the Queen to attempt such an undertaking*; which although it has failed, partly by the accidents of a storm, and partly by the stubbornness or treachery of some in that colony, for whose relief, and at whose intreaty, it was in some measure designed, is no objection at all to an enterprize so well concerted, and with such fair probability of success.

It was something singular that the States should express their uneasiness, when they thought we intended to make some attempt in the Spanish West Indies; because it is agreed between us, that whatever is conquered there by us or them shall belong to the conqueror; which is the only article that I can call to mind in all our treaties or stipulations with any view of interest to this kingdom; and for that very reason, I suppose, among others, hath been altogether neglected. Let those who think this too severe a reflection, examine the whole management of the present war by sea and land, with all our alliances, treaties, stipulations, and conventions, and consider whether the whole doth not look, as if some particular care and industry had

† The expedition in 1711, wherein Sir Hovenden Walker commanded the fleet, and Mr. Hill the land-forces for the reduction of Quebec and Canada, and regaining the Newfoundland fishery, which the French had taken from us.

been

been uſed to prevent any benefit or advantage that might poſſibly accrue to Britain?

This kind of treatment from our two principal allies hath taught the ſame dialect to all the reſt; ſo that there is not a petty prince whom we half maintain by ſubſidies and penſions, who is not ready upon every occaſion to threaten us, that he will recall his troops (although they muſt rob or ſtarve at home) if we refuſe to comply with him in any demand, however unreaſonable.

Upon the third head I ſhall produce ſome inſtances to ſhew, how tamely we have ſuffered each of our allies to infringe every article in thoſe treaties and ſtipulations, by which they were bound; and to lay the load upon us.

But before I enter upon this, which is a large ſubject, I ſhall take leave to offer a few remarks on certain articles in three of our treaties; which may let us perceive how much thoſe miniſters valued or underſtood the true intereſt, ſafety, or honour of their country.

We have made two alliances with Portugal, an offenſive and a defenſive; the firſt is to remain in force only during the preſent war; the ſecond to be perpetual. In the offenſive alliance, the Emperor, England, and Holland, are parties with Portugal; in the defenſive, only we and the States.

Upon the firſt article of the offenſive alliance it is to be obſerved, that although the grand alliance, as I have already ſaid, allows England and Holland to poſſeſs for their own whatever each of them ſhall conquer in the Spaniſh Weſt Indies; yet there we are quite cut out by conſenting, that the Archduke ſhall poſſeſs the dominions of Spain in as full a manner as their late K. Charles. And what is more remarkable, we broke this very article in favour of Portugal by ſubſequent ſtipulations; where we agree that K Charles ſhall deliver up Eſtramadura, Vigo, and ſome other places to the Portu-

gueſe

gueſe, as ſoon as we can conquer them from the enemy. They who are guilty of ſo much folly and contradiction, know beſt whether it proceeded from corruption or ſtupidity.

By two other articles (beſides the honour of being convoys and guards in ordinary to the Portugueſe ſhips and coaſts), we are to gueſs the enemy's thoughts, and to take the King of Portugal's word whenever he hath a fancy that he ſhall be invaded. We are alſo to furniſh him with a ſtrength ſuperior to what the enemy intends to invade any of his dominions with, let that be what it will. And until we know what the enemy's forces are, his Portugueſe Majeſty is ſole judge what ſtrength is ſuperior, and what will be able to prevent an invaſion; and may ſend our fleets whenever he pleaſes upon his errands to ſome of the farther parts of the world, or keep them attending upon his own coaſts till he think fit to diſmiſs them. Theſe fleets muſt likewiſe be ſubject in all things, not only to the King, but to his viceroys, admirals, and governors in any of his foreign dominions, when he is in an humour to apprehend an invaſion; which, I believe, is an indignity that was never offered before, except to a conquered nation.

In the defenſive alliance with that crown, which is to remain perpetual, and where only England and Holland are parties with them, the ſame care in almoſt the ſame words is taken for our fleet to attend their coaſts and foreign dominions, and to be under the ſame obedience. We and the States are likewiſe to furniſh them with twelve thouſand men at our own charge, which we are conſtantly to recruit; and theſe are to be ſubject to the Portugueſe generals.

In the offenſive alliance we took no care of having the aſſiſtance of Portugal, whenever we ſhould be invaded; but in this it ſeems we are wiſer; for that King is obliged to make war on France or Spain

Spain, whenever we or Holland are invaded by either; but before this we are to ſupply them with the ſame forces both by ſea and land, as if he were invaded himſelf. And this muſt needs be a very prudent and ſafe courſe for a *maritime power* to take upon a ſudden invaſion; by which, inſtead of making uſe of our fleets and arms for our own defence, we muſt ſend them abroad for the defence of Portugal.

By the thirteenth article we are told what this aſſiſtance is which the Portugueſe are to give us, and upon what conditions. They are to furniſh ten men of war; and when England and Holland ſhall be invaded by France and Spain together, or by Spain alone, in either of theſe caſes thoſe ten Portugueſe men of war are to ſerve only upon their own coaſts; where no doubt they will be of mighty uſe to their allies, and terror to the enemy.

How the Dutch were drawn to have a part in either of theſe two alliances, is not very material to inquire, ſince they have been ſo wiſe as never to obſerve them; and, I ſuppoſe, never intended it; but reſolved, as they have ſince done, to ſhift the load upon us.

Let any man read theſe two treaties from the beginning to the end, he will imagine that the King of Portugal and his miniſters ſat down and made them by themſelves, and then ſent them to their allies to ſign; the whole ſpirit and tenor of them quite through running only upon this ſingle point, what we and Holland are to do for Portugal, without any mention of an equivalent, except thoſe ten ſhips, which, at the time when we have greateſt need of their aſſiſtance, are obliged to attend upon their own coaſts.

The barrier-treaty between Great Britain and Holland was concluded at the Hague, on the 29th of October in the year 1709. In this treaty neither her Majeſty nor her kingdoms have any intereſt

eſt or concern, farther than what is mentioned in the ſecond and the twentieth articles: by the former the States are to aſſiſt the QUEEN in defending the act of ſucceſſion; and by the other, not to treat of a peace, till France hath acknowledged the QUEEN and the ſucceſſion of Hanover, and promiſed to remove the pretender out of that king's dominions.

As to the firſt of theſe, it is certainly for the ſafety and intereſt of the States-General, that the Proteſtant ſucceſſion ſhould be preſerved in England; becauſe ſuch a *Popiſh* prince as we apprehended, would infallibly join with France in the ruin of that republic. And the Dutch are as much bound to ſupport our ſucceſſion, as they are tied to any part of a treaty or league offenſive and defenſive againſt a common enemy, without any ſeparate benefit upon that conſideration. Her Majeſty is in the full peaceable poſſeſſion of her kingdoms, and of the hearts of her people; among whom hardly one in five thouſand are in the pretender's intereſt. And whether the aſſiſtance of the Dutch, to preſerve a right ſo well eſtabliſhed, be an equivalent to thoſe many unreaſonable exorbitant articles in the reſt of the treaty, let the world judge. What an impreſſion of our ſettlement muſt it give abroad, to ſee our miniſters offering ſuch conditions to the Dutch to prevail on them to be guarantees of our acts of parliament! neither perhaps is it right, in point of policy or good ſenſe, that a foreign power ſhould be called in to confirm our ſucceſſion by way of guarantee, but only to acknowledge it; otherwiſe we put it out of the power of our own legiſlature to change our ſucceſſion without the conſent of that prince or ſtate who is guarantee, how much ſoever the neceſſities of the kingdom may require it.

As to the other article, it is a natural conſequence that muſt attend any treaty of peace we can

make with France; being only the acknowledgement of her Majesty as QUEEN of her own dominions, and the right of succession by our own laws, which no foreign power hath any pretence to dispute.

However, in order to deserve these mighty advantages from the States, the rest of the treaty is wholly taken up in directing what we are to do for them.

By the grand alliance, which was the foundation of the present war, the Spanish Low Countries were to be recovered and delivered to the King of Spain; but by this treaty, that prince is to possess nothing in Flanders during the war; and after a peace the States are to have the military command of about twenty towns, with their dependencies, and four hundred thousand crowns a year from the King of Spain to maintain their garrisons. By which means they will have the command of all Flanders, from Newport on the sea, to Namur on the Maese, and be entirely masters of the Pais de Waas, the richest part of those provinces. Further, they have liberty to garrison any place they shall think fit in the Spanish Low Countries, whenever there is an appearance of war; and consequently to put garrisons into Ostend, or where else they please, upon a rupture with England.

By this treaty likewise the Dutch will in effect be entire masters of all the Low Countries; may impose duties, restrictions in commerce, and prohibitions at their pleasure; and in that fertile country may set up all sorts of manufactures, particularly the woollen, by inviting the disobliged manufacturers in Ireland, and the French refugees, who are scattered all over Germany. And as this manufacture increaseth abroad, the clothing-people of England will be necessitated for want of employment to follow; and in few years, by help of the low interest of money in Holland, Flanders may recover

recover that beneficial trade which we got from them. The landed men of England will then be forced to re-eſtabliſh the ſtaples of wool abroad; and the Dutch, inſtead of being only the carriers, will become the original poſſeſſors of thoſe commodities, with which the greateſt part of the trade is now carried on. And as they increaſe their trade, it is obvious they will enlarge their ſtrength at ſea, and that ours muſt leſſen in proportion.

All the ports in Flanders are to be ſubject to the like duties, that the Dutch ſhall lay upon the Scheld, which is to be cloſed on the ſide of the States: thus all other nations are in effect ſhut out from trading with Flanders. Yet in the very ſame article it is ſaid, that "the States ſhall be favoured "in all the Spaniſh dominions as much as Great "Britain, or as the people moſt favoured." We have conquered Flanders for them, and are in a worſe condition as to our trade there, than before the war began. We have been the great ſupport of the King of Spain, to whom the Dutch have hardly contributed any thing at all; and yet "they "are to be equally favoured with us in all his do-"minions. Of all this the QUEEN is under the unreaſonable obligation of being guarantee, and that they ſhall poſſeſs their barrier and their four hundred thouſand crowns a year, even before a peace.

It is to be obſerved, that this treaty was only ſigned by one of our plenipotentiaries *; and I have been told, that the other † was heard to ſay, he would rather loſe his right hand than ſet it to ſuch a treaty. Had he ſpoke thoſe words in due ſeaſon, and loud enough to be heard on this ſide the water, conſidering the credit he had then at court, he might have ſaved much of his country's

* Lord Townſhend. See John Bull.
† Duke of Marlborough.

honour, and got as much to himself; therefore, if the report be true, I am inclined to think he only SAID it. I have been likewise told, that some very necessary circumstances were wanting in the entrance upon this treaty; but the ministers here rather chose to sacrifice the honour of the crown, and the safety of their country, than not ratify what one of their favourites had transacted.

Let me now consider in what manner our allies have observed those treaties they made with us, and the several stipulations and agreements pursuant to them.

By the grand alliance between the Empire, England, and Holland, we were to assist the other two *totis viribus*, by sea and land. By a convention subsequent to this treaty, the proportions which the several parties should contribute towards the war, were adjusted in the following manner: the Emperor was obliged to furnish ninety thousand men against France, either in Italy, or upon the Rhine; Holland to bring sixty thousand into the field in Flanders, exclusive of *garrisons*; and *we* forty thousand. In winter 1702, which was the next year, the Duke of Marlborough proposed raising ten thousand men more by way of augmentation, and to carry on the war with greater vigour; to which the parliament agreed, and the Dutch were to raise the same number. This was upon a *par*, directly contrary to the former stipulation, whereby our part was to be a third less than theirs; and therefore it was granted with a condition that Holland should break off all trade and commerce with France. But this condition was never executed; the Dutch only amusing us with a specious declaration, till our session of parliament was ended; and the following year it was taken off by concert between our general and the States, without any reason assigned, for the satisfaction of the kingdom. The next, and some ensuing campaigns, further additional

ditional forces were allowed by parliament for the war in Flanders; and in every new ſupply the Dutch gradually leſſened their proportions, altho' the parliament addreſſed the Queen, that the States might be deſired to obſerve them according to agreement; which had no other effect, than to teach them to elude it by making their troops nominal corps; as they did by keeping up the number of regiments, but ſinking a fifth part of the men and money; ſo that now things are juſt inverted. And in all new levies we contributed a third more than the Dutch, who at firſt were obliged to the ſame proportion more than us.

Beſides, the more towns we conquer for the States, the worſe condition we are in towards reducing the common enemy, and conſequently of putting an end to the war. For they make no ſcruple of employing the troops of their *quota* towards garriſoning every town, as faſt as it is taken; directly contrary to the agreement between us, by which all garriſons are particularly excluded. This is at length arrived, by ſeveral ſteps, to ſuch a height, that there are at preſent in the field not ſo many forces under the Duke of Marlborough's command in Flanders, as Britain alone maintains for that ſervice, nor have been for ſome years paſt.

The Duke of Marlborough having entered the enemies lines and taken Bouchain, formed the deſign of keeping ſo great a number of troops, and particularly of cavalry, in Liſle, Tournay, Doway, and the country between, as ſhould be able to harraſs all the neighbouring provinces of France during the winter, prevent the enemy from erecting their magazines, and, by conſequence, from ſubſiſting their forces next ſpring, and render it impoſſible for them to aſſemble their army another year, without going back behind the Soam to do it. In order to effect this project, it was neceſſary

to be at an expence extraordinary of forage for the troops, for building ſtable, finding fire and candle for the ſoldiers, with other incident charges. The Queen readily agreed to furniſh her ſhare of the firſt article, that of the forage, which only belonged to her. But the ſtates inſiſting, that her Majeſty ſhould likewiſe come into a proportion of the other articles, which in juſtice belonged totally to them: ſhe agreed even to that, rather than a deſign of this importance ſhould fail. And yet we know it hath failed, and that the Dutch refuſed their conſent till the time was paſt for putting it in execution, even in the opinion of thoſe who propoſed it. Perhaps a certain article in the treaties of contribution ſubmitted to by ſuch of the French dominions as pay them to the States, was the principal cauſe of defeating this project; ſince one great advantage to have been gained by it was, as is before mentioned, to have hindred the enemy from erecting their magazines; and one article in thoſe treaties of contributions is, that the product of thoſe countries ſhall paſs free and unmoleſted. So that the queſtion was reduced to this ſhort iſſue: Whether the Dutch ſhould loſe this paltry benefit, or the common cauſe an advantage of ſuch mighty importance?

The ſea being the element where we might moſt probably carry on the war with any advantage to ourſelves, it was agreed, that we ſhould bear five eighths of the charge in that ſervice, and the Dutch the other three; and, by the grand alliance, whatever we or Holland ſhould conquer in the Spaniſh Weſt-Indies, was to accrue to the conquerors. It might therefore have been hoped, that this *maritime ally* of ours would have made up in their fleet what they fell ſhort in their army; but quite otherwiſe, they never once furniſhed their *quota* either of ſhips or men; or if ſome few of their fleet now and then appeared, it was no more than appearing; for they immediately

immediately ſeparated to look to their merchants, and protect their trade. And we may remember very well, when theſe guarantees of our ſucceſſion after having not one ſhip for many months together in the Mediterranean, ſent that part of their *quota* thither, and furniſhed nothing to us, at the ſame time that they alarmed us with the rumour of an invaſion. And laſt year, when Sir James Wiſhart was diſpatched into Holland to expoſtulate with the States, and to deſire they would make good their agreements in ſo important a part of the ſervice; he met with ſuch a reception as ill became a republic to give, that were under ſo many great obligations to us; in ſhort, ſuch an one as thoſe only deſerved who are content to take it.

It hath likewiſe been no ſmall inconvenience to us, that the Dutch are always ſlow in paying their ſubſidies; by which means the weight and preſſure of the payment lies upon the Queen, as well as the blame if her Majeſty be not very exact. Nor will even this always content our allies: for, in July 1711, the King of Spain was paid all his ſubſidies to the firſt of January next; nevertheleſs he hath ſince complained for want of money; and his *ſecretary* threatened, that if we would not further ſupply his Majeſty, he could not anſwer for what might happen; although K. Charles had not at that time one third of the troops for which he was paid; and even thoſe he had were neither paid or clothed.

I cannot forbear mentioning here another paſſage concerning ſubſidies, to ſhew what opinion foreigners have of our eaſineſs, and how much they reckon themſelves maſters of our money, whenever they think fit to call for it. The Queen was by agreement to pay two hundred thouſand crowns a-year to the Pruſſian troops; the States one hundred thouſand; and the Emperor only thirty thouſand for recruiting; which his Imperial Majeſty never paid. Prince Eugene happening to paſs by Berlin,

Berlin, the miniſters of that court applied to him for redreſs in this particular; and his Highneſs very frankly promiſed them, that, in conſideration of this deficiency, Britain and the States ſhould increaſe their ſubſidies to ſeventy thouſand crowns more between them; and that the Emperor ſhould be punctual for the time to come. This was done by that prince without any orders or power whatſoever. The Dutch very reaſonably refuſed conſenting to it; but the Pruſſian miniſter here making his applications at our court, prevailed on us to agree to our proportion, before we could hear what reſolution would be taken in Holland. It is therefore to be hoped, that his Pruſſian Majeſty, at the end of this war, will not have the ſame cauſe of complaint which he had at the cloſe of the laſt; that his military cheſt was emptier by twenty thouſand crowns than at the time that war began.

The Emperor, as we have already ſaid, was by ſtipulation to furniſh ninety thouſand men againſt the common enemy, as having no fleets to maintain, and in right of his family being moſt concerned in the ſucceſs of the war. However, this agreement hath been ſo ill obſerved, that from the beginning of the war to this day, neither of the two laſt emperors had ever twenty thouſand men on their own account in the common cauſe, excepting once in Italy, when the *Imperial* court exerted itſelf in a point they have much more at heart, than that of gaining Spain or the Indies to their family. When they had ſucceeded in their attempts on the ſide of Italy, and obſerved our blind zeal for puſhing on the war at all adventures, they ſoon found out the moſt effectual expedient to excuſe themſelves. They computed eaſily, that it would coſt them leſs to make large preſents to one ſingle perſon than to pay an army, and to turn to as good account. They thought they could not put their affairs

affairs into better hands; and therefore wisely left us to fight their battles.

Besides, it appeared by several instances how little the Emperor regarded his allies, or the cause they were engaged in, when once he thought the *empire* itself was secure. It is known enough, that he might several times have made a peace with his discontented subjects in Hungary upon terms not at all unbefitting either his dignity or interest; but he rather chose to sacrifice the whole alliance to his private passions, by entirely subduing and enslaving a miserable people, who had but too much provocation to take up arms to free themselves from the oppressions under which they were groaning; yet this must serve as an excuse for breaking his agreement, and diverting so great a body of troops, which might have been employed against France.

Another instance of the Emperor's indifference, or rather dislike, to the common cause of the allies, is the business of Toulon. This design was indeed discovered here at home, by a person whom every body knows to be the creature of a certain *great man*, at least as much noted for his skill in gaming as in politics, upon the base mercenary end of getting money by wagers, which was then so common a practice, that I remember a gentleman in business, who having the curiosity to inquire how wagers went upon the exchange, found some people deep in the secret to have been concerned in that kind of traffic; as appeared by premiums named for towns, which nobody but those behind the curtain could suspect. However, although this project had gotten wind by so scandalous a proceeding; yet Toulon might probably have been taken, if the Emperor had not thought fit in that very juncture to detach twelve or fifteen thousand men to seize Naples, as an enterprise that was more his private and immediate interest. But it was manifest, that his Imperial Majesty had no mind to see Toulon in

possession

poſſeſſion of the allies; for even with theſe diſcouragements the attempt might yet have ſucceeded, if Prince Eugene had not thought fit to oppoſe it; which cannot be imputed to his own judgement, but to ſome politic reaſons of his court. The Duke of Savoy was for attacking the enemy as ſoon as our army arrived; but when the Marechal de Theſſe's troops were all come up, to pretend to beſiege the place, in the condition we were at that time, was a farce and a jeſt. Had Toulon fallen then into our hands, the maritime power of France would, in a great meaſure, have been deſtroyed.

But a much greater inſtance than either of the foregoing, how little the Emperor regarded us or our quarrel, after all we had done to ſave his Imperial crown, and to aſſert the title of his brother to the monarchy of Spain, may be brought from the proceedings of that court not many months ago. It was judged, that a war carried on upon the ſide of Italy would cauſe a great diverſion of the French forces, wound them in a very tender part, and facilitate the progreſs of our arms in Spain as well as Flanders. It was propoſed to the Duke of Savoy to make this diverſion; and not only a diverſion during the ſummer, but the winter too, by taking quarters on this ſide of the hills. Only, in order to make him willing and able to perform this work, two points were to be ſettled: firſt, it was neceſſary to end the diſpute between the *Imperial* court and his Royal Highneſs, which had no other foundation than the Emperor's refuſing to make good ſome articles of that treaty, on the faith of which the Duke engaged in the preſent war, and for the execution whereof Britain and Holland became guarantees, at the requeſt of the late Emperor Leopold. To remove this difficulty, the Earl of Peterborough was diſpatched to Vienna, got over ſome part of thoſe diſputes to the ſatisfaction of the Duke of Savoy, and had put the

reſt

reſt in a fair way of being accommodated at the time the Emperor Joſeph died. Upon which great event the Duke of Savoy took the reſolution of putting himſelf at the head of the army, although the whole matter was not finiſhed, ſince the common cauſe required his aſſiſtance; and that until a new Emperor were elected, it was impoſſible to make good the treaty to him. In order to enable him, the only thing he aſked was, that he ſhould be reinforced by the Imperial court with eight thouſand men before the end of the campaign. Mr. Whiteworth was ſent to Vienna to make this propoſal; and it is credibly reported, that he was impowered, rather than fail, to offer forty thouſand pounds for the march of thoſe eight thouſand men, if he found it was want of *ability, and not inclination*, that hindered the ſending them. But he was ſo far from ſucceeding, that it was ſaid the miniſters of that court did not ſo much as give him an opportunity to tempt them with any particular ſums; but cut off all his hopes at once, by alledging the impoſſibility of complying with the Queen's demands upon any conſideration whatſoever. They could not plead their old excuſe of the war in Hungary, which was then brought to an end. They had nothing to offer but ſome general ſpeculative reaſons, which it would expoſe them to repeat; and ſo after much delay, and many trifling pretences, they utterly refuſed ſo ſmall and ſeaſonable an aſſiſtance; to the ruin of a project that would have more terrified France, and cauſed a greater diverſion of their forces, than a much more numerous army in any other part. Thus for want of eight thouſand men, for whoſe winter-campaign the Queen was willing to give forty thouſand pounds; and for want of executing the deſign I lately mentioned, of hindering the enemy from erecting magazines, towards which her Majeſty was ready not only to bear her own proportion, but a ſhare of

that

that which the States were obliged to; our hopes of taking winter-quarters in the north and ſouth parts of France are eluded, and the war left in that method which is like to continue it longeſt. Can there an example be given, in the whole courſe of this war, where we have treated the pettieſt prince with whom we had to deal in ſo contemptuous a manner? Did we ever once conſider what we could afford, or what we were obliged to when our aſſiſtance was deſired, even while we lay under immediate apprehenſions of being invaded?

When Portugal came as a confederate into the grand alliance, it was ſtipulated, that the Empire, England, and Holland, ſhould each maintain four thouſand men of their own troops in that kingdom, and pay between them a million of pattacoons to the King of Portugul for the ſupport of twenty-eight thouſand Portugueſe; which number of forty thouſand was to be the confederate army againſt Spain on the Portugal ſide. This treaty was ratified by all the three powers. But in a ſhort time after the Emperor declared himſelf unable to comply with his part of the agreement, and ſo left the two thirds upon us; who very generouſly undertook that burthen, and at the ſame time two thirds of the ſubſidies for maintenance of the Portugueſe troops. But neither is this the worſt part of the ſtory; for although the Dutch did indeed ſend their own *quota* of four thouſand men to Portugal, (which however they would not agree to but upon condition that the other two thirds ſhould be ſupplied by us); yet they never took care to recruit them: for in the year 1706, the Portugueſe, Britiſh, and Dutch forces having marched with the Earl of Galway into Caſtile, and by the noble conduct of that general being forced to retire into Valencia, it was found neceſſary to raiſe a new army on the Portugal ſide; where the Queen hath, at ſeveral times, increaſed her eſtabliſhment to ten thouſand

thouſand five hundred men; and the Dutch never replaced one ſingle man, nor paid one penny of their ſubſidies to Portugal in ſix years.

The Spaniſh army on the ſide of Catalonia, is, or ought to be, about fifty thouſand men, excluſive of Portugal. And here the war hath been carried on almoſt entirely at our coſt. For this whole army is paid by the Queen, excepting only ſeven battalions and fourteen ſquadrons of Dutch and Palatines; and even fifteen hundred of theſe are likewiſe in our pay; beſides the ſums given to King Charles for ſubſidies and the maintenance of his court. Neither are our troops at Gibralter included within this number. And further, we alone have been at all the charge of tranſporting the forces firſt ſent from Genoa to Barcelona; and of all the *Imperial* recruits from time to time. And have likewiſe paid vaſt ſums as levy-money for every individual man and horſe ſo furniſhed to recruit; although the horſes were ſcarce worth the price of tranſportation. But this hath been almoſt the conſtant misfortune of our fleet during the preſent war; inſtead of being employed on ſome enterpriſe for the good of the nation, or even for the protection of our trade, to be wholly taken up in tranſporting ſoldiers.

We have actually conquered all Bavaria, Ulm, Augſburg, Landau, and a great part of Alſace, for the Emperor: and by the troops we have furniſhed, the armies we have paid, and the diverſions we have given to the enemies forces, have chiefly contributed to the conqueſts of Milan, Mantu, and Mirandola, and to the recovery of the duchy of Modena. The laſt Emperor drained the wealth of thoſe countries into his own coffers, without increaſing his troops againſt France by ſuch mighty acquiſitions, or yielding to the moſt reaſonable requeſts we have made.

Of the many towns we have taken for the Dutch, we have conſented, by the barrier-treaty, that all thoſe which were not in the poſſeſſion of Spain, upon the death of the late Catholic King, ſhall be part of the States dominions; and that they ſhall have the military power in the moſt conſiderable of the reſt; which is in effect to be abſolute ſovereigns of the whole. And the Hollanders have already made ſuch good uſe of their time, that in conjunction with our general the oppreſſions of Flanders are much greater than ever.

And this treatment, which we have received from our two principal allies, hath been pretty well copied by moſt other princes in the confederacy, with whom we have any dealings. For inſtance; ſeven Portugueſe regiments, after the battle of Almanza, went off with the reſt of that broken army to Catalonia; the King of Portugal ſaid he was not able to pay them, while they were out of his country; the Queen conſented therefore to do it herſelf, provided the King would raiſe as many more to ſupply their place. This he engaged to do, but never performed. Notwithſtanding which, his ſubſidies were conſtantly paid him by my Lord Godolphin for almoſt four years, without any deduction upon account of thoſe ſeven regiments; directly contrary to the ſeventh article of our offenſive alliance with that crown, where it is agreed, that a deduction ſhall be made out of thoſe ſubſidies, in proportion to the number of men wanting in that complement which the King is to maintain. But whatever might have been the reaſons for this proceeding, it ſeems they are above the underſtanding of the preſent Lord Treaſurer *; who not entering into thoſe refinements of paying the *public money* upon *private* conſiderations, hath been ſo uncourtly as to ſtop it. This diſappointment, I

* Earl of Oxford.

ſuppoſe

ſuppoſe, hath put the court of Liſbon upon other expedients, of raiſing the price of forage, ſo as to force us either to leſſen our number of troops, or be at double expence in maintaing them; and this at a time when their own product, as well as the import of corn, was never greater; and of demanding a duty upon the ſoldiers cloaths we carried over for thoſe troops, which have been their ſole defence againſt an inveterate enemy; and whoſe example might have infuſed courage, as well as taught them diſcipline, if their ſpirits had been capable of receiving either.

In order to augment our forces every year in the ſame proportion as thoſe for whom we fight diminiſh theirs, we have been obliged to hire troops from ſeveral princes of the empire, whoſe miniſters and reſidents here have perpetually importuned the court with unreaſonable demands, under which our late miniſters thought fit to be paſſive. For thoſe demands were always backed with a threat to recall their ſoldiers; which was a thing not to be heard of, becauſe it might *diſcontent the Dutch*. In the mean time thoſe princes never ſent their contingent to the Emperor, as by the laws of the empire they are obliged to do; but gave, for their excuſe, that we had already hired all they could poſſibly ſpare.

But if all this be true; if, according to what I have affirmed, we began this war contrary to reaſon; if, as the other party themſelves upon all occaſions acknowledge, the ſucceſs we have had was more than we could reaſonably expect; if after all our ſucceſs we have not made that uſe of it, which in reaſon we ought to have done; if we have made weak and fooliſh bargains with our allies; ſuffered them tamely to break every article, even in thoſe bargains to our diſadvantage, and allowed them to treat us with inſolence and contempt, at the very inſtant when we were gaining towns,

provinces, and kingdoms for them, at the price of our ruin, and without any proſpect of intereſt to ourſelves; if we have conſumed all our ſtrength in attacking the enemy on the ſtrongeſt ſide, where (as the old Duke of Schomberg expreſſed it) "to "engage with France was to take a bull by the "horns;" and left wholly unattempted that part of the war, which could only enable us to continue or to end it; if all this, I ſay, be our caſe, it is a very obvious queſtion to aſk, by what motives or what management we are thus become the *dupes* and *bubbles* of Europe? Sure it cannot be owing to the ſtupidity ariſing from the coldneſs of our climate; ſince thoſe among our allies, who have given us moſt reaſon to complain, are as far removed from the ſun as ourſelves.

If in laying open the real cauſes of our preſent miſery I am forced to ſpeak with ſome freedom, I think it will require no apology. Reputation is the ſmalleſt ſacrifice thoſe can make us who have been the inſtruments of our ruin; becauſe it is that for which, in all probability, they have the leaſt value. So that in expoſing the actions of ſuch perſons it cannot be ſaid, properly ſpeaking, to do them an injury. But as it will be ſome ſatisfaction to our people to know by whom they have been ſo long abuſed; ſo it may be of great uſe to us, and to our poſterity, not to truſt the ſafety of their country in in the hands of thoſe who act by ſuch principles, and from ſuch motives.

I have already obſerved, that when the counſels of this war were debated in the late King's time, a certain *great man* was then ſo averſe from entering into it, that he rather choſe to give up his employment, and tell the King he could ſerve him no longer. Upon that prince's death, although the grounds of our quarrel with France had received no manner of addition, yet this Lord thought fit to alter his ſentiments; for the ſcene was quite changed

changed; his Lordſhip, and the family with whom he was engaged by ſo complicated an alliance, were in the higheſt credit poſſible with the Queen. The treaſurer's ſtaff was ready for his Lordſhip; the Duke * was to command the army, and the Dutcheſs, by her employments, and the favour ſhe was poſſeſſed of, to be always neareſt her Majeſty's perſon; by which the whole power at home and abroad would be devolved upon that family. This was a proſpect ſo very inviting, that, to confeſs the truth, it could not be eaſily withſtood by any, who have ſo keen an appetite for wealth or power. By an agreement ſubſequent to the grand alliance, we were to aſſiſt the Dutch with forty thouſand men, all to be commanded by the Duke of Marlborough. So that whether this war was prudently begun, or not, it is plain that the true ſpring or motive of it was the aggrandizing a particular family; and in ſhort a war of the *general* and the *miniſtry*, and not of the *prince* or *people*; ſince thoſe very perſons were againſt it when they knew the power, and conſequently the profit, would be in other hands.

With theſe meaſures fell in all that ſet of people who are called the *moneyed men*; ſuch as had raiſed vaſt ſums by trading with ſtocks and funds, and lending upon great intereſt and premiums; whoſe perpetual harveſt is war, and whoſe beneficial way of traffic muſt very much decline by a peace.

In that whole chain of incroachments made upon us by the Dutch, which I have above deduced; and under thoſe ſeveral groſs impoſitions from other princes, if any one ſhould aſk, why our general continued ſo eaſy to the laſt? I know no other way ſo probable, or indeed ſo charitable, to account for it, as by that unmeaſurable love of wealth, which his beſt friends allow to be his predominant paſſion. However, I ſhall wave any thing that is perſonal

* Duke of Marlborough.

upon this subject. I shall say nothing of those great presents made by several princes, which the soldiers used to call *winter-foraging*, and said it was better than that of the *summer*; of two and half *per cent.* subtracted out of all the subsidies we pay in those parts, which amounts to no inconsiderable sum; and, lastly, of the grand perquisites in a long successful war, which are so amicably adjusted between him and the States.

But when the war was thus begun, there soon fell in other incidents here at home, which made the continuance of it necessary for those who were the chief advisers. The *Whigs* were at that time out of all credit or consideration. The reigning favourites had always carried what was called the *Tory principles* at least as high as our constitution could bear; and most others in great employments were wholly in the church-interest. These last, among whom were several persons of the greatest merit, quality, and consequence, were not able to endure the many instances of pride, insolence, avarice, and ambition, which those favourites began so early to discover, nor to see them presuming to be sole dispensers of the royal favour. However, their opposition was to no purpose; they wrestled with too great a power, and were soon crushed under it. For those in possession finding they could never be quiet in their usurpations, while others had any credit, who were at least upon an equal foot of merit, began to make overtures to the discarded *Whigs*, who would be content with any terms of accommodation. Thus commenced this *solemn league and covenant*, which hath ever since been cultivated with so much application. The great traders in money were wholly devoted to the *Whigs*, who had first raised them. The army, the court, and the treasury, continued under the old *despotic* administration: the *Whigs* were received into employment, left to manage the parliament, cry down the

the landed intereſt, and worry the church. Mean time our allies, who were not ignorant, that all this artificial ſtructure had no true foundation in the hearts of the people, reſolved to make the beſt uſe of it as long as it ſhould laſt. And the general's credit being raiſed to a great height at home by our ſucceſs in Flanders, the Dutch began their gradual impoſitions; leſſening their *quotas*, breaking their ſtipulations, garriſoning the towns we took for them, without ſupplying their troops; with many other infringements: All which we were forced to ſubmit to, becauſe the general was *made eaſy*; becauſe the moneyed men at home were fond of the war; becauſe the *Whigs* were not firmly ſettled; and becauſe that exorbitant degree of power, which was built upon a ſuppoſed neceſſity of employing particular perſons, would go off in a peace. It is needleſs to add, that the Emperor, and other princes, followed the example of the Dutch, and ſucceeded as well, for the ſame reaſons.

I have here imputed the continuance of the war to the mutual indulgence between our general and allies, wherein they both ſo well found their accounts: to the fears of the *money-changers*, leſt their *tables ſhould be overthrown*; to the deſigns of the *Whigs*, who apprehended the loſs of their credit and employments in a peace: and to thoſe at home, who held their immoderate engroſſments of power and favour by no other tenure, than their own preſumption upon the neceſſity of affairs. The truth of this will appear indiſputable, by conſidering with what unanimity and concert theſe ſeveral parties acted towards that great end.

When the vote paſſed in the houſe of Lords againſt any peace without Spain being reſtored to the Auſtrian family, the Earl of Wharton told the houſe that it was indeed impoſſible and impracticable to recover Spain; but however there were *certain reaſons* why ſuch a vote ſhould be made

that time; which reasons wanted no explanation; for the general and the ministry having refused to accept very advantageous offers of a peace, after the battle of Ramalies, were forced to take in a set of men with a previous bargain to screen them from the consequenences of that miscarriage. And accordingly, upon the first succeeding opportunity that fell, which was the Prince of Denmark's death *, the chief leaders of the party were brought into several great employments.

Thus when the Queen was no longer able to bear the tyranny and insolence of those ungrateful servants, who, as they *waxed the fatter*, did but *kick the more*; our two great allies abroad, and our stock-jobbers at home, took immediate alarm; applied the neareſt way to the throne by memorials and messages jointly, directing her Majesty not to change her secretary or treasurer; who, for the true reasons that these officious intermeddlers demanded their continuance, ought never to have been admitted into the least degree of trust; since what they did was nothing less than betraying the interest of their native country to those princes, who, in their turns, were to do what they could to support them in power at home.

Thus it plainly appears that there was a conspiracy on all sides to go on with those measures, which must perpetuate the war; and a conspiracy founded upon the interest and ambition of each party; which begat so firm an union, that instead of wondering why it lasted so long. I am astonished to think how it came to be broken. The prudence, courage, and firmness of her Majesty, in all the steps of that great change, would, if the particulars were truly related, make a very shining part in her story; nor is her judgment less to be admired, which directed her in the choice of per-

* Prince George of Denmark, husband to Q. Anne.

laps

haps the only perſons who had ſkill, credit, and reſolution enough to be her inſtruments in overthrowing ſo many difficulties.

Some would pretend to leſſen the merit of this, by telling us, that the rudeneſs, the tyranny, the oppreſſion, the ingratitude of the late favourites towards their miſtreſs, were no longer to be borne. They produce inſtances to ſhew, how her Majeſty was purſued through all her retreats, particularly at Windſor; where, after the enemy had poſſeſſed themſelves of every inch of ground, they at laſt attacked and ſtormed the caſtle, forcing the Queen to fly to an adjoining cottage, purſuant to the advice of Solomon, who tells us, *It is better to live on the houſe-top, than with a ſcolding woman in a large houſe.* They would have it, that ſuch continued ill uſage was enough to inflame the meekeſt ſpirit. They blame the favourites in point of policy, and think it nothing extraordinary, that the Queen ſhould be at an end of her patience, and reſolve to diſcard them. But I am of another opinion, and think their proceedings were right. For nothing is ſo apt to break even the braveſt ſpirits as a continual chain of oppreſſions; one injury is beſt defended by a ſecond, and this by a third. By theſe ſteps the old *maſters of the palace* in France became *maſters of the kingdom* *; and by theſe ſteps a *general during pleaſure* might have grown into a *general for life*, and *general for life* into a *king*. So that I ſtill inſiſt upon it as a wonder, how her Majeſty, thus beſieged on all ſides, was able to extricate herſelf.

Having thus mentioned the real cauſes, although diſguiſed under ſpecious pretences, which have ſo long continued the war, I muſt beg leave to reaſon a little with thoſe perſons, who are againſt any peace but what they call a *good one*; and explain

* See the Tale of a Tub, p. 25. vol. 1.

themſelves,

themſelves, that no peace can be *good* without an entire reſtoration of Spain to the houſe of Auſtria. It is to be ſuppoſed, that what I am to ſay upon this part of the ſubject will have little influence on thoſe, whoſe particular ends or deſigns of any ſort lead them to wiſh the continuance of the war: I mean, the general and our allies abroad, the knot of late favourites at home, the body of ſuch as traffic in ſtocks; and, laſtly, that ſet of factious politicians, who were ſo violently bent at leaſt upon *clipping* our conſtitution in church and ſtate. Therefore I ſhall not apply myſelf to any of theſe, but to all others indifferently, whether *Whigs* or *Tories*, whoſe private intereſt is beſt anſwered by the welfare of their country. And if among theſe there be any who think we ought to fight on till King Charles be quietly ſettled in the monarchy of Spain, I believe there are ſeveral points which they have not thoroughly conſidered.

For, firſt, it is to obſerved, that this reſolution againſt any peace without Spain is a new incident, grafted upon the original quarrel by the intrigues of a faction among us, who prevailed to give it the ſanction of a vote in both houſes of parliament, to juſtify thoſe whoſe intereſt lay in perpetuating the war. And, as this proceeding was againſt the practice of all princes and ſtates whoſe intentions were fair and honourable; ſo is it contrary to common prudence as well as juſtice; I might add, that it was impious too, by preſuming to control events which are only in the hands of God. Ours and the States complaint againſt France and Spain are deduced in each of our declarations of war, and our pretenſions ſpecified in the *eighth article* of the grand alliance; but there is not in any of theſe the leaſt mention of demanding Spain for the houſe of Auſtria, or of refuſing any peace without that condition. Having already made an extract from both declarations of war, I ſhall here give a tranſlation of

of the eighth article in the grand alliance, which will put this matter out of dispute.

THE EIGHTH ARTICLE OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE.

"When the war is once undertaken, none of the "parties shall have the liberty to enter upon a "treaty of peace with the enemy, but jointly and "in concert with the others. Nor is peace to be "made without having first obtained a just and "reasonable satisfaction for his Cæsarean Majesty, "and for his Royal Majesty of Great-Britain, and "a particular security to the Lords the States-General of their dominions, provinces, titles, navigation, and commerce: and a sufficient provision, that the kingdoms of France and Spain "be never united, or come under the government "of the same person, or that the same man may "never be king of both kingdoms; and particularly, that the French may never be in possession of the Spanish West-Indies; and that they "may not have the liberty of navigation for conveniency of trade under any pretence whatsoever, "neither directly nor indirectly, except it is agreed, "that the subjects of Great Britain and Holland "may have full power to use and enjoy all the "same privileges, rights, immunities, and liberties of commerce by land and sea in Spain, "in the Mediterranean, and in all the places and "countries which the late King of Spain, at the "time of his death, was in possession of, as well "in Europe as elsewhere, as they did then use "and enjoy, or which the subjects of both, or "each nation, could use and enjoy, by virtue of "any right, obtained before the death of the said "King of Spain, either by treaties, conventions, "customs, or any other way whatsoever."

Here

Here we see the demands intended to be insisted on by the allies, upon any treaty of peace, are, a just and reasonable satisfaction for the Emperor and King of Great Britain, a security to the States-General for their dominions, *&c.* and a sufficient provision, that France and Spain be never united under the same man as King of both kingdoms. The rest relates to the liberty of trade and commerce for us and the Dutch; but not a syllable of engaging to dispossess the Duke of Anjou.

But to know how this new language, of *no peace without Spain*, was first introduced, and at last prevailed among us, we must begin a great deal higher.

It was the partition-treaty, which begot the will in favour of the Duke of Anjou; for this naturally led the Spaniards to receive a prince supported by a great power, whose interest as well as affection engaged them to preserve that monarchy entire, rather than to oppose him in favour of another family, who must expect assistance from a number of confederates, whose principal members had already disposed of what did not belong to them, and by a previous treaty parcelled out the monarchy of Spain.

Thus the Duke of Anjou got into the full possession of all the kingdoms and states belonging to that monarchy, as well in the old world as the new. And whatever the house of Austria pretended from their memorials to us and the States, it was at that time but too apparent, that the inclinations of the Spaniards were on the Duke's side.

However, a war was resolved; and, in order to carry it on with great vigour a grand alliance formed, wherein the ends proposed to be obtained are plainly and distinctly laid down, as I have already quoted them. It pleased God, in the course of this war, to bless the arms of the allies with remarkable successes; by which we were soon put into a condition

condition of demanding and expecting such terms of peace, as we proposed to ourselves when we began the war. But instead of this, our victories only served to lead us on to further visionary prospects; advantage was taken of the sanguine temper, which so many successes had wrought the nation up to; new romantic views were proposed, and the old, reasonable sober design was forgot.

This was the artifice of those here, who were sure to grow richer, as the public became poorer; and who, after the resolutions which the two houses were prevailed upon to make, might have carried on the war with safety to themselves, till malt and land were mortgaged, till a general excise was established, and the *dizieme denier* raised by *collectors in red coats*. And this was just the circumstance which it suited their interests to be in.

The house of Austria approved this scheme with reason; since whatever would be obtained by the blood and treasure of others, was to accrue to that family, while they only lent their name to the cause,

The Dutch might perhaps have grown resty under their burthen; but care was likewise taken of that by a *barrier treaty* made with the states, which deserveth such epithets as I care not to bestow; but may perhaps consider it at a proper occasion in a *Discourse* by itself *.

By this treaty the condition of the war with respect to the Dutch was wisely altered; they fought no longer for security, but for grandeur; and we, instead of labouring to make them *safe*, must beggar ourselves to make them *formidable*.

Will any one contend, that if at the treaty of Gertruydenburg we could have been satisfied with such terms of a peace, as we proposed to ourselves by

* Which discourse follows next in this volume.

the grand alliance, the French would not have allowed them? It is plain they offered many more and much greater, than ever we thought to infift on when the war began; and they had reafon to grant, as well as we to demand them; fince conditions of peace do certainly turn upon events of war. But furely there is fome meafure to be obferved in this; thofe who have defended the proceedings of our negotiators at the treaty of Gertruydenburg, dwell very much upon their zeal and patience, in endeavouring to work the French up to their demands; but fay nothing to juftify thofe demands, or the probability that France would ever accept them. Some of the articles in that treaty were fo very extravagant, that, in all human probability we could not have obtained them by a fucceffful war of forty years. One of them was inconfiftent with common reafon; wherein the confederates referved to themfelves full liberty of demanding what further conditions they fhould think fit; and in the mean time France was to deliver up feveral of their ftrongeft towns in a month. Thefe articles were very gravely figned by our plenipotentiaries, and thofe of Holland; but not by the French, although it ought to have been done interchangeably: nay, they were brought over by the fecretary of the embaffy; and the miniflers here prevailed on the Queen to execute a ratification of articles, which only one part had figned. This was an abfurdity in form, as well as in reafon; becaufe the ufual form of a ratification is with a preamble, fhewing *that whereas our miniflers, and thofe of the allies, and of the enemy, have figned*, &c. *We ratify*, &c. The perfon * who brought over the articles faid in all companies, (and perhaps believed), that

* Horatio Walpole, Secretary to that embaffy.

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it was a pity we had not demanded more; for the French were in a disposition to refuse us nothing we would ask. One of our plenipotentiaries affected to have the same concern, and particularly, that we had not obtained some further security for the empire on the Upper Rhine.

What could be the design of all this grimace but to amuse the people, and to raise stocks for their friends in the secret to sell to advantage? I have too great a respect for the abilities of those who acted in this negotiation, to believe they hoped for any other issue from it, than that we found by the event. Give me leave to suppose, the continuance of the war was the thing at heart among those in power, both abroad and at home; and then I can easily shew the consistency of their proceedings, otherwise they are wholly unaccountable and absurd. Did those who insisted on such wild demands, ever sincerely intend a peace? Did they really think, that going on with the war was more eligible for their country, than the least abatement of those conditions? Was the smallest of them worth six millions a-year, and an hundred thousand mens lives? Was there no way to provide for the safety of Britain, or the security of its trade, but by the French King's turning his arms to beat his own grandson out of Spain? If these able statesmen were so truly concerned for our trade, which they made the pretence of the war's beginning, as well as continuance; why did they so neglect it in those very preliminaries, where the enemy made so many concessions, and where all that related to the advantage of Holland, or the other confederates, was expressly settled? But whatever concerned us was to be left to a general treaty; no *tariff* agreed on with France or the Low countries, only the Scheld was to remain shut, which must have ruined our commerce with Antwerp. Our trade with Spain was referred the same way; but this they will pre-

tend to be of no conſequence, becauſe that kingdom was to be under the houſe of Auſtria, and we have already made a treaty with K. Charles. I have indeed heard of a treaty made by Mr. Stanhope with that prince, for ſettling our commerce with Spain: But whatever it were, there was another between us and Holland, which went hand in hand with it, I mean that of *barrier*, wherein a clauſe was inſerted, by which all advantages propoſed for Britain are to be in common with Holland.

Another point, which I doubt thoſe have not conſidered, who are againſt any peace without Spain, is, that the face of affairs in Chriſtendom ſince the Emperor's death hath been very much changed. By this accident the views and intereſts of ſeveral princes and ſtates in the alliance have taken a new turn, and I believe it will be found that ours ought to do ſo too. We have ſufficiently blundered once already by changing our meaſures with regard to a peace, while our affairs continued in the ſame poſture; and it will be too much in conſcience to blunder again, by *not* changing the firſt, when the others are ſo much altered.

To have a prince of the Auſtrian family on the throne of Spain, is undoubtedly more deſirable than one of the houſe of Bourbon; but to have the empire and Spaniſh monarchy united in the ſame perſon, is a dreadful conſideration, and directly oppoſite to that wiſe principle on which the eighth article of the alliance is founded.

To this perhaps it will be objected, that the indolent character of the Auſtrian princes, the wretched œconomy of that government, the want of a naval force, the remote diſtance of their ſeveral territories from each other, would never ſuffer an Emperor, although at the ſame time King of Spain, to become formidable: On the contrary, that his dependence muſt continually be on Great Britain

Britain, and the advantages of trade by a peace, founded upon that condition, would ſoon make us amends for all the expences of the war.

In anſwer to this, let us conſider the circumſtances we muſt be in, before ſuch a peace could be obtained, if it were at all practicable. We muſt become not only poor for the preſent, but reduced by further mortgages to a ſtate of beggary for endleſs years to come. Compare ſuch a weak condition as this with ſo great an acceſſion of ſtrength to Auſtria; and then determine how much an Emperor in ſuch a ſtate of affairs, would either fear or need Britain.

Conſider that the compariſon is not formed between a prince of the houſe of Auſtria, Emperor and King of Spain, and with a prince of the Bourbon family, King of France and Spain; but between a prince of the latter only King of Spain, and one of the former uniting both crowns in his own perſon.

What returns of gratitude can we expect when we are no longer wanted? Hath all that we have hitherto done for the Imperial family been taken as a favour, or only received as the due of the *auguſtiſſima caſa?*

Will the houſe of Auſtria yield the leaſt acre of land, the leaſt article of ſtrained, and even uſurped prerogative, to reſettle the minds of thoſe princes in the alliance, who are alarmed at the conſequences of this turn of affairs occaſioned by the Emperor's death? We are aſſured it never will. Do we then imagine, that thoſe princes who dread the overgrown power of the Auſtrian as much as that of the Bourbon family, will continue in our alliance upon a ſyſtem contrary to that which they engaged with us upon? For inſtance: what can the Duke of Savoy expect in ſuch a caſe? Will he have any choice left him but that of being a ſlave and a frontier to France; or a *vaſſal*, in the utmoſt

extent of the word, to the Imperial court? Will he not therefore of the two evils chuſe the leaſt; by ſubmitting to a maſter who hath no immediate claim upon him, and to whoſe family he is nearly allied; rather than to another who hath already revived ſeveral claims upon him, and threatens to revive more?

Nor are the Dutch more inclined than the reſt of Europe, that the empire and Spain ſhould be united in K. Charles, whatever they may now pretend. "On the contrary, it is known to ſeveral perſons, "that, upon the death of the late Emperor Joſeph, the States reſolved, that thoſe two powers "ſhould not be joined in the ſame perſon;" and this they determined as a fundamental maxim by which they intended to proceed. So that Spain was firſt given up by *them*; and ſince they maintain no troops in that kingdom, it ſhould ſeem that they underſtand the Duke of Anjou to be lawful monarch.

Thirdly, Thoſe who are againſt any peace without Spain, if they be ſuch as no way find their private account by the war, may perhaps change their ſentiments if they will reflect a little upon our preſent condition.

I had two reaſons for not ſooner publiſhing this diſcourſe; the firſt was, becauſe I would give way to others who might argue very well upon the ſame ſubject from general topics and reaſon, although they might be ignorant of ſeveral facts which I had the opportunity to know. The ſecond was, becauſe I found it would be neceſſary in the courſe of this argument, to ſay ſomething of the ſtate to which the war hath reduced us; at the ſame time I knew, that ſuch a diſcovery ought to be made as late as poſſible, and at another juncture would not only be very indiſcreet, but might perhaps be dangerous.

It is the folly of too many to miſtake the echo of

of a London coffeehouſe for the voice of the kingdom. The city-coffeehouſes have been for ſome years filled with people whoſe fortunes depend upon the Bank, Eaſt-India, or ſome other ſtock. Every new fund to theſe is like a new mortgage to an uſurer, whoſe compaſſion for a young heir is exactly the ſame with that of a ſtockjobber to the landed gentry. At the court-end of the town the like places of reſort are frequented either by men out of place, and conſequently enemies to the preſent miniſtry, or by officers of the army: no wonder then if the general cry in all ſuch meetings be againſt any peace either *with* Spain or *without*; which, in other words, is no more than this, that diſcontented men deſire another change of the miniſtry; that ſoldiers would be glad to keep their commiſſions; and that the creditors have money ſtill, and would have the debitors borrow on at the old extorting rate while they have any ſecurity to give.

Now, to give the moſt ignorant reader ſome idea of our preſent circumſtances, without troubling him or myſelf with computations in form; every body knows that our land and malt-tax amount annually to about two millions and an half. All other branches of the revenue are mortgaged to pay intereſt for what we have already borrowed. The yearly charge of the war is uſually about ſix millions; to make up which ſum we are forced to take up on the credit of new funds about three millions and an half. This laſt year the computed charge of the war came to above a million more than all the funds the parliament could contrive were ſufficient to pay intereſt for; and ſo we have been forced to divide a deficiency of twelve hundred thouſand pounds among the ſeveral branches of our expence. This is a demonſtration that if the war be to laſt another campaign, it will be impoſſible to find funds for ſupplying it without mortgaging

gaging the malt-tax, or taking ſome other method equally deſperate.

If the peace be made this winter, we are then to conſider what circumſtances we ſhall be in towards paying a debt of about fifty millions, which is a ſixth part of the purchaſe of the whole iſland if it were to be ſold.

Towards clearing ourſelves of this monſtrous incumbrance, ſome of theſe annuities will expire, or pay off the principal in thirty, forty, or an hundred years; the bulk of the debt muſt be leſſened gradually by the beſt management we can, out of what will remain of the land and malt-taxes, after paying guards and garriſons, and maintaining and ſupplying our fleet in the time of peace. I have not ſkill enough to compute what will be left after theſe neceſſary charges towards annually clearing ſo vaſt a debt; but believe it muſt be very little: however, it is plain that both theſe taxes muſt be continued, as well for ſupporting the government as becauſe we have no other means for paying off the principal. And ſo likewiſe muſt all the other funds remain for paying the intereſt. How long a time this muſt require, how ſteady an adminiſtration, and how undiſturbed a ſtate of affairs both at home and abroad, let others determine.

However, ſome people think all this very reaſonable; and that ſince the ſtruggle hath been for peace and ſafety, poſterity, which is to partake the benefit, ought to ſhare in the expence: as if, at the breaking out of this war, there had been ſuch a conjuncture of affairs as never happened before, nor would ever happen again. It is wonderful that our anceſtors, in all their wars, ſhould never fall under ſuch a neceſſity; that we meet no examples of it in Greece and Rome; that no other nation in Europe ever knew any thing like it, except Spain about an hundred and twenty years ago, when they drew it upon themſelves by their own folly, and have

have ſuffered for it ever ſince; no doubt we ſhall teach poſterity wiſdom, but they will be apt to think the purchaſe too dear, and I wiſh they may ſtand to the bargain we have made in their names.

It is eaſy to entail debts on ſucceeding ages, and to hope they will be able and willing to pay them; but how to enſure peace for any term of years, is difficult enough to apprehend. Will human nature ever ceaſe to have the ſame paſſions, princes to entertain deſigns of intereſt or ambition, and occaſions of quarrel to ariſe? May not we ourſelves, by the variety of events and incidents which happen in the world, be under a neceſſity of recovering towns out of the very hands of thoſe for whom we are now ruining our country to take them? Neither can it be ſaid, that thoſe *ſtates*, with whom we may probably differ, will be in as bad a condition as ourſelves; for, by the circumſtances of our ſituation, and the impoſitions of our allies, we are more exhauſted than either they or the enemy; and by the nature of our government, the corruption of our manners, and the oppoſition of factions, we ſhall be more ſlow in recovering.

It will, no doubt, be a mighty comfort to our grandchildren, when they ſee a few rags hung up in Weſtminſter-hall, which coſt an hundred millions, whereof they are paying the arrears, to boaſt as beggars do, that their grandfathers were rich and great.

I have often reflected on that miſtaken notion of credit, ſo boaſted of by the advocates of the late miniſtry: was not all that credit built upon funds raiſed by the landed men, whom they now ſo much hate and deſpiſe? Is not the greateſt part of thoſe funds raiſed from the growth and product of land? muſt not the whole debt be entirely paid, and our fleets and garriſons be maintained, by the land and malt-tax after a peace? If they call it credit to run

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ten millions in debt without parliamentary security, by which the public is defrauded of almost half; I must think such credit to be dangerous, illegal, and perhaps treasonable. Neither hath any thing gone further to ruin the nation than their boasted credit. For my own part, when I saw this false credit sink, upon the change of the ministry, I was singular enough to conceive it a good omen. It seemed as if the young extravagant heir had got a new steward, and was resolved to look in to his estate before things grew desperate, which made the usurers forbear feeding him with money, as they used to do.

Since the moneyed men are so fond of war, I should be glad they would furnish out one campaign at their own charge: it is not above six or seven millions; and I dare engage to make it out, that when they have done this, instead of contributing equal to the landed men, they will have their full principal and interest at six *per cent.* remaining of all the money they ever lent to the government.

Without this resource, or some other equally miraculous, it is impossible for us to continue the war upon the same foot. I have already observed that the last funds of interest fell short above a million, although the persons most conversant in ways and means employed their utmost invention; so that of necessity we must be still more defective next campaign. But perhaps our allies will make up this deficiency on our side by greater efforts on their own. Quite the contrary; both the Emperor and Holland failed this year in several articles; and signified to us some time ago, that they cannot keep up to the same proportions in the next. We have gained a noble barrier for the latter, and they have nothing more to demand or desire. The Emperor, however sanguine he may now affect to appear, will, I suppose, be satisfied with Naples, Sicily,

cily, Milan, and his other acquisitions, rather than engage in a long hopeless war, for the recovery of Spain, to which his allies the Dutch will neither give their assistance, nor consent. So that since we have done their business, since they have no further service for our arms, and we have no more money to give them; and lastly, since we neither desire any recompence, nor expect any thanks, we ought in pity to be dismissed, and have leave to shift for ourselves. They are ripe for a peace, to enjoy and cultivate what we have conquered for them; and so are we to recover, if possible, the effects of their hardships upon us. The first overtures from France are made to England upon safe and honourable terms; we who bore the burthen of the war, ought in reason to have the greatest share in making the peace. If we do not hearken to a peace, others certainly will, and get the advantage of us there, as they have done in the war. We know the Dutch have perpetually threatened us, that they would enter into separate measures of a peace; and by the strength of that argument, as well as by *other powerful motives*, prevailed on those who were then at the helm, to comply with them on any terms, rather than put an end to a war, which every year brought them such great accessions to their wealth and power. Whoever falls off, a peace will follow; and then we must be content with such conditions as our allies, out of their great concern for our safety and interest, will please to chuse. They have no farther occasion for fighting, they have gained their point, and they now tell us it is *our war*; so that in common justice it ought to be *our peace*.

All we can propose by the desperate steps of pawning our land or malt-tax, or erecting a general excise, is only to raise a fund of interest for running us annually four millions further in debt, without any prospect of ending the war so well as we

we can do at preſent. And when we have ſunk the only unengaged revenues we had left, our incumbrances muſt of neceſſity remain perpetual.

We have hitherto lived upon expedients which in time will certainly deſtroy any conſtitution, whether civil or natural; and there was no country in Chriſtendom had leſs occaſion for them than ours. We have dieted a healthy body into a conſumption, by plying it with phyſic inſtead of food. Art will help us no longer, and if we cannot recover by letting the remains of nature work, we muſt inevitably die.

What arts have been uſed to poſſeſs the people with a ſtrong deluſion, that Britain muſt infallibly be ruined, without the recovery of Spain to the houſe of Auſtria? making the ſafety of a great and powerful kingdom as ours was then to depend upon an event, which even after a war of miraculous ſucceſſes proves impracticable. As if princes and great miniſters could find no way of ſettling the public tranquillity without changing the poſſeſſions of kingdoms, and forcing ſovereigns upon a people againſt their inclinations. Is there no ſecurity for the iſland of Britain, unleſs a King of Spain be dethroned by the hands of his grandfather? Has the enemy no cautionary towns and ſea-ports to give us for ſecuring trade? Can he not deliver us poſſeſſion of ſuch places as would put him in a worſe condition, whenever he ſhould perfidiouſly renew the war? The preſent King of France has but few years to live by the courſe of nature, and doubtleſs would deſire to end his days in peace. Grandfathers in private families are not obſerved to have great influence on their grandſons; and, I believe, they have much leſs among princes; however, when the authority of a parent is gone, is it likely that Philip will be directed by a brother againſt his own intereſt, and that of his ſubjects? Have not thoſe two realms their ſeparate maxims of policy, which

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muſt operate in times of peace? Theſe at leaſt are probabilities, and cheaper by ſix millions a-year than recovering Spain, or continuing the war, both which ſeem abſolutely impoſſible.

But the common queſtion is, if we muſt now ſurrender Spain, what have we been fighting for all this while? The anſwer is ready, We have been fighting for the ruin of the public intereſt, and the advancement of a private. We have been fighting to raiſe the wealth and grandeur of a particular family; to enrich uſurers and ſtockjobbers, and to cultivate the pernicious deſigns of a faction by deſtroying the landed intereſt. The nation begins now to think theſe *bleſſings* are not worth fighting for any longer, and therefore deſires a peace.

But the advocates on the other ſide cry out, that we might have had a better peace, than is now in agitation, above two years ago. Suppoſing this to be true, I do aſſert, that, by parity of reaſon, we muſt expect one juſt ſo much the worſe about two years hence. If thoſe in power could then have given us a better peace, more is their infamy and guilt, that they did it not Why did they inſiſt upon conditions, which they were certain would never be granted? We allow, it was in their power to have put a good end to the war, and left the nation in ſome hope of recovering itſelf. And this is what we charge them with as anſwerable to God, their country, and poſterity, that the bleeding condition of their fellow-ſubjects was a feather in the balance with their private ends.

When we offer to lament the heavy debts and poverty of the nation, it is pleaſant to hear ſome men anſwer all that can be ſaid, by crying up the power of England, the courage of England, the inexhauſtible riches of England. I have heard a man * very ſanguine upon this ſubject, with a good

* The late Lord Halifax.

employment for life, and a hundred thouſand pounds in the funds, bidding us *take courage*, and *warranting that all would go well.* This is the ſtyle of men at eaſe, *who lay heavy burdens upon others, which they would not touch with one of their fingers.* I have known ſome people ſuch ill computers, as to imagine the many millions in ſtocks and annuities are ſo much real wealth in the nation; whereas every farthing of it is entirely loſt to us, ſcattered in Holland, Germany, and Spain; and the landed men, who now pay the intereſt, muſt at laſt pay the principal.

Fourthly, Thoſe who are againſt any peace without Spain, have, I doubt, been ill informed as to the low condition of France, and the mighty conſequences of our ſucceſſes. As to the firſt, it muſt be confeſſed, that, after the battle of Ramilies, the French were ſo diſcouraged with their frequent loſſes, and ſo impatient for a peace, that their King was reſolved to comply upon any reaſonable terms. But when his ſubjects were informed of our exorbitant demands, they grew jealous of his honour, and were unanimous to aſſiſt him in continuing the war at any hazard, rather than ſubmit. This fully reſtored his authority; and the ſupplies he hath received from the Spaniſh Weſt-Indies, which in all are computed, ſince the war, to amount to four hundred millions of livres, and all in *ſpecie*, have enabled him to pay his troops. Beſides, the money is ſpent in his own country; and he hath ſince waged war in the moſt thrifty manner by acting on the defenſive; compounding with us every campaign for a town, which coſts us fifty times more than it is worth, either as to the value, or the conſequences. Then he is at no charge for a fleet, further than providing privateers, wherewith his ſubjects carry on a piratical war at their own expence, and he ſhares in the profit; which hath been very conſiderable to France,

France, and of infinite disadvantage to us, not only by the perpetual losses we have suffered, to an immense value, but by the general discouragement of trade, on which we so much depend. All this considered, with the circumstances of that government, where the prince is master of the lives and fortunes of so mighty a kingdom, shews that monarch not to be so sunk in his affairs as we have imagined, and have long flattered ourselves with the hopes of.

Those who are against *any peace without Spain*, seem likewise to have been mistaken in judging our victories, and other successes, to have been of greater consequence than they really were.

When our armies take a town in Flanders, the Dutch are immediately put into *possession*, and we at home make *bonfires*. I have sometimes pitied the deluded people to see them squandering away their jewel to so little purpose. For example: what is it to us that Bouchain is taken, about which the warlike politicians of the coffeehouse make such a clutter? What though the garrison surrendered prisoners of war, and in sight of the enemy? We are not now in a condition to be fed with points of honour. What advantage have we, but that of spending three or four millions more to get another town for the States, which may open them a new country for *contributions*, and increase the perquisites of the general?

In that war of ten years under the late King, when our commanders and soldiers were raw and unexperienced, in comparison of what they are at present, we lost battles and towns, as well as we gained them of late, since those gentlemen have better learned their trade; yet we bore up then, as the French do now: nor was there any thing decisive in their successes; they grew weary as well as we, and at last consented to a peace, under which we might have been happy enough, if it had not

been followed by that wise *treaty of partition*, which revived the flame that hath lasted ever since. I see nothing else in the modern way of making war, but that the side which can hold out longest, will end it with most advantage. In such a close country as Flanders, where it is carried on by sieges, the army that acts offensively is at a much greater expence of men and money; and there is hardly a town taken, in the common forms, where the besiegers have not the worse of the bargain. I never yet knew a soldier, who would not affirm, that any town might be taken, if you were content to be at the charge. If you will count upon sacrificing so much blood and treasure, the rest is all a regular, established method, which cannot fail. When the King of France, in the times of his grandeur, sat down before a town, his generals and engineers would often fix the day when it should surrender: the enemy, sensible of all this, hath, for some years past avoided a battle, where he hath so ill succeeded, and taken a surer way to consume us by letting our courage evaporate against stones and rubbish, and sacrificing a single town to a campaign, which he can so much better afford to lose than we to take.

Lastly, Those who are so violently against *any peace* without Spain being restored to the house of Austria, have not, I believe, cast their eye upon a cloud gathering in the north, which we have helped to raise, and may quickly break in a storm upon our heads.

The northern war hath been on foot almost ever since our breach with France. The success of it is various; but one effect to be apprehended was always the same, that sooner or later it would involve us in its consequences; and that whenever this happened, let our success be never so great against France, from that moment France would have the advantage.

By

By our guarantee of the treaty of Travendall, we were obliged to hinder the King of Denmark from engaging in a war with Sweden. It was at that time underſtood by all parties, and ſo declared, even by the Britiſh miniſters, that this engagement ſpecially regarded Denmark's not aſſiſting King Auguſtus. But however, if this had not been ſo, yet our obligation to Sweden ſtood in force by virtue of former treaties with that crown, which were all revived and confirmed by a ſubſequent one, concluded at the Hague by Sir Joſeph Williamſon, and Monſieur Lilienroot, about the latter end of the King's reign.

However, the war in the north proceeded; and our not aſſiſting Sweden was at leaſt as well excuſed by the war which we were entangled in, as his not contributing his contingent to the empire, whereof he is a member, was excuſed by the preſſures he lay under, having a confederacy to deal with.

In this war the King of Sweden was victorious; and what dangers were we not then expoſed to? what fears were we not in? He marched into Saxony, and if he had really been in the French intereſt, might at once have put us under the greateſt difficulties. But the torrent turned another way, and he contented himſelf with impoſing on his enemy the treaty of Alt Raſtadt; by which K. Auguſtus makes an abſolute ceſſion of the crown of Poland, renounces any title to it, acknowledges Staniſlaus; and then both he and the K. of Sweden join in deſiring the guarantee of England and Holland. The Queen did not indeed give this guarantee in form; but as a ſtep towards it, the title of *King* was given to Staniſlaus by a letter from her Majeſty; and the ſtrongeſt aſſurances were given to the Swediſh miniſter, in her Majeſty's name, and in a committee of council, that the guarantee ſhould ſpeedily be granted; and that in the mean

while it was the same thing as if the forms were passed.

In 1708 K. Augustus made the campaign in Flanders: what measures he might at that time take, or of what nature the arguments might be that he made use of, is not known: but immediately after he breaks through all he had done, marches into Poland, and reassumes the crown.

After this we apprehended, that the peace of the empire might be endangered; and therefore entered into an act of guarantee for the neutrality of it. The King of Sweden refused upon several accounts to submit to the terms of this treaty; particularly because we went out of the empire to cover Poland and Jutland, but did not go out of it to cover the territories of Sweden.

Let us therefore consider what is our case at present. If the King of Sweden return and get the better, he will think himself under no obligation of having any regards to the interests of the allies; but will naturally pursue, according to his own expression, *his enemy wherever he finds him.* In this case the *corps* of the neutrality is obliged to oppose him; and so we are engaged in a second war, before the first be ended.

If the northern confederates succeed against Sweden, how shall we be able to preserve the balance of power in the north, so essential to our trade as well as in many other respects? What will become of that great support of the *Protestant interest* in Germany, which is the footing that the Swedes now have in the empire? Or who shall answer, that these princes, after they have settled the north to their minds, may not take a fancy to look southward, and make their peace with France according to their own schemes?

And lastly, if the King of Prussia, the Elector of Hanover, and other princes, whose dominions lie contiguous, be forced to draw from those armies

mies which act againſt France, we muſt live in hourly expectation of having thoſe troops recalled, which they now leave with us; and this recall may happen in the midſt of a ſiege, or on the eve of a battle. Is it therefore our intereſt to toil on in a ruinous war for an impracticable end, till one of theſe caſes ſhall happen, or to get under ſhelter before the ſtorm?

There is no doubt but the preſent miniſtry (provided they could get over the obligations of honour and conſcience) might find their advantage in adviſing the continuance of the war, as well as the laſt did, although not in the ſame degree after the kingdom hath been ſo much exhauſted. They might prolong it, till the parliament deſire a peace; and in the mean time leave them in full poſſeſſion of power. Therefore it is plain, that their proceedings at preſent are meant to ſerve their country directly againſt their private intereſt; whatever clamour may be raiſed by thoſe, who for the vileſt ends would remove heaven and earth to oppoſe their meaſures. But they think it infinitely better to accept ſuch terms as will ſecure our trade, find a ſufficient barrier for the States, give *reaſonable ſatisfaction* to the Emperor, and reſtore the tranquillity of Europe, although without adding Spain to the empire; rather than go in a languiſhing way, upon the vain expectation of ſome improbable turn for the recovery of that monarchy out of the Bourbon family; and at laſt be forced to a worſe peace, by ſome of the allies falling off upon our utter inability to continue the war.

Some

Some Remarks on the BARRIER-TREATY between her *Majesty* and the STATES-GENERAL.

To which are added, The said BARRIER-TREATY, with the two separate articles; Part of the Counter-project; The sentiments of Prince Eugene and Count Sinzendorf upon the said treaty; and, A representation of the English merchants at Bruges.

Written in the year 1712.

PREFACE.

WHEN I published the discourse, called, *The Conduct of the Allies*, I had thoughts either of inserting or annexing the Barrier-treaty at length, with such observations as I conceived might be useful for public information: but that discourse taking up more room than I designed, after my utmost endeavours to abbreviate it, I contented myself only with making some few reflections upon that *famous treaty*, sufficient, as I thought, to answer the design of my book. I have since heard, that my readers in general seemed to wish I had been more particular, and have discovered an impatience to have that treaty made public, especially since it hath been laid before the *house of Commons*.

That I may give some light to the reader, who is not well versed in those affairs, he may please to know,

know, that a project for a treaty of barrier with the States was transmitted hither from Holland; but being disapproved of by our court in several parts, a new project or scheme of a treaty was drawn up here, with many additions and alterations. This last was called the *counter-project*; and was the measure, whereby the Duke of Marlborough and my Lord Townshend were commanded and instructed to proceed in negotiating a *treaty of barrier* with the States.

I have added a translation of this *counter-project* in those articles where it differs from the *barrier-treaty*, that the reader, by comparing them together, may judge how punctually those negotiators observed their instructions. I have likewise subjoined the sentiments of Prince Eugene of Savoy, and the Count de Sinzendorf, relating to this treaty, written, I suppose, while it was negotiating. And, lastly, I have added a copy of the representation of the British merchants at Bruges, signifying what inconveniencies they already felt and further apprehended from this *barrier-treaty*.

Some

Some Remarks on the BARRIER-TREATY, &c. *

IMAGINE a reasonable person in China reading the following treaty, and one who was ignorant of our affairs, or our geography: he would conceive their High Mightinesses the States-General to be some vast powerful commonwealth, like that of Rome; and HER MAJESTY to be a petty prince, like

* Dr. Swift commenced the champion of Queen Anne's Tory ministry as early as the month of November 1710, under the title of *The Examiner*. Beside which he wrote several other papers in defence of the Queen, the constitution, and the ministry; particularly *Some advice to the members of the October club*; *The conduct of the allies*; *Remarks on the barrier treaty*; *The public spirit of the Whigs*, (a treatise wherein we may observe how well the Doctor was acquainted with the several interests and designs of all the princes in Europe); *The preface to the Bishop of Sarum's introduction*; and, *Some free thoughts on the present state of affairs*. These are a course of writings not to be considered in the light of *occasional pamphlets*, or little paltry *journals*, thrown into the world by some *hackney jade*, in the defence of *corruption*, and to serve the iniquitous designs of a party. No; these writings are to be considered, and read over and over again, as lectures of true, unprejudiced, constitutional politics, calculated to expose the enemies of the public, and to maintain at once the honour of the crown, and the liberties of the people of England. I cannot but think, whoever is totally unacquainted with these political tracts, might be tempted to revise them carefully, were it only for the sake of extracting some points of history, which, to many thousands of the present age, are somewhat more than paradoxes.——Whoever pretends to write the history of Queen Anne's reign, without revising diligently the works of this great author, will produce nothing better than some lame, partial, insignificant Grubstreet performance, like the rest of those vile accounts which have already, in defiance of truth, been imposed upon the world. I am sure the present generation of men, that is, the present generation of *landed men*, who are in fact the only proprietors of the whole kingdom, feel it to their cost, that Swift's reasonings are just, and that all his accounts are true.

like one of those to whom that republic would sometimes send a diadem for a present, when they behaved themselves well, otherwise could depose at pleasure, and place whom they thought fit in his stead. Such a man would think, that the States had taken our prince and us into their *protection*; and in return honoured us so far, as to make use of our troops as some small assistance in their conquests, and the enlargement of their empire, or to prevent the incursions of barbarians upon some of their outlying provinces. But how must it sound in an European ear, that Great Britain, after maintaining a war for so many years, with so much glory and success, and such prodigious expence, after saving the Empire, Holland, and Portugal, and almost recovering Spain, should, towards the close of a war, enter into a treaty with seven Dutch provinces, to secure to them a dominion larger than their own, which she had conquered for them; to undertake for a great deal more without stipulating the least advantage for herself; and accept, as an equivalent, the mean condition of those States assisting to preserve her Queen on the throne, whom by God's assistance she is able to defend against all her Majesty's *enemies* and *allies* put together?

Such a wild bargain could never have been made for us, if the States had not found it their interest to use very powerful motives with the chief advisers, (I say nothing of the person immediately employed); and if a party here at home had not been resolved, for ends and purposes very well known,

true. *Swift.* ——— Mr. Swift thinks the Dean's political tracts should have been ranged in his works in the order in which he has mentioned them; and that his several poems relative to those times, and which in truth greatly illustrate his political tracts, ought to be read in the following order, viz. *The virtues of Sid Hamet the magician's rod*; *The fable of Midas*; *Atlas, or, The minister of state*; *Horace, epist. 7. book 1. imitated, and addressed to the Earl of Oxford*; *Horace, sat. 6. book 2. part of it imitated*; *The author to himself*; *The faggot*; *To the Earl of Oxford in the tower.*

to

to continue the war as long as they had any occasion for it.

The *counter-project* of this treaty made here at London was bad enough in all conscience: I have said something of it in the *preface*; her Majesty's ministers were instructed to proceed by it in their negotiation. There was one point in that project, which would have been of consequence to Britain, and one or two more where the advantages of the States were not so very exorbitant, and where some care was taken of the house of Austria. Is it possible, that *our good allies and friends* could not be brought to any terms with us, unless by striking at every particular that might do us any good, and adding still more to those whereby so much was already granted? For instance, the article about demolishing of Dunkirk surely might have remained; which was of some benefit to the States, as well as of mighty advantage to us; and which the French King hath lately yielded in one of his preliminaries, although clogged with the demand of an equivalent, which will owe its difficulty only to this treaty.

But let me now consider the treaty itself. Among the one and twenty articles, of which it consists, only two have any relation to us, importing that the Dutch are to be guarantees of our succession, and are not to enter into any treaty until the Queen is acknowledged by France. We know very well, that it is in consequence the interest of the States, as much as ours, that Britain should be governed by a *Protestant* prince. Besides, what is there more in this guarantee, than in all common leagues offensive and defensive, between two powers, where each is obliged to defend the other against any invader with all their strength? Such was the grand alliance between the Emperor, Britain, and Holland; which was, or ought to have been, as good a guarantee of our succession to all intents and purposes,

poſſes, as this in the *barrier-treaty*. And the mutual engagements in ſuch alliances have been always reckoned ſufficient without any ſeparate benefit to either party.

It is, no doubt, for the intereſt of Britain, that the States ſhould have a ſufficient barrier againſt France; but their High Mightineſſes, for ſome few years paſt, have put a different meaning upon the word *barrier*, from what it formerly uſed to bear when applied to them. When the late King was Prince of Orange, and commanded their armies againſt France, it was never once imagined, that any of the towns taken ſhould belong to the Dutch; they were all immediately delivered up to their lawful monarch; and Flanders was only a *barrier*, to Holland, as it was in the hands of Spain, rather than France. So in the grand alliance of 1701, the ſeveral powers promiſing to endeavour to recover Flanders for a barrier, was underſtood to be the recovering thoſe provinces to the King of Spain; but in this treaty the ſtyle is wholly changed: here are about twenty towns and forts of great importance, with their chatellanies and dependencies, (which dependencies are likewiſe to be enlarged as much as poſſible), and the whole revenues of them to be under the perpetual military government of the Dutch, by which that republic will be entirely maſters of the richeſt part of all Flanders; and upon any appearance of war they may put their garriſons into any other place of the Low Countries; and farther, the King of Spain is to give them a revenue of four hundred thouſand crowns a-year to enable them to maintain thoſe garriſons.

Why ſhould we wonder that the Dutch are inclined to perpetuate the war, when by an article in this treaty the King of Spain "is not to poſſeſs "one ſingle town in the Low Countries, until a

" peace be made." The Duke of Anjou, at the beginning of this war, maintained ſix and thirty thouſand men out of thoſe Spaniſh provinces he then poſſeſſed: to which if we add the many towns ſince taken, which were not in the late King of Spain's poſſeſſion at the time of his death, with all their territories and dependencies; it is viſible what forces the States may be able to keep, even without any charge to their peculiar dominions.

The towns and chatellanies of this barrier always maintained their garriſons, when they were in the hands of France; and, as it is reported, returned a conſiderable ſum of money into the King's coffers; yet the King of Spain is obliged by this treaty (as we have already obſerved) to add over and above a revenue of four hundred thouſand crowns a-year. We know likewiſe, that a great part of the revenue of the Spaniſh Netherlands is already pawned to the States; ſo that after a peace nothing will be left to the ſovereign, nor will the people be much eaſed of the taxes they at preſent labour under.

Thus the States, by virtue of this *barrier-treaty*, will in effect be abſolute ſovereigns of all Flanders, and of the whole revenues in the utmoſt extent.

And here I cannot without ſome contempt take notice of a ſort of reaſoning offered by ſeveral people; that the many towns we have taken for the Dutch are of no advantage, becauſe the whole revenues of thoſe towns are ſpent in maintaining them. For, firſt, the fact is manifeſtly falſe, particularly as to Liſle and ſome others. Secondly, the States after a peace are to have four hundred thouſand crowns a-year out of the remainder of Flanders, which is then to be left to Spain. And laſtly, ſuppoſe all theſe acquired dominions will not bring a penny into their treaſury, what can be of greater conſe-

conſequence, than to be able to maintain a mighty army out of their new conqueſts, which before they always did by taxing their natural ſubjects?

How ſhall we be able to anſwer it to K. Charles III. that while we pretend to endeavour reſtoring him to the entire monarchy of Spain, we join at the ſame time with the Dutch to deprive him of his natural right to the Low Countries?

But ſuppoſe by a Dutch barrier muſt now be underſtood only what is to be in poſſeſſion of the States; yet, even under this acceptation of the word, nothing was originally meant except a *barrier* againſt France; whereas ſeveral towns demanded by the Dutch in this treaty can be of no uſe at all in ſuch a *barrier*. And this is the ſentiment even of Prince Eugene himſelf, (the preſent oracle and idol of the party here), who ſays, "that Dender-"mond, Oſtend, and the caſtle of Gand, do in "no ſort belong to the barrier; nor can be of o-"ther uſe, than to make the States-General maſ-"ters of the Low Countriers, and hinder their "trade with England." And further, "that "thoſe who are acquainted with the country know "very well, that to *fortify* Lier and Halle can give "no ſecurity to the States as a barrier, but only "raiſe a jealouſy in the people, that thoſe places "are only fortified in order to block up Bruſſels, "and the other great towns of Brabant."

In thoſe towns of Flanders where the Dutch are to have garriſons, but the eccleſiaſtical and civil power to remain to the King of Spain after a peace, the States have power to ſend arms, ammunition, and victuals, without paying cuſtoms; under which pretence they will engroſs the whole trade of thoſe towns, excluſive of all other nations.

This Prince Eugene likewiſe foreſaw; and in his obſervations upon this treaty, here annexed, propoſed a remedy for it.

And if the Dutch shall please to think, that the whole Spanish Netherlands are not a sufficient *barrier* for them, I know no remedy from the words of this treaty, but that we must still go on and conquer for them as long as they please. For the Queen is obliged, whenever a peace is treated, to procure for them *whatever shall be thought necessary* besides; and where their necessity will terminate, is not very easy to foresee.

Could any of her Majesty's subjects conceive, that in those very towns we have taken for the Dutch, and given into their possession as a *barrier*, either the States should demand, or our *ministers* allow, that the subjects of Britain should, in respect to their trade, be used worse than they were under the late King of Spain? yet this is the fact, as monstrous as it appears: all goods going to or coming from Newport or Ostend are to pay the same duties, as those that pass by the Scheld under the Dutch forts: and this in effect is to shut out all other nations from trading to Flanders. The English merchants at Bruges complain, that "after "they have paid the King of Spain's duty for "goods imported at Ostend, the same goods are "made liable to further duties, when they are carried from thence into the towns of the Dutch "new conquests; *and desire only* the same privileges "of trade they had before the death of the late "King of Spain, Charles II." And in consequence of this treaty, the Dutch have already taken off eight *per cent.* from all goods they send to the Spanish Flanders, but left it still upon us.

But what is very surprising, in the very same article, where *our good friends and allies* are wholly shutting us out from trading in those towns we have conquered for them with so much blood and treasure, the Queen is obliged to procure, that the States shall be used as favourably in their trade over all

all the King of Spain's dominions, as her own subjects, or *as the people moſt favoured*. This I humbly conceive to be perfect boys play; *Croſs I win*, and *pile you loſe* *; or, *What's yours is mine, and what's mine is my own*. Now, if it ſhould happen, that in a treaty of peace ſome ports or towns ſhould be yielded us for the ſecurity of our trade, in any part of the Spaniſh dominions at how great a diſtance ſoever, I ſuppoſe the Dutch would go on with their *boys* play, and *challenge half* by virtue of that article: or would they be content with the military government and the revenues, and reckon them among *what ſhall be thought neceſſary* for their barrier?

This prodigious article is introduced as ſubſequent to the treaty of Munſter made about the year 1648, at a time when England was in the utmoſt confuſion, and very much to our diſadvantage. Thoſe parts in that treaty, ſo unjuſt in themſelves and ſo prejudicial to our trade, ought in reaſon to have been remitted rather than confirmed upon us for the time to come. But this is Dutch partnerſhip; to ſhare in all our *beneficial bargains*, and exclude us wholly from theirs, even from thoſe which we have got for them.

In one part of *The conduct of the allies*, &c. among other remarks upon this treaty, I make it a queſtion, whether it were right in point of policy or prudence to call in a foreign power to be a guarantee to our ſucceſſion; becauſe by that means "we "put it out of the power of our legiſlature to al- "ter the ſucceſſion, how much ſoever the neceſſity "of the kingdom may require it?" To comply with the cautions of ſome people, I explained *my*

* The two ſides of our coin were once diſtinguiſhed by *croſs* and *pile*, as they are now by *heads* and *tails*.

meaning in the following editions. I was assured, that my Lord Chief Justice affirmed, that passage was treason. One of my answerers, I think, decides as favourably; and I am told, that paragraph was read very lately, during a debate, with a comment in very injurious terms, which perhaps might have been spared. That the legislature should have power to change the succession, whenever the necessities of the kingdom require, is so very useful towards preserving our religion and liberty, that I know not how to recant. The worst of this opinion is, that at first sight it appears to be *Whiggish*; but the distinction is thus: the *Whigs* are for changing the succession when they think fit, although the entire legislature do not consent; I think it ought never to be done but upon great necessity, and that with the sanction of the whole legislature. Do these gentlemen of revolution-principles think it impossible, that we should ever have occasion again to change our succession? And if such an accident should fall out, must we have no remedy until the seven provinces will give their consent? Suppose that this virulent party among us were as able, as some are willing, to raise a rebellion for reinstating them in power, and would apply themselves to the Dutch as guarantees of our succession to assist them with all their force, under pretence that the Queen and ministry, a great majority of both houses, and the bulk of the people, were for bringing over France, Popery, and the pretender? Their High Mightinesses would, as I take it, be sole judges of the controversy, and probably decide it so well, that in some time we might have the happiness of becoming a province to Holland. I am humbly of opinion, that there are two qualities necessary to a reader before his judgment should be allowed; these are, common honesty, and common sense; and that no man could have misrepresented that para-

paragraph in my discourse, unless he were utterly destitute of one or both.

The presumptive successor, and her immediate heirs, have so established a reputation in the world for their piety, wisdom, and humanity, that no necessity of this kind is like to appear in their days: But I must still insist, that it is a diminution to the independency of the imperial crown of Great Britain, to call at every door for help to put her laws in execution. And we ought to consider, that if in ages to come such a prince should happen to be in succession to our throne, who should be intirely unable to govern; that very motive might incline our guarantees to support him, the more effectually to bring the rivals of their trade into confusion and disorder.

But to return: The Queen is here put under the unreasonable obligation of being guarantee of the whole barrier treaty; of the Dutch having possession of the said barrier, and the revenues thereof before a peace; of the payment of four hundred thousand crowns by the King of Spain; that the States shall possess their barrier, even before K. Charles is in possession of the Spanish Netherlands; although by the fifth article of the grand alliance her Majesty is under no obligation to do any thing of this nature, except in a general treaty.

All kings, princes, and states are invited to enter into this treaty, and to be guarantees of its execution. This article, though very frequent in treaties, seems to look very oddly in that of the barrier. Popish princes are here invited among others to become guarantees of our Protestant succession; every petty prince in Germany must be intreated to preserve the Queen of Great Britain upon her throne. The King of Spain is invited particularly, and by name

name, to become guarantee of the execution of a treaty, by which his allies, who pretend to fight his battles and recover his dominions, ſtrip him in effect of all his ten provinces; a clear reaſon why they never ſent any forces to Spain, and why the obligation, not to enter into a treaty of peace with France until that intire monarchy was yielded as a preliminary, was ſtruck out of the counter-project by the Dutch. They fought only in Flanders, becauſe there they only fought for themſelves. King Charles muſt needs accept this invitation very kindly, and ſtand by with great ſatisfaction, while the Belgic lion divides the prey, and aſſigns it all to himſelf. I remember there was a parcel of ſoldiers, who robbed a farmer of his poultry, and then made him wait at table, while they devoured his victuals without giving him a morſel; and upon his expoſtulating, had only for anſwer, Why, Sirrah, are we not come here to protect you? And thus much for this generous invitation to all kings and princes to lend their aſſiſtance and become guarantees out of pure good nature for ſecuring Flanders to the Dutch.

In the treaty of Ryſwic no care was taken to oblige the French King to acknowledge the right of ſucceſſion in her preſent Majeſty; for want of which point being then ſettled, France refuſed to acknowledge her for Queen of Great Britain after the late King's death. This unaccountable neglect (if it were a neglect) is here called an omiſſion, and care is taken to ſupply it in the next general treaty of peace *. I mention this occaſionally, becauſe I have ſome ſtubborn doubts within me, whether it were a wilful omiſſion or no. Neither do I herein reflect in the leaſt upon the memory of his late Majeſty, whom I intirely acquit of any imputation upon this matter. But when I recollect the beha-

* Article XX.

viour,

viour, the language, and the principles of ſome certain perſons in thoſe days, and compare them with that omiſſion; I am tempted to draw ſome concluſions, which a certain party would be more ready to call falſe and malicious, than to prove them ſo.

I muſt here take leave (becauſe it will not otherwiſe fall in my way) to ſay a few words in return to a gentleman, I know not of what character or calling, who hath done me the honour to write three diſcourſes againſt that treatiſe of *The conduct of the allies*, &c. and promiſes, for my comfort, to conclude all in a fourth. I pity anſwerers with all my heart, for the many diſadvantages they lie under. My book did a world of miſchief (as he calls it) before his firſt part could poſſibly come out; and ſo went on through the kingdom, while his limped ſlowly after; and if it arrived at all, it was too late; for people's opinions were already fixed. His manner of anſwering me is thus: Of thoſe facts which he pretends to examine, ſome he reſolutely denies, others he endeavours to extenuate, and the reſt he diſtorts with ſuch unnatural turns, that I would engage by the ſame method to diſprove any hiſtory either ancient or modern. Then the whole is interlarded with a thouſand injurious epithets and appellations, which heavy writers are forced to make uſe of, as a ſupply for that want of ſpirit and genius they are not born to: Yet after all he allows a very great point, for which I contend, confeſſing in plain words, that the burden of the war hath chiefly lain upon us; and thinks it ſufficient for the Dutch, that next to England they have borne the greateſt ſhare. And is not this the great grievance of which the whole kingdom complains? I am inclined to think, that my intelligence was at leaſt as good as his; and ſome of it, I can aſſure him, came from perſons of his own party, although perhaps not altogether ſo inflamed.

ed. Hitherto therefore the matter is pretty equal, and the world may believe him or me as they pleaſe. But I think the great point of controverſy between us is, Whether the effects and conſequences of things follow better from his premiſſes or mine? And there I will not be ſatisfied, unleſs he will allow the whole advantage to be on my ſide. Here is a flouriſhing kingdom brought to the brink of ruin by a moſt ſucceſsful and glorious war of ten years, under an able, diligent, and loyal miniſtry, a moſt faithful, juſt, and generous commander, and in conjunction with the moſt hearty, reaſonable, and ſincere allies. This is the caſe, as that author repreſents it. I have heard a ſtory, I think it was of the Duke of ***, who playing at hazard at the Groom-porter's in much company, held in a great many hands together, and drew a huge heap of gold; but, in the heat of play, never obſerved a ſharper who came once or twice under his arm, and ſwept a great deal of it into his hat; the company thought it had been one of his ſervants. When the Duke's hand was out, they were talking how much he had won. Yes, ſaid he, I held in very long; yet methinks I have won but very little. They told him his ſervant had got the reſt in his hat; and then he found he was cheated.

It hath been my good fortune to ſee the moſt important facts that I have advanced juſtified by the public voice; which let this author do what he can, will incline the world to believe, that I may be right in the reſt. And I ſolemnly declare, that I have not wilfully committed the leaſt miſtake. I ſtopt the ſecond edition, and made all poſſible inquiries among thoſe who I thought could beſt inform me, in order to correct any error I could hear of; I did the ſame to the third and fourth editions, and then left the printer to his liberty.

This

This I take for a more effectual anſwer to all cavils, than an hundred pages of controverſy.

But what diſguſts me from having any thing to do with this race of anſwer-jobbers, is, that they have no ſort of conſcience in their dealings. To give one inſtance in this gentleman's third part, which I have been lately looking into: When I talk of the moſt petty princes, he ſays, that I meant crowned heads; when I ſay the ſoldiers of thoſe petty princes are ready to rob or ſtarve at home, he ſays I call kings and crowned heads robbers and highwaymen. This is what the *Whigs* call anſwering a book.

I cannot omit one particular concerning this author, who is ſo poſitive in aſſerting his own facts and contradicting mine; he affirms, that the buſineſs of Thoulon was diſcovered by the clerk of a certain great man, who was then ſecretary of ſtate. It is neither wiſe nor for the credit of his party to put us in mind of that ſecretary, or of that clerk; however, ſo it happens, that nothing relating to the affair of Thoulon did ever paſs through that ſecretary's office: Which I here affirm with great phlegm, leaving the epithets of falſe, ſcandalous, villanous, and the reſt, to the author and his fellows.

But to leave this author: Let us conſider the conſequence of our triumphs, upon which ſome ſet ſo great a value as to think, that nothing leſs than the crown can be a ſufficient reward for the merit of the general. We have not enlarged our dominions by one foot of land: Our trade, which made us conſiderable in the world, is either given up by treaties, or clogged with duties, which interrupt and daily leſſen it. We ſee the whole nation groaning under exceſſive taxes of all ſorts, to raiſe three millions of money for payment of the intereſt of thoſe debts we have contracted Let us look upon the reverſe of the medal; we ſhall ſee our neighbours

bours, who in their utmoſt diſtreſs called for our aſſiſtance, become by this treaty, even in time of peace, maſters of a more conſiderable country than their own; in a condition to ſtrike terror into us, with fifty thouſand *veterans* ready to invade us from that country, which we have conquered for them; and to commit inſolent hoſtilities upon us in all other parts, as they have lately done in the Eaſt-Indies.

THE BARRIER-TREATY BETWEEN HER MAJESTY AND THE STATES-GENERAL.

" HER Majeſty the QUEEN of Great Britain, " and the Lords the States-General of the " United Provinces, having conſidered how much " it concerns the quiet and ſecurity of their king- " doms and ſtates, and the public tranquillity, to " maintain and to ſecure on one ſide, the ſucceſ- " ſion to the crown of Great Britain in ſuch man- " ner as it is now eſtabliſhed by the laws of the " kingdom; and on the other ſide, that the States- " General of the United Provinces ſhould have a " ſtrong and ſufficient barrier againſt France and " others who would ſurprize or attack them: And " her Majeſty and the ſaid States-General appre- " hending with juſt reaſon the troubles and the " miſchiefs which may happen in relation to this " ſucceſſion, if at any time there ſhould be any per- " ſon, or any power, who ſhould call it in queſtion; " and that the countries and ſtates of the ſaid " Lords the States-General were not furniſhed " with ſuch a barrier: For theſe ſaid reaſons her " ſaid Majeſty the Queen of Great Britain, al- " though in the vigour of her age, and enjoying

" perfect

" perfect health (in which may God preſerve her
" many years), out of an effect of her uſual pru-
" dence and piety, has thought fit to enter with
" the Lords the States-General of the United Pro-
" vinces into a particular alliance and confederacy;
" the principal end and only aim of which ſhall
" be the public quiet and tranquillity; and to pre-
" vent, by meaſures taken in time, all the events
" which might one day excite new war. It is with
" this view, that her Britiſh Majeſty has given her
" full power to agree upon ſome articles of a
" treaty, in addition to the treaties and alliances
" that ſhe hath already with the Lords the States-
" General of the United Provinces, to her ambaſ-
" ſador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, Charles
" Viſcount Townſhend, Baron of Lyne-Regis,
" Privy Counſellor to her Britiſh Majeſty, Cap-
" tain of her ſaid Majeſty's Yeomen of the Guard,
" and her Lieutenant in the county of Norfolk;
" and the Lords the States-General of the United
" Provinces, the Sieurs John de Welderen Lord
" of Valburgh, Great Bailiff of the Lower Be-
" tewe, of the body of the nobility of the pro-
" vince of Guelder; Frederic Baron of Reede,
" Lord of Lier, St. Anthony, and T'er Lee, of
" the order of the nobility of the province of
" Holland and Weſt-Friezeland; Anthony Hein-
" ſius, Counſellor-Penſionary of the province of
" Holland and Weſt-Friezeland, Keeper of the
" Great Seal, and Superintendant of the fiefs of the
" ſame province; Cornelius Van Gheet, Lord of
" Spranbrook, Bulkeſteyn, &c.; Gedeon Hocuft,
" Canon of the chapter of the church of St. Pe-
" ter at Utrecht, and elected Counſellor in
" the ſtates of the province of Utrecht; Haſſel
" Van Sminia, Secretary of the chamber of the
" accounts of the province of Friezeland; Erneſt
" Itterſum, Lord of Oſterbof, of the body of the
" nobility of the province of Overyſſel; and Wicher

" Wichers, Senator of the city of Groningen; all " deputies to the aſſembly of the ſaid Lords the " States-General on the one part, reſpectively of " the provinces of Guelder, Holland, Weſt Friezeland, Zeland, Utrecht, Friezeland, Overyſſel, " and Groningen, and Ommelands; who, by virtue of their full powers, have agreed upon the " following articles."

ARTICLE I.

THE treaties of peace, friendſhip, alliance, and confederacy between her Britannic Majeſty and the States-General of the United Provinces ſhall be approved and confirmed by the preſent treaty, and ſhall remain in their former force and vigour as if they were inſerted word for word.

ARTICLE II.

The ſucceſſion to the crown of England having been ſettled by an act of parliament, paſſed the twelfth year of the reign of his late Majeſty King William III. the title of which is, *An act for the further limimitation of the crown, and better ſecuring the rights and liberties of the ſubject*; and lately, in the ſixth year of the reign of her preſent Majeſty, this ſucceſſion having been again eſtabliſhed and confirmed by another act made for the greater ſecurity of her Majeſty's perſon and government, and the ſucceſſion to the crown of Great Britain, *&c.* in the line of the Moſt Serene houſe of Hanover, and in the perſon of the Princeſs Sophia, and of her heirs, ſucceſſors, and deſcendents, male and female, already born or to be born: And although no power hath any right to oppoſe the laws made upon this ſubject by the crown and parliament of Great Britain; if it ſhall happen nevertheleſs, that under any pretence, or by any cauſe whatever,

whatever, any perſon, or any power or ſtate, may pretend to diſpute the eſtabliſhment which the parliament hath made of the aforeſaid ſucceſſion in the Moſt Serene houſe of Hanover, to oppoſe the ſaid ſucceſſion, to aſſiſt or favour thoſe who may oppoſe it, whether directly or indirectly, by open war, or by fomenting ſeditions and conſpiracies againſt her or him to whom the crown of Great Britain ſhall deſcend, according to the acts aforeſaid; the States-General engage and promiſe to aſſiſt and maintain, in the ſaid ſucceſſion, her or him to whom it ſhall belong, by virtue of the ſaid acts of parliament, to aſſiſt them in taking poſſeſſion, if they ſhould not be in actual poſſeſſion, and to oppoſe thoſe who would diſturb them in the taking ſuch poſſeſſion, or in the actual poſſeſſion of the aforeſaid ſucceſſion.

ARTICLE III.

Her ſaid Majeſty and the States-General, in conſequence of the fifth article of the alliance concluded between the Emperor, the late King of Great Britain, and the States-General, the 7th of September 1701, will employ all their force to recover the reſt of the Spaniſh Low Countries.

ARTICLE IV.

And further, they will endeavour to conquer as many towns and forts as they can, in order to their being a barrier and ſecurity to the ſaid States.

ARTICLE V.

And whereas, according to the ninth article of the ſaid alliance, it is to be agreed, amongſt other matters, how and in what manner the States ſhall

be made safe by means of this barrier, the Queen of Great Britain will use her endeavours to procure that in the treaty of peace it may agreed, that all the Spanish Low Countries, and what else may be found necessary, whether conquered or unconquered places, shall serve as a barrier to the States.

ARTICLE VI.

That to this end their High Mightinesses shall have the liberty to put and keep garrison, to change, augment, and diminish it, as they shall judge proper, in the places following; namely, Newport, Furnes, with the fort of Knock, Ypres, Menin, the town and citadel of Lisle, Tournay, and its citadel, Conde, Valenciennes; and the places which shall from henceforward be conquered from France, Maubeuge, Charleroy, Namur and its citadel, Lier, Halle to fortify, the ports of Perle, Philippe, Damme, the castle of Gand, and Dendermonde. The fort of St. Donas being joined to the fortification of the Sluice, and being entirely incorporated with it, shall remain and be yielded in property to the States. The fort of Rodenhuysen on this side Gand shall be demolished.

ARTICLE VII.

The said States-General may, in case of an apparent attack, or war, put as many troops as they shall think necessary in all the towns, places, and forts in the Spanish Low Countries, where the reason of war shall require it.

ARTICLE VIII.

They may likewise send into the towns, forts and

and places, where they ſhall have their garriſons, without any hinderance and without paying any duties, proviſions, ammunitions of war, arms, and artillery, materials for the fortifications, and all that ſhall be found convenient and neceſſary for the ſaid garriſons and fortifications.

ARTICLE IX.

The States-General ſhall alſo have liberty to appoint in the towns, forts, and places of their barrier, mentioned in the foregoing ſixth article, where they may have garriſons, ſuch governors and commanders, majors and other officers as they ſhall find proper, who ſhall not be ſubject to any other orders, whatſoever they may be, or from whenceſoever they may come, relating to the ſecurity and military government of the ſaid places, but only to thoſe of their High Mightineſſes (excluſive of all others); ſtill preſerving the rights and privileges, as well eccleſiaſtical as political, of K. Charles III.

ARTICLE X.

That beſides the States ſhall have liberty to fortify the ſaid towns, places, and forts, which belong to them, and repair the fortifications of them in ſuch manner as they ſhall judge neceſſary; and further to do whatever ſhall be uſeful for their defence.

ARTICLE XI.

It is agreed, that the States-General ſhall have all the revenues of the towns, places, juriſdictions, and their dependencies, which they ſhall have for their barrier from France, which were not in the poſſeſſion of the crown of Spain at the time of the

death of the late K. Charles II. and beſides, a million of livres ſhall be ſettled for the payment of one hundred thouſand crowns every three months, out of the cleareſt revenues of the Spaniſh Low countries, which the ſaid King was then in poſſeſſion of; both which are for maintaining the garriſons of the States, and for ſupplying the fortifications, as alſo the magazines, and other neceſſary expences in the towns and places above mentioned. And that the ſaid revenues may be ſufficient to ſupport theſe expences, endeavours ſhall be uſed for enlarging the dependencies and juriſdictions aforeſaid as much as poſſible; and particularly, for including with the juriſdiction of Ypres that of Caſſel, and the foreſt of Niepe; and with the juriſdiction of Liſle the juriſdiction of Douay, both having been ſo joined before the preſent war.

ARTICLE XII.

That no town, fort, place, or country of the Spaniſh Low Countries ſhall be granted, transferred, or given, or deſcend to the crown of France, or any of the line of France, neither by virtue of any gift, ſale, exchange, marriage, agreement, inheritance, ſucceſſion by will, or through want of will, from no title whatſoever, nor in any other manner whatſoever, nor be put into the power, or under the authority of the Moſt Chriſtian King, or any one of the line of France.

ARTICLE XIII.

And whereas the ſaid States-General, in conſequence of the ninth article of the ſaid alliance, are to make a convention or treaty with K. Charles III. for putting the States in a condition of ſafety by means of the ſaid barrier, the QUEEN of Great Britain will do what depends upon her, that all the foregoing

foregoing particulars relating to the barrier of the States may be inserted in the aforesaid treaty or convention; and that her said Majesty will continue her good offices, until the above-mentioned convention between the States and the said K. Charles the Third be concluded, agreeable to what is before mentioned; and that her Majesty will be guarantee of the said treaty or convention.

ARTICLE XIV.

And that the said States may enjoy from henceforward, as much as possible, a barrier for the Spanish Low Countries, they shall be permitted to put their garrisons in the towns already taken, and which may hereafter be so, before the peace be concluded and ratified. And in the mean time, the said King Charles III. shall not be allowed to enter into possession of the said Spanish Low countries, neither entirely nor in part: and during that time the QUEEN shall assist their High Mightinesses to maintain them in the enjoyment of the revenues, and to find the million of livres a-year above mentioned.

ARTICLE XV.

And whereas their High Mightinesses have stipulated by the treaty of Munster, in the fourteenth article, that the river Scheld, as also the canals of Sas, Swan, and other mouths of the sea bordering thereupon should be kept shut on the side of the States:

And in the fifteenth article, that the ships and commodities going in and coming out of the harbours of Flanders shall be, and remain charged with all such imposts, and other duties, as are raised upon commodities going and coming along the Scheld, and the other canals above mentioned:

The

The QUEEN of Great Britain promiſes and engages, that their High Mightineſſes ſhall never be diſturbed in their right and poſſeſſion in that reſpect, neither directly or indirectly; as alſo, that the commerce ſhall not in prejudice of the ſaid treaty be made more eaſy by the ſea-ports than by the rivers, canals, and mouths of the ſea, on the ſide of the States of the United Provinces, neither directly or indirectly.

And whereas by the ſixteenth and ſeventeenth articles of the ſame treaty of Munſter, his Majeſty the King of Spain is obliged to treat the ſubjects of their High Mightineſſes as favourably as the ſubjects of Great Britain and the Hans towns, who were then the people moſt favourably treated; her Britannic Majeſty and their High Mightineſſes promiſe likewiſe to take care that their High Mightineſſes ſhall be treated in the Spaniſh Low countries as well as in Spain, the kingdoms and ſtates belonging to it, equally and as well the one as the other, as the people moſt favoured.

ARTICLE XVI.

The ſaid QUEEN and States-General oblige themſelves to furniſh by ſea and land the ſuccours and aſſiſtance neceſſary to maintain by force her ſaid Majeſty in the quiet poſſeſſion of her kingdoms; and the Moſt Serene houſe of Hanover in the ſaid ſucceſſion, in the manner it is ſettled by the acts of parliament before mentioned; and to maintain the ſaid States-General in the poſſeſſion of the ſaid barrier.

ARTICLE XVII.

After the ratifications of the treaty a particular convention ſhall be made of the conditions, by which the ſaid QUEEN, and the ſaid Lords the States-General, will engage themſelves to furniſh the

the ſuccours which ſhall be thought neceſſary, as well by ſea as by land.

ARTICLE XVIII.

If her Britiſh Majeſty, or the States-General of the United Provinces, be attacked by any body whatſoever by reaſon of this convention they ſhall mutually aſſiſt one another with all their forces, and become guarantees of the execution of the ſaid convention.

ARTICLE XIX.

There ſhall be invited and admitted into the preſent treaty, as ſoon as poſſible, all the kings, princes, and ſtates, who ſhall be willing to enter into the ſame, particularly his Imperial Majeſty, the Kings of Spain and Pruſſia, and the Elector of Hanover. And her Britiſh Majeſty and the States-General of the United Provinces, and each of them in particular, ſhall be permitted to require and invite thoſe whom they ſhall think fit to require and invite, to enter into this treaty, and to be guarantees of its execution.

ARTICLE XX.

And as time hath ſhewn the omiſſion which was made in the treaty ſigned at Ryſwick in the year 1697, between England and France, in reſpect of the right of the ſucceſſion of England in the perſon of her Majeſty the QUEEN of Great Britain, now reigning; and that for want of having ſettled in that treaty this indiſputable right of her Majeſty, France refuſed to acknowledge her for QUEEN of Great Britain after the death of the late K. William III. of glorious memory: her Majeſty the Queen of Great Britain, and the Lords the States-General

General of the United Provinces, do agree, and engage themſelves likewiſe, not to enter into any negotiation or treaty of peace with France, before the title of her Majeſty to the crown of Great Britain, as alſo the right of ſucceſſion to the Moſt Serene houſe of Hanover to the aforeſaid crown, in the manner it is ſettled and eſtabliſhed by the before-mentioned acts of parliament, be fully acknowledged as a preliminary by France, and that France hath promiſed at the ſame time to remove out of its dominions the perſon who pretends to be King of Great Britain; and that no negotiation, or formal diſcuſſion of the articles of the ſaid treaty of peace, ſhall be entered into but jointly, and at the ſame time with the ſaid Queen, or with her miniſters.

ARTICLE XXI.

Her Britiſh Majeſty, and the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces, ſhall ratify and confirm all that is contained in the preſent treaty within the ſpace of four weeks, to be reckoned from the day of the ſigning. In teſtimony whereof, the underwritten ambaſſador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of her Britiſh Majeſty, and the deputies of the Lords the States-General, have ſigned this preſent treaty, and have affixed their ſeals thereunto.

At the Hague the 29th of October, in the year 1709.

(L. S.) Townſhend.
(L. S.) J. B. Van Reede.
(L. S.) G. Hoeuft.
(L. S.) E. V. Itterſum.
(L. S.) J. V. Welderen.
(L. S.) A. Heinſius.
(L. S.) H. Sminia.
(L. S.) W. Wichers.

THE

THE SEPARATE ARTICLE.

" AS in the preliminary-articles ſigned here at " the Hague, the 28th of May 1709, by the " plenipotentiaries of his Imperial Majeſty, of her " Majeſty the Queen of Great-Britain, and of the " Lords the States-General of the United Pro- " vinces, it is ſtipulated, amongſt other things, " that the Lords the States-General ſhall have, " with entire property and ſovereignty, the upper " quarter of Guelder, according to the fifty-ſecond " article of the treaty of Munſter, of the year " 1648; as alſo, that the garriſons which are, " or hereafter ſhall be, on the part of the Lords " the States-General, in the town of Huy, the ci- " tadel of Liege, and in the town of Bonne, ſhall " remain there, until it ſhall be otherwiſe agreed " upon with his Imperial Majeſty and the empire: " and as the barrier, which is this day agreed upon " in the principal treaty for the mutual guarantee " between her Britiſh Majeſty and the Lords the " States-General, cannot give to the United Pro- " vinces the ſafety for which it is eſtabliſhed, un- " leſs it be well ſecured from one end to the other, " and that the communication of it be well joined " together, for which the upper quarter of Guel- " der, and the garriſons in the citadel of Liege, " Huy, and Bonne are abſolutely neceſſary: (ex- " perience having thrice ſhewn, that France hav- " ing a deſign to attack the United Provin- " ces, has made uſe of the places above men- " tioned, in order to come at them, and to pene- " trate into the ſaid provinces). And further, as " in reſpect to the equivalent for which the upper " quarter of Guelder is to be yielded to the Unit- " ed Provinces, according to the fifty-ſecond arti- " cle of the treaty of Munſter above mentioned,

his

" his Majeſty K. Charles III. will be much more " gratified and advantaged in other places, than " that equivalent can avail! to the end therefore " that the Lords the States-General may have the " upper quarter of Guelder with entire property " and ſovereignty; and that the ſaid upper quar- " ter of Guelder may be yielded in this manner " to the ſaid Lords the States-General, in the con- " vention, or the treaty that they are to make with " his Majeſty K. Charles III. according to the thir- " teenth article of the treaty concluded this day; " as alſo, that their garriſons in the citadel of " Liege, in that of Huy, and in Bonne, may re- " main there, until it be otherwiſe agreed upon " with his Imperial Majeſty and the empire; her " Majeſty the Queen of Great Britain engages her- " ſelf, and promiſes by this ſeparate article, which " ſhall have the ſame force as if it were inſerted in " the principal treaty, to make the ſame efforts " for all this, as ſhe hath engaged herſelf to make " for the obtaining the barrier in the Spaniſh Low " Countries. In teſtimony whereof, the under- " written ambaſſador extraordinary and plenipo- " tentiary of her Britiſh Majeſty, and deputies of " the Lords the States-General, have ſigned the " preſent ſeparate article, and have affixed their " ſeals thereunto.

At the Hague, the 29th of October, 1709.

(L. S.) Townſhend.
(L. S.) J. B Van Reede.
(L. S.) G. Hoeuft.
(L. S.) E. V. Itterſum.
(L. S.) J. V. Welderen.
(L. S.) A. Heinſius.
(L. S.) H. Sminia.
(L. S.) W. Wichers.

THE

THE SECOND SEPARATE ARTICLE.

" AS the Lords the States-General have repre-
" sented, that in Flanders the limits between
" Spaniſh Flanders and that of the States are ſet-
" tled in ſuch a manner, as that the land belong-
" ing to the States is extremely narrow there; ſo
" that in ſome places the territory of Spaniſh Flan-
" ders extends itſelf to the fortifications, and under
" the cannon of the places, towns, and forts of
" the States, which occaſions many inconvenien-
" cies, as hath been ſeen by an example a little be-
" fore the beginning of the preſent war, when a
" fort was deſigned to have been built under the
" cannon of the Sas Van Gand, under pretence,
" that it was upon the territory of Spain: and as
" it is neceſſary, for avoiding theſe, and other
" ſorts of inconveniencies, that the land of the
" States upon the confines of Flanders ſhould be
" enlarged, and that the places, towns, and forts,
" ſhould by that means be better covered: her Bri-
" tiſh Majeſty, entering into the juſt motives of
" the ſaid Lords the States-General in this reſpect,
" promiſes and engages herſelf, by this ſeparate ar-
" ticle, that in the convention which the ſaid Lords
" the States General are to make with his Majeſty
" K. Charles III. ſhe will aſſiſt them, as that it
" may be agreed, that by the ceſſion to the ſaid
" Lords the States-General of the property of an
" extent of land neceſſary to obviate ſuch like, and
" other inconveniencies, their limits in Flanders
" ſhall be enlarged more conveniently for their ſe-
" curity; and thoſe of the Spaniſh Flanders remo-
" ved farther from their towns, places, and forts,
" to the end that theſe may not be expoſed any
" more. In teſtimony whereof, the underwritten
" ambaſſador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of

" her Britiſh Majeſty, and deputies of the Lords " the States-General, have ſigned the preſent ſe- " parate article, and have affixed their ſeals there- " unto."

At the Hague, the 29th of October 1709.

(L. S.) Townſhend.
(L. S.) J. B. Van Reede.
(L. S.) A. Heinſius.
(L. S.) G. Hoeuft.
(L. S.) H. Smiſia.
(L. S.) E. V. Itterſum.

The articles of the Counter-project, which were ſtruck out or altered by the Dutch in the barrier-treaty, with ſome remarks.

ARTICLE VI.

TO this end their High Mightineſſes ſhall have power to put and keep garriſons in the following places, *viz.* Newport, Knocke, Menin, the citadel of Liſle, Tournay, Conde, Valenciennes, Namur and its citadel, Lier, Halle to fortify, the fort of Perle, Damme, and the caſtle of Gand.

REMARKS.

In the barrier-treaty the States added the following places to thoſe mentioned in this article, *viz.* Furnes, Ypres, towns of Liſle, Maubeuge, Charleroy, Philipps, fort of St. Donas (which is to be in property to the States), and the fort of Rodenhuyſen

huyſen to be demoliſhed. To ſay nothing of the other places, Dendermond is the key of all Brabant; and the demoliſhing of the fort of Rodenhuyſen, ſituate between Gand and Sas Van Gand, can only ſerve to defraud the King of Spain of the duties upon goods imported and exported there.

ARTICLE VII.

The ſaid States may put into the ſaid towns, forts, and places, and in caſe of open war with France, into all the other towns, places, and forts, whatever troops the reaſon of war ſhall require.

REMARKS.

But in the barrier-treaty it is ſaid, *in caſe of an apparent attack, or war*, without ſpecifying againſt France: neither is the number of troops limited to what the reaſon of war ſhall require, but what the States ſhall think neceſſary.

ARTICLE IX.

Beſides ſome ſmaller differences, ends with a ſalvo, not only for the eccleſiaſtical and civil rights of the King of Spain, but likewiſe for his revenues in the ſaid towns; which revenues in the barrier-treaty are all given to the States.

ARTICLE XI.

The revenues of the chatellanies and dependencies of the towns and places, which the States ſhall have for their barrier againſt France, and which were not in the poſſeſſion of the crown of Spain at the late King of Spain's death, ſhall be ſettled

to be a fund for maintaining garrisons, and providing for the fortifications and magazines, and other necessary charges of the said towns of the barrier.

REMARKS.

I desire the reader to compare this with the eleventh article of the barrier-treaty, where he will see how prodigiously it is enlarged.

ARTICLE XIV.

All this to be without prejudice to such other treaties and conventions as the Queen of Great Britain and their High Mightinesses may think fit to make for the future with the said K. Charles III. relating to the said Spanish Netherlands, or to the said barrier.

ARTICLE XV.

And to the end that the said States may enjoy at present, as much as it is possible, a barrier in the Spanish Netherlands, they shall be permitted to put their garrisons in the chief towns already taken, or that may be taken, before a peace be made.

REMARKS.

These two articles are not in the barrier-treaty, but two others in their stead; to which I refer the reader. And indeed it was highly necessary for the Dutch to strike out the former of these articles, when so great a part of the treaty is so highly and manifesty prejudicial to Great Britain, as well as to the King of Spain; especially in the two articles inserted in the place of these, which I desire the reader will examine.

ARTI-

ARTICLE XX.

And whereas by the fifth and ninth articles of the alliance between the Emperor and the late King of Great Britain, and the States-General, concluded the 7th of September 1701, it is agreed and ſtipulated, that the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, with all the dependencies of the crown of Spain in Italy, ſhall be recovered from the poſſeſſion of France, as being of the laſt conſequence to the trade of both nations, as well as the Spaniſh Netherlands for a barrier for the States-General; therefore the ſaid Queen of Great Britain, and the States-General agree and oblige themſelves not to enter into any negotiation or treaty of peace with France, before the reſtitution of the ſaid kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, with all the dependencies of the crown of Spain in Italy as well as the Spaniſh Low Countries, with the other towns and places in the poſſeſſion of France above mentioned in this treaty; and alſo after the manner ſpecified in this treaty; as likewiſe all the reſt of the entire monarchy of Spain be yielded by France as a preliminary.

ARTICLE XXII.

And whereas experience hath ſhewn of what importance it is to Great Britain and the United Provinces, that the fortreſs and port of Dunkirk ſhould not be in the poſſeſſion of France in the condition they are at preſent; the ſubjects of both nations having undergone ſuch great loſſes, and ſuffered ſo much in their trade by the prizes taken from them by privateers ſet out from that port; inſomuch that France, by her unmeaſurable ambition, may be always tempted to make ſome enterpriſes upon the territories of the Queen of Great

Britain and their High Mightineſſes, and interrupt the public repoſe and tranquility; for the preſervation of which, and the balance of Europe againſt the exorbitant power of France, the allies engaged themſelves in this long and burthenſome war; therefore the ſaid Queen of Great Britain, and their High Mightineſſes agree, and oblige themſelves not to enter into any negotiation or treaty of peace with France, before it ſhall be yielded and ſtipulated by France as a preliminary, that all the fortifications of the ſaid town of Dunkirk, and the forts that depend upon it, be entirely demoliſhed and razed, and that the port be entirely ruined and rendered impracticable.

REMARKS.

Theſe two articles are likewiſe omitted in the barrier-treaty: whereof the firſt regards particularly the intereſts of the houſe of Auſtria; and the other about demoliſhing Dunkirk thoſe of Great Britain. It is ſomething ſtrange, that the late miniſtry, whoſe advocates raiſe ſuch a clamour about the neceſſity of recovering Spain from the houſe of Bourbon, ſhould ſuffer the Dutch to ſtrike out this article, which I think clearly ſhews the reaſon why the States never troubled themſelves with the thoughts of reducing Spain, or even recovering Milan, Naples, and Sicily, to the Emperor; but were wholly fixed upon the conqueſt of Flanders, becauſe they had determined thoſe provinces as a property for themſelves.

As for the article about demoliſhing of Dunkirk, I am not at all ſurpriſed to find it ſtruck out; the deſtruction of that place, although it would be uſeful to the States, doth more nearly import Britain, and was therefore a point that ſuch miniſters could more eaſily get over.

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The ſentiments of Prince EUGENE of Savoy, and of the Count DE SINZENDORF, relating to the barrier of the States General, to the upper quarter of Guelder, and to the towns of the electorate of Cologn, and of the biſhopric of Liege.

ALthough the orders and inſtructions of the court of Vienna and Barcelona upon the matters above mentioned do not go ſo far as to give directions for what follows; notwithſtanding, the Prince and Count above mentioned, conſidering the preſent ſtate of affairs, are of the following opinion.

Firſt, that the counter-project of England, relating to the places where the States-General may put and keep garriſons, ought to be followed, except Lier, Halle to fortify, and the caſtle of Gand. Provided likewiſe, that the ſentiments of England be particularly conformed to relating to Dendermond and Oſtend, as places in no wiſe belonging to the barrier; and which, as well as the caſtle of Gand, can only ſerve to make the States-General maſters of the Low Countries, and hinder trade with England. And as to Lier and Halle, thoſe who are acquainted with the country know that theſe towns cannot give any ſecurity to the States-General; but can only make people believe, that theſe places being fortified would rather ſerve to block up Bruſſels and the other great cities of Brabant.

Secondly, As to what is ſaid in the ſeventh article of the counter-project of England, relating to the augmentation of garriſons in the towns of the barrier in caſe of an open war; this is agreeable to the opinions of the ſaid Prince and Count; who think likewiſe, that there ought to be added to the

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eighth article, that no goods or merchandiſe ſhould be ſent into the towns where the States-General ſhall have garriſons, nor be comprehended under the names of ſuch things as the ſaid garriſons and fortifications ſhall have need of. And that to this end the ſaid things ſhall be inſpected in thoſe places where they are to paſs; as likewiſe the quantity ſhall be ſettled that the garriſons may want.

Thirdly, As to the ninth article relating to the governors and commanders of thoſe towns, forts, and places where the States-General ſhall have their garriſons; the ſaid Prince and Count are of opinion, that the ſaid governors and commanders ought to take an oath as well to the King of Spain as to the States-General: but they may take a particular oath to the latter, that they will not admit foreign troops without their conſent; and that they will depend excluſively upon the ſaid States in whatever regards the military power. But at the ſame time they ought excluſively to promiſe the King of Spain, that they will not intermeddle in the affairs of law, civil power, revenues, or any other matters, eccleſiaſtical or civil, unleſs at the deſire of the King's officers, to aſſiſt them in the execution; in which caſe the ſaid commanders ſhould be obliged not to refuſe them.

Fourthly, As to the tenth article there is nothing to be added, unleſs that the States-General may repair and increaſe the fortifications of the towns, places, and forts where they ſhall have their garriſons; but this at their own expence. Otherwiſe, under that pretext they might ſeize all the revenues of the country.

Fifthly, As to the eleventh article, they think the States ought not to have the revenues of the chatellanies and dependencies of theſe towns and places, which are to be their barrier againſt France; this being a ſort of ſovereignty, and very prejudicial to the eccleſiaſtical and civil œconomy of the country.

country. But the ſaid Prince and Count are of opinion, that the States-General ought to have, for the maintenance of their garriſons and fortifications, a ſum of money of a milion and a half, or two millions of florins, which they ought to receive from the King's officers, who ſhall be ordered to pay that ſum before any other payment.

Sixthly, And the convention which ſhall be made on this affair between his Catholic Majeſty and the States-General, ſhall be for a limited time.

Theſe are the utmoſt conditions to which the ſaid Prince and Count think it poſſible for his Catholic Majeſty to be brought; and they declare at the ſame time, that their Imperial and Catholic Majeſties will ſooner abandon the Low Countries, than take them, upon other conditions, which would be equally expenſive, ſhameful, and unacceptable to them.

On the other ſide, the ſaid Prince and Count are perſuaded, that the advantages at this time yielded to the States-General may hereafter be very prejudicial to themſelves: foraſmuch as they may put the people of the Spaniſh-Netherlands to ſome dangerous extremity, conſidering the antipathy between the two nations; and that extending of frontiers is entirely contrary to the maxims of their government.

As to the upper quarter of Guelder, the ſaid Prince and Count are of opinion, that the States-General may be allowed the power of putting in garriſons into Venlo, Ruremond, and Steffenſwaert, with orders to furniſh the ſaid States with the revenues of the country, which amount to one hundred thouſand florins.

As to Bonne, belonging to the electorate of Cologn, Liege, and Huy, to the biſhopric of Liege, it is to be underſtood, that theſe being *Imperial* towns, it doth not depend upon the Emperor to conſent that foreign garriſons ſhould be placed in them.

them upon any pretence whatſoever. But whereas the States-General demand them only for their ſecurity, it is propoſed to place in thoſe towns a garriſon of *Imperial* troops, of whom the States may be in no ſuſpicion, as they might be of a garriſon of an elector, who might poſſibly have views oppoſite to their intereſts. But this is propoſed only in caſe that it ſhall not be thought more proper to raze one or other of the ſaid towns.

The Repreſentation of the Engliſh merchants at Bruges, relating to the Barrier-treaty.

DAVID WHITE, *and other merchants, her Majeſty's ſubjects reſiding at Bruges, and other towns in Flanders, crave humbly to repreſent,*

THAT whereas the cities of Liſle, Tournay, Menin, Douay, and other new conqueſts in Flanders and Artois, taken from the French this war by the united forces of her Majeſty and her allies, are now become entirely under the government of the States-General; and that we her Majeſty's ſubjects may be made liable to ſuch duties and impoſitions on trade as the ſaid States-General ſhall think fit to impoſe on us: we humbly hope and conceive, that it is her Majeſty's intention and deſign, that the trade of her dominions and ſubjects, which is carried on with theſe new conqueſts, may be on an equal foot with that of the ſubjects and dominions of the States-General, and not be liable to any new duty, when tranſported from the Spaniſh Netherlands to the ſaid new conqueſts, as to our great ſurpriſe is exacted from us on the following goods, *viz.* butter, tallow, ſalmon, hides, beef, and all other product of her Majeſty's dominions, which we import at Oſtend, and there pay the

the duty of entry to the King of Spain, and conſequently ought not to be liable to any new duty, when they carry the ſame goods, and all others, from their dominions by a free paſs or *tranſport* to the ſaid new conqueſts: and we are under apprehenſion, that if the ſaid new conqueſts be ſettled, or given entirely into the poſſeſſion of the States-General for their barrier, (as we are made believe by a treaty lately made by her Majeſty's ambaſſador, the Lord Viſcount Townſhend, at the Hague), that the States-General may alſo ſoon declare all goods and merchandiſes, which are contraband in their provinces, to be alſo contraband and prohibited in theſe new conqueſts, or new barrier; by which her Majeſty's ſubjects will be deprived of the ſale and conſumption of the following products of her Majeſty's dominions, which are and have long been declared contraband in the United Provinces, ſuch as Engliſh and Scots ſalt, malt ſpirits, or corn brandy, and all other ſorts of diſtilled Engliſh ſpirits, whale and rape oil, *&c.*

It is therefore humbly conceived, that her Majeſty, out of her great care and gracious concern for the benefit of her ſubjects and dominions, may be pleaſed to direct, by a treaty of commerce, or ſome other way, that their trade may be put on an equal foot in all the Spaniſh Netherlands, and the new conqueſts of barrier with the ſubjects of Holland, by paying no other duty than that of importation to the King of Spain; and by a proviſion, that no product of her Majeſty's dominions ſhall ever be declared contraband in theſe new conqueſts, except ſuch goods as were eſteemed contraband before the death of Charles II. King of Spain. And it is alſo humbly prayed, that the product and manufacture of the new conqueſts may be alſo exported without paying any new duty, beſides that of exportation at Oſtend, which was always paid to the King of Spain; it being impoſſible for any nation

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in Europe to assort an entire cargo for the Spanish West Indies without a considerable quantity of several of the manufactures of Lisle; such as caradoras, cajant, picoses, boratten, and many other goods.

The chief things to be demanded of France are, to be exempted from tonage, to have a liberty of importing herrings and all other fish to France on the same terms as the Dutch do, and as was agreed by them at the treaty of commerce immediately after the treaty of peace at Ryswick. The enlarging her Majesty's plantations in America, &c. is naturally recommended.

THE

THE

EXAMINER*.

N° 13. Thurſday, November 2, 1710.

——Longa eſt injuria, longæ
Ambagas; ſed ſumma ſequar faſtigia rerum.

IT is a practice I have generally followed, to converſe in equal freedom with the deſerving men of both parties; and it was never without ſome contempt, that I have obſerved perſons wholly out of employment affect to do otherwiſe. I doubted, whether any man could owe ſo much to the ſide he was

* In Auguſt 1710, a weekly paper, called, *The* EXAMINER, began to be publiſhed. It was eſteemed to be the work of ſeveral eminent hands; among which were reckoned Lord Bolingbroke, Dr. Atterbury Biſhop of Rocheſter, Mr. Prior, and ſome others. However it came about, the general opinion is, that thoſe perſons proceeded no further than to the firſt twelve papers: after which it ſeems to be agreed, that the undertaking was carried on by Dr. Swift, who began with number 13, and ended at number 50. For although the paper continued many months after to be publiſhed, under the title of *The* EXAMINER; yet, by the inequality of the performance, it was manifeſt to all judicious perſons, that Dr. Swift had not the leaſt ſhare in them. *Dublin edition.*

As N° 13. was the firſt of theſe papers written by Dr. Swift, N° 44. was the laſt. Six more have been printed in the Iriſh edition: which is a proof, among many others, that he was not the editor. In a letter of his to Stella, dated June 7. 1711, the day on which

was of, although he were retained by it; but without some great point of interest, either in possession or prospect, I thought it was the mark of a low and narrow spirit.

It is hard, that for some weeks past I have been forced in my own defence to follow a proceeding that I have so much condemned in others. But several of my acquaintance among the declining party are grown so insufferably peevish and splenetic, profess such violent apprehensions for the public, and represent the state of things in such formidable ideas, that I find myself disposed to share in their afflictions; although I know them to be groundless

the Examiner, N° 44. was published, there is the following paragraph. "As for the Examiner, I have heard a whisper, that after "that of this day, which tells what this parliament has done, you "will hardly find them so good: I prophesy they will be trash for the "future; and methinks, in this day's Examiner, the author talks "doubtfully, as if he would write no more; so that if they go on, "they may probably be by some other hand: which, in my opinion, "is a thousand pities; but who can help it? Observe whether the "change be discovered in Dublin; only for your own curiosity, that's "all." In a subsequent letter, dated August 24. he says, "The "Examiner has been down this month, and was very silly the five "or six last papers."

The Examiner was a weekly paper in defence of the Tory ministry. This paper, as it was carried on by some very eminent hands, having obtained a vogue, Swift took up the character of the Examiner, and commenced a regular series of politics with N° 13. Nov. 2. 1710; and having completed the main design which first engaged him in the undertaking, with N° 44. June 7, 1711, and taken his leave of the town, as appears from the two last paragraphs of that number, he dropt the character of the Examiner, and never more writ another paper. There was a paper indeed still supported under the title of the Examiner; but it sunk immediately into rudeness and ill manners: and, what is still more, I can take upon me to assert from undeniable authority, even from the authority of Dr. Swift himself, that in fact the scurrility in those papers was encouraged by the ministry. In short, the subsequent Examiners were written by some under spur-leathers in the city, and were designed merely as proper returns to those Grubstreet invectives which were thrown out against the administration by the authors of the Medley, the Englishman, and some other abusive detracting papers of the like stamp. *Swift.*

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and imaginary, or, which is worſe, purely affected. To offer them comfort one by one, would be not only an endleſs, but a diſobliging taſk. Some of them, I am convinced, would be leſs melancholy if there were more occaſion. I ſhall therefore, inſtead of hearkening to farther complaints, employ ſome part of this paper for the future in letting ſuch men ſee, that their natural or acquired fears are ill grounded, and their artificial ones as ill intended; that all our preſent inconveniencies are the conſequence of the very counſels they ſo much admire, which would ſtill have increaſed if thoſe had continued; and that neither our conſtitution in church or ſtate could probably have been long preſerved without ſuch methods, as have been already taken.

THE late revolutions at court have given room to ſome ſpecious objections, which I have heard repeated by well-meaning men, juſt as they had taken them up on the credit of others, who have worſe deſigns. They wonder the Queen would chuſe to change her miniſtry at this juncture, and thereby give uneaſineſs to a general, who hath been ſo long ſucceſsful abroad, and might think himſelf injured, if the entire miniſtry were not of his own nomination; that there were few complaints of any conſequence againſt the late men in power, and none at all in parliament, which on the contrary paſſed votes in favour of the chief miniſter; that, if her Majeſty had a mind to introduce the other party, it would have been more ſeaſonable after a peace, which now we have made deſperate by ſpiriting the French, who rejoice at theſe changes, and by the fall of our credit, which unqualifies us for carrying on the war; that the parliament, ſo untimely diſſolved, had been diligent in their ſupplies, and dutiful in their behaviour; that one conſequence of theſe changes appears already in the

fall of the ſtocks; that we may ſoon expect more and worſe; and, laſtly, that all this naturally tends to break the ſettlement of the crown, and call over the pretender.

Theſe, and the like notions, are plentifully ſcattered abroad by the malice of a ruined party, to render the Queen and her adminiſtration odious, and to inflame the nation. And theſe are what, upon occaſion, I ſhall endeavour to overthrow by diſcovering the falſehood and abſurdity of them.

It is a great unhappineſs, when in a government conſtituted like ours it ſhould be ſo brought about, that the continuance of a war muſt be for the intereſt of vaſt numbers (civil as well as military) who otherwiſe would have been as unknown as their original. I think our preſent condition of affairs is admirably deſcribed by two verſes in Lucan:

Hinc uſura vorax, avidumque in tempore fœnus,
Hinc concuſſa fides, et multis utile bellum.

Which, without any great force upon the words, may be thus tranſlated:

" Hence are derived thoſe exorbitant intereſts " and annuities; hence thoſe large diſcounts for " advance and prompt payment; hence public cre- " dit is ſhaken; and hence great numbers find " their profit in prolonging the war."

It is odd, that among a free trading people, as we call ourſelves, there ſhould ſo many be found to cloſe in with thoſe counſels, who have been ever averſe from all overtures towards a peace: but yet there is no great myſtery in the matter. Let any man obſerve the equipages in this town, he ſhall find the greater number of thoſe who make a figure, to be a ſpecious of men quite different from any that were known before the revolution, conſiſting either of generals or colonels, or of thoſe whoſe whole fortunes lie in funds and ſtocks; ſo that

that *power*, which, according to the old maxim, was uſed to follow *land*, is now gone over to *money*; and the country-gentleman is in the condition of a young heir, out of whoſe eſtate a ſcrivener receives half the rents for intereſt, and hath a mortgage on the whole; and is therefore always ready to feed his vices and extravagancies, while there is any thing left So that if the war continue ſome years longer, a landed man will be little better than a farmer of a rack-rent to the army and to the public funds.

It may perhaps be worth inquiring, from what beginnings and by what ſteps we have been brought into this deſperate condition: and in ſearch of this we muſt run up as high as the revolution.

Moſt of the nobility and gentry, who invited over the Prince of Orange, or attended him in his expedition, were true lovers of their country, and its conſtitution in church and ſtate; and were brought to yield to thoſe breaches in the ſucceſſion of the crown, out of a regard to the neceſſity of the kingdom and the ſafety of the people, which did, and could only make them lawful; but without intention of drawing ſuch a practice into precedent, or making it a ſtanding meaſure by which to proceed in all times to come; and therefore we find their counſels ever tended to keep things, as much as poſſible, in the old courſe. But ſoon after, and under a ſet of men who had nothing to loſe, and had neither borne the burthen nor heat of the day, found means to whiſper in the King's ear, that the principles of loyalty in the church of England were wholly inconſiſtent with the *revolution*. Hence began the early practice of careſſing the diſſenters, reviling the univerſities, as maintainers of arbitrary power, and reproaching the clergy with the doctrines of *divine right*, *paſſive-obedience*, and *non-reſiſtance*. At the ſame time, in order to faſten wealthy people to the new government, they

propoſed thoſe pernicious expedients of borrowing money by vaſt *premiums*, and at exorbitant intereſt: a practice as old as Eumenes, one of Alexander's captains, who ſetting up for himſelf after the death of his maſter, perſuaded his principal officers to lend him great ſums, after which they were forced to follow him for their own ſecurity.

This introduced a number of new dextrous men into buſineſs and credit. It was argued, that the war could not laſt above two or three campaigns; and that it was eaſier for the ſubjects to raiſe a fund for paying intereſt, than to tax them annually to the full expenſe of the war. Several perſons, who had ſmall or incumbered eſtates, ſold them, and turned their money into thoſe funds, to great advantage: merchants, as well as other moneyed men, finding trade was dangerous, purſued the ſame method. But the war continuing, and growing more expenſive, taxes were increaſed, and funds multiplied every year, till they have arrived at the monſtrous height we now behold them; and that which was at firſt a corruption, is at laſt grown neceſſary, and what every good ſubject muſt now fall in with, although he may be allowed to wiſh it might ſoon have an end; becauſe it is with a kingdom as with a private fortune, where every new incumbrance adds a double weight. By this means the wealth of a nation, that uſed to be reckoned by the value of land, is now computed by the riſe and fall of ſtocks: and although the foundation of credit be ſtill the ſame, and upon a bottom that can never be ſhaken, and although all intereſt be duly paid by the public; yet, through the contrivance and cunning of *ſtockjobbers*, there hath been brought in ſuch a complication of knavery and cozenage, ſuch a myſtery of iniquity, and ſuch an unintelligible jargon of terms to involve it in, as were never known in any other age or country in the world. I have heard it affirmed, by perſons ſkilled in theſe

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calculations, that if the funds appropriated to the payment of intereſt and annuities were added to the yearly taxes, and the four ſhilling aid ſtrictly exacted in all counties of the kingdom, it would very near, if not fully, ſupply the occaſions of the war; at leaſt ſuch a part as, in the opinion of very able perſons, had been at that time prudent not to exceed. For I make it a queſtion, Whether any wiſe prince or ſtate in the continuance of a war, which was not purely defenſive, or immediately at his own door, did ever propoſe that his expenſe ſhould perpetually exceed what he was able to impoſe annually upon his ſubjects? Neither if the war laſt many years longer, do I ſee how the next generation will be able to begin another; which, in the courſe of human affairs, and according to the various intereſts and ambition of princes, may be as neceſſary for them, as it hath been for us. And if our fathers had left us as deeply involved, as we are likely to leave our children, I appeal to any man what ſort of figure we ſhould have been able to make theſe twenty years paſt. Beſides, neither our enemies nor allies are upon the ſame foot with us in this particular. France and Holland, our neareſt neighbours, and the fartheſt engaged, will much ſooner recover themſelves after a war: the firſt, by the abſolute power of the prince, who, being maſter of the lives and fortunes of his ſubjects, will quickly find expedients to pay his debts; and ſo will the other, by their prudent adminiſtration, the greatneſs of their trade, their wonderful parſimony, the willingneſs of their people to undergo all kind of taxes, and their juſtice in applying as well as collecting them. But above all, we are to conſider, that France aud Holland fight on the continent, either upon, or near their own territories, and the greateſt part of the money circulates among themſelves; whereas ours croſſes the ſea, either to Flanders, Spain, or Portugal, and every penny of it,

it, whether in ſpecie or returns, is ſo much loſt to the nation for ever.

Upon theſe conſiderations alone, it was the moſt prudent courſe imaginable in the Queen, to lay hold of the diſpoſition of the people for changing the parliament and miniſtry at this juncture, and extricating herſelf as ſoon as poſſible out of the pupillage of thoſe who found their accounts only in perpetuating the war. Neither have we the leaſt reaſon to doubt, but the enſuing parliament will aſſiſt her Majeſty with the utmoſt vigour, until her enemies again be brought to ſue for peace, and *again* offer ſuch terms as will make it both honourable and laſting; only with this difference, that the miniſtry perhaps will not *again* refuſe them.

Audiet pugnas vitio parentum
Rara juventus.

No. 14. Thurſday, November 9. 1710.

E quibus hi vacuas implent ſermonibus aures,
Hi narrata ferunt alio: menſuraque ficti
Creſcit, et auditis aliquid novus adjicit autor.
Illic credulitas, illic temerarius error,
Vanaque lætitia eſt, conſternatique timores,
Seditioque recens, dubioque autore ſuſurri.

I AM prevailed on, through the importunity of friends, to interrupt the ſcheme I had begun in my laſt paper, by an eſſay upon the art of *political lying*. We are told *the devil is the father of lies*, and *was a liar from the beginning*; ſo that, beyond contradiction, the invention is old: and, which is more, his firſt eſſay of it was purely *political*, employed

ployed in undermining the authority of his prince, and seducing the third part of the subjects from their obedience; for which he was driven down from heaven, where, as Milton expresseth it, he had been VICEROY of a great *western province*; and forced to exercise his talent in inferior regions among *other fallen spirits*, or *poor deluded men*, whom he still daily tempts to *his own sin*, and will ever do so, till he be *chained in the bottomless pit*.

But although the devil be the father of *lies*, he seems, like other great inventors, to have lost much of his reputation by the continual improvements that have been made upon him.

Who first reduced *lying* into an art, and adapted it to *politics*, is not so clear from history; although I have made some diligent inquiries. I shall therefore consider it only according to the modern system, as it hath been cultivated these twenty years past in the southern part of our own island.

The poets tell us, that after the giants were overthrow by the gods, the *Earth* in revenge produced her last offspring, which was *Fame*. And the fable is thus interpreted; that when tumults and seditions are quieted, rumours and false reports are plentifully spread through a nation. So that, by this account, *lying* is the last relief of a *routed, earth-born, rebellious party* in a state. But here the moderns have made great additions, applying this art to the gaining of power and preserving it, as well as revenging themselves after they have lost it; as the same instruments are made use of by animals to feed themselves when they are hungry, and to bite those that tread upon them.

But the same genealogy cannot always be admitted for *political lying*; I shall therefore desire to refine upon it, by adding some circumstances of its birth and parents. A *political lie* is sometimes born out of a discarded statesman's head, and thence delivered to be nursed and dandled by the *rabble*.

Sometimes

Sometimes it is produced a monſter, and *licked* into ſhape; at other times it comes into the world completely formed, and is ſpoiled in the *licking*. It is often born an infant in the regular way, and requires time to mature it; and often it ſees the light in its full growth, but dwindles away by degrees. Sometimes it is of noble birth; and ſometimes the ſpawn of a *ſtockjobber*. *Here* it ſcreams aloud at the opening of the womb; and *there* it is delivered with a *whiſper*. I know a *lie*, that now diſturbs half the kingdom with its noiſe, which although too proud and great at preſent to own its parents, I can remember its *whiſper-hood*. To conclude the nativity of this monſter; when it comes into the world without a *ſting*, it is ſtill-born; and whenever it loſes its *ſting*, it dies.

No wonder if an infant ſo miraculous in its birth ſhould be deſtined for great adventures; and accordingly we ſee it hath been the *guardian ſpirit* of a *prevailing party* for almoſt twenty years. It can conquer kingdoms without fighting, and ſometimes with the loſs of a battle. It gives and reſumes employments; can ſink a mountain to a molehill, and raiſe a molehill to a mountain; hath preſided for many years at committees of elections; can waſh a *blackamore* white; make a ſaint of an atheiſt, and a patriot of a profligate; can furniſh *foreign miniſters* with intelligence; and raiſe or let fall the credit of the nation. This goddeſs flies with a huge *looking-glaſs* in her hands to dazzle the croud and make them ſee, according as ſhe turns it, their ruin in their intereſt, and their intereſt in their ruin. In this glaſs you will behold your beſt friends clad in coats powdered with *fleurs de lis* and *triple crowns*; their girdles hung round with *chain*, and *beads*, and *wooden ſhoes*; and your worſt enemies adorned with the enſigns of *liberty*, *property*, *indulgence*, *moderation*, and a *cornucopia* in their hands. Her large wings, like thoſe of a flying fiſh, are of no uſe but when they

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are moiſt; ſhe therefore dips them in *mud*, and ſoaring aloft ſcatters it in the eyes of the multitude, flying with great ſwiftneſs; but at every turn is forced to ſtoop in *dirty ways* for new ſupplies.

I have been ſometimes thinking, if a man had the art of the *ſecond ſight* for ſeeing *lies*, as they have in Scotland for ſeeing ſpirts, how admirably he might entertain himſelf in this town, by obſerving the different ſhapes, ſizes, and colours of thoſe ſwarms of *lies*, which buz about the heads of *ſome people*, like flies about a horſe's ears in ſummer; or thoſe legions hovering every afternoon in Exchange Alley, enough to darken the air; or over a club of diſcontented grandees, and thence ſet down in cargoes to be ſcattered at elections.

There is one eſſential point wherein a *political liar* differs from others of the faculty; that he ought to have but a ſhort memory, which is neceſſary according to the various occaſions he meets with every hour of differing from himſelf, and ſwearing to both ſides of a contradiction, as he finds the perſons diſpoſed, with whom he hath to deal. In deſcribing the virtues and vices of mankind, it is convenient, upon every article, to have ſome eminent perſons in our eye, from whom we copy our deſcription. I have ſtrictly obſerved this rule; and my imagination this minute repreſents before me a certain *great man* *, famous for this talent, to the conſtant practice of which he owes his twenty years reputation of the moſt ſkilful head in England for the management of nice affairs. The ſuperiority of his genius conſiſts in nothing elſe, but an inexhauſtible fund of *political lies*, which he plentifully diſtributes every minute he ſpeaks, and by an unparalled generoſity forgets, and conſequently contradicts, the next half hour. He never yet conſidered, whether any propoſition were true

* The late Earl of Wharton.

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or falſe, but whether it were convenient for the preſent minute or company to affirm or deny it; ſo that if you think fit to refine upon him, by interpreting every thing he ſays, as we do dreams, by the contrary, you are ſtill to ſeek, and will find yourſelf equally deceived whether you believe or no. The only remedy is to ſuppoſe, that you have heard ſome inarticulate ſounds without any meaning at all; and beſides, that will take off the horror you might be apt to conceive at the oaths wherewith he perpetually tags both ends of every *propoſition*; although, at the ſame time, I think, he cannot with any juſtice be taxed with perjury, when he invokes God and Chriſt; becauſe he hath often fairly given public notice to the world, that he believes in neither.

Some people may think, that ſuch an accompliſhment as this can be of no great uſe to the owner, or his party, after it hath been often practiſed and is become notorious; but they are widely miſtaken. Few *lies* carry the inventor's mark, and the moſt proſtitute enemy to truth may ſpread a thouſand without being known for the author: Beſides, as the vileſt writer hath his readers, ſo the greateſt *liar* hath his believers; and it often happens, that if a *lie* be believed only for an hour, it hath done its work, and there is no farther occaſion for it. *Falſehood flies*, and *Truth* comes *limping* after it; ſo that when men come to be undeceived, it is too late; the jeſt is over, and the tale has had its effect: Like a man, who has thought of a good repartee, when the diſcourſe is changed, or the company parted; or like a phyſician, who hath found out an infallible medicine, after the patient is dead.

Conſidering that natural diſpoſition in many men to *lie*, and in multitudes to *believe*, I have been perplexed what to do with that maxim ſo frequent in every body's mouth, That *truth will at laſt prevail*.

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Here hath this iſland of ours, for the greateſt part of twenty years, lain under the influence of ſuch counſels and perſons, whoſe principle and intereſt it was to corrupt our manners, blind our underſtanding, drain our wealth, and in time deſtroy our conſtitution both in church and ſtate; and we at laſt were brought to the very brink of ruin; yet, by the means of perpetual repreſentations, have never been able to diſtinguiſh between our enemies and friends. We have ſeen a great part of the nation's money got into the hands of thoſe, who, by their birth, education, and merit, could pretend no higher than to wear out liveries; while others, who, by their credit, quality, and fortune, were only able to give reputation and ſucceſs to the revolution, were not only laid aſide as dangerous and uſeleſs, but loaded with the ſcandal of Jacobites, men of *arbitrary principles*, and *penſioners* to France; while truth, who is ſaid to *lie in a well*, ſeemed now to be buried there under a heap of ſtones. But I remember, it was an uſual complaint among the *Whigs*, that the bulk of the landed men was not in their intereſts, which ſome of the wiſeſt looked on as an ill omen; and we ſaw it was with the utmoſt difficulty, that they could preſerve a majority, while the court and miniſtry were on their ſide, till they had learned thoſe admirable expedients for deciding elections, and influencing diſtant boroughs by *powerful motives* from the city. But all this was mere force and conſtraint, however upheld by moſt dexerous artifice and mangement, until the people began to apprehend their *properties*, their *religion*, and the *monarchy* itſelf in danger; then we ſaw them greedily laying hold on the firſt occaſion to interpoſe. But of this mighty change in the diſpoſitions of the people I ſhall diſcourſe more at large in ſome following paper; wherein I ſhall endeavour to unde-

ceive or discover those deluded or deluding persons, who hope or pretend, it is only a short madness in the vulgar, from which they may soon recover; whereas, I believe, it will appear to be very different in its causes, its symptoms, and its consequences; and prove a great example to illustrate the maxim I lately mentioned, That *truth* (however, sometimes late) *will at last prevail.*

No 15. Thursday, November 16. 1710.

—— medioque ut limite curras,
Icare, ait, moneo: ne si demissior ibis,
Unda gravet pennas; si celsior, ignis aduret.

IT must be avowed, that, for some years past, there have been few things more wanted in England than such a paper, as this ought to be, and such as I will endeavour to make it, as long as it shall be found of any use, without entering into the violences of either party. Considering the many grievous misrepresentations of persons and things, it is highly requisite at this juncture, that the people throughout the kingdom should, if possible, be set right in their opinions by some impartial hand; which hath never been yet attempted; those who have hitherto undertaken it, being, upon every account, the least qualified of all humankind for such a work.

We live here under a limited monarchy, and under the doctrine and discipline of an excellent church. We are unhappily divided into two parties, both which pretend a mighty zeal for our religion and government, only they disagree about the means.

means. The evils we must fence against, are on one side fanaticism and infidelity in religion, and anarchy, under the name of a commonwealth, in government; on the other side, Popery, slavery, and the pretender from France. Now, to inform and direct us in our sentiments upon these weighty points, here are on one side two stupid illiterate scribblers, both of them *fanatics* by profession, I mean the *Review* and *Observator*; on the other side, we have an open *Non-juror* *, whose character and person, as well as learning and good sense, discovered upon other subjects, do indeed deserve respect and esteem; but his *Rehearsal*, and the rest of his political papers, are yet more pernicious than those of the former two. If the generality of the people know not how to *talk* or *think*, until they have read their *lesson* in the papers of the week, what a misfortune is it, that their duty should be conveyed to them through such *vehicles* as those? For, let some gentlemen think what they please, I cannot but suspect, that the two worthies I first mentioned have, in a degree, done mischief among us; the mock authoritative manner of the one, and the insipid mirth of the other, however insupportable to reasonable ears, being of a level with great numbers among the lowest part of mankind. Neither was the author of the *Rehearsal*, while he continued that paper, less infectious to many persons of better figure, who perhaps were as well qualified, and much less prejudiced, to judge for themselves.

It was this reason that moved me to take the matter out of those *rough*, as well as those *dirty* hands; to let the remote and uninstructed part of the nation see, that they have been misled on both sides by mad ridiculous extremes, at a wide distance on each side from the truth; while the right path

* The Rev. Mr. Charles Leslie.

is so broad and plain as to be easily kept, if they were once put into it.

Further, I had lately entered on a resolution to take very little notice of other papers, unless it were such, where the malice and falsehood had so great a mixture of wit and spirit, as would make them dangerous: which, in the present circle of scribblers, from twelve-pence to a halfpenny, I could easily foresee would not very frequently occur. But here again I am forced to dispense with my resolution, although it be only to tell my reader, what measures I am like to take on such occasions for the future. I was told that the paper called *The Observator* was twice filled last week with remarks upon a late *Examiner*. These I read with the first opportunity, and, to speak in the news-writers phrase, they give me *occasion for many speculations*. I observed with singular pleasure the nature of those *things* which the owners of them usually call *Answers*, and with what dexterity this matchless author had fallen into the whole art and cant of them. To transcribe here and there three or four detached lines of least weight in a discourse, and by a foolish comment mistake every syllable of the meaning, is what I have known many of a superior class to this formidable adversary, intitle, *An Answer*. This is what he hath exactly done in about thrice as many words as my whole discourse; which is so mighty an advantage over me, that I shall by no means engage in so unequal a combat; but, as far as I can judge of my own temper, entirely dismiss him for the future; heartily wishing he had a match exactly of his own size to meddle with, who should only have the odds of truth and honesty, which, as I take it, would be an effectual way to silence him for ever. Upon this occasion I cannot forbear a short story of a *fanatic farmer*, who lived in my neighbourhood, and was so great a disputant in religion, that the servants in all the families thereabouts reported,

reported, how he had confuted the biſhop and all his clergy. I had then a footman, who was fond of reading the Bible; and I borrowed a comment for him, which he ſtudied ſo cloſe, that in a month or two I thought him a match for the *farmer*. They diſputed at ſeveral houſes with a ring of ſervants and other people always about them; where Ned explained his texts ſo full and clear to the capacity of his audience, and ſhewed the inſignificancy of his adverſary's cant to the meaneſt underſtanding, that he got the whole country of his ſide, and the farmer was cured of his itch of diſputation for ever after.

The worſt of it is, that this ſort of outrageous party-writers I have ſpoken of above, are like a couple of make-bates, who inflame ſmall quarrels by a thouſand ſtories, and by keeping friends at a diſtance, hinder them from coming to a good underſtanding; as they certainly would, if they were ſuffered to meet and debate between themſelves. For, let any one examine a reaſonable honeſt man of either ſide upon thoſe opinions in religion and government, which both parties daily buffet each other about; he ſhall hardly find one material point in difference between them. I would be glad to aſk a queſtion about *two great men* of the late miniſtry, how they came to be *Whigs?* and by what figure of ſpeech half a dozen others, lately put into great employments, can be called *Tories?* I doubt whoever would ſuit the definition to the perſons, muſt make it directly contrary to what we underſtood it at the time of the revolution.

In order to remove theſe miſapprehenſions among us, I believe, it will be neceſſary, upon occaſion, to detect the malice and falſehood of ſome popular maxims, which thoſe idiots ſcatter from the preſs twice a-week, and draw an hundred abſurd conſequences from them.

For example: I have heard it often objected as

a great piece of insolence in the clergy and others to say or hint, that the *church was in danger*, when it was voted otherwise in parliament some years ago; and the Queen herself, in her last speech, did openly condemn all such insinuations. Notwithstanding which, I did then, and do still, believe the church hath, since that vote, been in very imminent danger; and I think I might then have said so without the least offence to her Majesty, or either of the two houses. The Queen's words, as near as I can remember, mentioned the church being in danger from *her administration*; and whoever says or thinks that, deserves, in my opinion, to be hanged for a traitor: but that the church and state may be both in danger under the best princes that ever reigned, and without the least guilt of theirs, is such a truth as a man must be a great stranger to history and common sense to doubt. The wisest prince on earth may be forced by the necessity of his affairs, and the present power of an unruly faction, or deceived by the craft of ill-designing men. One or two ministers, most in his confidence, may *at first* have good intentions, but grow corrupted by time, by avarice, by love, by ambition, and have fairer terms offered them to gratify their passions or interests from *one set of men* than another, until they are too far involved for a retreat; and so be forced to take *seven spirits more wicked than themselves*. This is a very possible case; and will not *the last state of such men be worse than the first?* that is to say, will not the public, which was safe at first, grow in danger by such proceedings as these? And shall a faithful subject, who foresees and trembles at the consequences, be called *disaffected*, because he delivers his opinion, although the prince declares, as he justly may, that the danger is not owing to his administration? Or shall the prince himself be blamed, when, in such a juncture, he puts his affairs into other hands *with the*

the universal applause of his people? As to the vote against those who should affirm the church was in danger, I think it likewise referred to danger from or under the Queen's administration, (for I neither have it by me, nor can suddenly have recourse to it); but if it were otherwise, I know not how it can refer to any dangers, but what were past, or at that time present; or how it could affect the future, unless the senators were all *inspired*, or at least that majority which voted it. Neither do I see it is any crime, farther than ill manners, to differ in opinion from a majority of either or both houses; and such ill manners, I must confess, I have been often guilty of for some years past, although I hope I never shall again.

Another topic of great use to these weekly inflamers is the young pretender in France, to whom their whole party is in a high measure indebted for all their greatness; and whenever it lies in their power, they may perhaps return their acknowledgements, as, out of their zeal for frequent *revolutions*, they were ready to do to his supposed father; which is a piece of *secret history*, that I hope will one day see the light; and I am sure it shall, if ever I am master of it, without regarding *whose ears may tingle*. But at present the word *pretender* is a term of art in *their* profession. A secretary of state cannot *desire leave to resign*, but the pretender is at bottom; the Queen cannot dissolve a parliament, but it is a plot to dethrone herself and bring in the pretender; half a score stockjobbers are playing the knave in Exchange-alley, and there goes the pretender with a *sponge*. One would be apt to think, they bawl out the pretender so often to take off the terror; or tell so many lies about him to slacken our caution; that when he is really coming, *by their connivance*, we may not believe them; as the boy served the shepherds about the *coming of the wolf*; or perhaps they scare us with the pretender,

tender, becauſe they think we may be like ſome diſeaſes, that *come with a fright*. Do they not believe that the Queen's preſent miniſtry love her Majeſty, at leaſt as well as *ſome others* loved the *church?* And why is it not as great a mark of *diſaffection* now, to ſay the *Queen is in danger*, as it was ſome months ago to affirm the ſame of the *church?* Suppoſe it be a falſe opinion, that the Queen's right is *hereditary and indefeaſible*; yet how is it poſſible, that thoſe who hold and believe ſuch a doctrine, can be in the pretenders intereſt? His title is weakened by every argument that ſtrengthens hers: it is as plain as the words of an act of parliament can make it, that her preſent Majeſty is heir to the ſurvivor of the late King and Queen her ſiſter: is not that an *hereditary right?* What need we explain it any further? I have known an *article of faith* expounded in much looſer and more general terms, and that by an author whoſe opinions are very much followed by a certain party *. Suppoſe we go further, and examine the word *indefeaſible*, with which ſome writers of late have made themſelves ſo merry: I confeſs, it is hard to conceive how any law which the ſupreme power makes, may not by the ſame power be repealed; ſo that I ſhall not determine, whether the Queen's right be *indefeaſible*, or no. But this I will maintain, that whoever affirms it ſo, is not guilty of a crime; for in that ſettlement of the crown after the reſolution, where her preſent Majeſty is in remainder, there are (as near as I can remember) theſe remarkable words, *to which we bind ourſelves and our poſterity for ever*. Lawyers may explain this, or call them words of form as they pleaſe; and reaſoners may argue, that ſuch an obligation is againſt the very nature of government; but a plain reader, who takes the words in their natural meaning, may be excuſed in think-

* Dr. Burnet, Biſhop of Sarum.

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ing a right ſo confirmed is *indefeaſible*; and if there be an abſurdity in ſuch an opinion, he is not to anſwer for it.

P. S. When this paper was going to the preſs, the printer brought me two more *Obſervators*, wholly taken up in my *Examiner* upon lying, which I was at the pains to read; and they are juſt ſuch an anſwer as the two others I have mentioned. This is all I have to ſay on that matter.

No 16. Thurſday, November 23. 1710.

Qui ſunt boni cives? qui belli, qui domi de patria bene merentes, niſi qui patriæ beneficia meminerunt?

I Will employ this preſent paper upon a ſubject, which of late hath very much affected me, which I have conſidered with a good deal of application, and made ſeveral inquiries about among thoſe perſons, who, I thought, were beſt able to inform me; and if I deliver my ſentiments with ſome freedom I hope it will be forgiven, while I accompany it with that tenderneſs which ſo nice a point requires.

I ſaid, in a former paper, [No. 13.], that one ſpecious objection to the late removals at court was the fear of giving uneaſineſs to a general who hath been long ſucceſsful abroad; and accordingly the common clamour of tongues and pens for ſome months paſt hath run againſt the baſeneſs, the inconſtancy, and ingratitude of the whole kingdom to the Duke of Marlborough, in return of the moſt

most eminent services that ever were performed by a subject to his country, not to be equalled in history: and then, to be sure, some bitter stroke of detraction against Alexander and Cæsar, who never did us the least injury. Besides, the people, who read Plutarch, come upon us with parallels drawn from the Greeks and Romans, who ungratefully dealt with I know not how many of their most deserving generals: while the profounder politicians have seen pamphlets, where Tacitus and Machiavel have been quoted to shew the danger of too resplendent a merit. If a stranger should hear these furious outcries of ingratitude against our general, without knowing the particulars, he would be apt to inquire, where was his tomb, or whether he were allowed Christian burial? not doubting but we had put him to some ignominious death. Or, hath he been tried for his life, and very narrowly escaped; hath he been accused of high crimes and misdemeanors; hath the prince seized on his estate, and left him to starve; hath he been hooted at, as he passed the streets, by an ungrateful rabble; have neither honours, offices, nor grants been conferred on him or his family; have not he and they been barbarously stript of them all; have not he and his forces been ill paid abroad; and doth not the prince, by a scanty limited commission, hinder him from pursuing his own methods in the conduct of the war; hath he no power at all of disposing of commissions as he pleaseth; is he not severely used by the ministry or parliament, who yearly call him to a strict account; hath the senate ever thanked him for good success, and have they not always publicly censured him for the least miscarriage? —— Will the accusers of the nation join issue upon any of these particulars, or tell us in what point our damnable sin of ingratitude lies? —— Why, it is plain and clear; for while he is commanding abroad, the Queen dissolves her parliament

parliament, and changes her miniſtry at home; in which *univerſal calamity* no leſs than *two perſons* allied by marriage to the general have loſt their places. Whence came this wonderful ſympathy between the civil and military powers? Will the troops in Flanders refuſe to fight, unleſs they can have *their own* Lord Keeper, *their own* Lord Preſident of the council, *their own* Chief Governor of Ireland, and *their own* parliament? In a kingdom where the people are free, how came they to be ſo fond of having their counſels under the influence of their army, or thoſe that lead it? who, in all well-inſtituted ſtates, had no commerce with the civil power, farther than to receive their orders, and obey them without reſerve.

When a general is not ſo popular, either in his army or at home, as one might expect from a long courſe of ſucceſs, it may perhaps be aſcribed to his *wiſdom*, or perhaps to his complexion. The poſſeſſion of ſome one *quality*, or a defect in *ſome other*, will extremely damp the people's favour, as well as the love of the ſoldiers. Beſides, this is not an age to produce favourites of the people, while we live under a Queen, who ingroſſeth all our love and all our veneration; and where the only way for a great general or miniſter to acquire any degree of ſubordinate affection from the public, muſt be by all marks of the moſt *entire ſubmiſſion and reſpect* to her ſacred perſon and commands; otherwiſe no pretence of great ſervices, either in the field or the cabinet, will be able to ſcreen them from univerſal hatred.

But the late miniſtry was cloſely joined to the general by friendſhip, intereſt, alliance, inclination, and opinion; which cannot be affirmed of the preſent: and the ingratitude of the nation lieth in the people's *joining as one man* to wiſh that ſuch a miniſtry ſhould be changed. Is it not at the ſame time notorious to the whole kingdom, that nothing but

a tender regard to the general was able to preſerve that miniſtry ſo long, until neither God nor man could ſuffer their continuance? Yet, in the higheſt ferment of things, we heard few or no reflections upon this great commander; but all ſeemed unanimous in wiſhing, he might ſtill be at the head of the confederate forces; only at the ſame time, in caſe he were reſolved to reſign, they choſe rather to turn their thoughts ſomewhere elſe than throw up all in deſpair. And this I cannot but add, in defence of the people with regard to the perſon we are ſpeaking of, that in the high ſtation he hath been for many years paſt, his *real defects* (as nothing human is without them) have in a detracting age been very ſparingly mentioned either in libels or converſation, and all his *ſucceſſes* very freely and univerſally applauded.

There is an active and a paſſive ingratitude. Applying both to this occaſion, we may ſay, the firſt is when a prince or people returns good ſervices with cruelty or ill uſage; the other is, when good ſervices are not at all, or very meanly rewarded. We have already ſpoken of the former; let us therefore, in the ſecond place, examine, how the ſervices of our general have been rewarded; and whether upon that article either prince or people have been guilty of ingratitude?

Thoſe are the moſt valuable rewards which are given to us from the certain knowledge of the donor, that they *fit our temper beſt*: I ſhall therefore ſay nothing of the title of *Duke*, or the *Garter*, which the Queen beſtowed upon the general in the beginning of her reign; but I ſhall come to *more ſubſtantial inſtances*, and mention nothing, which hath not been given in the face of the world. The lands of Woodſtock may, I believe, be reckoned worth 40,000 l.; on the building of Blenheim caſtle, 200,000 l. have been already expended, although

though it be not yet near finiſhed; the grant of 5000 l. *per annum* on the poſt-office is richly worth 100,000 l.; his principality in Germany may be computed at 30,000 l.; pictures, jewels, and other gifts from foreign princes, 60,000 l.; the grant at the Pall-mall, the rangerſhip, &c. for want of more certain knowledge, may be called 10,000 l.; his own and his Dutcheſs's employments at five years value, reckoning only the known and avowed ſalaries, are very low rated at 100,000 l. Here is a good deal above half a million of money; and, I dare ſay, thoſe who are loudeſt with the clamour of ingratitude, will readily own, that all this is but a trifle, in compariſon of what is *untold*.

The reaſon of my ſtating this account is only to convince the world, that we are not quite ſo ungrateful either as the Greeks or the Romans; and in order to adjuſt this matter with all fairneſs, I ſhall confine myſelf to the latter, who were much the more generous of the two. A victorious general of Rome, in the height of that empire, having *entirely ſubdued his enemies*, was rewarded with the larger triumph, and perhaps a ſtatue in the Forum, a bull for a ſacrifice, an embroidered garment to appear in, a crown of laurel, a monumental trophy with inſcriptions, ſometimes five hundred or a thouſand copper-coins were ſtruck on occaſion of the victory, which, doing honour to the general, we will place to his account; and laſtly, ſometimes, although not very frequently, a triumphal arch. Theſe are all the rewards that I can call to mind, which a victorious general received after his return from the moſt glorious expedition; having conquered ſome great kingdom, brought the king himſelf, his family, and nobles, to adorn the triumph in chains; and made the kingdom either a Roman province, or at beſt a poor depending ſtate in humble alliance to that em-

pire Now, of all these rewards I find but two, which were of real profit to the general, the *laurel crown*, made and sent him at the charge of the public, and the *embroidered garment*; but I cannot find, whether this last was paid for by the senate or the general; however, we will take the more favourable opinion; and in all the rest admit the whole expence, as if it were ready money in the general's pocket. Now, according to these computations on both sides, we will draw up two fair accounts; the one of Roman gratitude, and the other of British ingratitude, and set them together in balance.

A bill

A bill of Roman gratitude.

Imprim.	*L.*	*s.*	*d.*
For frank-incenſe and earthen pots to burn it in	4	10	0
A bull for ſacrifice	8	0	1
An embroidered garment	50	0	0
A crown of laurel	0	0	2
A ſtatue	100	0	0
A trophy	80	0	0
A thouſand copper medals, value halfpence a piece	2	1	8
A triumphal arch	500	0	0
A triumphal car, valued as a modern coach	100	0	0
Caſual charges at the triumph	150	0	0
	994	11	10

A bill of Britiſh ingratitude.

Imprim.	*L.*
Woodſtock	40,000
Blenheim	200,000
Poſt-office grant	100,000
Mildenheim	30,000
Pictures, jewels, &c.	60,000
Pall Mall grant, &c.	10,000
Employments,	100,000
	540,000

This is an account of the visible profits on both sides; and if the Roman general had any *private perquisites*, they may be easily discounted, and by more probable computations; and differ yet more upon the balance, if we consider, that all the gold and silver for *safeguards* and *contributions*, also all *valuable prizes* taken in the war, were openly exposed in the triumph, and then lodged in the capitol for the public service.

So that, upon the whole, we are not yet quite so bad at *worst*, as the Romans were at *best*. And I doubt, those who raise this hideous cry of ingratitude, may be mightily mistaken in the consequence they propose from such complaints. I remember a saying of Seneca, *Multos ingratos invenimus, plures facimus*; We *find* many ungrateful persons in the world, but we *make* more, by setting too high a rate upon our pretensions, and undervaluing the rewards we receive. When unreasonable bills are brought in, they ought to be taxed, or cut off in the middle. Where there have been long accounts between two persons, I have known one of them perpetually making large demands, and pressing for payments; who, when the accounts were cast up on both sides, was found to be debtor for some hundred. I am thinking, if a proclamation were issued out for every man to send in his *bill of merits*, and the lowest price he set them at, what a pretty sum it would amount to, and how many such islands as this must be sold to pay them. I form my judgement from the practice of those who sometimes happen to *pay themselves*, and, I dare affirm, would not be so unjust as to take a farthing more, than they think is due to their deserts. I will instance only in one article: A lady * of my acquaintance appropriated twenty-six pounds a-year out of her allowance for certain uses, which her

* Supposed to be her late Majesty, Q. Anne.

woman

woman received †, and was to pay to the lady or her order, as it was called for. But after eight years it appeared upon the ſtricteſt calculation, that the woman had paid but four pounds a year, and ſunk two and twenty for her own pocket. It is but ſuppoſing, inſtead of twenty-ſix pounds, twenty-ſix thouſand; and by that you may judge, what the pretenſions of *modern merit* are, where it happens to be its own paymaſter.

No 17. Thurſday, November 30. 1710.

Quas res luxuries in flagitiis, avaritia in rapinis, ſuperbia in contumeliis efficere potuiſſet; eas omnes ſeſe, hoc uno prætore per triennium, pertuliſſe aiebant.

WHen I firſt undertook this paper, I was reſolved to concern myſelf only with *things*, and not with *perſons*. Whether I have kept or broken

† The matter was this. At the Queen's acceſſion to the government, ſhe uſed to lament to me, that the crown being impoveriſhed by former grants, ſhe wanted the power her predeceſſors had enjoyed to reward faithful ſervants; and ſhe deſired me to take out of the privy purſe 2000 l. a year, in order to purchaſe for my advantage. As her Majeſty was ſo good to provide for my children, and as the offices I enjoyed by her favour brought me in more than I wanted, I conſtantly declined it, till the time ſhe was pleaſed to diſmiſs me from her ſervice. Then indeed, I ſent the queen one of her own letters, in which ſhe had preſſed me to take the 2000 l. a year; and I wrote at the ſame time to aſk her Majeſty, whether ſhe would allow me to charge in the privy-purſe accounts, which I was to ſend her, that yearly ſum *from the time of the offer*, amounting to 18,000 l. Her Majeſty was pleaſed to anſwer, I might charge it. This therefore I did. *Account of the conduct of the dowager Ducheſs of Marlborough*, p. 294. 295.

this reſolution, I cannot recollect; and I will not be at the pains to examine, but leave the matter to thoſe little antagoniſts, who may want a topic for criticiſm. Thus much I have diſcovered, that it is in writing as in building; where, after all our ſchemes and calculations, we are mightily deceived in our accounts, and often forced to make uſe of any materials we can find, that the work may be kept a-going. Beſides, to ſpeak my opinion, the *things* I have occaſion to mention are ſo cloſely linked to *perſons*, that nothing but *time* (the father of *oblivion*) can ſeparate them. Let me put a parallel caſe: ſuppoſe I ſhould complain, that laſt week my coach was within an inch of overturning in a ſmooth even way, and drawn by very gentle horſes; to be ſure all my friends would immediately lay the fault upon John, becauſe he knew he then *preſided* in my coach-box. Again, ſuppoſe I ſhould diſcover ſome uneaſineſs to find myſelf, I knew not how, over head and ears in debt, altho' I were ſure my tenants paid their rents very well, and that I never ſpent half my income; they would certainly adviſe me to turn off Mr. Oldfox * my *receiver*, and take another. If, as a juſtice of peace, I ſhould tell a friend, that my *warrants* and *mittimuſes* were never drawn up as I would have them; that I had the misfortune to ſend an honeſt man to gaol and diſmiſs a knave; he would bid me no longer truſt Charles and Harry †, my two clerks, whom he knew to be ignorant, wilful, aſſuming, and ill-inclined fellows If I ſhould add, that my tenants made me very uneaſy with their ſquabbles and broils among themſelves; he would counſel me to caſhier Will Bigamy ‡, the *ſeneſchal*

* Lord Godolphin

† Earl of Sunderland, and Henry Boyle, Eſq; were at this time Secretaries of ſtate.

‡ Lord Chancellor Cowper.

of

of my manor. And laſtly, if my neighbour and I happened to have a miſunderſtanding about the *delivery of a meſſage*, what could I do leſs than ſtrip and diſcard the *blundering* or *malicious* raſcal who carried it?

It is the ſame thing in the conduct of public affairs, where they have been managed with raſhneſs or wilfulneſs, corruption, ignorance, or injuſtice. Barely to relate the facts, at leaſt while they are freſh in memory, will as much reflect upon the *perſons* concerned, as if we had told their names at length.

I have therefore ſince thought of another expedient, frequently practiſed with great ſafety and ſucceſs by ſatirical writers; which is that of looking into hiſtory for ſome character bearing a reſemblance to the perſon we would deſcribe: and with the abſolute power of altering, adding, or ſuppreſſing what circumſtances we pleaſe, I conceive we muſt have very bad luck, or very little ſkill, to fail. However, ſome days ago in a coffeehouſe looking into one of the politic weekly papers, I found the writer had fallen into this ſcheme; and I happened to light on that part, where he was deſcribing a perſon, who from ſmall beginnings grew (as I remember) to be conſtable of France, and had a very *haughty imperious wife*. I took the author for a friend to our *faction* (for ſo, with great propriety of ſpeech, they call the Queen and miniſtry, almoſt the whole clergy, and nine parts in ten of the kingdom); and I ſaid to a gentleman near me, that although I knew well enough what perſons the author meant, yet there were ſeveral particulars in the *huſband's* character, which I could not reconcile; for that of the *Lady*, it was juſt and adequate enough. But it ſeems I miſtook the whole matter, and applied all I had read to a couple of perſons, who were not at that time in the writer's thoughts.

Now,

Now, to avoid such a misfortune as this, I have been for some time consulting Livy and Tacitus to find out the character of a *princeps senatus*, a *prætor urbanus*, a *quæstor ærarius*, a *Cæsari ab epistolis*, and a *proconsul*: But among the worst of them I cannot discover one, from whom to draw a parallel without doing injury to a Roman memory: So that I am compelled to have recourse to Tully. But this Author, relating facts only as an orator, I thought it would be best to observe his method, and make an extract from such harangues of his against Verres, only still preserving the form of an oration. I remember a younger brother of mine, who deceased about two months ago, presented the world with a speech of Alcibiades against an Athenian brewer. Now, I am told for certain, that in those days there was no ale in Athens; therefore that speech, or at least a great part of it, must needs be spurious. The difference between my brother and me is this; he makes Alcibiades say a great deal more than he really did, and I make Cicero say a great deal less. This Verres * had been the *Roman* governor of Sicily for three years; and, on his return from his government, the Sicilians intreated Cicero to impeach him in the senate; which he accordingly did in several orations, from whence I have faithfully translated and abstracted that which follows.

"My Lords,

"A pernicious opinion hath for some time prevailed, not only at Rome, but among our neighbouring nations, that a man who hath money enough, although he be ever so guilty, cannot be condemned in this place. But, however industriously this opinion be spread to cast an odium on the senate, we have brought before

* Earl of Wharton Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.

"your

" your Lordſhips Caius Verres, a perſon for his " life and actions already condemned by all men : " But, as he hopes, and gives out by the influence " of his wealth to be here abſolved ; in condemn- " ing this man you have an opportunity of bely- " ing that general ſcandal, of redeeming the *credit* " *loſt by former judgments*, and recovering the love " of the Roman people, as well as of our neigh- " bours. I have brought here a man before you, " my Lords, who is a robber of the public treaſure, " an overturner of law and juſtice, and the diſ- " grace as well as deſtruction of the Sicilian pro- " vince ; of whom, if you ſhall determine with " equity and due ſeverity, your authority will re- " main entire, and upon ſuch an eſtabliſhment as " it ought to be : But if his great riches will be " able to force their way through that religious re- " verence and truth, which become ſo awful an " aſſembly ; I ſhall however obtain thus much, " that the defect will be laid where it ought ; and " that it ſhall not be objected, that the criminal " was not produced, or that there wanted an " orator to accuſe him. This man, my Lords, " hath publicly ſaid, that thoſe ought not to be a- " fraid of accuſations, who have only robbed e- " nough for their own ſupport and maintenance ; " but that he hath plundered ſufficient to bribe " numbers ; and that nothing is ſo high or ſo " holy, which money cannot corrupt. Take that " ſupport from him, and he can have no other " left : for what eloquence will be able to defend " a man, whoſe life hath been tainted with ſo " many ſcandalous vices, and who hath been ſo " long condemned by the univerſal opinion of the " world ? To paſs over the foul ſtains and igno- " miny of his youth, his corrupt management in " all employments he hath borne, his treachery " and irreligion, his injuſtice and oppreſſion ; he " hath left of late ſuch monuments of his vil-

" lanies

" lanies in Sicily, made such havock and confusion " there, during his government, that the province " cannot by any means be restored to its former " state, and hardly recover itself at all under many " years, and by a long succession of good gover- " nors. While this man governed in that island, " the Sicilians had neither the benefit of our laws " nor their own, nor even of common right. In " Sicily no man now possesses more, than what the " governor's lust and avarice have overlooked, or " what he was forced to neglect out of mere " weariness and satiety of oppression. Every " thing, where he presided, was determined " by his arbitray will; and the best subjects he " treated as enemies. To recount his abominable " debaucheries would offend any modest ear, since " so many could not preserve their daughters and " wives from his lust. I believe there is no man, " who ever heard his name, that cannot relate his " enormities. We bring before you in judgment, " my Lords, a public robber, an adulterer, a " DEFILER OF ALTARS *, an enemy of religion " and of all that is sacred. In Sicily he sold all " employments of judicature, magistracy, and trust, " places in the council, and the *priesthood* itself, to " the highest bidder; and hath plundered that " island of forty millions of sesterces. And here " I cannot but observe to your Lordships, in what " manner Verres passed the day: the morning was " spent in taking bribes and selling employments; " the rest of it in drunkenness and lust. His dis- " course at table was scandalously unbecoming the " dignity of his station; noise, brutality, and ob- " sceneness. One particular I cannot omit; that, " in the high character of governor of Sicily, up-

* The story of the Lord Wharton is true, who, with some other wretches, went into a pulpit, and defiled it in the most filthy manner.

" on

" on a ſolemn day, a day ſet apart for public " prayer for the ſafety of the commonwealth, he " ſtole at evening in a chair to a married woman " of infamous character, againſt all decency and " prudence, as well as againſt all laws both human " and divine. Didſt thou think, O Verres! the " government of Sicily was given thee with ſo large " a commiſſion, only, by the power of that, to " break all the bars of law, modeſty, and duty; " to ſuppoſe all mens fortunes thine, and leave no " houſe free from thy rapine and luſt?" *&c*

This extract, to deal ingenuouſly, hath coſt me more pains, than I think it is worth; having only ſerved to convince me, that modern corruptions are not to be paralleled by antient examples, without having recourſe to poetry or fable. For inſtance I never read in ſtory of a law enacted to take away the force of all laws whatſoever; by which a man may ſafely commit, upon the laſt of June, what he would infallibly be hanged for if he committed on the firſt of July; by which the greateſt criminals may eſcape, provided they continue long enough in power to antiquate their crimes, and by ſtifling them a while can deceive the legiſlature into an *amneſty*, of which the enacters do not at that time foreſee the conſequence. A cautious merchant will be apt to ſuſpect, when he finds a man who has the repute of a cunning dealer, and with whom he hath old accounts, urging for a general releaſe. When I reflect on this proceeding, I am not ſurpriſed that thoſe who contrived a parliamentary *ſponge* for their *crimes*, are now afraid of a new revolution *ſponge* for their *money*; and if it were poſſible to contrive a *ſponge* that could only affect thoſe who had need of the other, perhaps it would not be ill employed.

No 18. Thursday, December 9. 1710.

Quippe ubi fas versum atque nefas; tot bella per orbem; Tam multæ scelerum facies———

I AM often violently tempted to let the world freely know, who the author of this paper is; to tell them my name and titles at length; which would prevent abundance of inconsistent criticisms I daily hear upon it. Those who are enemies to the notions and opinions I would advance, are sometimes apt to quarrel with the *Examiner* as defective in point of wit, and sometimes of truth. At other times they are so generous and candid to allow, it is written by a club, and that very great *hands* have *fingers* in it. As for those who only appear its adversaries in print, they give me but very little pain. The paper I hold, lies at my mercy, and I can govern it as I please; therefore, when I begin to find the wit too bright, the learning too deep, and the satire too keen for me to deal with, (a very frequent case, no doubt, where a man is constantly attacked by such shrewd adversaries), I peaceably fold it up, or fling it aside, and read no more. It would be happy for me to have the same power over people's tongues, and not be forced to hear my own work railed at, and commended, fifty times a day; affecting all the while a countenance wholly unconcerned, and joining out of policy or good manners with the judgment of both parties; this, I confess, is too great a hardship for so bashful and unexperienced a writer.

But, alas, I lie under another discouragement of much more weight. I was very unfortunate in the choice

choice of my party, when I ſet up to be a writer. Where is the merit, or what opportunity to diſcover our wit, our courage, or our learning, in drawing our pens for the defence of a cauſe, which the Queen and both houſes of parliament, and nine parts in ten of the kingdom, have ſo unanimouſly embraced? I am cruelly afraid, we politic authors muſt begin to leſſen our expenſes, and be for the future at the mercy of our printers. All hopes are now gone of writing ourſelves into places or penſions. A certain ſtarving author, who *worked* under the late adminiſtration, told me with a heavy heart above a month ago, that he, and ſome others of his brethren, had ſecretly offered their ſervice dog-cheap, to the preſent miniſtry, but were all refuſed: and are now maintained by contribution, like *Jacobites* or *fanatics*. I have been of late employed out of perfect commiſeration, in doing them good offices: For, whereas ſome were of opinion, that thoſe hungry zealots ſhould not be ſuffered any longer in their malapert way to ſnarl at the preſent courſe of public proceedings; and whereas others propoſed, that they ſhould be limited to a certain number, and permitted to write for their *maſters*, in the ſame manner as counſel are aſſigned for other criminal, that is, to ſay all they can in defence of their client, but not reflect upon the court: I humbly gave my advice, that they ſhould be ſuffered to write on, as they uſed to do; which I did purely out of regard to their perſons; for I hoped it would keep them out of harm's way, and prevent them from falling into evil courſes; which, although of little conſequence, to the public, would certainly be *fatal to themſelves*. If I have room at the bottom of this paper, I will tranſcribe a petition to the preſent miniſtry, ſent me by one of theſe authors in behalf of himſelf and fourſcore of his brethren.

For my own part, notwithſtanding the little encouragement to be hoped for at this time from the men in power, I ſhall continue my paper, till either the world or myſelf grow weary of it; the latter is eaſily determined; and for the former, I ſhall not leave it to the partiality of either party, but to the infallible judgment of my printer. One principal end I deſigned by it, was to undeceive thoſe well-meaning people, who have been drawn unawares into a wrong ſenſe of things, either by the common prejudices of education in company, the great perſonal qualities of ſome party-leaders, or the foul miſrepreſentations that were conſtantly made of all who durſt differ from them in the ſmalleſt article. I have known ſuch men ſtruck with the thoughts of ſome late changes, which, as they pretend to think, were made without any reaſon viſible to the world. In anſwer to this, it is not ſufficient to alledge, what no bobody doubts, that a good and wiſe prince may be allowed to change his miniſters without giving a reaſon to his ſubjects; becauſe it is probable, that he will not make ſuch a change without very important reaſons; and a good ſubject ought to ſuppoſe, that in ſuch a caſe there are ſuch reaſons, although he be not appriſed of them; otherwiſe he muſt inwardly tax his prince of capriciouſneſs, inconſtancy, or ill deſign. Such reaſons indeed may not be obvious to perſons prejudiced, or at a great diſtance, or ſhort thinkers; and therefore, if they be no ſecrets of ſtate, nor any ill conſequences to be apprehended from their publication, it is no uncommendable work in any private hand to lay them open for the ſatisfaction of all men. And, if what I have already ſaid, or ſhall hereafter ſay, of this kind, be thought to reflect upon *perſons*, although none have been named, I know not how it can poſſibly be avoided. The Queen in her ſpeech mentions *with great concern*, that " the " navy

" navy and other offices are burthened with heavy " debts ; and desires, that the like may be pre " vented for the time to come." And, if it be *now* possible to prevent the continuance of an evil, that hath been so long growing upon us, and is arrived to such a height ; surely those corruptions and mismanagements must have been great, which first introduced them, before our taxes were eaten up by annuities.

If I were able to rip up and discover, in all their colours, only about eight or nine thousand of the most scandalous abuses that have been committed in all parts of public management for twenty years past by a certain set of men and their instruments, I should reckon it some service to my country and posterity. But to say the truth, I should be glad the authors names were conveyed to future times along with their actions. For although the present age may understand well enough the little hints we give, the parallels we draw, and the characters we describe ; yet all this will be lost to the next. However, if these papers, *reduced into a more durable form*, should happen to live till our grandchildren be men, I hope they may have curiosity enough to consult annals and compare dates, in order to find out, what names were then intrusted with the conduct of affairs, in the consequences whereof themselves will so deeply share ; like a heavy debt in a private family, which often lies an incumberance upon an estate for three generations.

But leaving the care of informing posterity to better pens, I shall, with due regard to truth, discretion, and the safety of my person from the men of *the new-fangled moderation*, continue to take all proper opportunities of letting the misled part of the people see, how grossly they have been abused, and in what particulars. I shall also endeavour to convince them, that the present course we are in is

the moſt probable means, with the bleſſing of God to extricate ourſelves out of all our difficulties.

Among thoſe who are pleaſed to write or talk againſt this paper, I have obſerved a ſtrange manner of reaſoning, which I ſhould be glad to hear them explain themſelves upon. They make no ceremony of exclaiming upon all occaſions againſt a change of miniſtry in ſo critical and dangerous a conjuncture. What ſhall we, who heartily approve and join in thoſe proceedings, ſay in defence of them? We own the juncture of affairs to be as they deſcribe; we are puſhed for an anſwer; and are forced at laſt freely to confeſs, that the corruption and abuſes in every branch of the adminiſtration, were ſo numerous and intolerable, that all things muſt have ended in ruin without ſome ſpeedy reformation. This I have already aſſerted in a former paper; and the replies I have read, or heard, have been in plain terms to affirm the direct contrary; and not only to defend and celebrate the late perſons and proceedings, but to threaten me with law and vengeance for caſting reflections on ſo many great and honourable men, whoſe "birth, virtue, "and abilities, whoſe morals and religion, whoſe "love of their country, and its conſtitution in "church and ſtate," were ſo univerſally allowed; and all this ſet off with odious compariſons, reflecting on the preſent choice: is not this in plain and direct terms to tell all the world, that the Queen hath, in a moſt dangerous criſis, turned out a whole ſet of the beſt miniſters that ever ſerved a prince, without any manner of reaſon, but her royal pleaſure, and brought in others of a character directly contrary? And how ſo vile an opinion as this can conſiſt with the leaſt pretence to loyalty or good manners, let the world determine.

I confeſs myſelf ſo little a refiner in politics, as not to be able to diſcover what other motive, beſides obedience to the Queen, a ſenſe of public danger,

ger, and a true love of their country, joined with invincible courage, could ſpirit up thoſe great men who have now, under her Majeſty's authority undertaken the direction of affairs. What can they expect, but the utmoſt efforts of malice, from a ſet of enraged domeſtic adverſaries, perpetually watching over their conduct, croſſing all their deſigns, and uſing every art to foment diviſions among them, in order to join with the weakeſt, upon any rupture? The difficulties they muſt encounter are nine times more and greater than ever; and the proſpects of intereſt, after the *reapings* and *gleanings* of ſo many years, nine times leſs. Every misfortune at home or abroad, although the neceſſary conſequence of former counſels, will be imputed to them; and all the good ſucceſs given to the merit of former ſchemes. A ſharper hath held your cards all the evening, played booty, and loſt your money; and, when things are almoſt deſperate, you employ an honeſt gentleman to retrieve your loſſes.

I would aſk, whether the Queen's ſpeech doth not contain her intentions in every particular relating to the public, that a good ſubject, a Briton, and a Proteſtant can poſſibly have at heart? "To carry "on the war in all its parts, particularly in Spain, "with the utmoſt vigour, in order to procure a "ſafe and honourable peace for us and our allies; "to find ſome ways of paying the debts of the na"vy; to ſupport and encourage the church of "England; to preſerve the Britiſh conſtitution ac"cording to the union; to maintain the indul"gence by law allowed to ſcrupulous conſciences; "and to employ none but ſuch as are for the Pro"teſtant ſucceſſion in the houſe of Hanover." It is known enough, that ſpeeches on theſe occaſions are ever digeſted by the advice of thoſe who are in the chief confidence; and conſequently, that theſe are the ſentiments of her Majeſty's miniſters, as

well as her own; and we see the two houses have unanimously agreed with her in every article. When the least counterpaces are made to any of these resolutions, it will then be time enough for our malecontents to bawl out, "Popery, persecu- "tion, arbitrary power, and the pretender." In the mean while, it is a little hard to think, that this island can hold but six men of honesty and ability enough to serve their prince and country; or that our safety should depend upon their credit, any more than it would upon the breath in their nostrils. Why should not a *revolution* in the ministry be sometimes necessary, as well as a *revolution* in the crown? It is to be presumed, the former is at least as lawful in itself, and perhaps the experiment not quite so dangerous. The *revolution* of the *sun* about the *earth* was formerly thought a necessary expedient to solve appearances, although it left many difficulties unanswered; until philosophers contrived a better, which is that of the *earth's revolution* about the *sun*. This is found upon experience to save much time and labour, to correct many irregular motions, and is better suited to the respect due from a *planet* to a *fixed star*.

No 19. Thursday December 14, 1710.

Sunt quibus in satira videar nimis acer, et ultra Legem tendere opus; sine nervis altera quicquid Composui pars esse putat———

WHEN the printer came last week for his copy, he brought along with him a bundle of those papers, which, in the phrase of *Whig coffeehouses*, have *swinged off the Examiner*; most of which I had

had never ſeen or heard of before. I remember ſome time ago in one of the *Tatlers* to have read a letter, wherein ſeveral reaſons are aſſigned for the preſent corruption and degeneracy of our taſte; but I think the writer hath omitted the principal one, which I take to be the prejudice of parties. Neither can I excuſe either ſide of this infirmity: I have heard the arrantest drivellers *pro* and *con* commended for their ſhrewdneſs, even by men of tolerable judgment; and the beſt performances exploded as nonſenſe and ſtupidity. This indeed may partly be imputed to policy and prudence; but it is chiefly owing to that blindneſs, which prejudice and paſſions caſt over the underſtanding: I mention this becauſe I think it properly within my province in quality of *Examiner*. And having granted more than is uſual for an enemy to do, I muſt now take leave to ſay, that ſo weak a *cauſe*, and ſo ruined a *faction*, were never provided with pens more reſembling their condition, or leſs ſuited to their occaſions.

Non tali auxilio, nec defenſoribus iſtis,
Tempus eget———

This is the more to be wondered at, when we conſider, they have the full liberty of the preſs; that they have no other way left to recover themſelves; and that they want not men of excellent parts to ſet their arguments in the beſt light they will bear. Now, if two men would argue on both ſides with fairneſs, good ſenſe, and good manners, it would be no ill entertainment to the town, and perhaps be the moſt effectual means to reconcile us. But I am apt to think, that men of great genius are hardly brought to proſtitute their pens in a very odious *cauſe*; which beſides is more properly undertaken by noiſe and impudence, by groſs railing and ſcurrility, by calumny and lying, and by little trifling

trifling cavils and carpings in the wrong place, which thoſe *whifflers* uſe for arguments and anſwers.

I was well enough pleaſed with a ſtory of one of theſe anſwerers, who in a paper laſt week found many faults with a late calculation of mine. Being, it ſeems, more deeply learned than his fellows, he was reſolved to begin his anſwer with a Latin verſe, as well as other folks. His buſineſs was to look out for ſomething againſt an *Examiner*, that would pretend to *tax* accounts; and turning over Virgil he had the luck to find theſe words,

——*fugiant examina taxos*:

So down they went, and out they would have come, if one of his unlucky *prompters* had not hindered it.

I here declare, once for all, that if theſe people will not be quiet, I ſhall take the bread out of their mouths, and anſwer the *Examiner* myſelf; which I proteſt I have never yet done, although I have been often charged with it; neither have thoſe anſwers been written or publiſhed with my privity, as malicious people are pleaſed to give out; nor do I believe the common *Whiggiſh* report, that the authors are hired by the miniſtry to give my paper a value.

But the friends of this paper have given me more uneaſineſs with their impatience, than its enemies by their anſwers. I heard myſelf cenſured laſt week by ſome of the former for promiſing to diſcover the corruptions of the late adminiſtration, but never performing any thing. The latter, on the other ſide, are thundering out their *anathemas* againſt me for diſcovering ſo many. I am at a loſs how to decide between theſe contraries, and ſhall therefore proceed after my own way, as I have hitherto done; my deſign being of more importance, than that of writing only to gratify the ſpleen of one ſide, or provoke

provoke that of the other, although it may occasionally have both effects.

I shall therefore go on to relate some facts, that, in my humble opinion, were no hinderance to the change of the ministry.

The first I shall mention, was that of introducing certain new phrases into the court-style, which had been very seldom or never made use of in former times. They usually run in the following terms. "Madam, I cannot serve you while such "a one is in employment. I desire, humbly, to "resign my commission, if Mr. —— continues "secretary of state. I cannot answer that the city "will lend money, unless my L—d —— be Presi-"dent of the council. I must beg leave to sur-"render, except —— has the staff. I must not "accept the seals, unless —— comes into the other "office." This hath been the language of late years from subjects to their prince. Thus they stood upon terms, and must have their own conditions to ruin the nation. Nay, this dutiful manner of capitulating had spread so far, that every understrapper began at length to perk up and assume; he "expected a regiment; *or* his son must be a "major; *or* his brother a collector;" else he threatened to "vote according to his conscience."

Another of their glorious attempts was the clause intended in the bill "for the encouragement of "learning," by taking off the obligation upon fellows of colleges in both universities to enter upon holy orders: the design of which, as I have heard the undertakers often confess, was to remove the care of educating youth out of the hands of the clergy, who are apt to infuse into their pupils too great a regard for the church and the monarchy. But there was a farther secret in this clause, which may best be discovered by the first projectors, or at least the *garblers* of it: and these are known to be Col-

lins

lins and Tindal, in conjunction with a moſt *pious lawyer*, their diſciple.

What ſhall we ſay to their prodigious ſkill in *arithmetic*, diſcovered ſo conſtantly in their deciſion of elections; where they were able to make out by the *rule of falſe*, that *three* were more than *three and twenty*, and *fifteen* than *fifty?* Nay, it was a maxim, which I never heard any of them diſpute, That in determining elections they were not to conſider where the right lay, but which of the *candidates* was likelier to be true to the *cauſe*. This they uſed to illuſtrate by a very apt and decent ſimilitude of gaming with a ſharper; if you cannot cheat as well as he you are certainly undone.

Another caſt of their politics was that of endeavouring to impeach an innocent lady *, for no reaſon imaginable, but her faithful and diligent ſervice to the Queen, and the favour her Majeſty bore to her upon that account, when others had acted contrary in ſo ſhameful a manner. What elſe was her crime? Had ſhe "treated her royal miſtreſs with "inſolence or neglect? Had ſhe enriched herſelf "by a long practice of bribery, and obtaining ex"orbitant grants? Had ſhe ingroſſed her Majeſty's "favours, without admitting any acceſs but through "her means? Had ſhe heaped employments upon "herſelf, her family, and dependents? Had ſhe "an imperious haughty behavour?" Or, after all, was it a perfect blunder, and miſtake of "one per"ſon for another?" I have heard of a man, who lay all night on a rough pavement, and in the morning wondering what it could poſſibly be that made him reſt ſo ill, happening to ſee a feather under him, imputed the uneaſineſs of his lodging to that. I remember likewiſe the ſtory of a giant in Rabelais, who uſed to feed upon *wind-mills*; but was unfor-

* The Lady Maſham.

tunately

tunately choaked with a ſmall lump of *freſh butter* before a warm oven.

And here I cannot but obſerve, how very refined ſome people are in their generoſity and gratitude. There is a certain great perſon (I ſhall not ſay of what ſex) who for many years paſt was the conſtant mark and butt, againſt which our preſent malecontents uſed to diſcharge their reſentment; upon whom they beſtowed all the terms of ſcurrility that malice, envy, and indignation could invent; whom they publicly accuſed of every vice that can poſſeſs a human heart; pride, covetouſneſs, ingratitude, oppreſſion, treachery, diſſimulation, violence, and fury, all in the higheſt extremes: but of late they have changed their language on a ſudden; that perſon is now the moſt faithful and juſt that ever ſerved a prince; that perſon, originally differing from them in principles as far as eaſt from weſt, but united in practice, and falling together, they are now reconciled, and find twenty reſemblances between each other, which they could never diſcover before. *Tanti eſt, ut placeam tibi perire!*

But to return: How could it be longer ſuffered in a free nation, that all avenues to preferment ſhould be ſhut up, except a very few; when one or two ſtood conſtant *centry*, who docked all favours they handed down, or ſpread a huge inviſible net between the prince and ſubject, through which nothing of value could paſs? And here I cannot but admire at one conſequence from this management, which is of an extraordinary nature. Generally ſpeaking, princes, who have ill miniſters, are apt to ſuffer in their reputation, as well as in the love of the people: but it was not ſo with the Queen. When the ſun is over-caſt by thoſe clouds he exhales from the earth, we ſtill acknowledge his light and influence, and at laſt find he can diſpel, and drive them down to the horizon. The wiſeſt prince by the neceſſity of affairs, the miſrepreſentations

tations of designing men, or the innocent mistakes even of a good predecessor, may find himself encompassed by a crew of courtiers, whom time, opportunity, and success, have miserably corrupted: and if he can save himself and his people from ruin under the *worst* administration, what may not his subjects hope for, when with their universal applause he changeth hands, and maketh use of the *best?*

Another great objection with me against the late party, was the cruel tyranny they put upon *conscience* by a *barbarous inquisition*, refusing to admit the least *toleration* or *indulgence*. They imposed an hundred *tests*; but could never be prevailed on to *dispense* with, or *take off* the smallest, or even to admit of *occasional conformity*; but went on daily (as their apostle Tindal expresseth it) "narrowing "their terms of communion," pronouncing nine parts in ten of the kingdom *heretics*, and shutting them out of the pale of their church. These very men, who talk so much of a *comprehension in religion* among us, how came they to allow so little of it in *politics*, which is *their sole religion?* You shall hear them pretending to bewail the animosities kept up between the church of England and dissenters, where the differences in opinion are so few and inconsiderable; yet these very sons of *moderation* were pleased to *excommunicate* every man who disagreed with them in the smallest *article* of their *political creed*, or who refused to receive any new *article*, how difficult soever to digest, which the leaders imposed at pleasure to serve their own interest.

I will quit this subject for the present, when I have told one story. "There was a great king in "Scythia, whose dominions were bounded on the "north by the poor mountainous territories of a "petty lord, who paid homage as the king's vassal. "The Scythian prime minister, being largely *bribed*, "indirectly obtained his master's consent to suffer

"this

" this lord to build forts, and provide himſelf with " arms, under pretence of preventing the inroads " of the Tartars. This little depending ſovereign, " finding he was now in a condition to be trouble- " ſome, began to inſiſt upon terms, and threaten- " ed upon every occaſion to unite with the Tartars: " upon which the prime miniſter, who began to be " in pain about his *head*, propoſed a *match* betwixt " his maſter, and the only daughter of this tribu- " tary lord, which he had the good luck to bring " to paſs; and from that time valued himſelf as " author of a moſt glorious *union*, which indeed " was grown of abſolute neceſſity by his corrup- " tion." This paſſage, cited literally from an old hiſtory of Sarmatia, I thought fit to ſet down on purpoſe to perplex little ſmattering remarkers, and put them upon the hunt for an application.

No. 20. Thurſday, December 21. 1710.

——pugnacem ſcirent ſapiente minorem.

I AM very much at a loſs how to proceed upon the ſubject intended in this paper, which a new incident hath led me to engage in. The ſubject I mean, is that of *ſoldiers* and the *army*; but being a matter wholly out of my trade, I ſhall handle it in as cautious a manner as I am able.

It is certain, that the art of war hath ſuffered great changes almoſt in every age and country of the world; however, there are ſome maxims relating to it, that will be eternal truths, and which every reaſonable man muſt allow.

In the early times of Greece and Rome, the armies of thoſe ſtates were compoſed of their

citizens, who took no pay, becauſe the quarrel was their own; and therefore the war was uſually decided in one campaign; or, if it laſted longer, yet in winter the ſoldiers returned to their ſeveral callings, and were not diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of the people. The Gothic governments in Europe, although they were of military inſtitution, yet obſerved almoſt the ſame method. I ſhall inſtance only here in England: Thoſe who held lands *in capite* of the King, were obliged to attend him in his wars with a certain number of men, who all held lands from them at eaſy rents on that condition. Theſe fought without pay; and, when the ſervice was over, returned again to their farms. It is recorded of William Rufus, that being abſent in Normandy, and engaged in a war with his brother, he ordered twenty thouſand men to be raiſed, and ſent over from hence to ſupply his army; but having ſtruck up a peace before they were embarked, he gave them leave to diſband, upon condition they would pay him ten ſhillings a man, which amounted to a mighty ſum in thoſe days.

Conſider a kingdom as a great family, whereof the prince is the father, and it will appear plainly, that mercenary troops are only *ſervants armed*, either to awe the *children* at home, or elſe to defend from invaders the family, who are otherwiſe employed, and chuſe to contribute out of their ſtock for paying their defenders, rather than leave their affairs to be neglected in their abſence. The art of making ſoldiery a trade, and keeping armies in pay, ſeems in Europe to have had two originals: the firſt was *uſurpation*; when popular men deſtroyed the liberties of their country, and ſeized the power into their own hands, which they were forced to maintain by hiring guards to bridle the people. Such were anciently the *tyrants* in moſt of the ſmall ſtates of Greece; and ſuch were thoſe in ſeveral

parts

parts of Italy about three or four centuries ago, as Machiavel informs us. The other original of mercenary armies seems to have risen from larger kingdoms, or commonwealths, which had subdued provinces at a distance, and were forced to maintain troops upon them to prevent insurrections from the natives. Of this sort were Macedon, Carthage, and Rome of old; Venice and Holland at this day, as well as most kingdoms of Europe. So that mercenary forces in a free state, whether *monarchy* or *commonwealth*, seem only necessary either for preserving their conquests, (which in such governments it is not prudent to extend too far), or else for maintaing war at a distance.

In this last, which at present is our most important case, there are certain maxims, that all wise governments have observed.

The first I shall mention is, That no *private* man should have a commission to be *general for life*, let his merit and services be ever so great. Or, if a prince be unadvisedly brought to offer such a commission in one hand, let him (to save time and blood) deliver up his *crown* with the other. The Romans, in the height and perfection of their government, usually sent out one of the new *consuls* to be general against their most formidable enemy, and recalled the old one; who often returned before the next election, and, according as he had merit, was sent to command in some other part; which perhaps was continued to him for a second, and sometimes a third year. But if Paulus Æmilius, or Scipio himself, had presumed to move the *senate* to continue their *commissions for life*, they would certainly have fallen a sacrifice to the jealousy of the people. Cæsar indeed (between whom and a certain general, some of late, with much discretion, have made a *parallel)* had his command in Gaul continued to him for five years; and was afterwards made perpetual dictator, that is to say,

general for life; which gave him the power and the will of utterly deſtroying the Roman liberty. But in his time the Romans were very much degenerated, and great corruptions had crept into their morals and diſcipline. However, we ſee there ſtill were ſome remains of a noble ſpirit among them; for when Cæſar ſent to be choſen conſul, notwithſtanding his abſence, they decreed he ſhould come in perſon, give up his command, and *petere more majorum*.

It is not impoſſible, but a general may deſire ſuch a commiſſion out of *inadvertency*, at the *inſtigation of his friends*, or perhaps of his *enemies*; or merely for the *benefit and honour of it*, without intending any ſuch *dreadful conſequences*; and in that caſe a wiſe prince or ſtate may barely refuſe it without ſhewing any marks of their diſpleaſure. But the requeſt in its own nature is highly criminal, and ought to be entered ſo upon record, to terrify *others* in time to come from venturing to make it.

Another maxim to be obſerved by a free ſtate engaged in war, is, to keep the military power in abſolute ſubjection to the civil, nor ever ſuffer the former to influence or interfere with the latter. A general and his army are *ſervants*, *hired* by the civil power to act, as they are directed from thence, and with a commiſſion large or limited, as the adminiſtration ſhall think fit; for which they are largely paid in profit and honour. The whole ſyſtem by which armies are governed, is quite *alien* from the peaceful inſtitutions of ſtates at home; and if the rewards be ſo inviting as to tempt a ſenator to take a poſt in the army, whilſt he is there on his duty, he ought to conſider himſelf in no other capacity. I know not any ſort of men ſo apt as ſoldiers are to reprimand thoſe who preſume to interfere in what relates to their trade. When they hear any of us, in a coffeehouſe, wondering that ſuch a victory was not purſued; complaining that

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ſuch a town coſt more men and money than it was worth to take it; or that ſuch an opportunity was loſt of fighting the enemy; they preſently reprove us, and often with juſtice enough, for meddling in matters out of our ſphere; and clearly convince us of our miſtakes by terms of art that none of us underſtand. Nor do we eſcape ſo; for they reflect with the utmoſt contempt on our ignorance; that we, who ſit at home in eaſe and ſecurity, never ſtirring from our fire-ſides, ſhould pretend, from books and general reaſon, to argue upon military affairs; which after all, if we may judge from the ſhare of intellectuals in ſome who are ſaid to excel that way, is not ſo very profound, or difficult a ſcience. But if there be any weight in what they offer, as perhaps there may be a great deal, ſurely theſe gentlemen have a much weaker pretence to concern themſelves in matters of the cabinet, which are always either far above, or much beſide their capacities. Soldiers may as well pretend to preſcribe rules for trade, to determine points in philoſophy, to be moderators in an aſſembly of divines, or direct in a court of juſtice, as to miſplace their talent in examining affairs of ſtate, eſpecially in what relates to the *choice of miniſters*, who are never ſo likely to be ill choſen as when approved by them. It would be endleſs to ſhew, how pernicious all ſteps of this nature have been in many parts and ages of the world. I ſhall only produce two at preſent; one in Rome, the other in England. The firſt is of Cæſar: when he came to the city with his ſoldiers to *ſettle the miniſtry*, there was an end of their liberty for ever. The ſecond was in the great rebellion againſt K. Charles I. The King and both houſes were agreed upon the terms of a peace; but the officers of the army, as Ludlow relates it, ſet a guard upon the houſe of Commons, took a liſt of the members, and kept all by force out of the houſe, except thoſe who were for bring-

ing the King to a trial. Some years after, when they erected a military government, and ruled the iſland by major-generals, we received moſt admirable inſtances of their ſkill in politics. To ſay the truth, ſuch formidable ſticklers can have but two reaſons for deſiring to interfere in the adminiſtration; the firſt is that of Cæſar and Cromwell, of which God forbid I ſhould accuſe or ſuſpect any body, ſince the ſecond is pernicious enough, and that is, *to preſerve thoſe in power who are for perpetuating a war, rather than ſee others advanced, who, they are ſure, will uſe all proper means to promote a ſafe and honourable peace.*

Thirdly, Since it is obſerved of armies, that in the preſent age they are brought to ſome degree of humanity, and a more regular demeanor to each other and to the world, than in former times, it is certainly a good maxim to endeavour preſerving this temper among them; without which they would ſoon degenerate into *ſavages*. To this end, it would be prudent, among other things, to forbid that deteſtable cuſtom of *drinking to the damnation or confuſion* of any perſon whatſoever.

Such deſperate acts, and the opinions infuſed along with them into heads already inflamed by youth and wine, are enough to ſcatter madneſs and ſedition through a whole camp. So ſeldom upon *their knees to pray*, and ſo often to *curſe!* this is not properly atheiſm, but a ſort of *anti-religion* preſcribed by the devil, and which an atheiſt of common ſenſe would ſcorn as an abſurdity. I have heard it mentioned as a common practice laſt autumn, *ſome where or other*, to *drink damnation and confuſion* (and this with circumſtances very aggravating and horrid) to the *new miniſtry*, and to thoſe who had any hand in turning out the *old*; that is to ſay, to thoſe perſons whom her Majeſty has thought fit to employ in her greateſt affairs, with ſomething *more than a glance againſt the Queen herſelf.*

herſelf. And if it be true, that theſe *orgies* were attended with certain *doubtful words* of *ſtanding by their general,* who without queſtion abhorred them, let any man conſider the conſequence of ſuch diſpoſitions, if they ſhould happen to ſpread. I could only wiſh, for the honour of the army, as well as of the Queen and miniſtry, that a remedy had been applied to the diſeaſe in the *place* and *time* where it grew. If men of ſuch principles were able to propagate them in a camp, and were ſure of a *general for life,* who had any tincture of ambition, we might ſoon bid farewell to miniſters and parliaments, whether new or old.

I am only ſorry, ſuch an accident hath happened towards the cloſe of a war; when it is chiefly the intereſt of thoſe gentlemen, who have poſts in the army, to behave themſelves in ſuch a manner, as might encourage the legiſlature to make ſome proviſion for them, when there will be no further need of their ſervice. They are to conſider themſelves as perſons, by their education unqualified for many other ſtations of life. Their fortunes will not ſuffer them to retain to a party after its *fall,* nor have they weight or abilities to help towards its *reſurrection.* Their future dependence is wholly upon the prince and parliament, to which they will never make their way by *ſolemn execrations of the miniſtry*; a miniſtry of the Queen's own election, and fully anſwering the wiſhes of her people. This unhappy ſtep in ſome of *their brethren* may paſs for an uncontrollable argument, that politics are not their buſineſs or their element. The fortune of war hath raiſed ſeveral perſons up to ſwelling titles, and great commands over numbers of men, which they are too apt to transfer along with them into civil life, and appear in all companies, as if they were at the head of their regiments, with a ſort of deportment, that ought to have been dropt behind in that ſhort paſſage to Harwich. It puts

puts me in mind of a dialogue in Lucian, where Charon wafting one of their predeceſſors over Styx, ordered him to ſtrip off his armour and fine cloaths, yet ſtill thought him too heavy; " but," *ſaid he*, " put off likewiſe that pride and preſump- " tion, thoſe high ſwelling words, and that vain " glory;" becauſe they were of no uſe on the other ſide the water. Thus, if all that array of military grandeur were confined to the proper ſcene, it would be much more for the intereſt of the owners, and leſs offenſive to their fellow-ſubjects.

No 21. Thurſday, December 28, 1710.

Nam et majorum inſtituta tueri, ſacris ceremoniiſque retinendis, ſapientis eſt.

—— *Ruituraque ſemper*
Stat (mirum!) moles ——

WHoever is a true lover of our conſtitution, muſt needs be pleaſed to ſee what ſucceſsful endeavours are daily made to reſtore it in every branch to its ancient form, from the languiſhing condition it hath long lain in, and with ſuch deadly ſymptoms.

I have already handled ſome abuſes during the *late management*, and ſhall in convenient time go on with the reſt. Hitherto I have confined myſelf to thoſe of the ſtate; but, with the good leave of ſome who think it a matter of ſmall moment, I ſhall now take liberty to ſay ſomething of the *church*.

For ſeveral years paſt there hath not, I think, in Europe been any ſociety of men upon ſo unhap-

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py a foot as the *clergy* of England; nor more hardly treated by thoſe very perſons, from whom they deſerved much better quarter, and in whoſe power they chiefly had put it to uſe them ſo ill. I would not willingly miſrepreſent facts, but I think it generally allowed by enemies and friends, that the bold and brave defences made before the *revolution* againſt thoſe many invaſions of our rights proceeded principally from the clergy; who are likewiſe known to have rejected all advances made them to cloſe with the meaſures at that time concerting; while the *diſſenters*, to gratify their ambition and revenge, fell into the baſeſt compliances with the court, approved of all proceedings by their numerous and fulſome addreſſes, and took employments and commiſſions by virtue of the diſpenſing power, againſt the direct laws of the land. All this is ſo true, that if ever the pretender comes in, they will, next to thoſe of his own religion, have the faireſt claim and pretenſions to his favour from their merit and eminent ſervices to his ſuppoſed father, who, without ſuch encouragement, would probably never have been miſled to go the lengths he did. It ſhould likewiſe be remembered to the everlaſting honour of the London divines, that in thoſe dangerous times they writ and publiſhed the beſt collection of arguments againſt *Popery*, that ever appeared in the world. At the revolution the body of the *clergy* joined heartily in the common cauſe, (except a few, whoſe ſufferings perhaps have atoned for their miſtakes), like men who are content to go about for avoiding a gulf or a precipice, but come into the old ſtrait road again, as ſoon as they can. But another temper had now begun to prevail: for, as in the reign of K. Charles I. ſeveral well-meaning people were ready to join in reforming ſome abuſes, while others, who had deeper deſigns, were ſtill calling out for a *thorough reformation*, which ended at laſt in the ruin of the kingdom;

kingdom; ſo, after the late King's coming to the throne, there was a reſtleſs cry from men of *the ſame principles* for a *thorough revolution*; which, as ſome were carrying it on, muſt have ended in the deſtruction of the monarchy and church.

What a violent humour hath run ever ſince againſt the clergy, and from what corner ſpread and fomented, is, I believe, manifeſt to all men. It looked like a ſet quarrel againſt *Chriſtianity*; and, if we call to mind ſeveral of the *leaders*, it muſt, in a great meaſure, have been actually ſo. Nothing was more common in writing and converſation, than to hear that reverend body charged in groſs with what was utterly inconſiſtent; deſpiſed for their poverty, hated for their riches; reproached with avarice, and taxed with luxury; accuſed for promoting arbitrary power, and for reſiſting the prerogative; cenſured for their pride, and ſcorned for their meanneſs of ſpirit. The repreſentatives of the lower clergy were railed at for diſputing the power of the biſhops by the known abhorrers of Epiſcopacy; and abuſed for doing nothing in the convocations by thoſe very men who helped to bind up their hands. The vice, the folly, the ignorance of every ſingle man were laid upon the character: their juriſdiction, cenſures, and diſcipline, trampled under foot; yet mighty complaints againſt their exceſſive power: the men of wit employed to turn the prieſthood itſelf into ridicule: in ſhort, groaning every where under the weight of poverty, oppreſſion, contempt, and obloquy. A fair return for the time and money ſpent in their education to fit them for the ſervice of the altar; and a fair encouragement for worthy men to come into the church! However, it may be ſome comfort for perſons of that holy function, that their divine founder, as well as his *harbinger*, met with the like reception: *John came neither eating nor drinking, and they ſay he hath a devil; the Son of man came eating*

eating and drinking, and they say, Behold a glutton and a wine-bibber, &c.

In this deplorable state of the clergy, nothing but the hand of Providence, working by its glorious instrument the Queen, could have been able to turn the people's hearts so surprisingly in their favour, This princess, destined for the safety of Europe, and a blessing to her subjects, began her reign with a noble benefaction to the church; and it was hoped the nation would have followed such an example; which nothing could have prevented, but the false politics of a set of men, who form their maxims upon those of every tottering commonwealth, which is always struggling for life, subsisting by expedients, and often at the mercy of any powerful neighbour. These men take it into their imagination, that trade can never flourish, unless the country becomes a common receptacle for all nations, religions, and languages; a system only proper for small popular states, but altogether unworthy and below the dignity of an imperial crown; which with us is best upheld by a monarchy in possession of its just prerogative, a senate of nobles and of commons, and a clergy established in its due rights with a suitable maintenance by law. But these men come with the spirit of *shopkeepers* to frame rules for the administration of kingdoms; or, as if they thought the whole art of government consisted in the importation of *nutmegs*, and the curing of *herrings*. Such an island as ours can afford enough to support the majesty of a crown, the honour of a nobility, and the dignity of a magistracy: we can encourage arts and sciences, maintain our bishops and clergy, and suffer our gentry to live in a decent, hospitable manner; yet still there will remain hands sufficient for trade and manufactures, which do always indeed deserve the best encouragement, but not to a degree of

sending every living soul into the *warehouse* or the *workshop*.

This pedantry of republican politics has done infinite mischief among us. To this we owe those noble schemes of treating Christianity as a system of *speculative opinions* which no man should be bound to believe; of making the *being*, and the worship of God, a *creature* of the state; in consequence of these, that the teachers of religion ought to hold their maintenance at pleasure, or live by the alms and charitable collection of the people, and be equally encouraged of all opinions; that they should be *prescribed* what to teach by those who are to learn from them; and upon default have a *staff* and a *pair of shoes* left at their door: with many other projects of equal piety, wisdom, and good nature.

But, God be thanked, they and their schemes are vanished, and their *places shall know them no more*. When I think of that inundation of atheism, infidelity, profaneness, and licentiousness, which was like to overwhelm us, from what mouths and hearts it first proceeded, and how the people joined with the Queen's endeavours to divert this flood, I cannot but reflect on that remarkable passage in the Revelation, "where the serpent with "seven heads cast out of his mouth water after "the woman like a flood, that he might cause her "to be carried away of the flood: but the Earth "helped the Woman, and the earth opened her "mouth, and swallowed up the flood, which the "dragon had cast out of his mouth." For the Queen having changed her ministry suitable to her own wisdom, and the wishes of her subjects, and having called a free parliament, and at the same time summoned the convocation by her royal writ, *as in all times had been accustomed*; and soon after their meeting sent a most gracious letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury to be communicated to the

the biſhops and clergy of his province; taking notice of " the looſe and profane principles, which " had been openly ſcattered and propagated among " her ſubjects: that the conſultations of the clergy " were particularly requiſite to repreſs and prevent " ſuch daring attempts, for which her ſubjects, " from all parts of the kingdom, have ſhewn their " juſt abhorrence: *ſhe* hopes the endeavours of " the clergy in this reſpect will not be unſucceſs- " ful; and for her part, is ready to give them all " fit encouragement to proceed in the diſpatch of " ſuch buſineſs as properly belongs to them; and " to grant them powers requiſite to carry on ſo " good a work;" in concluſion, " earneſtly re- " commending to them to avoid diſputes; and de- " termining to do all that in her lies to compoſe " and extinguiſh them."

It is to be hoped, that this laſt part of her Majeſty's letter will be the firſt ſhe will pleaſe to execute; for, it ſeems, this very letter created the firſt diſpute; the fact whereof is thus related. The upper houſe having formed an addreſs to the Queen, before they received her Majeſty's letter, ſent both addreſs and letter together to the lower houſe, with a meſſage excuſing their not mentioning the letter in the addreſs, becauſe *this* was formed before the *other* was received. The lower houſe returned them with a deſire, that an addreſs might be formed with due regard and acknowledgements for the letter. After ſome difficulties, the ſame addreſs was ſent down again with a clauſe inſerted, making ſome ſhort mention of the ſaid letter. This the lower houſe did not think ſufficient, and ſent it back again with the ſame requeſt: whereupon the Archbiſhop, after a ſhort conſultation with *ſome* of his brethren, immediately adjourned the convocation for a month; and no addreſs at all was ſent to the Queen.

I underſtand not eccleſiaſtical affairs well enough to

to comment upon this matter; but it seems to me, that all methods of doing service to the church and kingdom, by means of a *convocation*, may be at any time eluded, if there be no remedy againſt ſuch an incident. And, if this proceeding be agreeable to the inſtitution, *ſpiritual aſſemblies* muſt needs be ſtrangely contrived, very different from any *lay ſenate* yet known in the world. Surely, from the nature of ſuch a *ſynod*, it muſt be a very unhappy circumſtance, when the majority of the biſhops draws one way, and that of the lower clergy another. The latter, I think, are not at this time ſuſpected for any principles bordering upon thoſe profeſſed by enemies to Epiſcopacy; and if they happen to differ from the greater part of the *preſent ſet* of biſhops, I doubt it will call *ſome things* to mind, that may turn the ſcale of general favour on the inferior clergy's ſide; who, with a profound duty to her Majeſty, are perfectly pleaſed with the *preſent turn of affairs*. Beſides, *curious people* will be apt to inquire into the *dates of ſome promotions*, to call to mind what deſigns were then upon the anvil; and from thence make *malicious deductions*. Perhaps they will obſerve the manner of voting on the biſhops bench, and compare it with what ſhall paſs in the upper houſe of convocation. There is however one comfort; that under the preſent diſpoſitions of the kingdom a diſlike to the proceedings of any of their Lordſhips, even to the number of a *majority*, will be purely *perſonal*, and not turned to the diſadvantage of the *order*. And for my part, as I am a true lover of the church, I had rather find the inclinations of the people favourable to *Epiſcopacy* in general, than ſee a majority of prelates cried up by thoſe who are *known enemies* to the character. Nor indeed hath any thing given me more offence for ſeveral years paſt than to obſerve, how *ſome* of that bench have been careſſed by *certain perſons*; and *others of* them openly celebrated by

by the infamous pens of atheiſts, republicans, and fanatics.

Time and *mortality* can only remedy theſe inconveniencies in the church, which are not to be cured, like thoſe in the ſtate, by a *change of miniſtry*. If we may gueſs the temper of a *convocation* from the choice of a *prolocutor*, as it is uſual to do that of a houſe of commons by the *ſpeaker*, we may expect great things from that reverend body, who have done themſelves much reputation by pitching upon a *gentleman* of ſo much piety, wit, and learning, for that office; and one who is ſo thoroughly verſed in thoſe parts of knowledge which are proper for it. I am ſorry, that the three Latin ſpeeches delivered upon preſenting the *prolocutor* were not made public; they might perhaps have given us ſome light into the diſpoſition of each houſe: and beſides, one of them is ſaid to be ſo peculiar in the ſtyle and matter, as might have made up in *entertainment* what it wanted in *inſtruction*.

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